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PART THREE: THE CASE OF CHILE 
The Chilean experience of agrarian transformation is 
particularly interesting from a theoretical point of view. 
Not only did the country, like-the rest of Latin America, 
experience during the colonial period the-formation of a 
specific form of land tenure which combined f edual-like 
relations with production for a world market, but also, unlike 
other social formations in the sub-continent, Chilean agrarian 
history exhibited three main characteristics of its own. 
First, until the 1960's, there was never in Chile°a peasant 
movement of a sufficient strength to influence the course of 
agrarian change. This means particularly that-it is largely 
impossible to explain the alteration of agrarian social 
relations in Chile by sole reference to the realm of agriculture 
itself. Second, perhaps the main feature of Chilean political 
and economic life in the twentieth century at least, has been 
the continuous inflationary rise in food prices which forces 
one to address explicitly the question of the relation between 
town and country in order to comprehend the transformation 
of agrarian relations. Third, during the relatively short 
period of the decade 1962 to 1973, the Chilean countryside 
experienced three radically [in intent at least) different 
agrarian reforms each of which corresponded to a different 
structure of the balance of class forces. The first reform 
was landlord dominated; the second amounted to a process of 
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capital-led development; while the 
initiate a transition to socialism 
suppressed by the military coup of 
reforms was therefore an expressioi 
and contradictions which prevailed 
of social transformation. 
third attempted to 
which was violently 
1973. - Each of these land 
i of the class alliances 
at each stage of the process 
The text which follows elaborates the theoretical 
discussions initiated in earlier chapters. Chapter 9 is 
concerned with an analysis of different periods of Chilean 
history; it discusses first the colonial period with reference 
to Spanish America as a whole and then moves to an assessment 
of various aspects of Chilean agrarian history from 1850 to 
1960. Chapter 10 continues the discussion into the 1960's 
and assesses briefly the three land reforms enumerated above. 
Before initiating the discussion proper, however, it is 
important to draw attention to an important question. All the 
'factual information' utilised in the following chapters is 
of a 'secondary nature' in the sense that it has already been 
produced by specific theoretical perspectives. Dominant among 
such perspectives was the developmentalist view assessed 
in Chapter 2. In particular this perspective formed the 
theoretical framework for the statistical investigations of 
land tenure on which land reform policies, the agrarian 
strategies of various political organisations, and the 'purely 
academic' investigations were largely based. The pervasive 
influence of developmentalism and the categories it produced 
is particularly problematic, given that one of my concerns in 
what follows is to reinterpret the existing information in the 
light of the theoretical perspective which I have developed 
in Part Two. What this means is that the available material 
cannot be simply adopted in extenso and without qualification. 
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Often this means that it cannot simply be adapted to my 
theoretical requirements either. Unfortunately this means 
that often only qualified statements can be made where it 
would otherwise have been possible to be rather more definite. 
Nevertheless,, despite these facts, it is indeed possible to 
provide an alternative interpretation of the existing material, 
which is what I attempt. The foregoing comments should be taken 
simply as indications of the unsatisfactory nature of the 
available evidence and not as statements to its absolute 
inappropriateness. 
op 
CHAPTER NINE CAPITALISM ANO CHILEAN AGRICULTURE 
.. all development of merchant's capital tends to 
give production more and more the character of 
production for exchange-value and to turn products 
more and more into commodities. Yet its development 
... is 
incapable by itself of promoting and explaining 
the transition from one mode of production to another. " 
[Marx, 1865a/1974: 327) 
"Landlord economy evolves in a capitalist way and 
gradually replaces the labour rent system by 'free 
wage-labour', the three-field system by intensive 
cultivation,, and the obsolete peasant. implements by 
the improved machinery employed on the big private 
farms. Peasant farming also evolves in a capitalist, 
way and gives rise to a rural bourgeoisie and a rural 
proletariat. " 
(Lenin, 1907k/1972: 2411 
In this chapter I shall not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
economic history of Chile from the Spanish Conquest and its 
consolidation in the sixteenth century up to the 1960'sß the 
period with which this study is concerned. Rather three 
selected periods will be examined with the view of explaining, 
in a historical sense, the reasons for the continued dominant 
power of landed property throughout this period. I shall attempt 
to show in particular that the characteristics of Chilean 
agricultural development did not constitute an automatic 
response to the so-called 'demands' or 'needs' of international 
capitalism, as is argued in particular by neo-mercantilist 
studies. What I shall attempt to argue is that the form of 
capitalist development experienced by Chilean agriculture 
can only be properly understood with reference to various class 
struggles and conflicts, the outcome of which needs to be 
explained. The dominance of a class of landlords in Chilean 
society has to be accounted for in ways other than by simple 
reference to the position of Chile on the periphery of the 
world economy. This is not to argue, of course, that the 
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various forms of imperialist penetration experienced by -- 
Chile 
- 
Chile [and Latin America] did not have effects. Rather, -it is 
to suggest that such effects are mediated by, in addition to 
imposing limits on, ý, the forms of struggle which actually-took 
place. ,, r,. 
Three periods are to be considered. The first covers 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and-is concerned with 
pre-independence Spanish America. An examination of, this 
period will enable me to outline the patterns. of'settlement in 
the sub-continent, with particular reference to the debates° 
surrounding the effects of the penetration of merchant's. 
capital and the evolution of theýencomienda and the hacienda. 
These institutions are of particular importance for an 
understanding of the characteristics of the Latin American 
system of land tenure. The latter, 'in particular, cameFto 
constitute the-dominant form of agricultural enterprise in 
central Chile and was only dismantled in the 1960's., It-will 
be argued in particular that the development of the social 
relations characterised by these institutions can only be 
properly comprehended in terms of a series of struggles which 
operated within a specific socio-material-, environment. 
The other two periods are concerned specifically with 
Chilean history. The second extends from 1850 to 1930 - from 
the incorporation of the Chilean economy into the World Free 
Trade system dominated by Britain up to the Great Depression. 
It was characterised by the domination of an alliance of 
British imperialism and a semi-feudal class of landlords, and 
the lack of an independent peasant economy. Chilean agriculture 
during this period was characterised by a combination of 
semi-Feudal relations and capitalist relations where labour 
was only formally subordinated to capital. The dominance of 
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landed property is explained largely in terms of its alliance 
with imperialism, while resistance to its control is shown to 
emanate from outside the sphere of agriculture itself. The 
years 1930 to 1960 will then be considered. They saw the 
increasing power of working-class organisation, the attack on 
imperialism by a national industrial bourgeoisie through a 
process of import substitution, and the development within 
agriculture of both the formal and real subordination of labour 
to capital under the aegis of landed property. Finally the 
chapter will end with a discussion of some theoretical problems 
in the analysis of Chilean agriculture and the peasantry. It 
is argued throughout that the transformation of°social relations 
in the countryside in Chile cannot be understood by an analysis 
of struggles within agriculture itself, but can only bei 
adequately explained through an analysis of the struggles in 
the wider social formation, thus showing the inadequacy of the 
dualistic conception of self-contained rural and urban spheres 
of production. 
9.1 The. Encomienda, the Hacienda and the Penetration of 
Merchant's Capital in Spanish America 
While the expropriation of the agricultural population from 
the land in Britain was in full swing, the sixteenth century 
saw the creation of a world market. As Marx was later to, 
argues "The modern history of capital dates from the creation 
in the 16th century of a world embracing commerce and a world 
embracing market. " (Marx, 1867/1974: 1451. While. 'domestic', 
expropriation was undertaken by landowners supported by the 
State1, the plunder of colonies was organised by merchant's 
capital with the backing of the State. 
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"The discovery of gold and silverýin America, the 
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of 
the aboriginal population, the beginning of the 
conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning 
of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting 
of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era 
of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings 
are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation ... 
The different momenta of primitive accumulation 
distribute themselves now, more or less in chrono- 
logical order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, 
Holland, France and England. In England at the end 
of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical 
combination, embracing the colonies, the national 
debt, the modern mode of. taxation and the protectionist 
system. These methods depend in part on brute force, 
e. g., the colonial system. But they will employ the 
power of the State, the concentrated and organised 
force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the 
process of transformation of the feudal mode of 
production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten 
the transition. Force is the midwife of every old . -ý. 
society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an 
1,1 ,1 economic power. " 'Cibid.: 7031, -- 
Modern historians have taken up this point and-it has become 
something of a cliche to assert that in the period ! of . 
mercantile capitalism, a combination of State power and 
merchant's capital was involved in the creation of a , new,,, 
international division of labour2. Without disagreeing with 
this general statement, it can be suggested that, more often 
than not, in the case of Spanish America at least, this 
combination of forces has been seen as generally unproblematic 
and uncontradictory. The fundamental opposition stressed 
particularly by those writers of a neo-mercantilist persuasion, 
is that between colonisers and colonised, Spaniards and Indians, 
developing capitalism and indigenous modes of production, and 
so on. The outcome of the conflicts thereby engendered is 
ultimately given, for these authors, by the needs of capitalism 
in the West, the subordinate position of the colonised in the 
international division of labour, and/or the requirements of 
the international market and the great metropolitan. centres. 
In the case of Latin America, the establishment of slavery as 
well as institutions such as the Spanish encomienda and the 
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agricultural estate known as the hacienda, indeed practically 
all major institutional and legal procedures are accounted for 
by reference to the supposed response of the Iberian Absolutist 
State to such 'needs'. Prominent among the proponents of 
such arguments are Wallerstein and Frank. I have already 
provided an overall discussion of their conceptions in Chapter 3; 
my intention here is to examine their writings only in so far 
as they pertain to the colonial period in Spanish America. 
9.1.1 The Encomienda in Spanish America 
The history of Spanish America in the period following the 
conquest can be said to be a history of control over labour. 
Throughout the period of Spanish rule, and even after, land 
was plentiful in Latin America. It was labour-power which was 
scarce and the history of the period can be seen in terms of 
the creation of institutions whose functions were the provision 
and control of a labour force which was needed for the 
exploitation of vast mineral resources - primarily gold and 
silver - the main economic activity of early colonial rule. 
The main method which the Spaniards used to acquire 
labour was through the institution known as the encomienda. 
This was an institution which enabled the Spaniards to extract 
surplus-labour from the Indians. This surplus-labour could 
take various forms, consisting of tribute in money or kind 
as well as labour-rent, whereby Indians were forced to work 
down the mines but also in the construction of churches and 
public works, local agricultural production and for personal 
service 
3. As Lockhart has argued, the term 'encomienda' is 
rather ambiguous for there were two major tendencies within 
this institution. One of these was the encomienda created 
by State officials, which was limited in tenure and which was 
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conceived as a concession of the right to collect and_enjoy 
the King's tribute. The other was the repartimiento, which. 
stemmed from the ad hoc arrangements made by Columbus, in the 
Antilles and which spread to other areas. Lockhart suggests 
that this latter institution was of a more amorphous nature 
without much of a legal framework but that it was also basically 
concerned with labour use (Lockhart, '969: 475]. 
The beneficiary of an encomienda, or encomendero as. he 
, f2 1 
was known, was entrusted by the Spanish State with a certain "k 
number of Indians over a certain territory who were, made to 
work in return for instruction in the Christian faith and 
'civilised' ways. A code of working conditions for the Indians 
was laid down by the Crown, including food and housing, a 
maximum work load, and some measure of education although this 
was practically impossible to enforce in practice4. The, 
encomendero was generally a man who had performed services on 
behalf of the Crown in the conquest of the Americas, and, 
Indians were entrusted 'in encomienda' to this personage who 
was thus rewarded with the privilege of drafting labour and 
extracting tribute from them. Harris [1974] mentions that 
Cortese for example, received an encomienda consisting of 
twenty two townships' inhabited by possibly as many as 
115,000 peoples. As it developed in the Americas, the encomienda 
had little connection with what was termed the encomienda in 
Spain. Keith argues quite correctly that "both in its 
original form established by Columbus in the Antilles (under 
the name 'repartimiento'], and after its subsequent modification 
by Ovando, it was a practical arrangement made by local 
authorities to meet problems quite different from those which 
had given rise to the peninsular encomienda" [Keith, 1971: 433-41. 
In Spain, Keith continues, the encomienda was essentially a 
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seigneurie which conferred rights to land while the Antillian 
encomienda conferred direct rights over Indians "who themselves 
had legal status as landowners" Cibid.: 434, emphasis added) 
6. 
Nevertheless, although the encomienda in the New World was 
not in itself a grant of property and did not provide a legal 
vehicle for property acquisition, it was a feudal institution 
and seems to have been addressed to a man presumed to be a 
property owner who could otherwise have taken little advantage 
of the grant (Lockhart, op. cit.: 416)7. 
Two major reasons are outlined by Keith in order to 
explain why a European seigneurial system was not set up in 
the New World. First, in the period following the conquest, 
rights to land were of little value anywhere in the New World. 
It was only after the 1550's that land was given away in large 
quantities by the Crown as well as beginning to assume the 
form of a commodity. Before this period land had little value 
except for those with access to the labour necessary to exploit 
it and the demand for it was small outside immediate vicinity 
of the Spanish towns. In addition land was not a commodity 
in pre-Colombian civilisation. Indian peasants paid tribute 
and labour-rent to their rulers with little or no reference 
to the land which was held in common, the property of local 
communities. Second, the control of land did not necessarily 
confer control over the labour necessary to work it. There 
was nothing to stop Indians from moving away until a later 
time when the Spaniards controlled most of the available 
arable land [Keith, op. cit.: 434). 
Having described briefly the encomienda, we can now turn 
to a more analytical discussion of the social forces involved 
in its operation and its gradual transformation. For 
Wallerstein, the encomienda is an example of what he calls 
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"coerced cash-crop labour". This is: 
'r ... a system of agricultural labour control wherein 
the peasants are required by some legal process 
enforced by the State to labour at least part of the 
time on a large domain producing some product for sale 
in the world market. Normally, the domain was the 
'possession' of an individual, usually by designation 
of the State, but not necessarily a heritable property. 
The State could be itself the direct owner of such a 
domain, but in this case there was a tendency to 
transform the mechanism of labour control ... This 
form of labour control became the dominant one in 
agricultural production in the peripheral areas of 
the sixteenth century European world-economy. ' 
[Wallerstein, 1974: 91) 
Wallerstein argues that his was a capitalist form of social 
organisation as it formed part of the capitalistzworld economic 
system. This is because, according to him, the world economy 
cannot be both feudal and capitalist. It has one form or the 
other. "Once it is capitalist, relationships that bear 
certain formal resemblances to feudal relationships are 
necessarily redefined in terms of the governing principles 
of a capitalist system. This was true both of the encomienda 
in Hispanic America and the so-called 'second feudalism' in 
eastern Europe" Cibid.: 92). For Wallenstein while 'coerced 
cash-crop labour' dominated the periphery, the core was based 
on 'free labour' and in the 'semi-periphery', 'intermediate 
forms' such as share-cropping were the norm. "But the 
motivation of landlord and labourer in the non-'free', sector 
were as capitalist as those in the core" Cibid.: 126). This 
conception of capitalism and feudalism in terms of a hotch potch 
of commodity circulation, the 'motivation' of subjects and 
institutional arrangements is typical of neo-mercantilist 
theorising as I have had reason to note in Chapter 3. There 
is no need to repeat the points of criticism discussed in that 
chapter. Nevertheless, as regards'Wallerstein's analysis of 
the encomienda, two points need to be stressed. First, the 
relationship between the Spanish Absolutist Statea and the 
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encomenderos was not as straightforward, as Wallerstein seems 
to imply. Second, the identification of the encomienda with 
agricultural production on a 'large domain'-is at best- 
misleading and implies a false continuity or correspondence 
between this institution and the hacienda.. In addition, and 
this is perhaps the most serious point, Wallerstein's convenient 
model of three forms of labour control'which supposedly vary 
according to the core/periphery pattern is characteristic of 
the determinism underlying his whole approach. " Even accepting, 
for the sake of argument, that what Wallerstein sees as mere 
legal forms of social control are>indeed that, rather than forms 
of more fundamental relations of production, it follows from 
his conception not only that all such forms are supposedly 
'capitalist' in nature, but also that the form of labour 
control is determined by the place which it occupies in the 
international division of labour. Popular struggles once 
again disappear from history. Forms of social control are no 
longer determined or even influenced by class struggle, but 
rather by the position of the society in the 'world capitalist 
system' whether in the 'periphery' or the 'core', and the 
predictable 'intermediate positions' between the polar opposites. 
In arguing the way he does of course' Wallerstein is doing no 
more than following the precepts of neo-mercantilism9. 
Frank, perhaps the 'leading light' of this school of 
1 
thought, pushes the argument even further 
0. 
In his book on 
pre-independence Mexican agriculture, Frank states explicitly 
that: 
... the economic organization and social institutions 
of agriculture in Mexico have, throughout its history, 
grown out of the development needs and capacities of 
an economic system of which Mexican agriculture formed 
only a part. This system was mercantile capitalism, a 
system which soon after the Spanish conquest of Mexico 
was to embrace the entire world. " (Frank, 1979: 13 
t 
6 46 
For Frank, a structure of underdevelopment and dependence 
was established in Latin America, during the conquest period. 
What produced the underdevelopment of Mexico and Peru and the 
development of North America was the richness of the former 
and the poverty of the latter. It was because Latin America 
was rich in commodities which were needed by expanding mercantile 
capitalism that it was 'underdeveloped' by the metropolitan 
centres in the West. The only way to avoid underdevelopment 
was to be of no use to the world market. For Frank there is 
such a thing as: an: 
rr ... apparently 
inexorable law of world capitalist 
development that riches, through the exploitation 
they invite, generate the development of underdevel- 
opment; and pre-capitalist poverty permits economic 
development because it makes the same colonialist 
exploitation impossible. r' [Frank, 1978: 153-4] '11 
As was the case with Wallersteiny Frank of course, maintains 
12 
that the colonial Spanish economies were capitalist. It is 
the 'demands' and 'needs' of the emerging world capitalist 
system, along with demographic forces and the geologi'ca'l' 
attributes of the Latin American land (silver,, gold and so on) 
which, for Frank ultimately explain the underdevelopment of 
colonial agriculture and the character of the institutiön's 
formed therein. For example, he explains the replacement of 
the encomienda by the repartimiento in New Spain as the result 
of the 1545-48 epidemic and the 'requirements' of the expanding 
Mexican Spanish economy. The epidemic reduced the supply of 
labour and, in addition, the expanding economy 'required' a 
much more flexible and more productive institution: hence the 
labour repartimiento was created (Frank, 1979: 24)13. UnFortun- 
ately the reasons were not quite so simple, as I shall proceed 
to show. 
The picture of Mexican agriculture painted by Frank is 
one where the 'logic' of 'metropolitan capitalist development' 
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was so powerful that both Spaniards and-, Indians were powerless 
to resist. During the period-f548-75, he. argues: 
... the expanding economy necessarily penetrated 
deeper and deeper into the Indian economy, which was 
increasingly converted into an integral appendage of 
the economy as a whole. Like everyone else, the 
viceregal authorities found themselves obliged to 
adjust increasingly to the logic of these events. " 
[ibid.: 30] 
Frank dismisses the Crown's attempts to legislate'for the 
protection of. the Indian communities as window dressing, as 
"their principal task, of course was not to protect the Indians 
but to supervise and facilitate the functioning of this, -same 
system and its expansion" Cloc. cit; -). - Hence not only does 
Frank visualise the actions of various social groups as merely 
responding to the 'logic' of accumulation and ! capitalist 
expansion', abut he also reduces the complex struggles of the 
period to a simple opposition between Spaniards and Indians. 
The State supposedly merely provided the institutional frame- 
work for the plunder'of the American colonies and the extraction 
of 'surplus' from the Indian communities which was undertaken 
by the colonists. The identity of 'interests' ý between : State 
and colonists is thus taken for, granted; and at the opposite 
end of the spectrum all Indians are seen, as forming a unitary 
exploited bloc. Frank's argument is as such not surprising 
as his concern is to show how a 'surplus' was extracted from 
Latin America and transmitted to, Spain, thus initiating the 
process of the 'development of underdevelopment' in a part of 
the present day 'Third World'. Unfortunately, even from Frank's 
text it is reasonably clear: that Mexican agriculture in the- 
colonial period was not characterised by a simple Spanish/Indian 
opposition, but by an array of groups with opposing 'interests'. 
Frank alludes in passing for instance, to non-encomendero 
Spaniards and to : the resistance, in . the second 
half of the; 
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sixteenth century, of the medium-sized Spanish farmers of 
Puebla and Bajio to the monopoly concentration of land around 
the towns. Nevertheless such class struggles are not 
systematically discussed in Frank's work. 
Having outlined Wallerstein's and Frank's arguments 
regarding sixteenth century Spanish America, I now want to 
examine this period in slightly greater detail. I shall argue 
two main points. First, it will be suggested that the 
Spanish/Indian opposition emphasised by Wallerstein and Frank 
is far too simplbtic a rendering of the complex structure of 
the Spanish American economy, and that a series of other 
struggles were also taking place, the most clearly documented 
of which was the conflict between the Spanish Absolutist State 
and the encomanderos. Second, I shall suggest that the 
transformation of the encomienda, in particular, was one 
result of such struggles and that consequently the history of 
the period cannot simply be understood with reference to a 
mercantile capitalist touchstone. Although Latin America was 
becoming incorporated into an international market, the 
effects of this incorporation were far from automatic, as 
they were mediated by the class structure. 
Mario Gongora, one of the foremost experts on this period 
of colonial history, stresses that: 
... the colonial empires founded after 1500 were 
characterised by all sorts of tensions and conflicts 
between the imperial authorities in the metropolitan 
countries and the discoverers, colonists and conquerors 
The colonial period was not merely an era of vegetative 
growth, of interest only from the standpoint of economic, 
social, demographic and cultural history; it was also 
genuinely political history, a history of contests and 
decisions, especially in the earliest and latest 
stages of Spanish domination, when parties and policies 
contended for mastery. " (Gongora, 1975: 127-8) 
Gongora argues that the actions of the Spanish State in Latin 
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America can be seen as the outcome of a conflict between the 
legal notion of 'Natural Law' whereby all inhabitants of 
the Spanish Empire were nominally the free subjects of the 
King, and the specific social and economic structure prevalent 
in the Americas. The main exponents of Natural Law were 
"the ecclesiastics and the jurists, who formed the backbone 
of the Crown's administration" Cibid.: 127). Although Göngora 
does tend to see the conflicts he describes as pricipally 
a conflict of ideas and legal notions, it is reasonably clear 
from his text that the Spanish State could not afford to allow 
free control of Indian labour-power in the hands of the settlers 
as it would then lose its power to exploit the resources of 
the New World. As it was the control of labour-power which 
was the basis of power` in the early history of Spanish"America, 
it is not surprising to find the Crown continuously attempting 
to enact and enforce its legal control over Indian labour"and 
tribute collection. 
One of the major-juridical enactments of the period were 
the famous New Laws of 1542'which by abolishing Indian slavery' 
attempted to stop the rapid depletion of labour resources` 
in the region14. Although the humanitarian efforts of 
missionaries such as Bartolome de Las Cases are sometimes 
seen as the cause of the reforms, it is clear as Harris argues 
that neither the Crown nor the Church could allow outright 
enslavement of the Indians by the colonists without "surrendering 
their own vested and potential interests in the greatest 
resource of the New World - its manpower" (Harris, op. cit.: 171. 
The same author continues by suggesting that "the laws of 
1542 were passed because slavery of the highland Indians was 
a political and economic threat to the sovereignty of the 
Spanish Crown in the New World" [loc. cit. ). 
But slavery could only be a partial solution to economic 
650 
organisation as "the vast'massof the indigenous population 
could not all of a sudden be uprooted and resettled on the 
lands already colonised by the Spaniards" CGdngora, op. cit.: 131). 
This remark by Gongora hints at one of the fundamental ways 
in which the main labour recruiting institution - the encomienda - 
operated. It required the maintenance of the indigenous 
pre-colombian social structures until the Spaniards could 
acquire the power to control most of the available land15. 
"The encomienda system thus was based on the largely 
unconscious assumption that indigenous social, political 
and economic organization would survive in more or 
less the same state in which the Spaniards found it, 
because there seemed to be no alternative to the 
control and exploitation of Indian populations 
through arrangements and patterns which already 
existed. " [Keith, op. cit.: 4351 16, 
Both the exploitation and the administration of, Indians was 
performed through the pre-colombian nobility or, 'caciques', 
who were at first exempt from labour and tribute and whose 
power vis-a-vis the Indian peasants was bolstered by the 
Spaniards (Keith, loc. cit.; Göngora, op. cit.: 118). The 
survival of the indigenous social structure was however contra- 
dicted by the instruction of Indians in Spanish ways' by the 
introduction of a money economy and the production for a 
Spanish market. 
In the establishment of the encomienda in Spanish America, 
one can see a series of contradictory problems with which 
the Spanish Crown was faced. It had to reward the conquistadors 
for the conquest of new lands and it needed them in order to 
Y. 
control and exploit the large empire which it now dominated. 
It therefore granted them encomiendas. However, the State 
found itself increasingly obliged to control the growing 
power of the encomenderos in order not to lose its grip over 
the territories. 
Apart from being dependent on the colonists, the Crown 
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was also economically dependent on Indian labour and tribute 
and so had to ensure the existence of a permanent pool of 
labour and an Indian economy, which it had to protect from the 
smash and grab actions of the colonists. Not only had it to 
maintain this pool of labour which was under constant threat 
of extermination, but it also had to entice or coerce Indians 
away from their lands and communities in order to work in the 
'Spanish sector' of the economy. It had to do this with the 
help of the encomenderos, while proclaiming at the same time 
that Indians were free subjects of the Crown. Finally, as if 
this were not enough, the State had to contend with the 
largest sector of the Spanish colonialists who were not 
encomenderos and who were clamouring for a piece of the cake.. 
The Spanish State attempted to overcome these problems 
through a series of measures primarily designed to abolish 
at least those features of the encomienda system which, from 
its point of view, it found objectionable. According to Keith, 
the Crown was opposed to the encomienda because the personal 
service which the Indians performed bonded them to particular 
Spaniards and was the main cause of depopulation17. However, 
the main reason for the State's opposition to the institution, 
according to most writers including Keith, was the fear that 
the encomenderos were becoming an uncontrollable class of 
feudal lords18 
"Having recently dealt with a powerful and independent 
nobility in Spain, it [the Crown - M. N. ) could not 
view with equanimity the prospect that an even more 
powerful and independent nobility might appear in the 
New World. " [op. cit.: 440) 
The personal service to the encomenderos was abolished in 
1549 and the extraction of surplus-labour from the Indians 
was gradually taken over by other institutions. These were 
the repartimiento, mita or catequi'l, whereby forced labour 
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was drafted for public works, and the corregimiento de Indios 
which was concerned with the extraction'of tribute in ki*nd 
and in cash. In ' the' sixteenth century a whole series"of legal 
enactments eventually wrested all administrative functions 
concerning Indians from the encomenderos, leaving them only 
with rights to receive tribute at levels assessed by officials 
of the State19. The functions of administration"were 
reassigned to officials or corregidores whose loyalty was 
assured because they were appointed for relatively short terms 
of office. In this context Göngora makes the following 
informative remarks: 
"From the standpoint of social history, the replacement 
by about the mid-sixteenth century of the encomienda 
involving-personal service by the system of mita 
and repartimiento is extremely important, because it 
demonstrates the strength of the Crown's reluctance 
to permit the growth of a feudal nobility, a reluctance 
displayed by its tendency to supply a labour force for 
landowners, mine-owners and operators of textile works 
through the medium of administrative arrangements, 
without conferring any permanent or hereditary privileges. 
The Crown thus transformed the upper strata of society, 
and placed the encomendero who occasionally benefitted 
from the repartimiento on the same level as any other 
miner or landowner; institutions that still bore traces 
of medieval concepts of overlordship were replaced 
by others more firmly based on the ownership of land 
or of a business enterprise ... ýf 
(Gdngora, op. cit.: 149] 
As regards its relation to the Indian labourers, the State, 
according to Gdngora, was faced with a choice between the 
utilisation of free wage-labour and compulsory labour which 
for him was a reflection of the ideological debates over the 
capabilities and liberty of the 'natives'. In this respect 
he notes that: 
"The instructions given in 1550 to Viceroy Velasco for 
his government of New Spain left the new incumbent 
free to use both methods, he was to encourage a 
system of free wage-labour, but he was to impose 
concurrently an element of obligation, though within 
the context of administrative regulations and 
independently of the encomienda system. " 
Cibid.: 143) 
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Without wishing to take issue with Gdngora's idealism, his 
remarks are very important for they do point to the existence 
at the time of labour-power as a commodity in a primarily 
feudal economy20. Nevertheless in the majority of cases a 
wage was not sufficient to entice the Indians away from their 
lands and it is understandable that what the Spaniards saw 
as the sloth and laziness of the Indians was a perfectly 
rational calculation to remain on their lands. In addition 
it must be noted that the 'wage' paid to the Indians was not 
sufficient for the reproduction of their labour-power as it 
was assumed that this would take place in the communities 
themselves21. Indeed, as I have already suggested it was part 
of the Crown's strategy to protect and maintain as much as 
possible the traditional Indian communities. To this effect 
it gathered the Indians systematically into nucleated villages 
called reducciones or congregaciones. 
This measure which was applied throughout the colonial 
period facilitated of course the extraction of surplus-labour 
by concentrating the supply of labour-power in geographically 
limited and easily controlled areas. At the same time it 
enabled the Spaniards to acquire those Indian lands on which 
the communities were situated. All these points are stressed 
by Frank (1979: 26-27] but he declines to mention the fact 
that the Crown went even further by insisting not only that 
the Indians be gathered together, but that the land on which 
they were to be resettled would be held under communal tenure 
and would be inviolable. As a result of this measure many 
fertile irrigated lands remained in Indian hands until the 
nineteenth century. In stressing this point Harris remarks 
that: 
it ... all through the highland area, one of the first 
actions of the nineteenth century republican governments, 
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after independence had been achieved from Spainy+. was 
the destruction of the safeguards preventing direct 
access to Indian land-and labour. " 
[Harris, op. cit.: 221 
This was undertaken with the ideological humanist justifications 
of private property and individual rights so characteristic 
of revolutionary France. The question which arises at this 
stage of the argument is how was it possible for the Crown to 
enact the measures outlined above given the power of the 
encomenderos which has been previously stressed. There is no 
doubt that the abolition of the encomienda was fiercely 
resisted by sections of the clergy as well as the encomenderos. 
All the serious texts refer to this. An informative remark 
of the period quoted by Gdngora illustrates the dependence 
of the State on the encomenderos extremely well: 
"Were it not for the trade and circulation of goods 
carried on by the encomenderos ... the King would - 
be nothing more than the 'lord of the maize-fields 
and cotton saddle cloths, and not of the treasure 
which at present Your Majesty collects every year'. " 
[cit., Göngora, op. cit.: 27) 1 
In a sense, it was due to the alliance between the. Absolutist 
State and merchant's capital, so eloquently-articulated in 
this remark, that the Crown succeeded in imposing its policies. 
Keith stresses that the Spanish State'would-probably 
not have been able to enact its reforms had it not been that 
new socio-economic forces had weakened the position of the 
encomenderos to a great extent. The encomienda, having 
originally conferred an almost complete monopoly over the 
exploitation of the indigenous economy on those Spaniards who 
received Indians, effectively debarred most non-encomenderos 
of the means to engage themselves in the pursuit of plentiful 
profit22. Unfortunately for them there were not and could not 
have been enough encomiendas to go round, but, had the 
demographic situation remained fairly stable, the encomenderos 
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could have supported enough other Spaniards as dependants 
to neutralise rivals and opponents [Keith, op. cit.: 441-23. 
A 
But the situation did not remain stable. The influx of 
immigrants from Spain and from all over the Indies into Peru 
and Mexico, attracted by tales of fabulous wealth along with 
the weakening of the Indian economies due to disease and the 
contradictions of the encomienda itself, altered the demand 
and supply of labour-power dramatically23. As a consequence 
there grew a large class of discontented non-encomenderos who 
represented a threat to political stability24. These moradores, 
or soldados as they were known, were particularly numerous 
in Peru where the Viceroys were clearly aware of the threat 
which they posed to the State [loc. cit. ]. Yet despite this 
apparent threat to the Crown's authority, their existence in 
the long run proved to be in the Crown's interest. This was 
because their main goal was to obtain encomiendas and they 
were thus much more of a danger to the encomenderos. For 
similar reasons the State's insistence on reforming the 
encomienda was much less of an immediate threat to the 
encomenderos' position than to the soldados. 
"Thus, for the encomenderos, alliance with the Crown 
was the best guarantee of-retaining privileges 
threatened by the soldados, and it is noteworthy 
that in the Peruvian civil wars, the bulk of the 
encomenderos were always found on the royal side, 
except in 1544, when the intemperate enforcement of 
the New Laws by Viceroy Blasco Nunez Vela, seemed to 
threaten the whole class with immediate loss of all 
its privileges. Even then, most encomenderos switched 
sides as soon as Blasco Nunez' successor, Pedro de la 
Gasca, assured them that their encomiendas would not 
be taken. " (Keith, op. cit.: 4421 25 
Thus it seems that it was the conflict of 'interests between 
encomenderos and non-encomenderos which enabled the Spanish 
Absolutist State through its Viceregal representatives to 
bring about a reform of the encomienda which the encomenderos 
would not otherwise have accepted without a serious and perhaps 
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even victorious struggle. Keith argues in'fact, that the 
Viceroys in Mexico and Peru took advantage of this conflict 
in order to limit the monopoly power of the encomenderos and 
to encourage the growth of a new and enlarged aristocracy 
whose wealth was to be based on the control of land rather 
than Indians. 
Spanish America in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
was therefore far from being free from struggles. Far from 
Latin American society merely responding automatically to 
external impulses as Frank and Wallerstein maintain, the effects 
of Factors such as demographic collapse, the demands of expanding 
capitalism and so one were always mediated by struggles the 
outcome of which was never given. Even from the cursory 
examination of the, changing structure of the encomienda given 
here, an examination which has purposely avoided any detailed 
discussion of regional differences, another point is also 
reasonably clear. The reliance on the squeezing of Indian 
labour in order to provide a profit rather than being totally 
dependent, for their reproduction, on the market is an 
indication that the encomenderos and merchants were running 
a largely feudal economy despite the fact that they may have 
been producing for, markets miles away. To suggest however, 
that a feudal mode of production dominated Spanish America 
at the time is not to preclude the existence of capitalist 
forms and commodity production as I have had occasion to note. 
It is also worth noting, although this contradicts most received 
wisdom from 'radical' writers regarding this period, that 
in a sense the Indian peasants. were not again to have it so 
good until the twentieth century., I do not want to imply 
given the conditions under which most Indians had to live and 
labour, that their; 's was a. 'pleasant lot'. I would not presume 
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to do so., Rather, I wish to suggest that under colonialism 
the Indian peasantry had, in the Spanish State, a strong, even 
if a two-faced and only partial, ally.. With the coming of 
independence and the control of the State by-the landowning 
class, the Latin American peasantry would have to wait until 
the period of systematic industrial capitalist transformation 
to acquire new allies amongst the proletariat and sections 
of the bourgeoisie. 
9.1.2 . 
The Rise-of., Landownership and the Genesis of the-Hacienda. 
I have already had occasion to discuss some of the problems 
associated with the conflation of modes of social production 
on the one hand with supposedly 'typical' forms of enterprise 
on the other. Some of the conclusions already reached can 
usefully be repeated here. The forms of organisation of the 
labour-process as represented by enterprises in social 
formations are effects of the underlying relations of production 
of society. As such, enterprises take many forms dependent 
on the many factors characteristic of a social formation, and 
they cannot in and by themselves account for the feudal or 
r. z 
capitalist nature of an economy. The feudal mode of production 
is not the manorial or hacienda systemsy just as the capitalist 
mode of production is not the industrial system or the ICI 
factory down the road. To conflate mode of production and 
enterprise is a form of economism, it is to 'empiricise' 
structural categories, to conflate essential and phenomenal 
relations and to reduce the complex notion of the social 
r-r 
economy to one of technique. Two points follow from the above. 
First, the question of whether a particular hacienda is 
Feudal or capitalist is largely a false question. The answer 
invariably tends to be that it contains both 'feudal' and 
'capitalist' features. In addition, because at the level 
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of the enterprise, the character'of relations of production 
are not always immediately apparent, ' these tend to be confused 
with forms of social control. The result in the case of the 
hacienda, has been that the discussion has often centred 
around the argument of whether debt-bondage'through 'hacienda 
stores' is an indication of feudalism or, not. The discussion` 
has proceeded merrily along, oblivious of the fact that 
similar forms of social control were and`are utilised in 
industrial enterprises Qmploying wage-labour 'in Latin America26 
Second, to attempt to'answer the question of whether 
haciendas are feudal or'capitalist by asking whether they are 
self-sufficient or produce for a'market, is also unhelpful. 
It amounts to defining feudalism or capitalism as 'ideal types' 
based on an internal principle. It is a similar form of 
reasoning to those conceptions which suggest, 'that feudalism 
is based primarily on agriculture, and capitalism on industry. 
It is not the mere presence of`a marketq`industry or whatever, 
or the mere lack of such, 
, 
which are`the defining characteristics 
of feudalism or-capitalism. What are important are'the roles 
and functions-of the market, industry and agriculture on the 
basis of the relations of production which underlie the society 
as a whole. 
I mention these points because there has been something 
of a 'hacienda studies industry' in academic circles over the 
past few years 
27. Most-such-studies have invariably been 
totally descriptive and have added little to our knowledge 
of the process of social transformation in Latin America, 
due principally to their lack of theoretical sophistication 
28. 
Let me say at this stage that I am not opposed to the study 
of haciendas as such, rather to the manner in which such 
studies have been approached. It is the unfortunate concentration 
on the detailed study of the enterprise, and the consequent 
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implicit or explicit extrapolations from-these to the nature 
of the economic structure as a whole which is mistaken. 
Enterprises do not equal modes of production. -Moreover, it 
will be remembered that, diff erent relations of=production can 
produce similar kinds of enterprise., ,A knowledge of the 
workings of the manorial or, hacienda systems can tell us about 
the existence ofj and the forms taken by, relations of 
production, but these forms of enterprise are-no more than, 
indications of the forms taken by'relations of production 
and the class struggle in the social formations in question. - 
What interests us in this section is therefore not a-'typical' 
enterprise as such, even less one or two haciendas,, xbut, rather 
the genesis of a particular form of class domination by landed 
property, an aspect of which can be seen in the form of 
agricultural enterprise known as the hacienda. -- 
The agricultural enterprise known as the hacienda can 
be said to have developed in the sixteenth century and to have 
dominated rural society up to the twentieth century in some 
Latin American countries. It is generally held that this 
form of enterprise dominated the Chilean central valley,, for 
instance, up to the 1960's, although we shall see later that 
this view is problematic. For the present it is important to 
note, as Kay suggests, that: 
... a distinction has to be established between those 
Latin American countries which had a high labour/land 
ratio and a developed form of Indian community organ- 
ization [Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Guatemala] 
and those which were comparatively underpopulated and 
in which the agriculture of the indigenous communities 
was relatively primitive [Chile, Argentina, Uruguay 
and Brazil]. In the former group of countries it took 
many centuries for the hacienda system to establish 
its dominance in the agrarian system: the process of 
enserfinent was slow ... In the latter group the process 
of enserfment was quicker and therefore the hacienda 
system developed earlier. " [Kay, op. cit.: 801 
Kay, who compares the transformation of the hacienda with that 
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of the European manorial system, suggests that in those 
countries in which the. Indian peasant economies were developed, 
the latter managed to resist quite successfully the encroachment 
of the large haciendas on their lands, a process which lasted 
up. to the present century29. If to the size of population 
and to the economic strength of the Indian communities we add 
during the colonial period the efforts of the Spanish State, 
which often, as we, have already seen, found itself on the side 
of the peasantry, we can account for, the stronger resistance 
put up by the peasantry against the landlords in those countries. 
In the other group of countries, not even the actions of the 
State could help, as its bargaining power was reduced due to 
the relatively small supply of labour and the weakness of the 
indigenous communities 
30 
It must. be stressed that the hacienda, a manorial form 
of landownership, did not develop from the encomienda which 
was merely concerned with labour use. No straightforward 
continuity between the two institutions took place. So much 
is clear from an examination of the main studies of the period 
31 
so that Taylor, for example, is quite mistaken when he asserts 
such a simple continuity32. The development of the hacienda 
was the result of, a whole series of processes and struggles 
over the period of Spanish= colonialism. In this context 
Frank stresses quite correctly that the origins of the form 
of landed property. exemplified by the hacienda cannot be 
attributed to the encomienda (Frank, 1979: 11]33. His 
explanation of the genesis of the hacienda is in fact much 
more in tune with the kind of argument we have seen him 
utilise with reference to the encomienda. 
"The hacienda grew primarily in response to its 
profitability, which in turn was a function of increased 
demand and price for its products and decreased 
supply from alternative sources ... The productive 
661 
requirements of this profit seeking commercial 
institution called into being new productive 
relations, or debt peon labour, which came to 
replace the previous institutions of the encomienda 
and repartimiento and increasingly to dominate the 
mode of production in the Mexican countryside. " 
Cibid.: 56-73 
The development of the hacienda in Mexico is accounted for by 
Frank in terms of its increased profitability in relation to 
the existing alternatives [e. g., mining] in a situation of 
labour shortages induced by epidemics. He argues first that 
the epidemic of 1575-8 and its aftermath produced a decline 
of the Mexican Indian population estimated at 2 million 
Cibid.: 401. This destroyed the Indian economies and produced 
massive shortages in the Spanish towns which led to price 
increases and made hoarding and speculation in foodstuffs 
highly profitable enterprises. This process was exacerbated 
by the fact that the white population did not remain static, 
but was continuously fuelled by an influx of immigrants from 
Spain, who were escaping from the depression through which the 
Spanish economy was going at the time. In addition Frank 
34 
argues that the decline in mining production caused partly by 
the reduction of the labour force and partly by the exhaustion 
of the more easily accessible surface ores, along with the 
decline in trade with a depression-ridden Spain, all contributed 
to the dislocation of the existing American economy. As a 
consequence the hacienda arose due to its profitability. 
"Faced then with declining profits in mining and rising 
profits in large-scale agriculture, any rational 
capitalist would surely withdraw his capital from 
mining and invest it in agriculture to the greatest 
extent possible; and if he was already operating in 
both sectors, as well as in commerce, as many 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century capitalists in 
Mexico were, this transfer would be all the easier and 
more normal. " (ibid.: 54) 
Now, I have no quarrel with Frank regarding either the 
phenomena he describes or for that matter the increased 
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profitability of agricultural productionivis-a-vis mining 
during this period. It iss however, quite another thing to } 
explain the development of the hacienda by reference to its ; 
profitability. This is a totally illegitimate procedure which 
cannot explain why haciendas developed as opposed to-other: - 
forms of agricultural enterprise. -This form of reasoning 
cannot explain the relations of production which prevailed 
in agriculture at the time35. 
Contrary to Frank's assertion, "! production relations'on 
haciendas were not simply characterised by debt-bondage. This 
is 'simply' a form of social control, other forms of which 
have plagued (and are still plaguing) the organisation of 
labour in many industries in capitalist as well as feudal 
social formations throughout the world. What was important 
with regard to social relations on the Mexican haciendas of 
this period was the fact that they were largely based on 
production relations of a feudal character. -t They were 
dominated by the utilisation of labour servicesy or corvee,, 
labour as it is sometimes known. Of course, the term 'feudalism' 
is a dirty word for Frank, but however one describes them, 
such features need explaining.. Why was wage-labour not 
systematically employed on the haciendas? -There are explan- 
ations for this but such explanations. ýrequire a much deeper 
analysis of the class structure than Frank's theoretical 
position will allow him to undertake., An increase in demand 
only explains the expansion of agricultural production (and 
even this is not automatic; it presupposes'first that it is 
in the interests of the landowners, to respond to that demand 
and second, that they are in a political and economic position 
to do so) and not the form taken by production relations in 
the agricultural sphere. This can only be explained from an 
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analysis of the various struggles prevalent at the time. 
Unfortunately, Frank's account only_examines the class structure 
superficially and even then it is simply seen as automatically 
determined by the overwhelming forces of the international 
market. Frank's account of the development of the hacienda 
must therefore be supplemented with a brief discussion of 
political processes. To do this we have to return to where 
we left our discussion of the Spanish State and the encomienda. 
Towards the end of the last section I suggested that the 
King's viceroys in Spanish America took advantage of the 
conflict between encomenderas and non-encomenderos to encourage 
the growth of a larger ruling class based on the control of' 
land, thereby further reducing the power of 'the- encomenderos". 
Already in the 1550's the repartimiento`'"system had made Indian 
labour-power available to a larger class. Asa result of the 
greater availability of labour-power, with the abolition of 
the encomenderos' monopoly, there grew up, according to Keith 
[op. cit.: 444], a significant demand for land. Keith does not 
mention the decimation of the Indian economies by epidemics 
during this period in Mexico, but it seems safe to suggest that 
it was only after the establishment of the repartimiento that 
it became possible to respond to the increased demand for 
food in the towns, which was due, as we have seen, to the 
collapse of the Indian communities and the increase in the 
Spanish and Mestizo populations. Hence the ability to 
respond to this increased demand for land presupposed first 
the destruction of the encomenderos as a class, and second, 
the weakness of the Indian communities whose lands could now 
be relatively easily acquired. With regard to the encomenderos, 
Keith mentions that they had ceased to be encomenderos in the 
full sense of the word [i. e., ceased to form a class based 
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on a monopoly of Indian labour-power] in New Spain and Peru 
well before the end of the sixteenth century and were 
transforming themselves into landowners: 
"They had lost most'of their ancillary privileges, 
while their tributes, the only major source of 
profit still left, were diminishing rapidly due to 
the impact of European diseases on the Indian 
population. Thus they were compelled to find other 
ways of maintaining their wealth and position in 
colonial society. The majority responded by building 
up large landholdings, even though this encouraged. 
their rivals to do 'the-same; the impossibility of 
continuing to base their 'estates' on direct admin- 
istrative control of Indians left the control of land 
as the only feasible alternative. " Cibid.: 443) 
With regard to the Crown and its representatives on the other 
hand, similar pressures were at work for it to encourage. the 
formation of a landowning class. Once it had established its 
authority by bringing the encomenderos under its control, it 
could only maintain its position through the use of patronage 
which consisted of the granting of mercedes [grants, of land] 
to those who had served in the conquest and settlement off new 
lands. 
"There remained few encomiendas (pensions) to be 
given away, and dividing existing encomiendas was not 
a very practical solution, although it was tried. 
Administrative offices, and especially the office of 
corregidor de indices also could be used as rewards, 
but there were not enough of these to go around either, 
and many such offices were short term or of little 
value. Furthermore, the Crown's desire to increase 
the patronage it could exercize directly from Spain, 
as well as its fear of overly independent viceroys, 
led it increasingly to restrict viceregal patronage. 
The main rewards the viceroys could offer to people 
who were already in the New World, then, was land. " 
[loc. cit. ] 
Thus it seems that the acquisition of land, and the consequent 
formation of a class of landowners, was pursued by the State, 
the encomenderos as well as the non-encomenderos. Even the 
Indian peasants sometimes preferred to leave their communities 
where they were subject to repartimiento labour for a life 
on the haciendas36. The 1550's and 1560's thus saw the 
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establishment of the first towns whose-founders received no 
en com i endas37 
We have already seen that in' the sixteenth century the 
cities were initially dependent for food on the Indian 
communities and agricultural production in their immediate 
vicinity. Only later did the Spaniards start acquiring an 
interest in land further from-the towns. -Gongora argues that 
this extension of production covered. a greater variety of products 
which were principally directed towards trade with Spain and 
other regions in the Americas, between which. a"kind, of --. - 
complementary commerce took place38. This, of-course, made 
all sectors of the empire very much dependent on, each other, 
as well as increasing the market for agricultural-products. 
If we add to this factor the increase in-demand-For food,. from 
Spanish towns and the mining centres which-"often acted as, 
the incentive for agricultural and stock-raising colonisation"- 
[Göngoral op. cit.: 149], we have covered most of the reasons 
for the increased demand for--land. 
, If we now turn to the question of-why-did haciendas s, 
based on largely 
than other forms 
much more comple: 
far 'between the 
already been the 
39 
explicitly 
feudal-production relations, develop, rather, 
of agricultural enterprise, the answer is, 
K and one has to read the texts. -mentioned so . 
lines', so to speak [even more than has 
case), as none address the question 
What has to be kept in mind first of all, is that although 
the expanding agricultural production so far described was 
taking place for a market, it was firmly developing on a 
feudal basis. This is primarily because it arose on the 
basis of encomienda and repartimiento labour. -; The new 
landowners were not dependent on the market for their 
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reproduction but, as Brenner puts it in a different context, 
they: 
'ý ... had direct 
[non-market] access to their own 
means of subsistence, [serf-peasant output from 
their demesnes), they did not have to buy on the 
market necessities for reproduction; their ability 
to survive, to reproduce, was independent of their 
ability to 'hold their place on the market'. " 
[Brenner, 1977: 70) 
What this means is that as they were dependent for their 
reproduction on the extraction of feudal rent [labour, kind 
or money) from the Indian peasants-, there was no pressure for 
the landlords to be competitive in order to survive. In times 
of increased demand all they needed to do was to squeeze 
the Indian peasantry in order to meet it. I have in fact 
suggested that not only the landowners but the whole economy 
of Spanish America in this period was totally dependent on 
the extraction of surplus-labour in this form, as the Indian- 
peasant communities were not only the source of food and labour- 
power but also of numerous other means of subsistence, means 
of production and raw materials40. Indeed, it is precisely 
this dependence which produced the increased demand for land 
in the first place, as we have seen. --In 
this context, although 
forms of capitalism did see the light of day here and there, 
it is understandable why, under these conditions, their devel- 
opment should be stifled and why capitalist forms of social 
organisation could not have systematically developed in the 
countryside - why those enterprises which did attempt to 
employ wage-labour found the process 'expensive'41. 
If we now examine the process in a more detailed fashion 
it is clear that along with the decline in population numbers, 
went the fact that the Indians lost what little political 
and economic power they did have, although I have mentioned 
that in some countries they did manage to resist the 
encroachment of the Spaniards for longer than in others. What 
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must be stressed, however, is that the demand for land by 
Spaniards was not just an end in itself but also"a means of- 
obtaining labour. In fact it is quite, clear that the. 
hacendados were monopolising land far in-excess of what they 
could use for agricultural purposes, CFrank, 1979: 70)... The 
monopolisation of., land was in fact-_the bast way to acquire 
labour, as the Indian communities. were-becoming more-and more 
inaccessible and Indians could escape from encomienda or. 
repartimiento labour. The expropriation of Indian, - 
. lands-enabled the hacendados both-to stifle a viable peasant-economy 
and to force peasants onto the haciendas. ", In time this:. -- 
strategy took over entirely from the utilisation ofithe forced 
labour institutions, and once peasants had settled on the w 
haciendas, it was-relatively easy=to-keep them there through 
a system of debt-bondage. Land was acquired-through a whole 
series of legal and illegal means: --by merced9 conquest, 
expulsion of Indians, bribery, fäisification of documents, and 
so on. Frank mentions, for examples that since land without 
an owner reverted to the Crown, Indian chiefs had an additional 
incentive to sell land in order to avoid its loss when the 
owner died. But economic and political pressure as>well as 
physical force was often enough to force-the owners to sell 
Cibid.: 69). Interestingly enough, the appropriation of, land 
during this period was not limited to Indian lands but those 
of poor Spaniards and Mestizos were not spared either 
[ibid.: 70). 
This process of expropriation and monopolisation of land 
by the large landowners was accompanied by what Kay 019741 
correctly calls the enserfdom of the Indian population. Given 
the dominant character of the Spanish American social formations 
previously discussed, -it is not surprising that the haciendas. 
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were based on the extraction of feudal rent rather than 
wage-labour, a situation which not even a shortage of labour-power 
could have brought about in such circumstances. It was 
cheaper for the landlord to install a 
'system 
of corvee labour, 
for instance, rather than pay the Indians a wage although this 
did occur at times. In periods of slump landowners could 
43 
always rely on the production of peasants from the lands 
{ 
allotted to them on haciendas. In periods of boom and increased 
demand for agricultural products, increased surplus-labour 
could easily be squeezed from them, and their labour-power 
easily switched to demesne production. Thisq, howevery required 
a quiescent and compliant peasantry and ways of tying the 
peasants to the hacienda in order to stop them moving away. 
Even in those cases where the hacendados had monopolised all 
the land, peasants could always escape to the towns, mines and 
so on44. In order to minimise this possibility a much more 
effective system of social control than legal serfdom was 
devised. Peasants were provided with too little land on the 
haciendas to reproduce themselves- ;, and this was 
'supplemented' 
by a 'wage' in kind or money to be spent only on hacienda 
stores, with the result that they could easily be kept 
continuously in debt. These debts were then inheritable by., 
children at the peasants' death45. Hence, in the absence of 
a European, ýtype of legal bondage which could not be used 
systematically 
46 
given Spanish laws and the position of the 
47-I 
State debt-bondage added to a feudal mode of production, 
was the best of both worlds for the hacendado. He avoided 
the possibility of peasant independence afforded by straight- 
forward feudal forms of production as well as the relative 
power and independence which accompanies wage-labour. The 
Crown did in fact attempt to place limitations on the practice 
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of debt-bondage but failed, and in the course of the sixteenth 
century the Indian peasant became increasingly tied to his 
place of work CGöngora, op. cit.: 152). Debt-bondage could 
in fact not have been legally abolished as it was not the 
result of a choice on the part of the hacendados. Given 
the dominant mode of production, the position of the State 
vis-a-vis landholding and the question of 'freedom', as well 
as the class struggles which I have described, a combination 
of feudal production and debt-bondage was the only possible 
outcome48. As Brenner says in another context: 
"This two-sided development is inexplicable as the 
result of ruling-class policy or ruling- 
class"-intention, but was the outcome of processes of class 
formation, rooted in class conflict. " 
[Brenner, op. cit.: 781 
As a result of different local circumstances the hacienda 
developed on the basis of different forms of feudal rent. As 
Gongora puts it: 
"What really happened was that the most varied systems 
of labour and land tenure coexisted and supported 
each other within a predominantly aristocratic social 
structure. '? (Gongora, op. cit.: 156) 
In those countries where Indian community organisation managed 
to resist for longer the encroachment of the haciendas, such 
as Bolivia, Peru, Mexico9 Guatemala and Ecuador, a higher 
proportion of subsistence agriculture is still the case today. 
There developed there a dual system of the hacienda and its 
resident peasants on the one hand, along with the hacienda/ 
village community relation on the other. The hacendados did 
not find it necessary to expropriate totally these villages, 
but in fact just left them some land, butt below the amount 
necessary to guarantee the Indians' economic independence, 
thereby assuring themselves of a further supply of labour-power. 
That from the beginning of the conquest Latin America 
was implicated into amercantilist system, as Frank, Wallerstein, 
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Taylor and others have argued, is beyond dispute, but the 
view that merchant's capital simply forced the area into 
becoming capitalist [Frank, Wallersteinor feudal [Taylor] 
cannot be sustained. The transformation of Spanish American 
society during this period was not the result of any logic. 
The eventual 'outcome was the result of a `series of struggles 
whose result was not predictable in a simple sense. Nevertheless 
these conflicts and struggles did not take place in a vacuum. 
They were limited by structures, themselves the result of 
previous struggles. The penetration of merchant's capital did 
have effects, one of these being to limit the struggles that 
were actually possible. Such limits Ywere also imposed by 
people's relations to their material environment - the mode of 
production of material life. This section must not therefore 
be read as replacing the effectivity of 'external' factors by 
that of factors 'internal' to Latin America alone. The 
difficulty consists precisely in understanding the'relations 
between the two which are the only ones to explain the 
transformation'inder study. This transformation can therefore 
not simply be understood in terms of the relative power of 
various groups, `irn the same way as it cannot be understood 
merely in terms of the demand and supply of commodities, 
population growth and so on. It is power within the context 
of social relations arid demand and supply'and demographic 
forces within the same context which is crucial. 
What is Of 'particular importance for 'the understanding 
of the subsequent process of change in the region is that, 
whereas in`Britain the development off capitalism occurred 
on the basis of a'two-fold process of the transformation of' 
labour into wage-labour and 
the development of a world market 
for commodities C'internalt' and 'external' factors], 'in Latin 
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America only commodity production for exchange on the same 
world market ['external' factors) saw the light of day. 
The formation of wage-labour in the New World, as we have 
seen, was impeded by a series of forces and struggles, with 
the result that it was only later that such 'internal' factors 
could combine with 'external' forces to produce wage-labour 
systematically. But before this process could be systematically 
initiated, several centuries of landlord domination and 
oppression had to be experienced by the Latin American peasantry. 
9.2 Chile and the Domination of Landed Property: 1850-1930 
In both this section and the next I shall be concerned with 
tracing some of the changing relations between the various 
classes in Chilean society up to the decade of the 1960's. 
Although I have already established theoretically some of the 
possible relations between landed property, capital, wage- 
labour and imperialism in the period of capitalist transformation, 
it remains to see whether these theoretical arguments can 
help us to understand the concrete case of Chile. In the 
first section I shall attempt to account for the domination 
of a landed class in Chile and for the consequences this had 
with regard to changing relations in the agriculture of the 
country. This will provide the necessary background without 
which the form taken by the further capitalist transformation 
of agriculture from the 1930's onwards cannot be understood. 
This process will be treated in the second section. 
It will be argued throughout that the transformation of 
agriculture cannot be adequately understood without a 
consideration of social relations outside what is normally 
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considered as agriculture. I should perhaps make-it-clear 
that I am not making the simple, comment that 'other factors' 
have to be 'taken into account' if processes of rural. change 
are to be understood. Most current writers on these issues 
continuously pay lip-service-to-this--idea without. -in any way 
altering their basic approach, which is to consider that 
'rural' change can be explained-in-terms of , 'rural factors', 
with the addition of some obvious : 'external'. [urban] phenomena. 
I wish to go much further than this-and to challenge the notion 
of 'agriculture' or the 'rural' as .a self-contained entity, - 
itself. To be more precise, I want to suggest-that-the-social 
transformation of agriculture cannot be, understood solely as 
the result of a 'conflict' between supposed 'rural' classes: 
landlords, peasants, capitalist farmers, agricultural-labourers, 
and so on. Much less can, it be understood by-an analysis of 
such conflicts within, a 'typical' agricultural-enterprise: 
hacienda, plantation, capitalist farm, or whatever. -. -. Rather, 
as I have already argued in-previous chapters, -the development 
of capitalism in agriculture can only be-adequately comprehended 
if in addition to the struggle between landlords and peasants, 
we also examine the struggle and alliances between such - 
classes as landed property, capital, imperialism and wage-labour 
throughout the social formation. In other words, I, am_ 
suggesting that the social transformation, of agriculture 
like, for that matter, that of industry- can only be grasped 
if we attempt to overcome the distinction between the-urban 
[with 'its' classes] and the rural [with -, ' its' classes). , 
Perhaps I should say a few words regarding the periodisation 
employed here. It is the most common periodisation used-by.: 
students of Chilean. history and it is founded on the assumption 
of the theoretical primacy of the position-of the country. in 
the world market. Thus, the 1850's saw the incorporation of 
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Chile into an international division of, labour dominated by 
Britain, through the export of wheat to that country; while, 
after the 1880's, the export of nitrates to the same country 
contributed to the creation of an enclave economy. By 1930 
artificial fertilizer production in, Western Europe had 
occasioned the collapse of the Chilean nitrate industry, whose 
'leading role' was gradually replaced by copper; while 
Britain was replaced by theryUnited States in its position of 
major trading 'partner, ' and imperialist power.,. Asja result 
of the Great Depression of the 1930's it is suggested, by both 
the developmentalists and the neo-mercantilists that Chile 
switched from a form of development 'towards . 
the outside' to 
one of development 'towards the inside', primarily through 
import substitution industrialisation., Despite the fact that 
both these perspectives tend mistakenly to visualise the 
Chilean economy as reacting more or less automatically to the, 
'stimuli" of the world market, the periodisation itself, 
retains its validity as Western imperialism had very definite 
effects and was a major determinant of the internal social 
structure of the country. The role of imperialism was 
particularly important, as throughout Chilean history the more 
'nationalist' socio-economic forces failed to overcome the 
power of imperialism. The important point, howevers, _is 
to 
., 
understand that this lack of immediately visible success does 
not mean that imperialism was not resisted and that its force 
was 'overwhelming' and 'all-determining'. Rather, one of the 
main reasons why imperialism was so successful in Chile has to 
be sought in the. fact that it managed to secure a firm alliance 
with local classes:,, in particular the landlords. Here, 
, 
however, 
I am not concerned with analysing the effects of, imperialist 
penetration as such, but rather with accounting for the reasons 
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for the dominance of landed property over this period. The 
imperialist penetration of Chile accounts in large measure for 
this dominance. 
Before examining Chile's position in the world economy, 
a few points regarding the country's geographical position 
may be useful. Chile extends for over 4,200 kilometers from 
north to south along the south-west coast of South America. 
Its average width is just below 200 kilometers and at no place 
is its eastern frontier more than 400 kilometers away from the 
Pacific Ocean. The basic physical characteristic of the 
Chilean landscape is its composition of three features running 
in roughly parallel lines from north to south. These are 
the mountains of the Andes to the east, which gradually decrease 
in height from north to south; the central plateau of the west; 
and the depression running between the two. 
It 
is this latter 
area, in the middle provinces, which is the region of greatest 
agricultural productivity and potential; it is the location 
of Santiago, the capital and the area of greatest population 
density. The Mediterranean climate of central Chile implies 
little or no rainfall in the growing season and thus makes 
irrigation an important component of agricultural activity. 
Water is as valuable as land itself and without irrigation 
most of the country would be as barren as the northern desert - 
an area rich in minerals but one of the driest in the world. 
The area south of the Bio-Bio river is the rainy part of the 
country. Moving from north to_south, an area of crop and 
livestock farming is gradually replaced by hardwood forests 
which are at their most dense at the level of the island of 
Chiloe. Further south the climate becomes more harsh and 
livestock ranching is practised. In the southern area as a 
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important as it is in central Chile. Most, of the', available 
data on Chilean agriculture is concerned with the central 
valley and therefore most of the comments I shall make in 
relation to agriculture in Chile refer-primarily to that area. 
9.2.1 Chile in the World Economy. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century the available 
markets for Chilean agricultural products were small. The 
small size of towns, the, fact that the rural population 
produced its own necessary means of subsistence and'the post- 
independence redirection of demand from Peru, explains the 
relative inactivity of agricultural production during this,,. 
period (Kay, 1977a: 106). The majority of Chilean haciendas 
concentrated during this period on extensive livestock rearing 
which required only small amounts of labour-power. This 
situation started to alter in the early 1850's with the gold 
rushes in California and Australia, which created temporary 
markets for Chilean wheat and flour until these areas were 
able to produce their own food. By 1858, however, Chilean 
wheat had been replaced by Californian wheat in these markets 
of the Pacific [Bauer, 1975: 63-7]49. However, the process 
which affected fundamentally the fortunes of Chilean landowners 
was the country's incorporation into the new international 
division of labour dominated by Free-Trade Britain. 
The Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1847 and that of the 
commercial monopoly enshrined in the Navigation Acts in 1849, 
crowned, as I have had occasion to note, the victory of 
British industrial capital over landed property and merchant's 
capital. As Marx noted, these events established the period 
of "Machinery and Modern Industry" based on relative surplus- 
value extraction: 
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.. the cheapness of the articles produced by 
machinery, and the improved means of transport and 
communication furnish the weapons for conquering 
foreign markets. By ruining handicraft production 
in other countries, machinery forcibly converts them 
into fields for the supply of its raw material ... 
A new and international division of labour, a division 
suited to the requirements of the chief centres of 
modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the 
globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, 
for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly 
industrial field. " [Marx, 1867/1974: 424-53 
One of the major commodities imported by the United Kingdom 
after the abolition of the Corn Laws was wheat and Marx provides 
several tables which show the extraordinary increase in the 
importation of cereals of all kinds into the country partic- 
ularly after 1850 [ibid.: 425-6]. The following table, which 
is concerned solely with wheat imports is provided by Hobsbawm: 
T r. L-. IeO4 
Imports of Wheat into the United Kingdom 1840-1889 
[in thousands of cwt] 
Quinquennium_ Annual Average Quinquennium Annual Average 
1840-4 39,700 1865-9 148,100 
1845-9 49,400 1870-4 1979800 
1850-4 82,200 1875-9 260,200 
1855-9 79,600 1680-4 288,000 
. 
1860-4. ._ _. __144,100 
1885-9 280,600 
Source:. Hobsbawm, 1975: 198 
Hobsbawm notes that British farmers refused to compete 
with foreign producers and switched from cereal farming to 
livestock and dairy production [ibid.: 199]. In addition, the 
increased efficiency in agricultural production, which, as 
Marx also noted, followed the abolition of the Corn Laws, 
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created an increasing demand in Britain for fertilizers 
[Mathias, 1969: 341-2). 
The incorporation of Chile into the new international 
division of labour was to be undertaken primarily through the 
medium of wheat production up to the 1880's [in the central 
valley], and thereafter through the production of nitrates 
in the north of the country up until the f930's. Both these 
commodities were produced for the British market and the latter 
was British controlled50. The increase in exports of wheat 
and flour from Chile during this period is shown in Table 9.2; 
the continued high level of exports during the first half of 
the 1890's is explained by the incorporation of the newly 
colonised regions of the south into wheat production51. Bauer 
[op. cit.: 68) argues that high world prices and falling' freight 
costs were the main reasons behind the large volume of grain 
exports from Chile. Added to this was the fact that Chile 
during this period was the-only grain exporter in the southern 
hemisphere, before Argentina and Australia had entered the 
world market. By 1880, however, massive cereal production in 
North America, Australia and Russia (followed at a later date 
by Argentina), brought a rapid decline-in world prices which 
fell steadily from 64.5 shillings per quarter in'1867 to" 
26.1 shillingstin: 1900ý(Kay, op. cit.: 107). Mechanisation and 
cheap land and labour accounted for the increase in production 
in these new areas of the world, while agriculture-in the 
central valley in-Chile-operated within semi-feudal social 
relations, which imposed obstacles on the development of the 
productive forces. In any case, the landowners in the central 
valley found that, even though they could no longer compete 
on the world market, -an expanding home market was developing 
as a result of the newly acquired nitrate fields in the north. 
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Table 9.2 
Total Average Annual 
-Exports of . 
Wheat and Flour from 
Chile: 1844-1905 [in hundreds of tons] 
Years Quantity Years Quantity 
1844-45 102.4 1876-80 1,102.6 
1646-50 257.6 1881-85 1,350.9 
1851-55 378.1 1886-90 882.4 
1856-60 292.2 1891-95 19455.6 
1861-65 685.2 1896-1900 739.2 
1866-70 1,282.2 1901-05 385.2 
1871-75 1,524.1 
Source: Kay, op. cit .: 109 
They therefore switched from grain production back to livestock 
production in order to supply the growing home market. As 
it will be argued below, before the 1880's the landlords of 
the central valley were therefore under no pressure to alter 
production relations in agriculture. 
Chile acquired mostýof the northern Atacama Desert with 
its rich nitrate and copper deposits during her victorious 
War of the Pacific 01879-83] against Peru and Bolivia. The 
nitrate industry which developed, the more important of the 
two at the time, was controlled by British. interests and 
produced mainly for the British market. Between 1880 and 1910 
Chile's exports were almost totally dominated by nitrates and 
the majority of her foreign trade was undertaken with 
Britain [Mamalakis, 1976: 31). The detailed figures of Chile's 
exports and imports between 1850 and 1930, including her 
main trading 'partners' are provided in Table 9.3. By the 
1930's the market for nitrates had collapsed due to the 
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replaced by the United States as the main imperialist power 
after World War I. Between 1880 and 1930, therefore9 Chile 
was a classic enclave economy, the mining sector producing an 
estimated 20% of the total average income between 1907 and 
1930 [Table 9.41. 
Table 9.4 
Estimated Average Relative Income and Employment of Sectors 
of the Chilean Economy: 1907-30 (percentages] 









43 36 4-, =="-17 100 Employment 
Source: Mamalakis, op. cit.: 15 
On the other hand this table shows that the mining sector 
only employed about 4% of the total active population between 
the same dates. In addition, `this sector earned through 
'trade' most of the foreign exchange of the country and 
generated enormous profits, half of which were. appropriated 
by the Chilean State through customs duties, the rest being 
remitted abroad CMamalakis, op. cit.: 20; Kay, 1981: 489]. Another 
crucial effect of the imperialist domination of the Chilean 
economy was the enormous expansion of the»service sector, whose 
share of national income and employment is also indicated in 
Table 9.4. Mamalakis [op. cit.: 16-17] defines this sector, 
to include trade, banking, the State, personal services, 
transport and electricity. Its importance to the economy can 
be noted by the fact that it has accounted for'at lsäst 30% 
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of the labour force in all census years since 1907, while it 
has generated 50% of the country's income. Mamalakis notes 
that even if transport, storage and communications are excluded 
from this sector, it has employed more people than agriculture 
in every census year except 1940 [ibid.: 17-18]. 
As public revenue from the exportation of mineral products 
increased from the 1880's onwards, so did the bureaucratic 
state machinery, and so did the banking and loan capital sector. 
The latter granted easy credit to the large landowners 
[Bauer, 1975: ch. 4). The growth of mining and its attendant 
'services' after the 1880's set off a substantial growth of 
the home market for agricultural produce [Table 9.5). The 
reasons for this impressive flow of population to the cities 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century is accounted for 
by Friedman and Lackington in the following terms: 
"The economy's heavy dependence on the production 
and export of minerals, especially nitrates during 
the early period and later also copper, gave a strong 
initial push to urbanization during that period. The 
transfer of funds from mining operations via the public 
treasury resulted in heavy expenditure for public works, 
with particular emphasis on Santiago and the principal 
port cities of the country. " 
[Friedman and Lackington, 1967: 111 
The migration to areas of employment in the north of the 
country and in the towns during this period was not, however, 
the result of any transformation of social relations in 
agriculture as we shall see. Neither was there any significant 
industrial development during this period, most industrial 
production being concerned with the transformation of agricultural, 
forest, fish and mineral products for the urban population 
[Mamalakis, op. cit.: 14). In addition, a further important 
feature of the economy during this period should be borne in 
mind. The increased demand for food which resulted from the 
grwoth of towns and mining, along with a constant expansion of 
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the money supply after 1878, exerted a strong inflationary 
pressure on food prices which resulted in a 19000% increase 
in the prices of basic agricultural commodities between 
1880 and 1930 [Wright, op. cit.: 481. We shall see later that 
the inflationary rise in food prices was ultimately to produce 
dramatic consequences within agriculture. For the present it 
is worth noting thatthe numerical growth of the non-rural 
population described in Table 9.5 only gives a very superficial 
impression of the growth of the home market for food, which 
for greater accuracy should be expressed in monetary terms. 
In the absence of such statistics it is important to bear in 
mind the obvious income differentials between the miners in 
the northern provinces and the population of Santiago which, 
because of the importance of the service sector and the absence 
of industrial development already noted, contained a large 
proportion of much higher paid clerical workers, -who were 
dominant in the service sector (Mamalakis, op. cit.: 17). 
Another very important reason for the non-correspondence 
between the numerical size of the home market and its real 
size, which is of particular importance in Latin America in 
general and in Chile in particular, concerns the relatively 
large number of so-called 'marginals', or urban unemployed. 
These migrants from the rural areas have failed to be absorbed 
by the small industrial sector, with the result that they eke 
out an existence below 'subsistence level' and hence can 
hardly be assumed as belonging to a home market. This group 
was only systematically 'discovered' statistically, theoretically 
and politically in the 1960's and, although its size is 
difficult, if not impossible to guage in the late nineteenth 
century, its possible existence constitutes another reason for 
being wary of equating population figures with "paying consumers", 
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as Wright [op. cit.: 48) unproblematically asserts52. This- 
would be especially the case if Kay (1977: 113) is correct in 
suggesting that the second half of the. nineteenth. century 
witnessed the first signs of a proletarianisation of the 
peasantry53. A better indication of the movement of population 
from rural areas to the towns isýprovided-in-Table 9.6. 
-r-L-1 - In m 
Rate of -Growth and 
Percentage -Distribution of Urban -and 
Rural Population: 1865-1970 
Urban Population Rural Population 
Rate of % of Rate of % of 
Period Growth Total Pop. * Growth Total Pop. * 
u ,t 
1865-75 3.4 28 0.8 72 
1875-85 3.4 35 1.5 65 
1885-95 2.0 40 0.0 60 
1895-1907 0.5 46 1.1 54 
1907-20 2.6 43 0.5 57 
1920-30 1.9 47 0.4 53 
1930-40 2.0 49 1.1 51.. 
1940-52 2.6 52 0.0 48 
1952-60 4.0 59 0.8 41 
1960-70 3.4 65 0.5 ý35' 
# Percentages have been calculated on the first year 
of the period. 
Source: Kay, 1971: 250 
As I have already noted, the Chilean landlords switched to 
production for the internal market after the 1880's. The 
available evidence shows that agricultural production increased 
by an average of 3% between 1910 and 1930 [Kay, 1971: 253; 
1981: 492), while the rate of growth per capita achieved by the 
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same sphere was the greatest so far this century (Kay-, 1977: 114). 
The reason for this increase is to be found, as we shall see, 
not solely in the expansion of the internal market but also 
crucially in the struggles waged by the urban bourgeoisie and 
working class for the cheapening of the price of food. 
In brief, the period from 1850 to 1930 saw an expansion 
of agricultural production in Chile. If we wish to understand 
the reasons for this expansion as well as the forms which it 
took, we have to move beyond the phenomenon of the market to 
a discussion of the relations of production which prevailed 
in the countryside, as well as to an assessment of the various 
class struggles and alliances which characterised the period. 
First I shall examine the countryside itself and then I shall 
discuss agricultural production within the economy as a whole. 
9.2.2 Social Relations in Agriculture. 
The domination of the hacienda enterprise over agricultural 
material production in the central valley of Chile during 
this period has been so considerable that, on the whole, the 
history of Chilean agriculture has, to my mind erroneously, 
although to a large extent understandably, been equated with 
that of the hacienda. As I have already intimated, I want to 
move away from such an approach here, although one major 
obstacle to such a venture is the paucity of available data 
and the distortion of that which is available by the implicit 
theoretical situation of the hacienda enterprise at the centre 
of the dominant problematic which has produced the data. Some 
of the theoretical problems which the available data faces 
have already been discussed with reference to Latin America 
as a whole, but it is important to keep in mind the fact that 
these problems which I equated particularly with developmentalism, 
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are present even amongst-writers on Chile who are far from 
espousing this variant of dualism-in all-its instances 
54 
The peculiar forms. of appearance-which both Feudal and 
capitalist production relations have taken in the Chilean 
countryside to a large extent make possible the characteristics 
of the dominant social problematic within which agrarian- 
transformations are confronted. .--I °' 
The dominance of large landed property, the latifundio, 
in central Chile was so thorough and all-pervasive that a 
viable peasant economy never developed to challenge its 
authority. Apart perhaps from the south of the country, there 
never developed during the nineteenth century a basis for a 
'peasant, road' to capitalist development in Chilean agriculture. 
In this feature Chile was an exceptional case, even by Latin 
American standards. This of course does not mean that there 
was no opposition or resistance to the dominance of landlords 
in the country - indeed there-was., - but that the most-powerful 
and organised opposition was not to come from the countryside, 
but from the towns. We are faced in Chile with the fact that 
there never developed any peasant movement of any political 
significance until urban movements directly intervened in the 
countryside. The lack of any organised independent peasant- 
movement in central Chile does not, -however, imply, as some 
writers seem to think,, the existence of either-an apathetic 
or a contented peasantry55, but rather testifies to, the total 
control and immense power of the large landowners over the 
conditions of existence of the peasants, who were unable to 
establish any viable independent economy in opposition to large-, 
landed property. 
The distribution of land ownership in the central. valley 
of Chile for the years 1917 and 1935y-the years of the first 
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published acreage data are provided in Table 9.7. It can be 
seen from these figures that in 1917 a total or 947 individuals 
[corporate landownership in Chile is minimal), or 1.8% of all 
legally registered owners controlled over 71% of all 
agricultural land in the central valley in the form of estates 
over 1,000 acres. In 1935 these relative proportions had 
changed insignificantly to 1.1% and 67% respectively. The 
data refers to land ownership, so that rented land is excluded, 
a fact which minimises the size of the peasantry. Also, it 
should be noted that the figures refer to 'agricultural' land, 
i. e., land used specifically for agricultural purposes, a fact 
which decreases the unequal distribution of land ownership, 
as the larger estates also controlled land which they 
considered to be of no agricultural value. It is the bringing 
of this land into cultivation which accounts for the increase 
in land surface from 1917 to 1935. Of course, what is of no 
agricultural value to some, may be of value to others, and 
the latifundios controlled more land than they could possibly 
use, partly in order to undermine the possibility of a viable 
peasant economy and assure themselves a continuous and pliable 
labour supply. The other major difference between 1917 and 
1935 was the massive increase in the number of tiny plots below 
five hectares [the minifundios). The reasons for this 
increase will be explained below, for the present we must 
elaborate on the character of the social production relations 
in agriculture in the nineteenth century. 
The Chilean peasantry during this period can be divided 
into three major groups: the resident peasants on the haciendas, 
among whom the labour-service tenants or inquilinos were the 
most important; the smallholders known as minifundistas, who 
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thus obliged to sell part of their labour-power in order to 
subsist; and the large mass of floating labourers or peone 
without direct access to land, who engaged in seasonal labour 
during harvest time and the rest of the year made ends meet 
the best they could. The constituents of these groups of 
direct producers, it should be noted, could not reproduce 
themselves independently of the landlord economy. The only 
ones who could possibly do soy the inquilinos, were 'politically' 
dependent on the landlord through relations'of a semi-feudal 
nature. According to Kay's C1977a: 106-71 description of the 
hacienda, there were various kinds of inquilinos who were 
distinguished primarily by the size'of the land leased to them 
and the number of animals they were allowed'to pasture on the 
hacienda. The size of their labour obligation varied accord- 
ingly. The inquilinos had access to two different plots of 
land: one was a garden plot surrounding the house in which the 
family of the inguilino lived; the second was'a larger plot 
and was not situated in any set location, as it had to conform 
with the rotation of the estate's land. In addition, the 
labour-service tenant had the right to pasture a specified 
number of animals on demesne land, and to collect 'wood from 
the forest. For the days he worked on the demesne he received 
lunch, and bread for the other meals. Through the access it 
had to these means of production and raw materials, the 
inquilino household reproduced itself 
56. 
The surplus labour 
of the household on the landlord's demesne basically consisted 
of the following: 
"The inquilino was under an obligation-to supply the 
hacienda enterprise with one or more peones obligados 
[obligatory workers) nearly all the year round. When 
the peon obligado performed the labour services, he 
would receive-the inquilino's food ration. This explains 
why the peon obligado was also referred to as reemplazante, 
since-he-replaced the labour duty of'the inquilino. If 
the peon reemplazante was contracted from outside the 
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inquilino's household, the inquilino would-in addition 
pay him a supplementary wage of half- _pay_ -. 
[media paga]. 
It was obviously only the richer inquilinos who could 
afford to do this. In those cases where livestock 
farming was important, the inquilino had to provide 
his wife's or daughter's labour to milk the cows. The 
size of . the 
land lease [regali+a 'de tierra] given to 
inquilinos varied according to the fertility of the 
soil, the type of crop grown, his position within the 
labour force (largely determined by the number of years 
of service and degree of 'loyalty' expressed by the 
landlord], and above all the number of labourers he 
provided for the demesne - that iss the amount of 
labour rent paid to the landlord. " 
[Kay, loc. cit. ) 
The reproduction of the labour service tenants presupposed 
their ownership and control over a number of means of production, 
but in addition to the landlord having ultimate ownership of 
the land he leased, along with irrigation works; etc: s'the 
latter also had 'extra-economic' means of persuasion-and 
compulsion at his disposal. These included control of the 
local judiciary, administration and police, paternalistic 
relation, hacienda stores, religious indoctrination, and so 
on - in other wordsl-a whole culture and politics of social 
control and oppression57. On the other hand, debt-bondage 
rarely needed to be used, as a large supply of labour-power 
was available even accounting for rural-urban migrations58. 
In addition to the labour-service tenants, the hacienda 
could also draw'on the labour of smallholders who did not 
possess enough land and means of production to reproduce 
themselves independently, and consequently sold their labour- 
power seasonally on the large estates. They lived close to 
the hacienda and could also use some of the estate's resources 
such as pastures, woods or arable land. Some of them even 
worked on the enterprises of the inquilinos Cibid.: 1041. 
Finally a large group of seasonal wage labourers existed 
which formed a large reserve army of labour on which the 
landlord could draw when he needed to. Bauer (1971: 1074] notes 
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that in one part of central Chile alone, nearly., 60% of the 
total adult male population of 101,000 were considered by 
the census taken in 1865 to be "persons without residence 
or fixed destiny who prefer manual labour in any kind of rural 
or urban task". It should be noted that despite this existence 
of wage-labour, the large part of the wage of non-resident, _.,,,. 
workers on the hacienda was usually paid in kind [ibid.: 1080-1], 
a fact which reduced the real value of wages and increased 
social control. Unfortunately we do not have any accurate 
idea of the relative numerical importance of-these three groups 
in Chile at that time, but the following table of estimates 
provides us with a rough idea. Unfortunately this table does. 
not give an indication of the number of minifundistas9 nor 
is it clear whether 'day labourers' refers to workers. on the 
hacienda (in which case it may include minifundistas) or 
whether it refers to seasonal wage-labour alone. Nevertheless, 
what is noticeable, particularly in 1865, is the large; 
proportion of 'day labourers' and 'marginal, underemployed' 
in the rural population. 
Table 9.8 
Estimates _nf_ 
Population and Some- Agricultural Occupations 
in Central Chile, 1865 and 1930 
Population 
Categories 1865 1930 
Total Population 
Total Rural Population 
Inquilino Households 










* The category of 'empleado' refers to managers 
foremen, clerical workers and craftsmen. Source: Bauer, 1975: 159. 
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Despite the inadequacy of the existing data we can, 
however, say, it seems to me, that in essence social relations 
in Chilean agriculture during the nineteenth century combined 
both feudal and capitalist forms. The forms of rural labour 
included feudal, semi-feudal and capitalist forms, and there 
was an absence of a viable independent peasant economy. Despite 
this plurality of forms and the existence of seasonal wage- 
labour on a massive scale, it would be false to see Chilean 
agriculture during this period as moving towards capitalism 
along a linear path. Rather, the utilisation, of the labour- 
power of both labour tenants and seasonal wage-labour was 
increased on the haciendas as a result of the increased demand 
for wheat after 1850, a fact which makes it difficult to 
ascertain positively whether feudal or capitalist relations 
of production dominated the agricultural sphere. 
Bauer [1971: 1077] estimates that-the amount of land 
allotted to cereal production increased from 130,000 to 
400,000 hectares between 1850 and 1875, and he calculates 
that this implied an increase of between 35,000 and 50,000 
workers for the harvesting of grain. As the large landowners 
controlled most of the land in the country, they never faced 
any problem in finding the acreage necessary to extend grain 
production. As labour-power was also plentiful, the landowners 
had no major problems obtainingIt either. What, are important 
for our purposes, 'however, are the social relations within 
which this labour-power was organised, -and 
the manner in 
which labour productivity was increased on the haciendas, 
because production was increased by employing more labour-power 
on more land as well as by increasing the rate of exploitation. 
First I shall examine the manner in which the quantityrof 
labour-power was increased and then I shall discuss the increase 
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in labour productivity. 
Given the availability of a large pool of underemployed 
labour, the landowners merely dipped into this pool and 
settled more labour tenants on their estates and encouraged 
the creation of hamlets of minifundistas on the edge of the 
haciendas: 
"From these settlements the estates drew labour. 
An investigation of Caupolican, for example, reported 
that the 'outside, ambulatory, or loose peons ... 
naturally come from the families of small holders or 
from the households of inquilinos'. For the hacienda 
it mattered little whether the labourers lived on small 
plots on the estates or on privately-owned dwarf 
holdings. In the latter case the estate was spared 
bothersome administrative problems. In any event,, the- 
growth nearby of a large population with too little 
land to be self-sufficient but content enough for the-- 
time being to resist emigration was a welcome development 
for the landowner. " [ibid.: 1082) 
In addition the main advantage to the landowner of minifundista 
labour was its seasonal character: 
"Resident labour occupied land and required admin- 
istration and often rations. Far more preferable 
were workers who were readily available for the two 
or three months of the grain harvest and who could 
easily be dismissed when the need for them was past. 
The difficulty lay in keeping unattached men in the 
agricultural zone so that when the"need arose it would 
not be necessary-to increase wages to attract a sufficient 
number of workers. ' [ibid.: 1079] 
While the increase in numbers of the smallholders between 
1917 and 1935 is shown in Table 9.7, the increase in the number 
of inquilinos between -1865 and 1930 can 
be ascertained from 
Table S. S. Table 9.9 gives an idea of the numerical increase 
in small-scale producers as a whole between 1865 and 1895, 
in a part of the central valley between the rivers Maipo and 
Maule. The increase in number of small producers and the 
decrease in number of landless labourers testifies in some 
measure to the settlement of labour on land, although part of 
the difference is accounted for by migration. It is interesting 




Peasant Producers and Itinerant . 
Wage-Labour in one `{°""' 
area of Central Chile: 1865 and 1895 
Peasant Producers Itinerant"Wage-Labour 
Year 
. _[Inquilinos 
& Minifundistas] [Peones) 
1865 24,000 59,000 
1895 68,000 43,000 
Source: Bauer, 1971: 1083 
the landlords increased their supply of labour-power without 
increasing wages or wage equivalents. On the contrary, there 
are indications that the amount of necessary labour, whatever 
its form, was in some ways reduced. The reason that landowners 
did not have to increase wages is explained by the large 
supply of labour, the lack off sufficient alternatives for 
labourers to escape toi and the social relations of production 
within, which agriculture was operating. Bauer shows that 
landowners in fact complained of a shortage of hands despite, 
the abundance of labour-power, and that they were concerned 
about being obliged to increase wages in order to keep. the 
workers from migrating to other sources of employment. Cmining 
areas, towns, railroad construction, and so on). The way 
they overcame the problem, which after all was only. a small 
one, given the lack of employment in relation to the available 
labour supply, was by increasing 'extra economic', pressure on 
the workers. For example: 
"Threatened by the prospect of higher wages if workers 
could not be retained in the agricultural zone, the 
landowners enlisted the help of-the clergy. Directives 
were sent by the bishops to each parish priest that 
instructed them to inveigh against the destruction of 
family life that emigration would causa. " 
(ibid.: 1081] 60 
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"There were a number of ways workers could be brought 
into the system without payment of money. Where 
before a man and his family would simply be shown a 
small plot on the estate and be expected to put up 
their own flimsy shelter, in , the 1870's and after 
landowners often offered a ready-made shack and used 
this device to arraigar (root) workers to the. estate. 
The SNA (the landowners' organisation - M. N. ) pointed 
to the examples of Pomerania and East Prussia where 
landowners trying to increase the service tenantry 
obtained excellent results by building shelter for 
their workers. Other 'philanthropic' landowners made 
a practice of distributing water melons among their 
workers or-advancing an credit items form the 
hacienda pulperia (store - M. N. ). " 
(Bauer, 1975: 165) 
"The distribution of daily rations, gifts at weddings 
and births, handouts during times of food shortage, 
'which are a work of charity and also advantageous 
to the (landowner's) interests', and even a watermelon 
for 'the grateful workers' were reminders of the source 
from which blessings flowed. Even next to an obvious 
labour source - for example on the outskirts of 
Santiago - landowners set aside valuable plots of land 
on their estates and took on the task of administration 
in order to have at their beck and call the loyal . 
servant, dependent on the well-being of the estate and 
the landowner's whim.? ' 
(ibid.: 166) 61 
In addition to increasing the amount of employed labour, the 
landowners also increased production by increasing the 
productivity of all forms of labour. The increased level 
of exploitation which resulted was achieved primarily without 
an increase in capital investment, although some investment 
in irrigation, clearing, fertilizers and equipment did take 
place (Bauer, 1975: 156). The major mechanism which was used 
to increase the quantity of surplus labour was that of a 
'squeezing' or 'tightening the screws' on all three major 
forms of labour: the length of working time was increased, 
and so was the intensity of labour; the labour-process was 
'rationalised'; surplus labour was increased; and necessary 
labour was shortened. 
If we first examine the case of the labour-service tenants 
who resided permanently on the hacienda, the evidence suggests 
that those who were already settled had to provide additional 
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service. Whereas the maximum service before 1850 tended to 
be one peon obligado, the inquilino was later forced to provide 
two and even three full time workers, while his land allotment 
was not increased (Bauer, 1971: 1074). The newly settled 
tenants, however, received reduced land allotments which were 
'compensated' by an additional 'wage' which was lower than 
the wage earned by labour attracted from beyond the boundaries 
of the hacienda [Bauer, 1971: 1075; Kay, 1977a: 112). These new 
tenants - in some areas they were called inquilinos-peones - 
received at times only a garden plot. They were mainly 
selected from the inquilino household and were either relatives 
of the inquilinoýor reemplazantes. Due to the increase in 
settlement of inquilinos-peones on the hacienda and the greater 
employment of peones, the inquilinos were finding it more 
difficult to contract-replacements for their labour services, 
as they would now have to supplement the latter's earnings 
to a level equivalent to peon wages. - The majority of inquilinos 
therefore began to fulfil their labour obligations themselves 
(Kay, loc. cit. ), a process which implies some increased 
differentiation of the labour tenants. 
The process of increasing the extraction of surplus-labour 
was also experienced by the labourers employed from beyond the 
hacienda, whether they were minifundistas or itinerant wage- 
labourers. Bauer C1975: 155) remarks that in the middle of the 
nineteenth century the peones only worked for a few weeks of 
the year and only a few days in the week, while by 1925 they 
worked for more days and "a reduction in the number of holidays 
permitted fewer excuses and less dissipation [sic]". Although 
there may have been a similar number of 'day labourers' and 
'marginal, underemployed' in 1865 and 1930 [Table 9.8]g Bauer 
insists that "it is clear that by the later date they were 
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putting in more and longer days" Cibid.: 1591. In addition to 
extending the labour time of the labourers, the landowners 
also increased the intensity of the labour-process. Two main 
methods were employed here: the systematic introduction of a 
piece-wage system (known as the tarea], and a rationalisation 
of the labour-process and an intensification of supervisory 
control. Kay notes that: 
"Work by tarea was mainly used during the harvesting 
period, when it was important to bring in the harvest 
before the weather could damage the crop and lower the 
return. This system also required less supervision 
from the estate administration. The wage per tarea 
was often three to four times higher than the daily 
rate. " [Kay, 1977a: 1131 62 
The increase in the intensity of labour also resulted from 
closer supervision and the employment of more clerks, section 
bosses, and other supervisory personnel for this purpose 
(Bauer, 1975: 156). The number of empleado families (administrative 
clerical, technical and supervisory personnel 
63 increased from 
5,000 in 1865 to 18,000 in 1930 (Table 9.8). The evidence 
therefore points unmistakably to an increase in exploitation 
after the 1850's. 
In conclusion, Chilean agriculture between 1850 and 1930 
produced commodities first for the British market and then 
for the home market. It was characterised by a combination 
or 'articulation' of both feudal and capitalist social relations. 
The particular form which these relations took, however, was 
not just the result of a particular combination of two 
invariants. Chilean agriculture cannot be understood as a 
specific combination of supposedly 'pure' capitalist and 
feudal modes. Rather the phenomenal representation of both 
the feudal and capitalist relations were peculiar to it. As 
Lenin notes, labour service is itself a transitory form, it 
"is the transition from corvee to, capitalism" (1908/1977: 85); 
699 
it implies greater commodity production than the feudal 
corvee system, but it retains feudal forms of 'extra-economic' 
coercion and personal dependence. On the other hand, the 
fact that wage-labour was paid mainly in kind with some 
cash, implies a high level of commodity production as the- 
value of commodities is translatable into monetary terms. 
However, there was no free labour market in the bourgeois sense, 
as the landowners increased their labour supply aided by 
'extra-economic' machinery. It is not helpful either to 
describe the social relations in Chilean agriculture during 
this period as vaguely pre-capitalist. Apart from its 
inaccuracy, such a characterisation is purely negative and 
merely measures a deviation from an ideal. It is also linked 
to a notion of linearity. This was certainly not the case, 
as this period saw the hardening of both semi-feudal and 
semi-capitalist forms, as was indicated by the manner in which 
agricultural production was increased. A greater reliance 
by the landowners on both service labour and wage-labour 
[part of it being tied to small holdings] developed during this 
period64 
It may seem strange that I insist on the existence of 
capitalist relations of production in Chilean agriculture 
during this period, but this is only so if one equates 
capitalism with a mechanised labour-process. It is important 
to understand, as I have already insisted; that capitalist 
social relations do exist when labour is only formally 
subordinated to capital. In so far as capitalist relations 
of production were present in Chile these were, as I have 
shown, based solely, or primarily; on the extraction of 
absolute surplus-value. The semi-feudal relations which 
paralleled them relied also on similar forms of surplus 
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extraction, although of course we cannot here speak of 
surplus-value65. The absence of the systematic use of 
machinery is not an indication of the absence of capitalism, 
neither is the fact that the wage-labour which was employed 
on the haciendas was purely seasonal. The seasonal and casual 
nature of labour in agriculture is not an indication of the 
lack of a working class, as seasonal labour is prevalent in 
capitalist agriculture due to the longer length of production- 
time in relation to working-time. Marx in fact argues that 
it is purely as a result of the development of wage-labour 
under capitalism in agriculture, that "the rural labourer 
becomes even more dependent on merely casual accessory employ- 
ment and his condition deteriorates thereby" [Marx, 1874/1974: 245). 
The seasonal nature of rural labour is a result of the 
creation of wage-labour and not of some 'pre-capitalist' mode 
of production, as under the latter labour has access to the 
land. 
Finally, I have tried to give a general indication of the 
control of large landed property over Chilean agriculture. 
The Chilean landowners were able to respond to the market 
because of their total position of dominance. The corollary 
of this dominance was the lack of an important viable peasant 
economy in Chile. This can also be seen by the fact that only 
a few sharecropping arrangements were entered into when the 
landlords increased grain production after the 1850's. 
Logically the landlords could have adopted this solution as 
well as increasing the settlement of inquilinos and 
minifundistas. Some sharecropping arrangements were entered 
into on those estates which lacked capital (Bauer, 1971: 1064). 
As Kay [1977a: 114) notes "for the landlord the advantage of 
this contract was that the sharecropper supplied all the labour 
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and sometimes half of the working capital". Sharecropping 
therefore presupposes a rich peasant economy as the peasant 
has to produce surplus labour in the form of commodities. 
As such the few sharecropping arrangements which did take 
place were only entered into with the richer peasants 
[Kay, loc, cit. ]. A certain amount of differentiation of the 
peasantry was therefore taking place, but it is important to 
note, as Kay remarks, that even in sharecropping, the peasants 
did not provide all the working capital. This is perhaps 
the best indication of the weakness of peasant economy in 
Chile during this period. Nevertheless the power of the 
landowners was not confined to agriculture, and it is to an 
examination of the relations between landed property and the 
other classes of the Chilean social formation that we must 
now proceed. -- 
9.2.3 The Landed Property/Imperialism Alliance. 
From 1880 to 1930 the Chilean landowners did not just confine 
their power to the agricultural sector but dominated the social 
formation as a whole along with financial interests and 
British imperialism. While imperialism rarely intervened 
directly in the process of political domination, landed 
property dominated the Chilean State. For example, Wright 
01973: 2441 mentions that the SNA, the National Agricultural 
Scoiety which was-the large landowners' organisation, "was 
also a quasi-official agency of government ... and in general 
acted as an informal Ministry of agriculture"; while Bauer 
01975: 215-71 notes that in 1854,41% of the 83 members of 
Congress owned large agricultural estates, this figure 
increasing to 50%y 57% and 46% in the years 1874,1902 and 
, 1918 respectively 
66 
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The following remarks by Bauer give a good impression 
of the balance of forces at the time: 
"In Congress as in the elite in general, the 
importance of landownership is a relection of: 
[1) the increasing yield of agriculture; [2) the 
enduring prestige value of land for urban investors; 
and [3) the relative weakness of the urban sectors 
of the economy. This is not to say that mining, trade 
and industry were not thriving; they clearly were. 
But because these activities were dominated by 
foreigners, few individual Chileans directly represented 
the most dynamic sectors of the country. Chilean 
nitrates propelled John Thomas North, the famous British 
'nitrate king' to social prominence in England (and 
very nearly into the House of Commons), but in Chile, 
the social and political reflection of mining tended 
to be one step removed from the activity itself; that 
iss the government obtained the Chilean share through 
taxation and channeled this revenue through the public 
administration into transport, education and urban 
improvement. This then created many well-paid openings 
for office holders and professionals - as many as 
thirty-eight per cent of the 1915-18 Congress might be 
classified as such - but these men and their ideas were 
more likely to be drawn from the traditional-landholding 
families than anywhere else. As a consequence, it is 
arguable that the Thirty-first Congress (1915-18) 
contained fewer direct representatives from the mining 
and commercial sectors than did the Tenth [1852-5). 
Thus, even in a period of rapid economic growth, when 
a great deal of wealth was generated in non-agricultural 
sectors, when cities and an urban proletariat were 
rapidly expanding, the main machinery of government 
was composed of either traditional landowners or of men 
for whom landownership and the life style this implied 
continued to be a cherished value. " 
(ibid.: 217) 
The particular form of imperialist penetration in Chile had 
the peculiar effect of both blocking the development of a 
national manufacturing industry, because of the reliance on 
manufactured imports which were paid for by mining revenues, 
and of creating a large service sector which I have previously 
described. Thus the two classes which provide the-main 
opposition to landed property - the industrial bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat - were both relatively weak, while the -- 
latter was in addition geographically isolated in the northern 
desert. Apart from these two classes, the opposition to the 
landowners also came from the better paid clerical and 
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professional workers in the service sector and the mass of 
underemployed 'marginals' who also inhabited the towns. 
Nevertheless the important point remains, that it was the 
penetration of imperialism in Chile which limited the power 
of the anti-landlord classes. 
Imperialism itself was not opposed to landlord political 
domination, not simply because of the accidental fact that the 
landlords happened to be the dominant class and that their 
continued dominance ensured political stability, but also and 
more importantly, because both imperialism and landed property 
faced the same class enemies. The incipient Chilean industrial 
bourgeoisie was also a national bourgeoisie in the sense that 
its interests conflicted with imperialist domination. This 
was so much so that in one well-known case at least - that of 
President Balmaceda, who in the early 1890's had attempted to 
pursue nationalist bourgeois policies - the dominant alliance 
of imperialist, landlord and commercial intervats lost no time 
in fomenting a civil war to bring the country back to 
'normality'67 The capitalist ventures which engaged in the 
construction of railways, roads and buildings - which 8almaceda 
encouraged along with the 'Chileanisation' of the nitrate 
industry - attracted workers from the countryside by offering 
relatively high wages, which soon drew the opposition of the 
landlords [Frank, 1971: 105-6168. In addition, the working 
conditions of the miners in the north were similar to those 
of the peasantry69 and the nitrate industry, being in a position 
of world monopoly, was concerned not to overproduce and 
create a fall in prices 
70. 
With the additional factor of the 
abundance of labour-power, these features account for the 
industry's labour process being, as in agriculture, based all 
in all an the extraction of absolute surplus-value and the 
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attendant maintenance of the lowest possible price of labour- 
power. Any opposition to landed property was therefore 
unlikely to come from this quarter. Even though the mining 
industry came increasingly under pressure from the miners' 
demands to improve working conditions and generally to increase 
real wages from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, by 
the time this movement gathered momentum the nitrate industry 
was already under recession 01907-81 from which it never 
recovered. Indeed, the growth of the movement of the nitrate 
miners can be said to have coincided with the depression in 
the industry and the consequent laying-off of hundreds of 
workers [Angell, 1972: 391. 
Despite these various factors, the 1880's saw the 
beginnings of an intense struggle against landed property which 
continued unabated up-to the 1970's. This struggle was to 
involve at different periods an alliance of the bourgeoisie, 
the working class, the urban professional and clerical groups 
and the underemployed against the landed property/imperialism 
alliance. Although it was later to involve the various 
peasant classes, in the period up to 1930 the main opponents 
of the landlords were the urban groups enumerated above. ' The 
more specific issue around which the struggle evolved was 
the high price, and the inflationary increase in the price, 
of food. The inflationary rise in the price of food 
(Table 9.101 was exacerbated by the gradual introduction of 
protective measures in the 1890's. The landowners, after the 
1880's, had changed their position from free-traders to 
protectionists along with their altered economic interests. 
They were particularly concerned about the importation into 
Chile of cheaper Argentinian beef and imposed a duty on 
imported cattle, which amounted to 207. of the market price, 
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Table 9.10 
Prices of -three 
food products in Santiago: 1846-1925 
[Averages of five-year periods in current pesos) 
Quinquennium Flour C46 kg) 
Beans 
[100 kg) Cow Index1 
1846-50 2.09 2.26 10.12 44 
1851-55 3.28 3.18 12.66 80 
1856-60 3.00 4.46 25.83 104 
1861-65 2.55 2.70 20.40 79 
1866-70 2.93 3.31 23.30 93 
1871-75 2.95 4.29 31.20 114 
1876-80 3.82 4.75 30.50 125 
1881-85 3.50 4.84 43.40 146 
1886-90 4.29 5.74 49.40 171 
1891-95 4.71 7.04 57.00 198 
1896-1900 6.19 8.57 64.75 237 
1901-05 6.90 12.20 104.00 330 
1906-10 11.41 25.60 210.00 592 
1911-15 18.47 36.20 207.00 819 
1916-20 22.54 47.00 282.00 1081 
1921-25_ 30.08 59.40 356.00 1386 
# The three commodities have been weighted to 
calculate the index in the following way: 
flour 45%; beans 45%; cow 10%. 
Source: Appendix A 
ýýý 
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a measure which drew the opposition of the population of 
Santiago organised by the Democratic Party. Although it is 
not necessary to document the details of this struggle here 
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it is important to note that the main issue to be attacked 
by the Democratic Party was the cattle duty itself and that 
it argued its case in a similar manner to the English 
Anti-Corn Law League. Wright [1973: 245) remarks that the 
arguments against the cattle tax were taken explicitly from 
those of the League, and that amongst the groups most opposed 
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to the tax were those capitalists "who alleged that the 
duty raised the cost of living and hence production costs'? 
[ibid.: 249). 
There iss however, one major difference between the case 
of the Corn Laws and that of the Chilean cattle tax. Very 
simply, this is concerned with the fact that, whereas wheat 
could have been said to form a major part of the English 
working-class diet, the same could not be said of beef and 
the Chilean working class, with the result that it may seem 
difficult to argue that the high price of beef increased the 
price of labour-power. In other words, it may seem prima facie 
impossible to suggest that beef formed part of the necessities 
of life. Nevertheless, several characteristics of the 
Chilean case complicate the situation. First, as Bauer 
01975: 761 notes, on average the inhabitants of Santiago consumed 
in 1888,150 kilogrammes of beef per year: twice as much as 
those of New York or Paris72. Second, although these figures 
testify to a cultural preference for meat, they are also a 
reflection of the relative wealth of the service sector 
employees who, as I have noted, constituted a large proportion 
of the population of Santiago, especially in relation to the 
small size of the working class. Third, as the Democratic 
Party itself argued [Wright, 1973: 244], the turning of 
cultivated fields into pasture which the high price of beef 
implied, would contribute to a rise of food prices in general. 
Finally, and most importantly, it would be mistaken to assume, 
as Wright and Bauer seem to dog that because the Democratic 
Party aimed its attack at the cattle tax and the price of beef, 
that this was also the main objective of the mass of the poor 
who were directly involved in street demonstrations against 
it. Let me amplify this point. The struggle to abolish the 
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cattle tax was not confined to the realms of intellectual 
debate and intrigue within the State apparatus, but the 
Democratic Party succeeded in organising a mass movement which 
demonstrated on the streets. The physical confrontation 
reached a climax in the infamous Red Week massacre of 1905, 
where hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured 
on the streets of Santiago Cibid.: 252-31. Not-surprisingly 
the majority of the demonstrators were the poor underemployed-- 
'marginals' and workers of the city, for whom beef was"unlikely 
to constitute a staple food! If one were to argue that the 
price of beef was the main concern of the demonstrators, as 
opposed to that of the Democratic Party, one would have to resort to 
statements regarding the power'of populist demagogy and so 
forth, which are not worth taking seriously. - The problem, 
however, disappears if we turn to the-figures for price 
increases for the year 1905, for it soon becomes apparent that 
during that year alone, while the price of beef increased by 
just under 5%, the price of flour increased by over 30% and 
that of beans, the staple diet of the working class, by 80% 
(Appendix A]. Moreover, these figures probably underestimate 
the true level of price increases, for they refer to wholesale 
and not to retail prices. If we also'mention that a survey 
of 81 working-class families between 1911 and 1921 revealed 
that on average 60% of their total income was'spent on food 
Cibid.: 2401, we have arrived at a straightforward answer to 
our problem. 
It follows from these points that it can safely be 
ascertained that the opposition to landed property which 
focussed on the abolition of the cattle tax, was directed against 
the high price and the inflationary rise in the price of 
food in general, and not just of meat. The various sectors 
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of the population of Santiago were concerned with the price 
of different food products. The fact that the workers and 
poor of the capital provided in the streets (they were not 
represented at the level of the State) the main force behind 
the struggle does not qualify this opposition to the landlords 
as 'working-class'. On the contrary, this was, like the 
Anti-Corn Law League, a bourgeois movement. It was so not 
because of the social composition of its adherents, but rather 
because of its political line, the effect of which would be 
to reduce the price of the necessities of life and thereby 
wages. As Marx put it in relation to the struggle for the 
abolition of the Corn Laws " ... the price of bread was to 
be 
reduced in order to reduce wages, and ... the profit of capital 
would rise by as much as rent fell" (Marx, 1846/1976: 4571. 
As the industrial bourgeoisie was very weak in Chile if 
compared to England, and as it was itself concerned with 
introducing tariff barriers of some sort (Wright, 1975: 51 ff], 
it was obliged to find allies in the better-off consumers of 
the service sector and among the working class and the 
underemployed. The fact that this alliance did not succeed 
either in halting agricultural protectionsim or more 
importantly in reducing food prices, testifies to the power 
of the landlord/imperialism alliance. 
The SNA managed to keep a protectionist tariff in force, 
apart from short periods of suspension, until after 1930 and 
greater protection for agricultural products was introduced 
in 1916,1921 and 1925 Cibid.: 56173. With the collapse of 
nitrate exports in 1918, and the massive unemployment which 
resulted, the pressure from the anti-landlord alliance increased, 
while the control of inflationary prices became the overriding 
priority of the mobilised and better organised masses. The 
709 
development of organised trade unions and workers' parties, 
added to the bourgeois elements of the alliance, gave rise to 
a more sophisticated programme in 1919. According to Wright, 
the new demands of what he terms this "urban consumer programme" 
were: 
I'll agrarian reform, to increase 
productivity over the long run, 
at the production wholesale and 
obtain immediate relief. After 
superseded the cattle tax as th 
fight of the urban lower-income 
agricultural 
and 2] price controls 
retail levels to 
1918 these demands 
e central issues in the 
groups against inflation. 
The 1919 urban consumer program was implemented in 
its essentials within less than fifteen years. This 
resulted not only from the growth of working and 
middle class political power, but also from the 
increased sensitivity of governments, irrespective of 
ideology or social composition, to the, disruptive 
potential of uncontrolled inflation. Following the 
precedent of the 1918 cattle tax suspension, the 
authorities responded to every substantial rise in the 
inflation rate by offering the minimum concession 
necessary to forestall dangerous mass mobilization. 
The cattle tax was suspended again when prices rose in 
1925, and eliminated as a political issue in 1927 when 
it was placed on a sliding scale based on price levels. 
The Caja de Colonizacion Agricola (Agricultural 
Colonization Agency] was established in 1928 For the 
explicit purpose of fostering productivity, and hence 
lowering food costs, by subdividing latifundia. 
Finally, with the dramatic acceleration of inflation 
following the trough of the Depression in 1932, the 
current right-center government did not hesitate to 
implement existing plans for a powerful national 
price control agency in a vain attempt to preserve 
social and political stability. " 
(Wright, 1973: 2581 
Thus the situation which resulted from the class struggles 
between the anti-landlord alliance and landed property were 
very much a compromise. The dominance of landed property was 
by no means smashed. It was hardly weakened as it retained 
control of agricultural production which it was to transform 
1ý in its own intersts after 1930. Inflation was not controlled, 
as the figures in Appendix A show. What did happen, as 
Wright points out, is that the State enacted the minimum 
measures to forestall mobilisation. The lack of control 
over inflationary price rises was later to produce demands 
6 
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for the adjustment of wages to the cost of living. The 
demands for land reform which increased after 1919, were 
demands for the modernisation of the latifundia through 
,a 
certain amount of subdivision of the largest estates. The 
large estates did in fact subdivide their domains among members 
of their family, a fact which accounts for the greater number 
of owners of large estates in 1935 as compared to 1917 [Table 9.71. 
Despite the failure of the anti-landlord alliance to 
remove landed property from a position of power, it must be 
stressed that the struggle did amount to a major pressure on 
landed property. Together with the struggle by the working 
class to increase the price of labour-power, the struggle 
against landed property was to contribute to forcing the 
landlords to initiate a major programme of investment of new 
machinery and techniques on their estates which was to develop 
particularly clearly after 1930. 
It is sometimes suggested that the period 1650-1930- 
was one of 'missed opportunities' for Chilean agriculture, 
whereby the rural sector preferred to increase its 'traditional' 
methods of production rather than invest in 'national 
development' and the 'modernisation' of agricultural estates 
protected by tariff barriers74 [Kay, 1981: 488-93; Wright, 1975: 45). 
This argument reduces the explanation for 'development' or 
lack of 'development' to a question of choice on the part of 
a group of economic agents. I hope it is apparent from the 
argument I have presented so far, that it was rather the social 
structure in which agricultural production took place during 
this period which accounts in large measure for the manner 
in which it was increased. It was not a matter of choice, or 
ruling class decision, but rather a question of the form 
taken by production relations and the balance of class forces. 
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The social relations in agriculture were such that landowners 
could easily increase production by increasing surplus labour 
extraction in both semi-feudal and formally capitalist ways75. 
The plentiful supply of both labour-power and land, along with 
the unchallenged dominance which the landlords exercised in 
the countryside, contributed to the reproduction of both 
kinds of production relations. It is this dominance of landed 
property over the whole social formation which I have attempted, 
admittedly rather briefly, to account for. This dominance 
cannot merely be explained with reference to the landlords' 
control of the State apparatus and a so-called "oligarchical 
mode of domination", whatever that is (Kay, 1981: 489,492). 
This merely pushes the question back one degree, as this 'mode 
of domination' then has to be explained. I have attempted 
to argue that a crucial factor in accounting for the 
reproduction of the immense power of landed property over the 
Chilean social formation as a whole during this period, must 
be the alliance of landed property with imperialism. It was 
the forms which imperialist penetration took in Chile which 
stifled the development of a national industry, and merely 
allocated Chile to the role of wheat and then nitrate provider 
in the international division of labour. The blockage of 
national capitalist industrial development reduced the 
effectiveness of the opposition to the landlords in the struggle 
between wage-labour, capital and landed property. As I have 
already argued theoretically, the transformation of capitalist 
agriculture from absolute to relative surplus-value extraction 
(what bourgeois social science refers to as the 'modernisation' 
or 'development' of agriculture) amounts to a phenomenal 
alteration of capitalist social relations which requires a 
class struggle between capital, often allied with wage-labour 
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and other classes, against landed property. In Chile this 
struggle only began to manifest itself from the late nineteenth 
century onwards. Even then, the form which it took (importance 
of the city petty-bourgeoisie and the urban poor], as well 
as the weakness of the anti-landlord alliance, are largely 
accounted for by the form of imperil. ist penetration. The 
effects of this pressure on landed property only started to 
be felt after World War I. In addition a viable peasant 
economy which could have provided an ally to the landlord 
opposition, in the form of an alternative road to capitalist 
development, was lacking. This phenomenon is the major proof 
of the fallacy of attempting to account for agricultural 
development by remaining within the confines of this sphere 
and considering it as a self-contained and independently 
existing domain. The transformation of social relations in 
agriculture cannot be accounted for solely by reference to the 
class struggle between landlords and peasants. 
Finally it must not be forgotten that in so far as 
capitalist relations were present in the Chilean countryside, 
the landlords never leased their land to capitalists but 
actually controlled production themselves [or via managers). 
This is an indication of the weakness of capital and the lack 
of a rich peasantry; it implies that the landlords realised 
both the profit and the ground-rent themselves. The huge 
overall profits which these amounted to, show that there was 
absolutely no need for them to 'modernise' their estates. 
It was only really in the 1930's, with the temporary collapse 
of imperialist control, that national capital reached a 
position of power to challenge sufficiently the absolute 
dominance of landed property while the latter temporarily lost 
its major ally. It was during and following the 1930's that the 
landlords were forced to 'modernise' their estates. 
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9.3 The Landlord-led Capitalist Transformation: 1930-1960 
The period from 1930 to 1960 witnessed two related processes 
in Chilean agriculture: the gradual differentiation of the 
labour tenants on the haciendas and the investment of machinery 
on, and general 'modernisation' of these same estates. At 
the same time, however-, agriculture became, for the first time, 
unable to supply the growing demand for food by the domestic 
market, with the result that agricultural products had to be 
imported on a systematic basis. According to Mamalakis 
(op. cit.: 131], Chile's trade deficit in food, water and forestry 
products increased from 045.6 million in 1956 (9% of 
non-agricultural exports), to %110.6 million in 1963 (22.2% of 
non-agricultural exports]. A fuller picture is provided in 
Table 9.11. Whatever Chilean capital had managed to gain in 
its temporary victory over imperialism through its enactment 
of an import substitution process, was not paralleled during 
this period by a similar 'victory' over landed property. 
Table 9.11 
Chilean Agricultural Trade Balance, 1936-1965 
(in millions of US $) 
3 Year 
Average- Exports Imports Balance 
1936-38 28.6 17.6 + 11.0 
1939-41 20.8 20.1 + 0.7 
1942-44 25.9 32.6 - 6.7 
1945-47 42.7 55.2 - 12.3 
1948-50 39.6 69.2 - 29.6 
1951-53 42.5 81.7 - 39.2 
1954-56 25.3 103.0 - 77.7 
1957-59 31.7 83.5 - 51.8 




Source:. Key, 1971: 252 
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Clearly then, even though agricultural production was increased 
during this period through 'mechanisation' - the gradual 
introduction of relative surplus-value extraction in the 
agriculture labour-process - it was not increased fast enough. 
This led to an increased pressure by capital, in alliance 
with now organised labour, over landed property, which eventually 
reached its climax in the redistributive land reforms of the 
1960's and early 1970's. The dominant ideological form which 
the struggle took was one between developmentalism and 
modernisation theory where the first acted as the ideology of 
capital-led development, and the latter as that of landlord-led 
development. The arguments and data presented by the 
developmentalists and discussed in Chapter 2 must therefore 
be seen as the main ideological expression of the anti-landlord 
struggle led by national capital. The objective forms of 
that same struggle must, however, not be forgotten. 
9.3.1 The Changing Balance of Class Forces and the Increased 
Pressure on Landed Property 
The alteration in the balance of class forces which took place 
during this period was characterised by three fundamental 
aspects: the strengthening of domestic capital, primarily via 
a process of import substitution; the increase in power of the 
working class manifested in the development of trade unionism 
and powerful left-wing parties; and the struggle for peasant 
unions. 
The collapse of trade with Britain during World War I 
and the development of artificial fertilizers destroyed the 
nitrate industry on which Chile depended for its foreign 
exchange. This was followed by the collapse of the capitalist 
world economy when Chile, along with other Latin American 
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countries, lost its capacity to import. The details of this 
process, along with the import substitution 'industrialisation' 
which followed, are reasonably well known and need not be 
repeated here76. Suffice to note that import substitution 
industrialisation behind high tariff barriers which was to 
become the mainstay of ECLA's strategy for development after 
World War II, implied a weakening of imperialism and a 
strengthening of the position of the national [particularly 
the industrial] bourgeoisie during the 1930's. The bourgeoisie 
managed to secure for itself a strong position within the 
State, with the result that the lion's share of the State's 
development funds were directed towards industry rather than 
agriculture [Carriers, 1977a]. In the absence of preferential 
treatment 
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the Chilean landowners generally found the 'rate 
of return' on agricultural investment relatively low in 
comparison with other spheres of investment (Mamalakis and 
Reynolds, 1965: ch. 31. As we shall see below, landlords did 
engage in mechanisation programmes, but evidently not to a 
sufficient extent to satisfy the home market. Although they 
were powerful enough to retain control over agriculture so 
that they were never reduced to renting out their property 
to capitalist farmers, the weakening of imperialism during 
the inter-war period decreased their power vis-avis the industrial 
bourgeoisie. 
The weakening of imperialism was, however, only a 
temporary affair. This is indicated by the'fact that whatever 
import substitution did take place was confined to Department II 
(production of means of consumption] and that consequently 
Chile was still dependent on foreign means of production which 
were'not produced at home (Furtado, op. cit.: 84). Nevertheless, 
even though imperialism was not defeated by import substitution 
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capitalist development-, a point that is constantly stressed 
by 'dependency' theorists 
78' 
after World War II the national 
bourgeoisie remained a force to be reckoned with, and was 
added to the classes comprising the power bloc during this 
period. 
The inability of agriculture to satisfy the home market 
for food was one major factor which kept the struggle between 




Consumer--Index-of Santiago Prices, 1937-1974 
(Average over five year period] 
All Quinquennium items Food 
1937-40* 6.55 6.19 
1941-45 11.95 11.54 
1946-50 27.40 25.32 
1951-55 100.00 100.00 
1956-60 564.49 557.89 
1961-65 1602.48 1742.81 
1966-70 5398.63 5847.31 
# Four year period 
Source: Appendix 6 
As can be seen from Table 9.12 the rate of inflation during 
this period can only adequately be described as 'galloping'. 
Although the rate of increase in the price of food did not 
substantially deviate from that of all the items included in 
the index, it was such as to ensure the systematic and continuing 
opposition of capital to landed property. Indeed, it will 
be remembered from Chapter 2 that the famous 'structuralist' 
account of inflation devised by the ECLA economists, who acted 
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as the spokesmen of the national bourgeoisie, was based 
precisely on an argument which maintained that it was the 
structure of landownership which constituted one of the main 
obstacles to [capitalist] development. It is therefore 
understandable how the failure of agriculture to satisfy the 
demand for food, and the inflationary increase in agricultural 
prices, along with the phenomenal forms taken by production , 
relations in the countryside, could all help to reproduce the 
ideological notion that agriculture and the latifundistas 
were 'f eudal's 'traditional' in their behaviour, and so on80. 
As we shall see, during this period none of these terms was 
applicable to Chilean agriculture as capitalist production 
relations dominated the countryside. 
The other class which developed its power during this period 
and which was also directly concerned with the inflationary 
increase in food prices, was the working class. The growth 
of a powerful labour movement in which the two left-wing 
parties, the Communist and the Socialist Parties - both explicitly 
marxist in persuasion - were dominant, provided during this 
period a direct and strong challenge to the power of capital81. 
The left in Chile was powerful enough to establish for a 
n brief period of 12 days a Socialist Republic, while the country 
was the only one in Latin America to elect a Popular Front 
government in the late 1930's. These examples, although brief, 
do testify to the power of the Chilean labour movement which 
throughout this period succeeded in raising the price of 
labour-power through struggles For an eight-hour day, the 
raising of wages, labour and social security legislation, 
better working conditions, and so on. 
Although there is no need here to provide an account of 
working-class struggles in Chile, I think it is important to 
mention one particular issue which brings out clearly the point 
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I wish to stress: namely, that the growing power of the 
working class contributed strongly to forcing the bourgeoisie 
to put pressure on landed property in order to cheapen the 
price of food. The particular issue which I think important 
to mention in somewhat more detail was the ability of the 
left, the Communist Party in particular, to fight successfully 
for the annual adjustment of wages to the cost of living index. 
Wright [1973:; ý58-9) argues that the enactment of wage 
adjustment legislation in 1937 and 1941 was only a variation 
on established policy which, since the Red Week Massacre of 
1905 had attempted to contain unsuccessfully the rise in food 
prices. He suggests that the bourgeoisie had to condescend 
to this outcome, so as to avert the conflict and mass 
mobilisation which the Red Week had shown could easily be 
produced by inflation. Although there is not much doubt that 
this was indeed one of the reasons for the success of the left, 
it should also be borne in mind that this struggle only 
succeeded because of the continuous antagonism between capital 
and landed property, which manifested itself primarily in 
conflicts over the price of food82. Carriere, in his important 
analysis of SNA documents, shows for instance that between 
1937 and 1964, out of the 445 "most intense" "inter-sectoral 
conflict situations" in which the SNA was involved, 168 cases 
[37%] were directly concerned with a "clash of interest" with 
the industrial sector. The issues most likely to produce 
such a 'clash' were: 1) the SNA demands for removing maximum 
prices for agricultural products (32 cases); 21 demands for 
tariffs on foreign agricultural products (35 cases]; 31 the 
promotion of agricultural exports through commercial agreements 
[22 cases]; 4) export quotas on agricultural products [17 cases); 
5) taxes and subsidies affecting the agricultural sector 
[16 cases); 61 import tariffs, particularly those on agricultural 
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machinery (12 cases); and 7) 
between the agricultural and 
[Carriere, 1975: 25-61. This 
manifestations of the antagol 
landed property. 
The annual readjustment 
the allocation of credit as 
industrial sectors [11 cases] 
shows quite clearly the 
iism between domestic capital and 
of wages along with the more 
general pressures exerted by wage-labour meant, of course, 
a decrease in profits83, which capital maintained by increasing 
prices, thereby creating more inflation and so on. The only 
other way it could maintain these, in the long run if not in 
the short run, was by investing in new machinery which had to 
be imported. This solution was not only expensive, but it 
also demanded foreign exchange for which domestic capital 
found itself again in conflict with the landlords, not only 
because the latter also sought grants to import machinery84, 
but also because an increasing amount of 
precious foreign 
exchange was spent on importing food. It is not surprising 
in these circumstances that the industrial bourgeoisie found 
itself squeezed between the working class and the landlords, 
and allied itself in turn with either class against the other, 
depending on the circumstances. Thus, during this period, the 
bourgeoisie allied itself with the working class against the 
landlords on the issue of agricultural prices, and with the 
landlords against the working class on the issue of wages 
(Carriere, op. cit. ). Given the power of the working class 
as expressed in the wage readjustment legislation, it became 
exceedingly difficult for capital to reduce substantially 
the price of labour-power. An alternative way to do this was 
through a removal of the justification for wage readjustment: 
the inflationary rise in food prices. By the 1960'sß a major 
alliance of capital and wage-labour was directed 
against landed property through the medium of demands for 
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land redistribution. 
The position of industrial capital was thus precarious, 
although it had managed to consolidate a foothold within the 
country as a whole and the State apparatus in particular, 
where it had removed landed property from its position of 
absolute power, it did not manage during this period to 
penetrate the countryside;. this it only did in the mid 1960's. 
However, it is possible to understand the clamours for agrarian 
reform which reached their climax in the 1960'sß as well as 
the ideological connection which was made by the bourgeoisie 
and eloquently expressed by the developmentalists, between 
the 'traditional' practices of the landowners, the unequal land 
tenure pattern and the rate of inflation. 
The power of wage-labour in the towns was also largely 
contingent on a contradiction, but one which had its source 
in the nature of the dominant classes. Wage-labour-in Chile 
had been helped to attain its power - as expressed in its 
ability to obtain annual wage readjustments - by the antagonism 
between capital-and landed property, and especially the 
relative power of the latter to resist a takeover by capital. 
This point is crucial and was never to be properly understood 
by the leadership of the working class, with disastrous 
consequences at a later date. To put the point simply, it is 
possible to suggest that if Chilean domestic capital-had been 
able to reduce the price of food by intervening in the 
countryside, it would have largely been able to circumvent and 
diffuse the power of wage-labour expressed in its demand for 
annual wage increases, by increasing the purchasing power of 
labour while decreasing the value of labour-power in real 
terms. The strategy associated with relative surplus-value 
extraction and utilised with such success by industrial capital 
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in so many parts of-the world, was therefore not available to 
Chilean domestic capital during this period. The power of 
urban wage-labour as typified by the issue around which it 
was generally mobilised - the issue of prices - was thus 
precarious as it largely depended on the ability of landed 
property to resist its incorporation into capital. ,, 
In the 
absence of this resistance, one of the contradictory conditions 
of the existence of the power of wage-labour would disappear. 
This point remained totally unperceived by the Left, as is, 
made evident by its continuous unproblematic and uncompromising 
ideological attack on the so-called landed 'oligarchy', the 
contradictory nature of which was totally misunderstood. 
Although wage-labour did manage to build a powerful urban 
movement during the period under discussion, it was much less 
successful in the countryside. Again there is no need to 
recount in any depth the history of the class struggle in the 
Chilean countryside, as such accounts can be found elsewhere 
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I shall concentrate at this stage on noting a limited number 
of points which are of particular importance for the present 
discussion and for the train of events to be discussed in 
the following chapter. The first point to note is that peasant 
organisation in Chile was initiated by political parties and 
unions which had developed their strength in urban areas. As 
Klein puts it, the origins of the peasant movement were: 
... not created as a result of pressure exerted by 
peasants, to which different urban groups would 
have reacted; quite on the contrary from the very 
beginning, the political parties of the left, with 
leaders and supporters of a completely urban characters 
were the ones to start working in the rural sector. 
We are referring primarily to the communist party's 
endeavours. Later on the Catholic Church began to send 
personnel to counter-balance the Marxists' advances 
and offer the peasants another alternative. " 
(Klein, 1973: 132-3) 
The reasons for the failure of an independent peasant movement 
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to develop have, of course, nothing whatsoever to do with 
any supposedly 'peasant' psychological attitude such as 
'natural apathy', 'lack of consciousness', 'backwardness', 
or whatever. The seemingly sudden and massive upsurge in 
peasant militancy which was to take place-in the late 1960's, 
when the power of landed property was drastically curtailed 
and peasant organisation was finally legalised, puts paid to 
such conceptions 
86. 
Rather, as I have already argued, the 
reasons for the lack of an independent peasant movement are to 
be found in the weakness of Chilean peasant production and 
the extreme power of the latifundistas. Carriers (1977b) shows 
very well, for instance, how between 1920, and 1948 the attempts 
at peasant organisation were systematically smashed by the 
power of the landed proprietors. Although Carriers concentrates 
on the practice of the SNA within the national State, it must not 
be forgotten that the landlords had a free"hand in the 
countryside itself where they directly controlled the local 
State apparatuses [Loveman, 1976: chs. 3-6). The failure of 
the struggle to organise the peasantry is indicated by the 
fact that not once between 1948 and 1965 did the proportion 
of organised labour reach 1% of all rural labour [Carriere, 
1977b: 17). 
The second important point to note in the context of 
this discussion is an exceedingly important one to which I 
shall have occasion to return. It concerns the form in which 
the urban groups attempted to organise the peasantry. The 
strategy of all urban groups including both the Communist Party 
and the Catholic organisations, took the form primarily of 
organising unions on the basis of enterprises. This policy, 
which was to have disastrous consequences at a later date - 
it contributed, I shall argue later, to the failure 
to develop socialist relations in the countryside under 
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Allende - was born and consolidated during this period. By 
excluding those peasants [the majority] who did not reside 
permanently on the haciendas from any organisation, it 
divided the peasantry to such an extent that in the late 
1960's peasant collective action was to be largely confined 
to the permanent workforce on the haciendas [Klein, op. cit.: 78). 
But this is to anticipate a future discussion. For the present 
it is sufficient to note that prior to 1960, although peasant 
organisation was largely confined to Communist Party activity, 
the intervention in the countryside by all the urban groups 
was to take this particular form. 
Thus the dominance of landed property was challenged 
throughout the Chilean social formation during this period. 
It was challenged successfully in the urban areas and at the 
level of the States by an alliance of the industrial 
bourgeoisie and the working class, but with much less success 
in the countryside where the working-class parties acted 
practically alone. Unionism was only really to succeed when 
capital itself was to intervene in the countryside along with 
the working class, and when the domination of large landed 
property was systematically attacked through a capital-led 
form of agricultural development in the 1960's. Wage-labour 
was never strong enough to beat the landowners on its own in 
the latter's domain. It was only when it allied itself 
with capital in the countryside itself - as it had previously 
done in the cities with success - that it met with any success. 
Capital was able to penetrate agriculture systematically 
after 1960 precisely because landlord-led capitalist develop- 
ment had failed to take place fast enough to satisfy domestic 
demand for food despite the undoubted '. modernisation' of 
many landed estates. Hence it is not surprising to find, as 
we shall see in the following chapter, that during the main 
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period of capital-led development in agriculture - the Frei 
agrarian reform of 1964 to 1970 - only the most 'inefficient' 
estates (in other words,. the ones with the least capital 
investment) were to be affected by the provisions of the 
reform. Although these points anticipate a later argument, 
I have thought it necessary to mention them briefly in order 
to indicate my reasons for emphasising the points I do in the 
present section. It now remains to examine the process 
of landlord-led capitalist transformation in agriculture 
after 1930. 
9.3.2 The Transformation of the Countryside. 
As I have already noted, the Chilean countryside during this 
period was transformed under the direction of the large landed 
proprietors in two main related ways. The first was the 
gradual capitalisation of the great estates, and the second 
was the transformation and loss of importance of the labour 
tenancy system or inquilinaje. 
Crosson [1970: ch. 3] shows that, in the 1950's, the stock 
of agricultural machinery increased from between 80 to 120 per 
cent, the consumption of fertilizers doubled, while the 
consumption of pesticides grew between three and four times. 
All this occurred while the number of persons actively 
employed in agriculture remained constant. A more detailed 
account of the increase in the stock of agricultural machinery 
is provided in Table 9.13. The growth in agricultural 
production which this investment produced can be seen in 
Tables 9.14 and 9.15. Table 9.15 indicates in particular 
that despite the growth in agricultural production during 
this period, the per capita and total rates of growth were 
below those prevailing in the period preceding 1930. In other 
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words these figures describe the inability of large landed 
property, despite its capitalisation, to keep up with the 
growth of the domestic market. 
Table 9.14 
Growth of Chilean Agricultural Production in the 1950's 
1949/51-1954/56 1954/56-1959/61 1949/51-1959/61 
% inc. Av. ann. % inc. Av. ann. % inc. Av. ann. 
% inc. % inc. % inc. 
Crops 20.0 3.70 15.5 3.00 39.0 3.33 
Animal 
6.2 1.30 9.6 1.85 17.0 1.60 Products 
TOTAL 
_13.6 2.60 
11.8 2.25 27.0 2.45 
Source: Crosson, op. cit.: 48 
Table 9.15 
Annual %_rate of change of per capita and total agricultural 
production, 1910-1965 
Period Per Capita Rate Total Rate 
1910/12-1918/22 1.4 2.8 
1918/22-1928/32 1.5 3.1 
1928/32-1933/37 0.1 1.5 
1933/37-1943/47 -0.3 1.3 
1943/47-1953/55 -0.5 1.5 




The transformation of the labour tenants is altogether 
a more complex issue. The best and most detailed description 
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estimates that in 1955 the tenants occupied about one fifth 
of the cultivated land and produced about one quarter of the 
total output of the hacienda system of central Chile; while 
by 1965 these proportions had fallen to one seventh and one 
fifth respectively. In Chile as a whole, he suggests, the 
total amount of land leased to labour tenants diminished by 
about one sixth between the same dates, whereas that leased 
to sharecroppers remained about the same Cibid.: 1141. Kay 
Cibid.: 114-6) argues that this process of proletarianisation 
took place in the following ways: 
[i] Their absolute and relative proportion of the labour 
force employed on haciendas diminished as did their proportion 
of the total economically active rural population (from 21% 
in 1935 to 12% in 1955 and 6% in 1965). 
[ii] The amount of land leased to inquilinos decreased. 
[iii) Grazing rights were reduced as demesne land was 
extended. 
[iv] The landlord increasingly undertook the ploughing 
and/or harvesting of the tenant's enterprise himself. 
CV) Increasingly the inquilino's function as a labour 
supplier disappeared as the tenants performed their labour 
services themselves. In 1955 about one quarter of the total 
labour time on the inquilino enterprise was fulfilled by hired 
labour' whereas by 1965 he relied almost entirely on unpaid 
family labour. In addition the members of the inquilino 
household worked to an increasing extent as voluntarios 
(seasonal wage-labourers resident on the hacienda) in order to 
acquire additional income for the household. Hence the labour 
tenants were finding it Increasingly difficult to reproduce 
their own conditions of existence. 
[vi] The introduction of minimum wage legislation which 
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was implemented following urban struggles, compelled the 
landowner to pay an increasing proportion of the inquilino's 
wage in cash. This legally compulsory percentage increased 
from 25% in 1953 to 35% in 1963, to 50% in 1950, to 75°% in 1965, 
and to 100% in 1967 [Kay, 1971: 2471. Although these legal 
measures were not always enforced by the landlords, they do 
indicate another pressure for the proletarianisation of the 
labour tenant. 
[vii] Kay also argues that the quantity of means of 
production owned by the inquilinos declined. In 1965 almost 
half did not possess an iron plough and two-thirds lacked 
draught animals [Table 9.16). This table compares the owner- 
ship of means of production by inquilinos with that of share- 
croppers [medieros), and with that of those labour tenants who 
were also sharecroppers Cinquilinos-medieros). Finally Kay 
suggests that the only way left for the tenant, increasingly 
forced by proletarianisation, to maintain his enterprise was to 
enter into a sharecropping arrangement. The land allotted 
to the inquilino-mediero was usually double the size of that 
allotted to ordinary inquilinos. Of course this arrangement 
was confined "to those inquilinos who were better capitalized 
and who possessed a larger household labour force" 
(Kay, 1977a: 116). Unfortunately Kay does not tell us what 
proportion of labour tenants managed to graduate to inquilino- 
mediero status between 1930 and 1960' although it is clear 
that they must have been in a minority. In any case' by 1965 
it is estimated that 70% of all the land leased to labour 
tenants was leased to pure inquilinos and 30% to inquilinos- 
medieros87. 
Now, I have no fundamental disagreement with Kay's 
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tenants. He does, however, to my mind, over-emphasise this 
process while under-emphasising the other side of the coin: 
the fact that some must have managed to accumulate enough to 
resist their proletarianisation, either by retaining their 
(ever more precarious) inquilino status, or by making a successful 
transition to sharecropping. This must also have been the 
case among the minifundistas which Kay unproblematically 
asserts to have been proletarianised simultaneously with the 
labour tenants [ibid.: 120-1). In other words, I am suggesting 
that rather than speaking of the proletarianisation of labour 
tenants, we should be examining their differentiation. This 
point is also valid in the case of the minifundistas although 
they are a slightly different case, asp in the main, they 
never constituted viable peasant enterprises and had to depend 
on selling their labour-power long before the 1930's. 
The figures relating to the amount of land leased to 
labour tenants and sharecroppers cited by Kay above, are 
slightly misleading, for whereas he rightly notes that the 
land leased to inquilinos decreased by one sixth between 1955 
and 1965 in Chile as a whole, this is not the whole picture. 
Table 9.17 
Land Leased-to Labour Tenants and Sharecroppers in Chile: 
1955 and 1965 
Year 
Leased to_inquilinos Leased to medieros and 
and empleados inquilino-medieros 




1955 136,862.6 0.5 1389,822.2 1.4 
1965 
. 
110,. 041.. 5 0.4 408,999.5 1.3 
Change: _ -26,621.1 
he = 19.6% +19,177.3 ha = 4.92% 
Source: Chile, 1955: 14; 1969: 40-41 
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Table 9.17 indicates the figures from the two relevant 
agricultural censuses. Several points can be noted: 
[i] the figures do not distinguish between the land 
leased to labour tenants and that leased to empleados, so 
that it is not strictly speaking accurate to use these data 
to refer to inquilinos only, unless one wishes to maintain that 
empleados were also labour tenantse8, 
[ii] Even though the land leased to labour tenants 
decreased by 19% CKay? s one sixth), that leased to sharecroppers 
increased by 5% which is not a negligible amount. 
[iii] The amount of land leased in sharecropping 
arrangements was three to four times greater than that leased 
in the other tenancies. 
It is safe to assume that the land leased to sharecroppers 
must have also increased before 1955 although in the absence 
of reliable data this will have to remain a conjecture. There 
is also evidence to suggest that sharecroppers hired wage-labour 
CBarraclough, 1973: 138]. If we add to these factors the 
greater number and value of the means of production controlled 
by sharecroppers [Tables 9.16 and 9.18) it seems reasonably 
clear that a class of rich peasants Ckulaks) was developing 
alongside a proletariat during this period89. 
Table 9.18 
Value 
_of_ the _Means of 
Production Owned by Different Tenants 
in Central Chile 
Source: Kay,, 1971: 240 
Means of Production Inquilina- 
[in Eo of-19651 
Inquilinos 
Medieros Medieros 
0- 500 59 9 0 
501-1000 23 19 0 
1001-1500 8 20 24 
1501-2000 7 22 24 
2000+ 3 30 52 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
No. of cases 213 46 25 
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This point is perhaps made even clearer in Table 9.19 where 
the amount of land and the value of production controlled by 
tenants is compared to that produced by owners. The particularly 
important point to note is that the sharecroppers produced 
about 14% of the value of the country's agricultural production, 
a higher figure than that of both the 'sub-family' (minifundios] 
and 'family' farms90. This relatively high percentage reflects 
therefore the greater control over means of production and 
labour-power by sharecroppers, which is not visible in the 
data which'merely refer to the distribution of land ownership, 
such as that usually presented by developmentalism. In addition, 
it should be noted that the value of agricultural production 
produced by tenants as a whole was second only to that 
produced on the latifundia [multi-family large). This feature 
implies that amongst the peasant producers, the various 
tenants on the haciendas were by far the dominant group. The 
rich peasantry, however small, was not so much being produced 
from among the ranks of the owners of land, but from among 
the ranks of the tenants. Not surprisingly it was these 
tenants who were to be the main beneficiaries of land reforms 
in the 1960's. These figures show the importance of tenant 
peasant production in Chile, and the existence of a 'peasant 
road' in agriculture, and at the same time they show the 
subordination of this process to a 'Junker road'. In summary, 
therefore, it seems that rather than simply being proletarian- 
ised as Kay suggests, the Chilean peasantry after 1930 was 
being differentiated, although the development of a 'peasant 
road' was still subordinated to landlord-led development. 
Whether this argument regarding the peasantry is valid 
or not, it remains beyond doubt that the haciendas during this 
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capitalist enterprises. On average, over a year, wage-labourers 
constituted 54% of the hacienda labour force, while the 
inquilinos averaged 23% (Kay, ' 1977a: 117). The two types of 
wage-labour employed by landowners were the voluntarios, which 
I have already mentioned, and the afuerinos (literally 
'outsiders'], who were either smallholders or itinerant wage- 
labourers. The former lived permanently on the estates, while 
the latter did not. Although there is no systematic study of 
minifundistas in Chile 
91, 
we do know something about afuerinos, 
as the hacienda workers have been over-studied. -According to 
Kay, for example: 
"About 10" per cent of afuerinos were also minifundistas; 
10 to 15 per cent fulfilled obligations as reemplazantes 
of inquilinos; approximately 10 per cent also undertook 
urban-rural employment Csmall trading in villages and 
countryside, working on road constructions and the like); 
and the remaining 65 to 70 per cent were employed during 
various months of the year - that . 
isy.. they were 'full-time' 
aFuerinos. About 90 per cent of afuerinos worked 
regularly as such, and 85 per cent were employed as 
afuerinos for more than six months of the year. " 
[ibid.: 117). 
As far as; the amount of land owned by the large haciendas in 
the 1960's is concerned, it can be seen from Table-9.19 that 
they (multi-family large) directly controlledý58.6% of the 
arable land, Awhile I have already noted [Table 2.1) that the 
same group owned 81.3% of all land. The large landowners also 
provided 43% of the value of agricultural production (Table 9.19). 
By 1960, therefore, despite the existence of a 'peasant road' 
to capitalism in agriculture, a landlord-led transition dominated 
the countryside. 
In addition to describing the process of transformation 
of the hacienda after the 1930'sß Kay is one of the few authors 
to present an explanation for the process., He argues that- 
the landowners switched from using labour tenants to employing 
wage-labour because the latter measure was cheaper: 
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"Labour-service tenancy and sharecropping were only 
convenient for the landlord as long as labour rent 
and kind or money rent remained higher than the profit 
he could obtain by exploiting the rented land himself. 
As soon as cash wages of inquilino labour increased at 
a faster rate than wages of pure wage-labour on the one 
hand, and land productivity of the hacienda enterprise 
increased - pushing up profits per hectare of the 
demesne - on the other hand, a substitution process in 
favour of pure wage labour took place. " 
Cibid.: 1i8) 
He also suggests that the three main forces behind the 
proletarianisation of the inguilinos were the mechanisation 
of the haciendas, the use of modern inputs and the reallocation 
of land to those crops which increased the profit rate per 
acre [e. g., sugar beet, linseed, sunflower seed and rape seed), 
and the relative increase of-inguilino labour in relation to 
wage-labour [ibid.: 120). Now, although Kay's argument is a 
useful account of how the process appeared at the phenomenal 
level, it fails ultimately to explain the reasons for the 
further capitalist transformation of Chilean, agriculture after 
the 1930's. The explanation for the development of capitalism 
in Chile or elsewhere cannot be reduced to a question of 
choice by a class of landlords. It fails to account for the 
social relations within which choices are made, for the 
circumstances which condition the outcome of 'choices'. - The 
'mechanisation' of the haciendas, their switching to new 
crops, and the increase in the cost to the landowners of 
employing service tenants also have to be accounted for. 
If we want to account for these phenomena we have to go 
beyond the action of individuals or classes and examine the 
changing social relations which underpin them. Although the 
continued increase in the urban market for agricultural products 
was one reason for the investment of machinery on the large 
estates, it cannot on its own suffice as an accounts as the 
landlords failed consistently to meet this demand. I. have 
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argued in this section that central to any explanation of the 
transformation of agriculture after the 1930's must be the 
struggle between landed property and an alliance of capital, 
and wage-labour under the leadership of the former, particularly 
in the towns. It is the continuing pressure applied by this 
alliance on landed property, particularly in relation to 
inflationary food prices", which largely accounts for the 
transition to relative surplus-value extraction in Chilean 
agriculture from the inter-war period onwards. During this 
period-, up to the mid 1960'sß capital was not powerful enough 
to penetrate the sphere of agriculture itself, with the result 
that it could only pressurise landed property to initiate its 
own capitalist transformation. The fact that a landlord-led 
process of capitalist development dominated this period also 
explains the fact that agriculture did not industrialise fast 
enough. The landlords were in control of the transformation 
of the agricultural labour-process into a mechanised and 
industrial labour-process. As such they added a form. of 
relative surplus-value extraction onto an already existing 
absolute surplus-value mechanism, a process which transformed 
only slowly the social relations on the haciendas. The 
concurrent differentiation of the labour tenants was also a 
relatively slow process", so that at the onset of the 1960'sß 
although capitalist production relations dominated the 
agricultural sphere, the forms which they took combined both 
real and formal forms of labour subordination. The slow rate 
of development of the productive forces which a landlord . 
dominated transformation produces should be perfectly under- 
standable following my analysis in Chapter S. This slow rate 
of development when under landlord control, is a phenomenon, 
not only experienced by Chile. As Lenin noted, this was also 
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the case in post-Reform Russia. In Chile, in addition, the 
landowners found it difficult and 'uneconomical' to 
industrialise, as they were faced with competition from industry 
over financial aid. In sum, the same factors which explain 
the increased pressure on landed property the greater power 
of domestic capital - also contribute to explaining the slow 
rate of growth of the agricultural sector in Chile. The 
contradictory outcome of this class struggle was ultimately 
to be resolved in. the, mid 1960's by the systematic intervention 
of capital into the countryside. 
9.4 Conclusion: Some Theoretical Problems 
To conclude this chapter I want to examine explicitly some 
theoretical problems inherent in current analyses of the 
Chilean rural social structure, and in particular current 
conceptions of rural labour. I shall and by commenting 
briefly on some important aspects of the class structure in 
the countryside at the onset of the 1960's. 
The reason why I think it important to comment on the 
conceptualisations which Follow is twofold. First, because 
of the fact that they have failed to provide a valid under- 
standing of the Chilean peasantry and continue to do so; and 
second, because the misconceptions which underlie them have 
formed the basis of political practices which, as I intend 
to argue later, help to account for the failure of socialism 
in the Chilean countryside in the early 1970's. In addition' 
these erroneous conceptualisations and their attendant practices 
have their roots in economistic dualism, specifically within 
the 'problematic of the enterprise', a position with which 
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this thesis is explicitly concerned. It is thus important 
to show the scientific and political effects of such a 
misconception in the case of Chile. - 
Perhaps the best way to introduce the theoretical problems 
I wish to discuss in relation to the Chilean peasantry is to 
quote an example of . the generally agreed definition of the 
Chilean inquilino: 
"The inquilino, and inquilinaje as an institution, 
provided the foundation of the hacienda labour system. 
In the nineteenth century inquilinos rarely received 
money wages; rather, in exchange for their labour and 
the labour of their families on a determined number of 
days, the landlord provided housing, land to work, 
pasture rights, and food rations. Into the twentieth 
century the inquilino remained a small producer on 
allotted land, receiving in-kind and perquisite 
payments Cregalias). By 1919 some inquilinos also 
obtained a small cash wage, well below the market rate, 
to supplement the regalias. " CLoveman, 1976: 291 
The first point to stress in the context of this definition is 
that it is not restricted to Loveman. I could have picked any 
of a number of authors who produce very similar definitions. 
For instance, Kay notes that the inquilino's labour services 
in the nineteenth century were "remunerated with production 
and consumption fringe benefits" C1977: 1061, and he asserts 
that "it is more correct to consider land leases as a means 
of remunerating labour at a lower cash wage cost than as a 
means of obtaining rent payments" Cibid.: 118); while Bauer 
[1971: 1061] sees inquilinos as "men who exchanged labour for 
the privilege of cultivating a tiny plot of estate land. "f92 
This notion, therefore, of the labour-service tenant as 
someone who exchanges 'labour' for a plot of land, in other 
words as a labourer paid mainly in kind [perquisites] rather 
than money, is not confined to one particular school of thought 
or political position. It, is a conception generally accepted 
bath by academics and political agents (State agencies, 
political parties, etc. ]. 
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Secondly, it should be noted that this conception is 
not based on any explicitly developed theory but is merely a 
direct adoption of phenomenal everyday customary terms and 
assumptions into scientific discourse. The term 'regalia' 
[literally perquisite] to designate the land and other 
privileges under the control of the labour tenant is a perfect 
example of this. The use of this term is scientifically 
entirely inadequate, for it hides the relations of production 
under which corv; e labour [for this is what we are talking 
about) operates. It equates the status of the tenant's plot 
with a mere inducement like a company car. OF course everyday 
conceptions, based as they are on phenomenal categories, are 
not neutral. They represent, to put it crudely, the position 
of the ruling_class or classes - in this case the landlords. 
A landlord wrote in 1927: 
"The inquilino system is not a 'labour contract' but 
an agreement by the owner to rent a small piece of 
land to the inquilino, the rent being determined by 
the quality, quantity, and location of the land. 
The inquilino pays the rents according to what has 
been agreed, in Ca) cereals, [b] harvesting tasks, 
Cc) various agricultural duties like rounding up 
cattle, rodeo, ploughing, reaping, fallowing, and 
finally the obligation to provide a peon to work on 
the (undo [estate] the whole year round or for periods 
of four, six or eight months, depending on what has 
been agreed. " 
[cited by Kay, op. cit.: 118) 
Despite the fact that the landlord is using the term 'rent' 
rather than 'wage in kind', a conception much closer to the 
real relations of production than those exhibited by the 
academics I mentions the basic conception remains the same: 
an exchange of land for labour. As I have mentioned, Kay 
distinguishes between land leases as a wage, and land leases 
as a way of obtaining rent, and he argues that the first form 
becomes predominant after 1930. In fact at the level of 
appearances at which Kay remains, this distinction cannot be 
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maintained in a non-arbitrary manner. The distinction is 
blurred even further by the fact that when rent is paid, it 
is paid in the form of labour, so that from the position of 
the landlord, labour rent and wage-labour are commensurable. 
Kay's inability to distinguish phenomenally between the two 
phenomenal categories he creates can be seen in the following 
statement: 
"To determine more objectively the way in which the 
inquilinaje system should be viewed [that isp as a 
source of labour rent or wage labour) we would have 
to compare the amount of labour rent paid by the 
inquilino with the amount of wage payment received from 
the landlord. In strictly economic terms, if the former 
amount is larger than the latter the inquilino can be 
viewed as a lessor partially paid with a wage; if the 
reverse is the case, as a wage labourer partially paid 
with supplementary production fringe benefits. " 
[ibid.: 135n) 
This statement is exceedingly confusing because the wage paid 
by the landlord can never be greater than the amount of-. labour 
performed by the peasant, or else the landlord would`be paying 
for nothing. Even if we give Kay the benefit of the doubt, 
however, and we assume that he means that if more than 50% of 
the inquilino's 'labour' is paid in cash he=is a wage labourer, 
the problems still remain. The point is basically that Kay 
is viewing the situation from the viewpoint of the landlord, 
which is not in itself a reason for criticism, but which 
assumes that two forms of exploitation based on completely 
different relations of production are commensurable. It is 
therefore not surprising that Kay explains the transition to 
relative surplus-value extraction as simply a process of proletar- 
ianisation, as I have noted, in the previous section. ' Now,.. I do 
not wish to suggest that Kay consciously takes a landlord 
position. Rather I want to argue that by failing to submit 
everyday terminology [phenomenal categories]: to a systematic 
critique, Kays along with the majority of writers on the 
93 
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Chilean peasantry, has unwittingly absorbed ideological 
concepts into his discourse. 
The major error which the definitions of the Chilean 
labour tenants outlined above suffer from, is twofold. It 
removes from view the process of exploitation and it erroneously 
considers the inquilino as a wage-labourer. The fact of seeing 
the inquilino as providing labour in exchange for land and 
other'perquisites' assumes that-the labour tenant is 'paid' 
for his labour on the demesne. It reduces the relations between 
landowner and peasant to one of equal-or unequal exchange. 
In fact, of course, this is not the case. The corvee labourer 
works on the demesne for free, without payment. The land 
he receives is sufficient only to cover his reproduction and 
that of his family. The land and other 'perquisites' (including 
cash] he may receive are 'equivalents' for the time he spends 
working to reproduce himself - for his necessary labour time. 
The time he spends working on the hacienda is surplus labour 
time for which he receives no payment whatsoever. There is 
no need to go into this argument in any detail as Marx has 
presented us with a superlative analysis94. It is perhaps 
worth noting that if the inquilino receives in addition to 
his land a cash sum, this is no equivalent for working on the 
hacienda, as Kay (op. cit.: 112) seems to imply. Rather, it 
means that the peasant is not in a position to reproduce 
himself entirely on his plot of land, and that part of his 
labour on the landlord's demesne is necessary labour. 
The conception of the inquilinos exchanging 'labour' for 
land and 'perquisites' also mistakenly considers them to be 
'workers' [potential wage-labourers) rather than peasants., 
Let me say here that my point is a theoretical one, and is not 
concerned with the question of whether the inquilinos can 
95 best be considered as peasants or wage-labourers after 1930. 
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What I am suggesting is that the conceptualisation which is 
generally utilised, necessarily assumes the inquilinos to be 
wage-labourers irrespective of the historical period in 
question. This is particularly clear in the extracts by 
Bauer, Loveman and Kay cited above, where the reference is 
to the nineteenth century. This error is evident in the 
utilisation of terms like 'perquisites' to refer to means of 
production such as land. I have already noted that a reason 
for the adherence to this conception is the uncritical 
acceptance of a dominant ideology. Another is the fact that 
the labour tenants do not legally own the land which they 
operate. The minifundistas or smallholders, on the other hand, 
do legally own the land and tend to be considered as 'peasants' 
in the literature. I have already remarked on this point and 
the confusions surrounding it in my discussion of development- 
alism in Chapter 2, so that this error is clearly not confined 
to the authors mentioned here. One particularly dramatic 
consequence of this position can be seen in the fact that in 
the class analyses undertaken by marxist parties and academic 
authors in the 1960's and 1970's, the inquilinos were invariably 
classified in toto as wage-labourers, while the minifundistas 
were classified as a whole as peasants or small capitalists. 
Although I do not intend to examine these class analyses at 
present but in the next chapter, it is perhaps worthwhile 
noting the typical case of Klein [1973: 73-6] who adheres to 
an academic version of this position. He provides what he 
calls a 'class analysis' solely on the basis of land tenure, 
and suggests that minifundistas are "small landowners" (sic), 
who own small areas of land worked with family labour. These 
are placed at a higher level than "rural labourers", who are 
'! all labourers in agriculture that sell their labour in 
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exchange for a salary that may be partly in perqui'sites'' 
partly in money or solely money"t. In order to unravel the 
errors of this kind of argument it is worthwhile pursuing the 
comparison of the inquilino and the minifundista. 
What the notion of land as a payment in kind forgets; is 
that land is in itself valueless unless one`possesses (legally 
owns or not) means of production to cultivate it. A plot of 
land is worth nothing to awage-labourer because he does not 
own any means of production to cultivate it. Land cannot be 
considered as a wage in kind because a wage presupposes the 
separation of labour from capital and from `landed property 
96. 
The social situation of the inquilino family presupposes there- 
fore that it possesses means of production, so that the 
family can reproduce itself on its plot, and on the other land 
to which it has access. If the inquilino also receives an 
additional cash payment, this means that'the land is not 
sufficient for his own reproduction at the socially necessary 
level, and is a sign of his proletarianisation. This is not, 
as Kay and others seem to thinks merely because cash becomes 
a proportion of his 'wage', but rather because it indicates 
that he cannot produce enough to reproduce himsZkf as a 
peasant, and is consequently obliged to sell' part of his 
labour-power in order to survive. The quantity of money he 
will receive from the landlord will seem to be much smaller 
than the payment of wage-labour for the 
in no way implies that the inquilino is 
greater extent than the wage-labourer, 
latter covers also his necessary labour 





as the wage of the 
time$ and he is 
The means of production which ' the' labour tenant possesses 
also mean that the possibility' does exist For. him to accumulate 
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and produce more on his plots than the landlord could, as 
he can exploit his own labour and that of his family. An 
indication of some of the means of production owned by 
inquilinos has been provided in Table 9.16. Unfortunately, 
however, this data only refers to ploughs and draught animals 
and gives no indication of other simpler instruments such as 
hoes, so that the non-possession of ploughs or animals is no 
indication of proletarian status; it merely indicates a 
differentiation of the inquilinos into richer and poorer groups 
of peasants. I have already indicated that some inquilinos 
did manage to accumulate sufficiently to make the transition 
to sharecropping, and also that some managed to provide 
replacements for their services, a fact which also-implies 
some accumulation. In any case, whether the labour tenants 
were partly proletarianised or not, they must have had access 
to some means of production in the absence of which they could 
no longer be labour tenants. Irrespective of specific concrete 
cases, the social situation of the inquilino must be such that 
he is capable of reproducing himself on the land. If we 
examine the case of the minifundista we find that this is not 
the case. 
The social situation of these smallholders is such - and 
the literature is in agreement on this point - that they are 
forced to work on the haciendas as wage labouring afuerinos. 
In other words, despite the fact that they may legally own 
their plots of land, as well as means of production, their 
production on that land is insufficient for their own 
reproduction, so that they are forced to work, on the haciendas, 
or elsewhere, in order to acquire their socially necessary 
means of existence. As was the case with the inquilinos, many 
of these smallholders may become entirely proletarian, while 
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a minority may manage to accumulate, in which case they would 
cease to work on the haciendas. Nevertheless, in general, '"It 
1_ is true to say that the position of the minifundiasta is such 
that he cannot reproduce himself on the land he 
the inquilino can reproduce himself on the land 
follows from this analysis that the inquilinos 
[or less poor) peasants than the minifundistas. 
century the majority of the latter were already 
the former were not. 
ownsy while 
he rents. It 
are richer 
In the nineteenth 
semi-proletarians, 
This is a very important conclusion which cannot be 
reached if inquilinos are simply seen as receiving land in 
exchange for labour. In fact, superficially at the level of 
appearances, it does seem as though the minifundista/afuerino 
may be 'better off', as he owns the land and earns a 'full' 
wage, while the inquilino does not own any land and may earn 
only a small sum. This, however, is only the case if one 
remains at the level of appearances, where relations of 
production are obscured and where the bourgeois or landlord 
points of view predominate. These points of view reduce 
production to the labour-process, with the result that if one 
remains at the level of the enterprise, the hacienda, one 
merely reproduces such positions and the relations which 
underpin them. From the landlord's point of view, as I have 
noted, the allocation of land to the peasant is viewed as a 
payment in the same manner as a wage to the labourer is. From 
the landlord's or hacienda's point of view, the labour hired 
from beyond its boundaries counts as 'outside' labour 
Cafuerinos], irrespective of whether the workers be smallholders 
or itinerant wage-labourers. In the same way as one has to 
go beyond the hacienda [both geographically and scientifically) 
in order to discover the different social relations in which 
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smallholders and wage labourers live, so one has to move 
beyond the enterprise in order to ascertain the social relations 
which form the basis of inquilino labour. 
The policy of the marxist parties in relation to Chilean 
agriculture from the 1930's onwards, failed to go beyond such 
phenomenal forms, remained within the problematic of the 
enterprise and hence reproduced bourgeois social relations 
within this sphere. Although I shall return to this question 
in the next chapter, it is worth noting a small number of 
points at this stage. Between 1930 and 1960 the main left-wing 
organiser in the Chilean countryside was the Communist Party. 
I have already noted the failure of the party to penetrate 
agriculture during this period of bitter struggles, and I 
have also noted that it concentrated on organising hacienda- 
based unions. It is not difficult to see how this policy, which 
organised 'workers' on the haciendas to the practical 
exclusion of non-hacienda labour, was based on the kind of 
conception outlined above. Resident labour on the hacienda 
was conflated with wage-labour or potential wage-labour, while 
non-hacienda labour was-relegated to a petty-bourgeois 'peasant' 
position98. This was so much so that when the Communist Party 
did eventually succeed in the 1960's in organising in agriculture 
along with other parties, the only peasants to show any 
signs of militancy were those who resided permanently on the 
haciendas Cinquilinos and voluntarios). In his study of rural 
conflict during this later period, Klein writes: 
"These two categories of permanent workers form the 
basis of the workers belonging to rural unions and are 
largely those who get involved in collective conflicts 
in the countryside. " [Klein, op. cit.: 78) 
This, of course, was to add to the mythology of these 
categories as being wage-labourers, as 'militancy' is for 
'workerism' supposed to be a major 'quality' of the proletariat, 
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while it is supposedly absent in a 'peasantry'. 
The minimum wage legislation for which the left agitated 
after 1930 and which it obtained, was also applicable to 
agriculture. This also indicates that the struggles of the 
proletariat in industrial enterprises were transposed to 
agricultural enterprises unproblematically, as if social 
relations were identical in both. This unproblematic conflation 
of labour relations in industrial and agricultural enterprises 
is expressed quite clearly in the following: 
"The Communist Party, since the days of Recabarren and 
FOCH's initial intervention in the rural sector, had 
an ideological commitment to organize the rural labour 
Force and create a worker-campesino alliance in a 
national class organization ... From 1938 onward the 
Communist Party fostered the establishment of legal 
unions as well as union committees and 'free unions' 
(sindicatos libres) and assisted campesinos in the 
presentation of labour petitions and the organization 
of strikes ... The Communists attempted in many cases 
to conform with the formal stipulation of the Labour 
Code: 'sindicatos industriales' in each (undo 
[estate - M. N. ] and 'sindicatos prof esionales' by 
commune, department or region to link together the 
individual unions. When enough unions had been 
created in a region, the Party attempted to organize 
a federation ... " 
(Loveman, 1976: 1591 
The worker/peasant alliance for the Chilean Communist Party 
was solely a question of organising labour in agricultural 
enterprises, in a similar fashion to the manner in which the 
proletariat in industry was organised. 
It should also perhaps be noted that the Chilean Communist 
Party has always been a loyal follower of the Comintern line 
even to the point of often absurdly ignoring Chilean concrete 
conditions entirely [Angell, op. cit.: 86-951. This intransigent 
adherence to the Comintern line operated to such an extent 
that the Comintern itself felt obliged, in 1932, to reprimand 
the Party, and it: 
... detected a wide gap between the development of the 
revolutionary situation in Chile and the ability of the 
party to direct it. It added that the level of 
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ideological development was so weak that in reality 
the majority of the regional organizations vacillated 
between proletarian ideology and bourgeois ideology;,, 
it criticised the party for playing safe in its 
selection policy by admitting only very few members; 
and felt that with the rising of the marines in 1931 
the party had displayed complete passivity before and- 
during the event, and yet after, it had worked out the 
best policy for splitting the incipient-revolutionary 
movement by proclaiming a slogan of 'All Power to the 
Soviets', and hence dividing the party from the masses. " 
(ibid.: 86-7) 
In such a context it is not surprising that the party's 
analysis of agriculture was so weak. Incidentally, one should 
perhaps not over stress the errors of the Chilean Communist 
Party over those of other Latin American communist parties, 
because an official document of the Constituent Congress of 
the Confederation of Latin American Labour Unions, an organis- 
ation of Communist Unions in Latin America, published"in, 1929 
noted that the organisation of the "agricultural proletariat" 
should be undertaken in the following manner: 
"The Latin American Congress of Unions feels that the 
basic task is to create organizations-that will bring 
together workers on the large cotton, coffee, sugar, 
tobacco, rubber, banana plantations, etc., as well as 
workers on cattle ranches and in the forest industry. 
These workers should constitute the basic framework 
of the unions, with workers scattered over small 
enterprises filling out the whole. 
In addition to basically proletarian elements, the 
labor union should include semi-proletarians; that iss 
small-property owners for whom the principal means of 
existence is still wages. The sharecropper is not 
considered a wage-earner, and'should generally not 
belong to labor unions but rather to farmers', leagues. " 
(Aguilar, ed., 1968: 107] 
The same document distinguishes between the 'workers' on the 
estates and the 'peasants' who presumably are individually 
scattered beyond the large estates Cibid.: 108-9). The 
consideration of workers. on large estates unproblemetically 
as "agricultural proletarians" is quite incredible given the 
fact that so many of these 'workers' were tenants throughout 
Latin America and not just in Chile. 
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In this context, it may seem paradoxical that the 
Chilean [and Latin American] Communist party [parties] saw 
labour on the haciendas as a form of wage-labour while the 
party [parties] also maintained that Latin American agriculture 
was basically Feudal 
99. In fact such positions are easily 
reconciled if one maintains that feudalism is characterised 
simply by oppressive forms of social control and that the only 
difference between urban and rural labourers are these forms 
of control. There are many indications that communist parties 
took such a position. For example, the same official document 
quoted above notes that: 
"In spite of all this diversity in agrarian relations, 
both in different countries as well as in different 
regions of the same country, the status of the -- 
agricultural proletariat is quite similar everywhere. 
Hundreds of thousands of agricultural proletarians and 
semi-proletarians are the victims of the most inhuman 
exploitation. A complete system of norms (sic) which 
are not very different from those of servitude and 
semi-slavery are directed against the agricultural 
proletariat: obligatory work for all members of the 
same family, the handing-down of debts from father to 
son, the payment of salaries through vouchers 
exchangeable only at company stores, deceitful hiring 
systems, etc., are common phenomena in the majority 
of Latin American countries or in different regions of 
the same country. " [ibid.: 105) 
I have concentrated on the position of the Communist Party 
in Chile for the simple reason that it was the main labour 
organiser in the countryside between 1930 and 1960. Other 
parties which were to intervene in the countryside after 1960 
were to exhibit the same kind of errors as those which I have 
discussed here100ý 
I have insisted so far on the fact that the inquilinos 
cannot be considered as wage-labourers, but does this mean 
that they can be considered unproblematically as peasants 
101-.; 
' 
Given the fact that there is no such thing as a unitary 
peasantry, these two qualifications are not valid alternatives. 
It seems to me that, given the discussion outlined so far, 
and with reference to Table 9.16,9.18 and 9.19, the inquilinos 
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or corvde labourers should be thought of as middle peasants. 
As such, in the 1960's, this class can be seen as involved in 
a process of differentiation with the majority becoming 
proletarians (following Lenin and Mao, these are best qualified 
as poor peasants, as they still have access to some means of 
production] and a minority turning, usually through the - 
acquisition of a share-cropping arrangement and by employing 
wage-labour, into rich peasants. The advantage of this 
characterisation is that it draws attention to the' intermediate 
nature of the inquilino in the 1960's and'to his continual 
access to some land and means of production. The majority of 
minifundistas on the other hand, by virtue of owning 
'sub-family farms' - i. e., an 'enterprise' on which a family 
cannot be reproduced - can only be seen as poor peasants. 
Those smallholders who are able to reproduce themselves and 
their families on their plots are classified in Table 9.19 
as 'family farm' owners and they must be seen as middle peasants, 
as the assumption is that they do not employ wage-labour. This 
is the case despite the fact that many among them may be 
colonists or European immigrants. If these producers are 
more highly capitalised than the middle peasants on the 
haciendas, this only shows the ultimate impossibility of 
developing a class analysis simply on the basis of access to 
land and the employment of wage-labour. In the absence of 
some indication of the importance of means of production other 
than land on these enterprises, no accurate analysis is possible. 
The 'multi-family medium' and 'multi-family large' enterprises 
refer to large and extra-large enterprises in terms of land 
ownership. Unfortunately the data do not give an indication 
of the relations on these estates, although my analysis has 
argued that capitalist relations were dominant. 
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As the work of Mao in particular shows, any adequate 
marxist analysis would of course have to classify the classes 
in agriculture according to specifically marxist criteria, and 
would not superimpose its categories over legal and customary 
ones. In the absence of such an analysis though, the 
classification proposed here-must only be seen as approximate, 
as the data on which it is based are founded on customary 
categories. As far as the numbers in these classes are concerned, 
Klein Cop. cit.: 256] estimates that in the Central Valley alone, 
in 1965, the inquilinos numbered between twenty-six and 
forty-eight thousand, and the minifundistas numbered one 
hundred and eight thousand. The landless labourers, both 
permanently and-temporarily resident on the haciendas, are 
estimated to number between 167,000 and 213,000. It is impossible 
to disentangle the permanent from the temporary wage-labourers 
from these figures but it is not erroneous to assume that the 
permanent labour force on the haciendas [both inquilino and 
voluntario], the group which was ultimately to be unionised 
and which still had access to means of production, constituted 
a minority of the rural labour force. The CIDA report for 
Chile CCIDA, 1966: 293] estimates that in 1955 the inquilinos 
and inquilino-medieros numbered together 12.4% of the rural 
active population102, while wage-labourers Cafuerinos and 
voluntarios] made up 27.2% of the same total. The proportion 
of pure sharecroppers [medieros] was 4.0%. It is understandable 
therefore how the policy of those political parties which 
intervened in the Chilean countryside, was to divide the 
peasantry along criteria of residency on the haciendas and 
was thereby to create cleavages within the poor peasant class. 
By concentrating its organisational efforts on permanent 
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hacienda labour onlyI the left was to contribute ultimately 
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to the creation of a rich peasantry on the large estates, 
when these were expropriated and handed over to the resident 
labour force in the 1960's. The misconceived position of the 
Chilean Left, based as it was on economistic dualism, was 
ultimately to work against the formation of a strong 
worker-peasant alliance and thus against the success of a 
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B 100 A 
1937 8.77 8.67 98.8 
38 9.12 4.0 9.10 4.9 99.8 
39 9.30 2.0 8.93 -1.9 96.0 
40 10.44 12.2 10.40 16.5 99.6 
41 12.02 15.1 11.88 14.2 98.8 
42 15.18 26.3 15.52 30.6 102.2 
43 17.63 16.1 18.38 18.4 104.2 
44 19.65 11.4 19.68 7.1 100.1 
45 21.40 8.9 20.98 6.6 98.0 
46 24.83 16.0 -24.36 16.1 98.1 
47 33.16 33.5 32.69 34.2 98.6 
48 39.13 18.0 38.06 16.4 97.3 
49 46.41 18.6 43.70 14.8 94.2 
50 53.43 15.1 50.92 16.5 95.3 
51 65.13 21.9 64.22 26.1 98.6 
52 79.56 22.1 82.02 27.7 103.1 
53 100.00 25.7 100.00 21.9 100.0 
54 172.00 72.0 186.00 66.0 108.1 
55 302.00 75.6 317.00 70.4 105.0 
56 471.00 56.0 494.00 55.8 104.9 
57 627.00 33.1 699.00 41.5 111.5 
58 752.00 19.9 752.00 7.6 100.0 
59 1043.00 38.7 1041.00 38.4 99.8 
60 1164.00 11.6 1194.00 14.7 102.6 
61 1246.00 7.0 1309.00 9.6 105.0 
62 1409.00 13.0 1538.00 17.5 109.1 
63 2042.00 44.9 2296.00 49.3 112.4 
64 2981.00 46.0 3444.00 50.0 115.5 
65 3839.00 28.8 4477.00 30.0 116.6 
66 4717.00 22.9 5465.00 22.1 115.8 
67 5575.00 18.2 6268.00 14.7 112.4 
68 7066.00 26.7 7876.00 25.6 111.5 
69 9230.00 30.6 10287.00 30.6 111.4 
70 12212.00. _. 
32.3 13915.00 35.3 113.9 
Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 
various issues, 1950-77. 
CHAPTER TEN AGRARIAN REFORM PROCESSES IN CHILE AND THEIR 
SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS: 1962-1973 
... when we investigate the composition of the 
peasantry, not'only must we know the number of 
owner-peasants, semi-owner peasants and tenant 
peasants, who are differentiated according to, tenancy 
relationships, but more especially we must know the 
number of rich peasants, middle peasants and poor 
peasants, who are differentiated according to class ... 
[Mao, '1930b/1971: 44) 
"In as much as the antithesis between town and country 
is one of the root causes of the economic and cultural 
backwardness of the countryside, one which in a 
period of so deep a crisis as the present confronts 
both town and country with the direct threat of ruin 
and collapse, the R. C. P. regards the eradication of this 
antithesis as one of the basic tasks of building 
communism ... 
In all its work in the countryside the R. C. P. will 
continue to rely on the proletarian and semi-proletarian 
sections of the rural population ... exerting every effort 
to bring them closer to the urban proletariat and wresting 
them from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and 
petty property interests. 
As-far as the Kulaksy the rural bourgeoisie are concerned 
the policy of the R. C. P. is one of decisive struggle 
against their attempts at exploitation and the suppression 
of their resistance to Soviet, communist' policy. 
With regard to the middle peasants, the policy of the 
R. C. P. is to draw them into the work of socialist 
construction gradually and systematically. The 
Party 
sets itself the task of separating them from the 
Kulaks, 
of winning them to the side of the working class by 
carefully attending to their needs, by combatting their 
backwardness with ideological weapons and not with 
measures of suppression, and by striving in all cases 
where their vital interests are concerned to come to 
practical agreements with them, making concessions to 
them in determining the methods of carrying out 
socialist reforms. " 
[Lenin, 1919/1974: 139-401 
At the onset of the 1960's agriculture constituted a major 
problem for Chilean capital. The failure of landed property 
to satisfy the urban demand for food and its failure to reduce 
the price of agricultural commodities' contributed to 
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inflationary pressures which eroded the, profits of-domestic 
capital. Complaints of this nature were a constant feature 
of the writings of the ideological representatives of-the- 
Chilean national bourgeoisie of which the 'structuralists' of 
ECLA were the most prominent example. In spite of the fact 
that only a third of the country's population was employed in 
the sphere of agriculture during this period, a feature which 
is often taken as an indication of the lack of importance of 
agricultural production, what has sometimes been termed the 
'agrarian question' was central to the life of the social 
formation, both-economically and politically. 
The decade 1962 to 1973 saw three distinct processes of 
agrarian reform, the immediate object of which was the, trans- 
formation of the large latifundios. The first only lasted for 
two years [1962-64) under the Conservativetgovernment of 
Alessandri and was basically a continuation of the process of 
transformation of capitalist agriculture under the leadership 
of landed property which had been initiated in the 1930's. 
The second 01966-701, under the government of the Christian - 
Democrats, saw a dramatic transformation of social relations 
in the countryside and. the systematic penetration of an alliance 
of capital and wage-labour into the countryside. On the one 
hand this process saw the expropriation of large estates which 
did not conform to stated norms of 'capitalist efficiency', 
and the granting of incentives to large and medium enterprises 
which were willing to conform to such norms. On the other 
hand it saw the development of a 'peasant road' to capitalist 
development both in the organisation of the expropriated 
estates and in the creation of peasant organisation, mainly 
labour unions. The third process coincided with the government 
of Popular Unity [1971-73) and saw the total expropriation of 
the haciendas and the attempted construction of more socialist 
_ _______ ---- 
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forms in the countryside. While the Christian Democratic 
agrarian reform under Frei failed to solve the agrarian problem 
to the satisfaction of capital and thus occasioned a split in 
the ruling classes which cost the government the election of 
1970, its populism produced at the same time a previously 
unknown level of political activism among the-peasantry. At 
the same time, however, this reform brought to the. fore a clash 
of interests between the urban working class and the dominant 
peasant classes which the government of Popular Unity failed 
to overcome. The failure to create a, worker-peasant alliance, 
due partly to the reliance of Popular Unity-in the countryside 
an the richer sectors of the peasantry and the new capitalist 
farmers, was, it will be argued, one of the major causes for 
the failure of the Chilean socialist experiment. This was the 
case despite the relatively small size of the agricultural 
population precisely because of the importance of the question 
of food prices in Chilean society. 
In what follows I do-not intend to provide a detailed 
evaluation of land reforms in Chile or a list of 'achievements' 
and 'failures' of these reforms. Such accounts can be found 
elsewhere1. Rather' as in the previous chapters, my intention 
is to utilise the case of Chile in order to illustrate and to 
pursue the theoretical issues with which this thesis is 
concerned. 
10.1 Further Landlord-led Transformation: The Alessandri 
Reform : 1962-64 
To the pressures of the urban forces on landed property were 
added in the 1960's the effects of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. 
The Alliance, which was developed as a counter to the threat 
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of communism in the subcontinent, despite its being an aspect 
of United States imperialism, had contradictory effects on the 
Latin American social formations, and Chile in particular. 
On the one hand, despite its rhetoric of bourgeois equality, 
the Alliance did not and could not contemplate any restructuring 
of the landlord/imperialism alliance. Yet, on the other hand, 
its very presence legitimised the existence of some form of 
transformation of rural-relations and lent . support to the 
bourgeois anti-landlord forces in the cities while providing 
funds for rural development programmes which conformed to its 
criteria. The issue of inflation was one of the dominant 
themes of the presidential election of 1958 which brought the 
Conservative Alessandri. to power. Moreover, Alessandri 
defeated the Left-wing candidate, Allende', by only 31,000 votes 
[Sandri, 1976: 194]; this fact, along with the pressure of 
rural labour conflicts, contributed to the urgency for the 
bourgeoisie to confront the problem of agriculture. The land 
reform legislation which was enacted in 1962 was a result of 
these pressures [Loveman, 1976: 225; Petras and LaPorte, 1971: 136]. 
In spite of these pressures, however, the landowners still 
managed to remain in control of the process which can best be 
understood as a continuation of the process of landlord 
transition, to which was added a colonisation programme to take 
the pressure off the hacienda system in the central valley. 
The two years of land reform under Alessandri, therefore, did 
not see any dramatic transformation of rural relations. The 
interesting features of this period lie first in the fact that 
despite the landlords' ability to circumvent the process, the 
formal legislation did explicitly recognise the necessity of 
a transformation of property relations and second in the fact 
that landowners were also formally obliged to adhere to 
technical criteria of efficiency. 
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According to Loveman, the Alessandri agrarian reform 
law: 
+t ... specified that land reform in Chile was necessary in order to permit access to property in land to those 
who worked it, to improve the living conditions of the 
campesino population, and to increase agrarian production. 
Formally, land reform consisted of redistribution of 
property rights in rural land to provide better living 
conditions for the rural labour force and to improve 
agricultural production through technological 
modernization. " [Loveman, op. cit.: 225) 
Loveman continues by noting that under the new law rural 
proprietors had the legal obligation to cultivate the land in 
a manner which increased productivity and fertility so that 
"property in rural land no longer legally included the 
discretionary authority not to cultivate" Cloc. cit. ). Of course, 
too much emphasis should not be put on these legal measures ''ry 
as they could easily be avoided by the landowners`who were under 
no real pressure to comply with them. Nevertheless' the 
legislation did imply a tacit admittance by the'landlords that 
land reform constituted'a legitimate sphere of state activity 
[Kaufman, 1972: 45). The law in fact permitted the expropriation 
of certain categories of agricultural lands [poorly'used land, 
abandoned land, and so on), and systematically encouraged a 
subdivision of large estates which the landowners enacted in 
order to exempt themselves from expropriation procedures 
CLoveman, op. cit.: 2391. The Alessandri reform established a 
cumbersome machinery for the transfer of property in land 
which in practice totally restricted the potential application 
of redistributive measures- CLoveman, op. cit.; Petras and LaPorte, 
op. cit.; Thome, 1971: 87). The fact that expropriated land 
he'd to be paid for at its full value' in cash and in less than 
three years, for example, gives an indication of the reasons 
for the lack of any land distribution process during this 
period. 
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The increase in investment in machinery and the 
corresponding increase in agricultural production during this 
short period have been noted in the last chapter [Tables 9.13-15); 
and so has the inability of these increases to match the demand 
for agricultural products [Tables 9.11-12]. The process of 
agrarian change under Alessandri, therefore, merely constituted 
the continuation of a transformation which had been initiated 
in the 1930's, the gradual mechanisation of the large estates, 
which was accompanied of course by the restructuring of the 
labour force which was also discussed in Chapter S. 
The Alessandri reform attempted to assuage the land hunger 
in the countryside by deflecting the pressure on the large 
estates and satisfying the demands of the Alliance for Progress 
through the institution of colonisation programmes. Colonisation 
was not new in Chile and had already been inaugurated, in. 1928 
when colonies of German immigrants were established in the 
frontier region. Similar programmes had been undertaken in 
1936 and 1943 [Loveman, op. cit.: 2241 but had not benefitted 
the peasants in any way, as the beneficiaries had been 
predominantly technicians, empleados and foreign immigrants. 
The colonisation programme undertaken by the Alessandri 
government was distinguished by the fact that it averaged the 
settlement of about 300 families per year between 1962 and 
1964, as compared to an average settlement of 126 families 
per year between 1929 and 1961 [Petras and LaPorte, op. cit.: 1671. 
Of course, such measures hardly affected the peasantry, and 
the Christian Democratic Party [hereafter PDC] was to take 
particular advantage of this fact during the 1964 presidential 
election. 
It is important to, understand the significance of the 
Alessandri reform despite its limited effects on social 
relations in agriculture. Its importance does not lie in its 
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settlement and colonisation programme, but rather in its 
attitude towards the large landowners. It implied, for the 
first time in Chile, a recognition by the State of the failure 
of a landlord-led process of agricultural development to 
increase production fast enough to satisfy urban demand, and 
it expressed the need for a more rapid technical modernisation 
of agricultural labour-processes. The law itself stressed 
that "every agricultural proprietor is obligated to cultivate 
the land, increase its productivity and fertility, conserve 
the other natural resources and to effect the investments 
necessary to better its exploitation ... " (cit. Loveman, 
op. cit.: 225). The emphasis on the establishment of technical 
efficiency on the large estates is an indication both of "the 
fact that the process which the Chilean haciendas were 
experiencing was one of transition to agrarian industrialism, 
and of the fact that this process was not proceeding fast 
enough. It thus confirms the capitalist nature of production 
relations in the agrarian sector and indicates that the process 
which was occurring was one of the gradual incorporation of 
landed property into capital - the gradual transformation of 
landlords from an independent and distinct class into a fraction 
of capital. I have already argued in the previous chapter 
that since the 1930's the landlords had come to rely more and 
more on a process of relative surplus-value extraction. In a 
recent article the same point is stressed by Kay: 
"Labour productivity in agriculture grew at about 
2.2 per cent annually between 1940 and 1964 which 
compares quite favourably to industry's 2.6 per cent ... New higher value industrial crops were more extensively 
cultivated, the area of fruit plantations almost 
doubled between 1930 and 1964 and the use of fertilizers, 
pesticides and insecticides greatly increased. The 
increase in agricultural production during this period 
was mainly achieved via the relative surplus-value 
mechanism, i. e., by increasing productivity, and not by 
increasing absolute surplus value as in the earlier period. " 
[Kay, 1981: 495) 
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The dominant transformation in Chilean agriculture in the 
1960's was therefore not a transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, but rather a transformation of agrarian relations 
towards a reliance on the extraction of relative surplus-value 
under the leadership of the landlords themselves. As landlords 
were in sole control of the process, what was occurring was 
the incorporation of landed property into capital. The 
Alessandri reform merely formalised what was already taking 
place. 
The Alessandri reform, of course, ' ignored the peasants 
entirely and was not concerned with any process of land 
redistribution, a fact which has led most commentators on the 
subject to dismiss it as not constituting a 'real reform' at 
E3112 . For Feder, For example, 
it merely constituted what'he 
calls a "counterreform" which "wants above allýto maintain the 
status quo. It is neither destructive nor constructive'... - 
Counterreform maneuvers to maintain "the power and position of 
the landed elite, and with it the entire fabric of Latin 
American society" (Feder, 1970: 174). Yet it is only possible 
to dismiss the Alessandri reform if one abstracts entirely from 
the real process, of transformation of social relations which 
was occurring in the Chilean countryside and if one defines 
land reform in terms of an ideal of land redistribution. Social 
relations were changing in the countryside and the Alessandri 
reform did contribute to this change. Although at the level 
of appearances, the 'status quo' might not have altered, the 
social relations and character of the class structure was 
being transformed dramatically. This alteration can not of 
course be comprehended by simply reference to the fact that 
the Alessandri reform was 'conservative'' 'elitist', 'right-wing', 
'merely gestural' or backed by United States imperialism. It 
is such a failure to subject agrarian-social relations to an 
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adequate analysis which helps to explain the failure of later 
transformations. 
It is also important to stress the concern of the, 
Alessandri reform with technical efficiency, for the agrarian 
reform of the Christian Democrats which followed was largely 
concerned with the same issues. In addition, this reform 
operated with the 1962 legal provisions until 1967. when a new 
law was passed. The distinguishing feature of the land reform 
of the PDC was not the capitalist nature of the reform,. nor 
the insistence on technical efficiency; rather, its, specificity 
lay in the fact that the large, landlords were no longer in 
control of the process and that as a consequence greater 
reliance was placed on the [richer] peasant classes. It is 
important to bear in mind- therefore, the fact that neither, of 
these agrarian reforms was concerned with the creation of 
capitalist landed property, for landed property in Chile was 
already essentially capitalist. Their concern was rather the 
establishment of industrial' capitalism in agriculture and the 
incorporation of landed property into capital. While the . 
Alessandri reform left this process in the hands of the land- 
lords themselves, the Frei reform was to operate a process on 
the basis of different classes. By the end of the Frei reform, 
however, not only were landlords distinctly capitalist, they 
were also largely a fraction of capital itself. - 
10.2 Capital-led Transformation: The Frei Reform : 1966-1970 
The agrarian transformation which Chile experienced during 
this period of Christian Democratic administration was , 
characterised by the systematic penetration of capital in 
alliance with wage-labour into the countryside. Yet,, despite 
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the fact that it amounted to a reversal of the dominant 
position which landed property had always held in Chile and 
successfully established capital as the dominant force in the 
countryside, the agrarian reform exhibited peculiar character- 
istics which were largely due to the nature of the class which 
implemented the process. It should perhaps be recalled at 
this point that just because I am referring to a process of 
capital-led development, I do not means to suggest that 
capitalists or industrialists, or even the Chilean bourgeoisie, 
were, either in terms of numbers or in terms of ideology, the 
major force behind the PDC land reform. Rather, it is important 
to stress the dominant position of the urban patty-bourgeoisie 
in the process of transformation which the countryside 
experienced, a fact which largely explains many of the peculiar 
features and contradictions which characterised the agrarian 
reform. The fact that the reform amounted to a form of 
capital-led development, while at the same time creating 
co-operatives and an explosion in peasant unionism, is a 
particular feature of Chilean capitalist development during 
this period, a process which was guided by a petty-bourgeois 
political party. It is important therefore, to make a few 
introductory comments on the factors which produced the 
particular form of capitl-led development which Chilean 
agriculture experienced during the second half-of the 1960's. 
I have already stressed the importance of the large urban 
petty-bourgeoisie which characterised Chilean society and the 
role which it played in the anti-landlord alliance. The 
particular importance of the service sector in the country's 
economy was emphasised as an indication of this importance. 
The importance of this sector in the 1960's is indicated in 
Table 10.1. The size and importance of the service sector 
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of the size of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, but in the absence 
of more accurate statistics this indirect indicator will have 
to suffice. Both in terms of its electoral base"and its 
ideology, the PDC can be said to be the'party of this petty- 
bourgeoisie or 'middle class'3. Although by 1964 the PDC had 
gathered electoral support from members of all classes, 'its 
dominant electoral base was to be found among the urban petty- 
bourgeoisie which provided 58% of the total Christian Democratic 
vote from the urban provinces of Santiago and Valparaiso 
[Kaufman, op. cit.: 1251. As far as its ideological position 
was concerned, the PDC espoused a line which was, in common 
with many other Latin American parties, nationalist, populist 
and anti-marxist. The dominant electoral slogan of President 
Frei and the POC was the notion of 'revolution and liberty', 
an expression which gives some indication of the ideology of 
the party. A strict adherence to bourgeois development, 
coupled with an emphasis on Christian morality and populism, 
led to particular contradictions within PDC agrarian policy. 
The ideological character of the party has been described as 
follows: 
"There are obvious strains and tensions within the 
movement, but its ideological focus is on national 
integration, mobilization of social energies and 
development. The dominant wing of the party emphasizes 
reforms within the framework of capitalism which, 
with explicit co-ordination and planning by the 
government, will promote industrial development. Its 
more radical and militant activists talk about 
building a 'communitarian society' through 'anti- 
imperialism' and a 'non-capitalist path of development' 
... Christian Democracy, with 
its rhetoric of 'mass 
participation' in reconstructing Chilean society and 
its emphasis on the 'dignity' of the poor, undoubtedly 
has an appeal to the working class. It combines the 
appeals of nationalism and populism with a muted 
corporatism calling for the co-operation of all 
classes in the attainment of 'national goals'. " 
[Zeitlin and Petras, 1970: 17) 
This addition of explicitly capitalist forms of development 
with an emphasis on communitarian populism was to produce 
peculiar forms of capital-led development in Chilean agriculture. 
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The dominance of the petty-bourgeoisie in the process meant, 
among other things, that unlike the situation in so many other 
countries, landowners were not transformed into rentiers 
who leased land to capitalist farmers, - but that'the dominance 
of capital took the form of creating on the'one hand highly 
capitalised enterprises under owner management, and on the other 
co-operative ventures on expropriated land. The creation of 
co-operatives also meant a peculiar form of the 'peasant road' 
where individual ownership was not, at least for the short 
run, the form of tenancy established by the State. It should 
also be noted at this point that unlike land redistribution 
programmes in many countries, the POC land reform did not 
distribute expropriated land to the small 'individual peasant 
proprietors, but to the permanent labour force of 'the 
expropriated latifundia. It was these peasants, primarily the 
inquilinos who constituted the dominant class on the expropriated 
estates and in the 'co-operative' ventures which-were created. 
The 1964 presidential election was hard fought in the 
countryside where the peasant vote was systematically courted 
by political parties who attempted to establish a permanent 
clientele within rural areas4. The PDC promised 'land to the 
tillers' and was assured of support from the Alliance for 
Progress in its implementation of a redistribution programme 
which sought to modernise the agrarian sector. As part of its 
process of mobilising the peasantry behind its policies, the 
PDC engaged in a systematic organisation of peasant unions. 
Thus, the PDC reform in its'concern with' the peasantry, involved 
more than a simple redistribution of land. It also involved 
the legalising of rural unions' and the creation of a' movement 
of rural labour which affected five times as many peasants 
as the programme of land redistribution (Lehmann, 1971: 372). 
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The programme of unionisation was carried out in a situation 
of competition among political parties for the loyalty of the 
peasantry. Yet, despite this competition, - , which concerned- 
primarily the Christian Democrats, Communists and Socialists, 
the peasantry was not organised on class lines. Rather, 
specific classes of peasants were dominant in most unions- all, 
of which attempted to incorporate the peasantry as a whole. 
These classes were primarily these which provided the permanent 
labour force on the haciendas. The PDC agrarian reform thus 
relied in its peasant programme on the dominant peasant class', 
in the countryside. Although the PDC land reform was a 
reform 'from above' and initiated byýthe city, it unleashed 
a massive process of rural political. activity for the first 
time in Chilean history. The upsurge°in peasant militancy 
which it unleashed and the expectations which the programme 
raised in the countryside, were to contribute to the contra- 
dictions of a land reform which could only, -by its very nature, 
satisfy the access of a minority to land. 
10.2.1 'The Transformation of Social Relations in the 
Countryside and the Character of the New Peasant Road. 
The agrarian policy of the PDC which-was eventually embodied 
in legislation which was enacted in 1967, provided for the 
expropriation of land from those estates which were deemed to 
be too large and inefficient, and for the redistribution of 
the. land to 100.000 peasant families in six years. In addition, 
the PDC government advocated the need to increase production 
by granting-incentives and loans to the new enterprises, the 
'integration! of the'peasantry'into the economic, political 
and social life of the nation, and. the raising of the standard 
of living of the 'peasantry's [Winn and Kay, 1974: 1361. The 
three most important aspects of the land reform process were 
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the process of expropriation and the creation of new peasant 
'co-operative' enterprises, the development of peasant unionism, 
and the further capitalisation of. the large and newly created 
middle-sized commercial enterprises. I shall examine briefly 
each of these aspects in turn. 
As Kay C1977b: 2061 notes, the process of land expropriation 
itself was slow, selective and limited. Between 1965 and 1970 
only one quarter of the large latifundios were expropriated. 
This amounted to just over 10% of the land measured in basic 
irrigated hactares6 (BIH] and benefitted 22.000 peasant families 
rather than the promised 100,000, a figure which amounted to 
7% of the total number of tenants and rural wage-labourers 
in the country. In addition, the law only provided for the 
expropriation of land - to be paid partly in cash, partly in 
bonds [Kaufman, op. cit.: 893 - did not provide for the 
expropriation of livestock and machinery, and at the same time 
granted the landowner his choice of a 'reserve' equal to 
80 BIH7. 
On the expropriated lands were created asentamientos 
[literally settlements), membership of which was restricted 
to those peasants who "had worked in a permanent form on the 
[expropriated) property, for at least three of the last four 
years prior to the expropriation agreement ... 11 [cit. Kaufman, 
op. cit.: 121). Membership of the asentamientos was therefore 
restricted to the permanent labour force of inquilinos and 
voluntarios, while the temporary rural wage-labourers and poor 
peasants (the afuerinos) were excluded. Within the 
asentamientos themselves the dominant peasant class was that 
of the ex-inquilinos - well-to-do middle peasants - who were 
transformed by means of altered social relations into a rich 
peasantry. Their dominance and transformation took several 
j IL 
772 
forms, the main features of which must be noted. ' 
The asentamientos were designed as transitional 
institutions whereby the land was owned by the State until 
the peasants could purchase it, and were managed jointly by the 
beneficiaries Casentados) and the bureaucrats of the land 
reform agency, CORA (Agrarian Reform Corporation]. After a 
three to five year trial period the property and management of 
the asentamientos was to be transferred to the peasants, who 
could either choose a 'co-operative' form of production or 
choose to split up the asentamientos into parcels farmed on 
an individual basis, but maintaining at the same time a loose 
form of co-operative organisation (Kay, 1977a: 124). The 
structure of the asentamiento represented a compromise between 
the 'communitarian' and 'individualistic' wings of the POC, 
the former being in favour of co-operative ownership, while 
the latter advocated individual ownership [Kaufman, op. cit.: 
chs. 3 & 4). The petty-bourgeois populist compromise attempt 
to avoid in the asentamientos both the 'evils' of capitalism 
and communism is well expressed by Swift 01971: 36) who outlines 
the main objective of the asentamientos as being: 
If .. to cultivate the lands efficiently, improving 
their production through the assistance of CORA; to 
train the future beneficiaries for the responsibility 
of being farm managers; to develop a community and 
promote co-operatives'in its and urge them to use most 
of their income for investment; and to construct the 
infrastructure necessary for the development of 
community living and for the normal cultivation of the 
farm. " 
The asentamientos were dominated by the ex-inquilinos now 
asentados. Not only were the inquilinos allowed to retain 
their so-called 'production fringe benefits' to which they 
were now given legal title -a fact which soon showed that 
these were anything but 'fringe benefits', as we shall see 
below - but they were the only peasants to have a voice and a 
- _,.. U. 
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vote in the administrative council and assembly of the 
asentamiento [Kay, 1977a: 124]. The ex-voluntarios, now called 
socios, had neither 'production fringe benefits' [they never 
had any on the haciendas] nor voting rights. The numerical 
dominance of the ex-inquilinos among the members of 
asentamientos is also indicated in Table 10.2 which compares 
the distribution of' the`"workforce of the asentamientos of the 
Central Valley with that of 100 private estates in the province 
of O'Higgins. 
Table 10.2 
Composition-of-the rural workforce in the asentamientos of the 
Central Valley and in the Province of O'Higgins [percentages]. 
Position O'Higgins Asentamientos 
Foremen, Empleados1 11.0 38.1 
Specialised workers - 
Inquilinos 32.5 55.0 
Afuerinos & Voluntarios 48.5 7.0 
Others 8.0 - 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Source:.. Kaufman,. op. cit.: 122. 
The transformation of the inquilinos into rich peasants iss 
however, well indicated by the fact that as asentados, they 
employed afuerinos like the landlord had done before . The 
afueririos, according to 'Kay C 1977x: 126] were often employed 
to work on the collective land, thus freeing the asentado to 
dedicate his labour-time to the parcel to which he now had 
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legal title. The difference in income among the workforce on 
the estates to which this procedure gave rise, is illustrated 
in Table 10.3. 
Table 10.3 
Daily income. of_. asentado_s and contracted labour, 1965-66, on 
six asentamientos [in E of 1965-66). 
Asentamiento ASENTADOS CONTRACTED LABOUR 
Tranquilla 15.63 8.87 
Los Arcangeles 12.31 5.73 
El Carillo 9.54 7.23 
San Luis de Panimavida 9.46 4.49 
Santa Isabel 12.72 6.56 
Coipin 11.37 5.64 
Source: Kaufman, op. cit.: 121. 
A survey of 95% of all the 1966-67 asentamientos showed an 
even greater disparity in income between asentados and agri- 
cultural labourers. Table 10.4, for example shows that over 
57% of asentados earned between two and ten times the minimum 
wage for agricultural workers. Such a disparity is of course 
not explicable in terms of income distribution, but reflects 
class positions. The systematic preference exhibited by the 
asentados for the cultivation of their own private plots rather 
than the communal land of the asentamientos is noted by most 
writers on the POC reform. Lehmann in particular notes that: 
"The asentados enjoyed more individual pasture rights 
than before, and the rights were less strictly limited; 
they also had the use of a plot of land around their 
house and three-quarters of a hectare [in the Central 
Valley] for private cultivation in the fields. " 





Relative Earnings of Asentados: 1966-67 
% of No. of times the 
Asentados minimum agricultural 
wäge -earned 






Source: Thiesenhusen, 1971: 119. 
These various usufruct rights were now free of charge while 
on the latifundia they were seen as a wage in kind, with money 
wages being reduced by a corresponding sum. By 1972, estimates 
by the State suggest that over 13% of the sown area in these 
new co-operatives was under individual control, and the 
available data do seem to suggest that as a whole by the same 
date individually controlled land had increased since 
expropriation, although accurate figures are not available 
[ibid.: 93). 
In addition to the increased importance of individual 
control of land on the asentamientos, the dominance of rich 
peasant production is also indicated by the manner in which 
the 'co-operative' operated. The agrarian reform agency of 
the State, COFRA, provided credit for . 
investments and paid an 
equal advance on profits to all asentados for days worked, 
which was meant to finance essential subsistence over the 
agricultural year. However, as the asentamientos did not make 
large profits and often even experienced losses, the State was 
actually subsidising the enterprise. The advance in actual 
ýý 
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fact was considered by the asentados to be a wage for work 
on the collective land, especially as CORA did not deprive 
them of the advance and did not lower it when the asentados 
could not pay it back [ibid.: 87). According to Lehmann, the, 
asentados: 
it ... were expected to work most of the land collectively, 
under an elected leadership, and either to distribute 
profits among themselves according to the number of days 
worked and the quality of each man's work, or to save them. 
The role of the advance was to guarantee subsistence 
precisely so that the asentados, rather than concentrate 
on their private land in order to feed themselves during 
the year, would, with cheap credit from the state, seek 
to enrich themselves while raising productivity and 
yields on 'collective' land. The model assumed that the 
asentados would respond according to this rationality, 
if only because it would otherwise be difficult for them 
to repay their debts, including the advance, and the veto 
power of CORA officials on the Administrative Council 
of the asentamientos was to be a-further guarantee. 
But, what if the peasants would not pay their debts? 
And, more to the point, perhaps, what if-the 'all-powerful' 
CORA, the so-called 'new patron' had few effective 
sanctions available to enforce debt repayment? " 
Cibid.: 92) 
Lehmann refers to the preference of the asentados to work on 
their own plots under these conditions, as the effect of a 
"non-capitalist rationality" Cibid.: 9019 but given the account 
that he himself provides' it seems clear that there was 
nothing 'non-capitalist' whatsoever about the 'rationality' 
of the asentados. As Lehmann points out, the asentados received 
free use of machinery, seeds and pesticides and the labour-time 
which they put into work on the collective land was hardly 
controlled so that the advance was paid regardless of labour- 
time Cibid.: 94] . 
"Once the asentados have understood that their debts 
are unlikely to be: claimed if they can show somehow 
that they are unable to pay them, they are also likely 
to have little compunction in distributing among them- 
selves favours whose cost is borne by the State. In any 
case, the debts of most asentamientos for capital loans 
and year to year loans for inputs and advances, are so 
enormous that their-members can hardly be made to believe 
in a rationality based on future profits. " 
Cloc. cit. ] . 11 
i 
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In this fashion the middle-peasant inquilinos were being 
transformed into rich peasants. Not only did they acquire the 
product of their private plots which was now increased by the 
free utilisation of costly investments, but they also received 
an 'advance' which, according to Lehmann's own admittance, 
amounted to between 21% and 51% more than the wages received 
by the average farm worker in 1969 Cibid.: 87). Under such 
circumstances it was not surprising that the asentados resisted 
the 'incorporation' of other peasants into the asentamientos 
(Kaufman, op. cit.: 120; Lehmann, 1974c: 89). In addition, it 
should also be noted that the highly bureaucratic nature of 
the reform process also contributed to the strengthening of the 
dominance of the asentados who acquired privileged access to 
State bureaucracies and political patronage [Lehmann, 1974c; 
Kaufman, op. cit. ]. 
In sum the creation of asentamientos not only ignored 
the majority of the peasant population but also gradually 
transformed the inquilinos into a rich peasantry. By the and 
of the PDC administration the asentados had gained control over 
20% of the total irrigated land which averaged out at 10 BIH 
per asentado. This amounted to ten times the amount of land 
per minifundista and over one third of-the rural labour force 
had no access to land at all [Kay, 1974b: 2). As one of the 
more acute analysts of this process puts it: 
... -the effect of the Christian Democratic policy was 
to skim off the top stratum of the old rural peasant 
class and to make it the principal beneficiary of the 
new social order. Conceivably this inquilino stratum 
of the rural society could come to constitute an 
important bulwark of social and political stability. " 
[Kaufman, op. cit.: 122-31 
It should be understood that the PDC reform did not so much 
create the divisions between peasants who were to benefit and 
those who were not to benefit from land redistribution, as 
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accentuate the divisions which were already there. The 
commonly held view which identifies the inquilino with wage- 
labourers can of course only see the differentiation of the 
peasantry as being an effect of the PDC reform itself, and at 
the same time it fails to account for the fact that it was 
the inquilinos who were the main beneficiaries of the 
redistributive process. It is only if one recognises the 
existence, however subordinate and weak, of a peasant road an 
the haciendas - i. e., of capitalist social relations - that the 
course of the PDC agrarian reform can be seen as anything more 
than purely accidental. After all, it was only because the, 
inquilinos had access to means of production that they could 
benefit at all from individual land redistribution. 
The dominance of the inquilinos was, -however, -'not restricted 
to the new asentamientos; it was also prevalent in the new 
rural unions. The legal obstacles to the organisation of the 
peasants were removed by the PDC government and both the State 
and political parties became systematically involved in organ- 
ising the rural population into unions. The spectacular growth 
in unionisation between 1967 and 1970 is represented-in 
Table 10.5. The three major unions during this period were 
Libertad, a right-wing Christian union, strongly anti-communist, 
in favour of the private subdivision of"-asentamientos, and in 
receipt of funds from United Stated AID; Ranquil, which-was 
controlled by an alliance of communists and socialists; and 
Triunfo, which benefitted from the direct patronage of the 
State and was more inclined to reflect the position of the 
'communitarian wing' of the PDC. _. Tý 
The first point to stress is that these unions were not 
divided on class lines. Rather, all unions, irrespective of 
their party affiliation, gathered their membership from among 
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Table 10.5 
Membership of Rural Unions 1967 and 1970 
UNION . 1967 . 
1.970 
Libertad 15,411 29,132 
Ranquil 10,961 43,867 




all classes of peasants and acted as 'defenders of peasant 
interests' vis-a-vis the landlords, and as brokers vis-a-vis 
the State and its various apparatuses CLoveman, 1976; Lehmann, 
1971 and 1972). This feature of these unions is made clear by 
the fact that membership was based on the place of work and 
different classes of peasants all worked in the same enterprises. 
Moreover, another consequence of the union form of organisation 
is precisely that, as it is based on the enterprise, permanent 
rather than occasionally employed labourers will have a dominant 
voice. Further, as I have had occasion to stress, among the 
permanent workforce of inquilinos and voluntarios it was the 
former who were dominant. As a result we should not be 
surprised to find first that the inquilinos and voluntarios 
formed the majority of unionised peasants and second, that 
the inquilinos were a dominant force [not necessarily in numbers] 
in the unions. 
The first point is not difficult to establish. All major 
commentators on the nature of rural unions [Affonso at al. 9 1970; 
Lehmann, 1971 and 1974c; Loveman, 1976; Klein, 1973) agree, 
in the words of Lehmann (1974o: 83) that "the bulk of union 
membership came from permanent workers, not from the 'most 
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proletarianized' day-labourers - which reflected power 
relationships within the rural proletariat". The second point 
is much more difficult to establish, mainly because of-the 
paucity and weakness of the existing data. Nevertheless a 
number of important points can be made which show, ifdnothing 
else, the contradictory position of rural unions which was an 
effect of their multi-class nature. The first important point 
to note is the increase in the number of strikes on agricultural 
estates between 1960 and 1969. 
Table 10.6 
Number of Strikes 1960-71 
Number of Strikes 







1971 1. , 
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Source: Barraclough and - 
Fernandez$ 1974: 
. 194-5. 
As an effect of union pressure and the ability of unions to see 
that the new legislation on the minimum rural wage and social 
security was actually enforced, the income of agricultural 
labour increased substantially under the Christian Democrats 




Index of real minimum agricultural wages 
YEAR 1962 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
INDEX 
. _100.11 - -125. S. _131_. _4 - 126.1 
123.4 149.5 207.4 
Source: Zammit, ed...,. 1973:. 338 
As soon as we talk of wages in the context of Chilean 
agriculture, however, the picture becomes confusing, for in 
most accounts the term 'wages' includes the so-called 
'production fringe benefits' which I discussed in Chapter S. 
When we are told that the unions agitated for higher- wages, 
as they did systematically from their legal inception, it is 
not immediately apparent that these wages included such, 
'perquisites'. Yet the literature is in agreement that "in 
making wage claims, unions of all political colours would 
include demands referring specifically to the kind-content of 
wages" [Lehmann, 1974c: 51). Even this formulation is confusing 
for it was not 'wages in kind' which the unions demanded, but 
access to land, pasture, means of production and so one or a 
"resource-use payment", to use the metaphorical term utilised 
by Kay C1977a: 1251. Although we know that such demands were 
made, it is much less possible to discover the relative 
importance of such demands in relation to increases in money 
wages, as most authors do not recognise the importance of the 
distinction. What, is certain, however, is that these demands 
for access to land conflicted with the effects of State 
legislation which restricted more and more the size of 'payments' 
in kind in relation to the value of the total wage. These were 
7B2 
restricted to 25% in 1965 and legally abolished altogether 
in 1967. Of course, these legal measures were not always 
enforced, yet the contradiction remained. 
These provisions were also contradicted by a legal measure 
enacted in 1966 - as part of the same package which restricted 
the subdivision, of large estates - which required all rental 
contracts between landlords and peasants to be legally binding 
for a minimum of six years. 
"Inquilinos, inquilino-medieros, sharecroppers, and 
truck croppers Cchacareros], previously having only a 
tenuous access to land, were now guaranteed a minimum 
six-year contract when landowners entered into rental 
arrangements. These provisions also protected 
campesinos from reprisals when they joined unions, made 
formal complaints to the Labour Department, or pressured 
CORA to expropriate the farms on which they worked. " 
CLoveman, 1976: 2511 
It should also presumably be added to Loveman's remarks that 
this measure protected the inquilinos from dismissal over the 
six-year period. The inquilinos were therefore in a powerful 
position, for if the landlord refused to adhere to this legal 
provision they could always pressurise through the unions, 
[especially the PDC unions) for expropriation and further 
extension of the land redistribution programme. This became 
increasingly the case as under pressure from increasing 'wages' 
and from demands by the State to mechanise their enterprises, 
landowners were finding 'production perquisites' increasingly 
'expensive' in relation to money wages. As a consequence of 
these pressures during the land reform process large-scale 
expulsions of labour occurred on the haciendas [Kay, 1977b: 125)9. 
Not surprisingly it was the casual labour force of the 
afuerinos which was the most obviously affected, while the 
permanent labour force, when threatened with dismissal, could 
resort to pressurising for expropriation. Thus the inquilinos 
found themselves squeezed between two counteracting tendencies; 
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one which pressurised for a decrease of their role as peasant 
producers, for their dismissal from their place of work and 
their proletarianisation, and another which allowed them to 
overcome this problem by renogatiating their usufruct rights 
and more importantly by providing them with the power to 
pressurise for expropriation and redistribution. Thus demands 
for expropriation grew, first through bargaining procedures 
and later, as the redistribution process was very slow (Table 10.8] 
through more direct action such as the seizures of estates 
[Table 10.9). 
Table 10.8 








1965 99 286.8 2,061 
1966 265 145.6 2,109 
1967 217 354.8 4,218 
1968 223 725.2 5,644 
1969 314 1,078.2 ý69404 
TOTAL. 1,118 2,590.6 20,436 
Source: Kaufman, op. cit.: 98 
The number of these seizures of estates is difficult to 
estimate but what is apparent is first that they increased 
towards the and of the PDC term of office when it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the land reform was to be exceedingly 
limited even from the point of view of the middle-peasants, 
and second that they were in the main (in the Central Valley 
at least) intended to pressurise the State to expropriate the 
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Table 10.9 
Estimated Number of Seizures of Estates 1967-71 
Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Na, of estates 9 26 148 456 1278 
Source: Kay, 1975: 425 
relevant enterprises and were not attempts to establish forms 
of production by the peasants themselves (Lehmann, 1974c). In 
the absence of approval by the State of course, the middle- 
peasants could not count on subsidies, loans and so on by State 
agencies. The PDC government responded adversely to these 
seizures, declaring that 'the occupied farm will not be 
expropriated'. This led to the growth of rural discontent 
and to a loss of support by the POC among the two-thirds of 
the unionised peasants under its nominal control (Kay, 1977a: 126). 
The PDC, of course, had no control at all over the non-unionised 
peasants who amounted, according to the same author, to over 
half of the total peasant population in 1970 (loc. cit. ). The 
result of this disaffection among the peasantry was the fact 
that Allende received a majority of the votes of the rural 
male population in 1970. 
So far I have argued that there is evidence to suggest 
that the inquilino middle-peasants Dominated the unions. This 
is not just confined to the points I have already made, but 
is also apparent in the structure of the marxist rural unions 
and was itself a product of the position of the marxist 
parties themselves. Kaufman argues, for example, that the 
Ranquil union did not suffer markedly in its social composition 
from either of the Christian unions and notes that: 
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"In the countryside itself, it was evident that neither 
the Communists nor the Socialists were particularly 
interested in directing their attention to the 
afuerino stratum. The rural Marxist movement instead 
showed a tendency to go in the other direction - toward 
a more 'vertical' pattern of mobilization, which combined 
some segments of the afuerinos with higher strata of 
the peasantry. " 
[Kaufman, op. cit.: 210) 
I have noted the background to this position in the previous 
chapter, but it is useful to note that Luis Corvalan, the 
Secretary General of the Chilean Communist. Party, is quoted by 
Kaufman as asserting that: 
"We Communists believe that the best form of organisation 
is that of the independent union, with headquarters in 
the village, in which are grouped the workers from 
various fundos and all of the modest sectors of the rural 
population, from the wage hand to the small proprietor, 
including the sharecropper, the poor peasant, etc. " 
[cit., Kaufman: loc. cit. ] 
There is nothing wrong with an organisation which embraces 
several peasant classes of course, provided that a conception 
of alliance is developed and that the leadership of the 
organisation is in the hands of-the poor peasants and agricultural 
labourers - in other words, provided that a sophisticated 
strategy is developed. In the absence of such a strategy, the 
leadership of the organisation will go to the dominant class 
'automatically'. In any case, and for obvious reasons` the 
small proprietors Cminifundistas) did not join unions and the 
Triunfo union was itself dominated by the inquilinos. Figures 
from the Ministry of Labour fully confirm this fact as they 
show for example, that in 1961 in the union's provincial 
federation of O'Higgins, 48% of the 954 members were afuerinos, 
while of the twelve members of the provincial board only two 
were afuerinos and the rest were inquilinos [Kaufman, - loc. cit. ]. 
We can add to these facts the point that this union hardly 
differed from the PDC unions, not only in its composition but 
also in its practice. It was as much concerned with collective 
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bargaining for 'wages' and pressurising for access to land -., 
as the others (Lehmann, 1972). 
The character and practice of the marxist parties was 
particularly problematic, as the evidence shows that their 
main basis of electoral support came from the afuerinos. As 
Petras and Zeitlin (1968) show, the marxist parties increased 
their electoral support among the peasantry as a whole between 
1958 and 1964, but the greatest increase came from the 
.. 
agricultural labourers and poor peasants, so. that "as the 
political Left in Chile has gained increasing access to the 
peasantry as a whole, its voting strength has increasingly 
coincided with economic class lines within the peasantry" 
Cibid.: 261). By the end of the PDC term of office and the 
presidential elections of 1970, the trend was confirmed, as 
Gel fart (1974) -has shown. The afuerinos were of course the 
main bearers of the increased level of unemployment in the 
countryside and thus, not only did they _'not 
benefit' at all 
from the reforms, but they also had their chances of employment 
substantially reduced. Many richer peasants were also 
disaffected by their failure to obtain land, while the 
minifundistas as a whole had ndt benefitted either0. Thus, 
1 
the majority of the peasantry's expectations were not fulfilled 
by the PDC reform although it is important to bear in mind 
the fact that the reasons for this disaffection varied between 
classes. The lack of access to land, the lack of employment 
prospects and the desire to increase money wages although they 
may have had similar electoral_results$ cannot be identified. 
It is one of the unfortunate problems of the literature on 
Chilean agriculture, that the differing demands of various 
peasant classes are conflated under a general notion of demand 
for 'wages' and access to land, so that it is only with 
ýk 
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difficulty that antagonistic peasant classes'can be identified. 
Let me now turn to the third aspect of agrarian change 
under the POC reform. As far as ' the level of agricultural 
production is concerned, Kay (1977b: 206) notes that its"total 
rate of growth was 4.6% per annum for the period 1965-68, which 
amounted to a threefold increase in comparison to the average 
rate of growth of the previous two decades. Despite the major 
drought which Chile experienced in 1968, the average rate of 
growth of agricultural production between 1965 and 1970 was 
just below 3%, a significantly higher figure than the average 
rates of growth since the 1930's [Table 9.15). The increase 
in agricultural production expressed in money terms is 
indicated in Table 10.10. 
Table 10.10 
Index of-Value of Agricultural Production 1965-1972 













and. Fernandez, 1974: 125. 
This increase in agricultural production came primarily from 
the private farm sector although production also increased on 
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the asentamientos [known as the 'reformed sector' in the 
literature] [Kay, 1981: 500]. This is not surprising, as the 
landlords kept all their machinery and livestock when 
expropriated. In addition, the State systematically encouraged 
production increases on the private ft ems by providing large 
quantities of subsidised credits, facilities for importing 
machinery cheaply and by increasing prices for agricultural 
products [Kay, 1977b: 207; Loveman, 1976: 259). This measure 
of increasing agricultural prices, which is an indication of 
the continuous relative power of the landowners, contradicted 
of course the basis of thecapital-led transformation of 
agriculture, as its main purpose, it will be recalled, is 
precisely to decrease the price of food. Of course this measure 
could only contribute to inflation and to the slowing down 
of the 'industrialisation' process. All in all, the government 
attempted to placate the insecurity of the landlords created 
by the upheaval of the reform: 
... by reassuring landlords through legislation that, 
firstly, only estates above 80 standard hectares in size 
could be expropriated, secondly that all new investments 
which they carried out would be fully-compensated in 
cash at market value in case of expropriation, and thirdly - 
this being the more original aspect of the legislation - 
an assurance that those latifundias which undertook 
investments paid decent wages to their workforce and 
became efficient farms would almost certainly not be 
expropriated. " (Kay, 1977b: 207) 
The distribution of State credit to agriculture is shown in 
Table 10.11 where the various institutional sources of credit 
are compared over the years 1864-68. The State Bank and CORFO 
(Development Corporation) were two institutions which 
concentrated the bulk of their loans to the large private Farms; 
CORA Financed the beneficiaries of the land reform, while 
INDAP CInstitute_For Agricultural Development) was an institution 
whose loans were directed towards the minifundistes. What 
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share of State loans was directed towards the large commercial 
farms. The landowners responded to these 'carrot and stick' 
policies by increasing their means of production, decreasing 
the legal size of their estates by private subdivision, expelling 
labour and intensifying land use which enabled them to pay 
the higher wages and avoiding expropriation (Kay, 1977b: 208). 
In other words, the capitalist landowners were being transformed 
into capitalist farmers. In sum, to cite Winn and Kay's 
formulations: 
"By the and of the Frei administration, Chilean 
agricultural production had increased, real wages had 
doubled and job security obtained for the resident 
workers Cinquilinos) but at the cost of growing 
unemployment for the remainder Cafuerinos). The rise 
in agricultural production was the result of the 
substitution of machines for mens facilitated by State 
credits and impelled by the threat of expropriation, 
higher wages and guaranteed employment. On balance, 
the Christian Democrat agrarian reform improved the 
situation of the agro-capitalists and wealthier peasants, 
but 
. _did . 
little for the poorer strata the efuerinos, 
minifundistas and Indian communities - who remained 
unorganised, unassisted and unemployed. " 
[Winn and Kay, 1974: 1381 
The POC agrarian reform was a capital-led agrarian reform. 
As such its general effects were similar to other such trans- 
formations, increased production but at the necessary expense 
of increased inequality, " poverty, and differentiation among 
the peasantry. It finally transformed the landlords, not 
from feudal landlords into capitalist landlords, but from 
capitalist landlords into' capitalist =farmers'. -- By. -the and of 
the "reform landed property as an independent category had 
ceased to exist in all but name. 
In addition, the land reform exhibited particular contra- 
dictions of its own due to the specific characteristics of 
social relations in Chilean agriculture and the particular 
petty-bourgeois policies of the Christian Democrats. In the 
first place, there was a major contradiction between the PDC's 
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policy of 'modernising' the large estates and its policy of 
encouraging a peasant road. Many landowners subdivided their 
estates into units smaller than 80 BIH in order to avoid 
expropriation.. This formal subdivision also helped to destroy 
rural Onions by leaving less than twenty permanent workers 
in each new estate, twenty being the legal minimum number of 
workers required to maintain a union 
11 (Lovemang, op. cit.: 250). 
This process slowed down the expropriation-process and under 
pressure from the unions, the government introduced legislation 
to prohibit subdivision in 1966 [ibid.: 251]. Increasingly, 
however, landlords demanded a ceasing of expropriation and the 
abolition of the restrictions on subdivisions and dismissals 
[Kaufman, op. cit.: ch. 5,239-40). While many landowners were 
prepared to see the expropriation of 'inefficient' enterprises, 
they could not countenance expropriation on the grounds of 
size alone as this was obviously an attack on private property 
itself. As one landlord spokesman put it: "If a property is 
not farmed efficiently, let it be expropriated. But if it is 
efficient, it should be left in peace no matter what its size. " 
[cit.,, Kaufman, op. cit.: 1583. We shall see below that this was 
largely the position taken by industrialists as well. It 
shows that while there is support among the representatives 
of capital for the incorporation of independent landed property 
into capital, they will be opposed to a measure which is 
interpreted as an attack on private property - i. e., capital - 
itself. Any attempt to 'radicalise' the land reform by 
expropriating the 'efficient farms' [i. e., the new capitalist 
farmers) would be opposed by capital as a whole. In any case 
no great amount of explicit opposition by capital was required 
to slow down the redistribution process. The subdivisions of 
estates and particularly the huge costs of the reform produced 
by the generous compensation schemes, the high costs of settle- 
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ment and the spiralling bureaucratic expenditure, forced a 
slow down of the reform process (Kay, 1977b: 2091. Kaufman 
Cop. cit.: 242,2451 notes that it was only because of the 
ability of the PDC government to negatiate successfully for a 
US 0 20 million loan that expropriations continued after 1968. 
Another aspect of the contradiction between the 
'modernisation' of the large estates and the creation of a 
powerful rich peasantry, was produced by the PDC reform in the 
form of a contradiction between the encouragement and organising 
of unions on the one hand, and the policy of replacing people 
by machines on the other. The provision of credits for 
machinery and all types of modern 'inputs' encouraged landowners 
to reduce the labour force, while the encouragement given to 
unionisation provided the peasants with the ability to resist 
such measures (Kay, 1977b: 208). Nevertheless-, large-scale 
dismissals occurred both before and after the union legislation 
was enacted. 
Finally, the Form taken by the 'new' peasant road was 
largely based on communal forms of property, access to which 
was jealously restricted by the beneficiaries. These 
asentamientos employed wage-labour on a temporary basis like 
the landowners had done before. The unions, attempting to 
represent the 'interests' of 'the peasantry' as a whole, were 
contradictory organisations. On the one hand, they attempted 
to provide access to land and means of production, for one 
sector of their members, on the other they were after all 
concerned with finding employment and increasing the wages of 
the other sector. The two werey of course, difficult to 
reconcile. This contradiction is well expressed by a report 
on the attitude of the asentados to the unions: 
"With respect to syndicalization, the asentados have 
not defined themselves very clearly. All recognize that 
union participation was decisive in achieving the 
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expropriation of some Fundos, where they worked-as` 
inquilinos 
... 
[But] in some areas the peasants fear 
that through the union9 the occasional [i. e., temporary - 
M. N. ) workers presently contracted to the asentamiento 
might gain the right to be incorporated into the 
asentamiento. In some asentamientos, unionism continues 
to play a role ... In others it has, lost its importance 
or it simply does not function, by the decision of the 
asentados themselves. " 
(cit., Kaufman, op. cit.: 1361 
All these contradictions were to have dramatic effects on the 
agrarian process which followed under the government of 
Popular Unity, largely as we shall see, because they were never 
precisely understood. In addition to these contradictions in 
the countryside, the PDC reform produced contradictions between 
town and country. It is to an examination of some of these 
that we must now turn. 
10.2.2 Some Aspects of-the Contradiction Between the 
Countryside and the Town 
It has been one of the main arguments of this work that the 
main concern of a capital-led land reform is to reduce the 
price of food in order to occasion a drop in wages and increase 
capital accumulation. In Chile the failure of import 
substitution, the inability to open up the domestic market, and 
the continuing shortage of foreign exchange aggravated the 
incapacity to promote rapid accumulation. It will also be 
recalled that increases in food prices were central to urban 
politics. The inability of agriculture under the control of 
capitalist landed property to increase production at a 
sufficient rate to satisfy demand and the consequent inflation, 
were the dominant factors tp produce the intervention of capital 
in the countryside in the shape of the PDC reform. Yet, 
because of the relative weakness of the industrial domestic 
bourgeoisie, the attack on landed property during this period 
was undertaken primarily by the urban patty-bourgeoisie in 
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alliance with the working class, while the still powerful 
landowners extracted large concessions for the privilege of 
'sacrificing' the most 'inefficient' among them to the 
burgeoning 'peasant road'. Moreover it will also be recalled 
that one of the factors which explained the relative power of 
the urban working class to acquire wage readjustments in line 
with inflation, was precisely the existence of high food prices - 
in other words, of a powerful landed class. In the absence 
of the antagonism between capital and landed property, there 
would be no guarantee that one of the obstacles to reducing 
wages would not be removed. All these features produced a 
number of contradictions between classes in the urban and 
rural settings. 
As far as foreign capital was concerned, the policy of 
the PDC was to purchase 51% of the shares of the large copper 
companies while at the same time offering the same concerns 
tax incentives in order to encourage an expansion in investment. 
The growth in copper production was to solve the problem of 
foreign exchange, while at the same time further foreign loans 
were acquired. At the same time the State entered into joint 
ventures with foreign capital hoping to encourage foreign 
investment while keeping some control over it [Kay, 1981: 500). 
During the first three years of its term of office the PDC 
policy was helped by high copper prices and by the utilisation 
of industrial capacity left idle during the Alessandri period. 
The increase in the market for means of production provided 
by the boost to the peasant road also helped accumulation and 
the rate of inflation decreased. By the and of 1967, however, 
all existing plant capacity was being utilised, copper prices 
began to level off and the rate of inflation increased 
dramatically [Appendix B, Chapter 9]. Private investment, 
both foreign and domestic, decreased after this date and the 
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State attempted to fill the gap itself j which resulted in an 
expansion of the public deficit [Kay, 1981: 501). Despite 
increases in agricultural production, the prices of agricultural 
products did not fall and the agricultural trade balance did 
not improve [Table 10.12). 
Table 10.12 
Chilean-Agricultural Trade Balance 1965-1972 
[in millions of US 01 
YEAR EXPORTS 
- -. IMPORTS BALANCE 
Imports of Pesticides, 
" Fertilizer, Seeds & Machinery 
1965 21 172 -151 . 201 
1966 20 194 -174 224 
1967 22 173 -151 208 
1968 23 185 -162 817 
1969 24 213 -189 248 
1970 29 165 -136 204 
1971 28 265 -237 297 
1972 - .... .... _535 - 
588 
Source: Barraclough and Fernandez, 1974: 158 
The consumption of food over the whole PDC period is 
indicated in Table 10.13, where it is shown that despite the 
increases in food production indicated earlier, the total 
consumption of food in the country declined substantially, 
especially after 1968. It appears from Table 10.13 that the 
increased figures of agricultural production were largely 
enabling the State to reduce imports of food but that total 
food consumption was declining. If we bear in mind the increase 
in food prices from 1968 onwards, we can comprehend that what 
was actually occurring, especially after this date, was 
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is confirmed in Table 10.14 where the real value of -the 
industrial minimum wage is shown. 
Table 10.14 
Index of Real Minimum Industrial Wages 








Source: Zammit, op. cit.: 338 
Thus, despite the fact that imports of food declined over 
this period [apart from 1969 following the drought], it would 
be mistaken to take this as being either an indication of 
increased consumption by the working class, or a solution to 
the problem of agriculture for capital. The PDC agrarian 
reform failed to solve the problem of food prices despite the 
increase in agricultural production, and imports of food were 
only kept down because of the decline in wages in real terms. 
This fall in real wages was therefore not bought by capital 
by decreasing the price of food, by solving the problem of 
agriculture, but by managing to contain the increasing militancy 
of the urban working class. The landowners had transformed 
themselves into capitalist farmers but without producing a fall 
in prices; on the contrary, as I have indicated, the State 
itself increased agricultural prices in order to placate the 
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landowners. 
Not surprisingly in this situation, struggles over wage 
increases were a constant feature of the period. Table 10.15 
documents the number of strikes between 1960 and 1969. 
Table 10.15 
Number of Strikes 1960-1969 
Year Total Legal Illegal 
1960 257 85 172 
1961 262 82 180 
1962 401 85 316 
1963 413 50 363 
1964 564 88 476 
1965 723 148 575 
1966 1073 137 936 
1967 1142 264 878 
1968 1124 223 901 
1969 
. 997 206 
771 
Source: Angell, 1972: 76 
It was only because of the relative power of the working class 
that its real income did not decrease further during Frei's 
term as it managed to secure considerable wage increases. By 
1967 however, the State was arguing that if programmes like 
the land reform were: 
... to remain compatible, with the objective of price 
stability' some additional Sacrifices would have to be 
imposed on the urban population. A number of measures 
were envisioned, including cutbacks on welfare spending, 
additional tax increases, and the encouragement of 
private savings. But the most controversial aspect of 
this 'consolidation' [as the program was termed by 
government officials] was an attempt to place new 
restrictions on wage increases. " 
[Kaufman, op. cit.: 236) 
The conflict of the understated 'additional sacrifices' to be 
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borne by the working class came to a head over the struggle 
for the 1967 wage readjustment bill. From 1964 to 1967 the 
government had allowed wage and salary readjustments equal to 
the official price increases of the preceding year. Through 
tax increases, as well as by keeping readjustments equal to, 
instead of above, the rate of inflation, the'PDC government 
hoped to check price rises while at the same time pushing 
forward its agrarian reform [Kaufman, loc. cit. ]. The 1967 
readjustment bill which was eventually passed after a struggle, 
restricted wage rises to the increase in the consumer price 
index, with the result that the dramatic cwt-in-wages, - 
desired by the government and the right-wing parties was not 
obtained, and neither was the purchasing power of the working 
class increased. In real terms industrial wages continued to 
fall. 
Kaufman, argues that the 'problem' with Chile was that 
each class eschewed co-operation in the 'national interest' 
in favour of maintaining and increasing its own economic 
position in relation to the others. He suggests, like a good 
liberal-, that the urban working class should have accepted a 
reduction in wages in order for the government to meet the 
costs of the land reform without creating undue inflationary 
pressures Cop. cit.: ch. 71. Underlying this position is the 
familiar argument which we have already encountered and which 
suggests that the 'interests' of the working class and those 
of the 'peasantry' are opposed, as the former require a decrease 
and the latter an increase in food prices, and Kaufman intimates 
as much himself Cibid.: 248]. The errors of this view should 
by now be reasonably clear. It assumes that cheap food is a 
working-class demand, that the peasantry forms a unity, and 
it sees such antagonisms which are the products of capitalist 
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production relations as general abstract 'interests', supposedly 
valid for all historical situations. To-put the same position 
in a different manner, the argument assumes that'this 
antagonism is given and hence beyond control. Yetl-the fact 
that capitalist production relations actually produce an 
antagonism between the 'urban' working class and the-'rural' 
'peasantry' needs to be understood. What'this phenomenal 
antagonism actually means is that a unity-or alliance between 
the working class and the peasantry is not given by capitalism, 
but has to be constructed by a marxist party. In view of this 
fact it may be pertinent to comment briefly on the character- 
istics of this antagonism in Chile and the position of the 
marxist parties towards it. fl 
First of all it is worth pointing out that the Chilean 
working class was far from consisting of a political unity. 
It was divided between a large number of unions,. between 
political parties, between places of work, between sexes, between 
regions, and soon. Indeed, this feature is not particular 
to Chile and is a general product of capitalism. In fact there 
is no such thing as 'the' working class which is-simply given 
as a politically united entity. As Debray, for instance, 
rightly puts it: 
" ... there is no such thing as an essential proletariat 'viewed in the round', embodied in an identifiable 
group; there are only sectors and strata at , very different 
stages of development, often in conflict with one another, 
varying as from one industry to another, one district to 
another, one trade union to another' varying even within 
a single factory. " 
CDebray, 1977: 2911 
A united working class has to be produced by a political party 
through a correct practice. Now, what is important to note 
regarding Chile, was that this unity had not been produced by 
the end of the 1960's. Indeed, the various unions were 
affiliated to the CUT [Central Confederation of Workers] but 
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the latter was a weak organisation which had little control 
over its affiliated members (Kaufman, op. cit.: ch. 6; Angell, 
op. cit. ). Each union basically fought for increasing the wages 
of its own members in a manner which can only be described 
as 'economistic'. There were signs that this was changing in 
1969 when some workers took to more_direct action such as 
factory occupation [Roxborough'at al., 1977: 61) but there can 
be no doubt that no political unity had been created by that 
date. This is not to disparage the political work of serious 
militants, but merely to state the importance of not idealising 
the unity of the working class. Moreover, and most importantly, 
it should be noted that according to Allende himself, only 20% 
of the working class was actually unionised in 1970 [Debray, 
1971: 109]. 
Under such conditions it was not surprising that there 
was no immediate 'congruence of interests' between the proletariat 
and the peasantry. As far as the peasantry itself was concerned, 
we have seen that it was becoming differentiated and that 
marxist unions, along with others, were largely dominated by 
rich peasants. The urban proletariat was. thus institutionally 
completely divided from the poor peasants and the rural wage- 
labourers, and both were bearing the brunt of-the capitalist 
transformation of agriculture. In general there seemed little 
organised co-operation between urban and rural unions, according 
PTM 
to the president of the Ranquil union himself [Kaufman, op. cit.: 209 
while at the same time, the question. of actually confronting 
the real contradictions between the urban working class and 
the peasantry never seems to have been seriously considered 
by the marxist parties which confined themselves to criticising 
the PDC government for abandoning the land reform process. 
Confronted by the choice produced by the capitalist relations 




wage increases 'or' increasing expenditure on agrarian reform, 
the marxist parties opted for the former Cibid.: 241). OF 
course, this 'choice' is a false one as it can be overcome by 
questioning the relations which produced it; yet there. is no 
evidence to suggest that these parties considered taking this 
last position. On the contrary, the evidence of, their political 
practice during the government of Popular Unity which followed, 
only confirmed their inability to analyse the basis of the 
contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry. Even 
though the marxist parties paid continuous lip-service to the 
'worker/peasant alliance', this notion remained largely 
rhetorical as far as their practice was concerned as we shall 
see. 
Finally, a word should be said regarding the position of 
industrialists towards the PDC agrarian reform12. Kaufman 
Cop. cit.: 160-11 notes that the industrialists took an 
ambivalent position towards the agrarian reform. Whilst they 
remained politically neutral and their organisations did not 
intervene in the struggle over expropriation and distribution 
of land, a survey found that they voiced private anxieties 
as to the threat to private property which the land reform 
represented [loc. cit. ) .A more precise formulation of the 
position of the industrialists at the time is provided by 
Chonchol who was the head of INDAP: 
"The modern industrial bourgeoisie was not very 
sympathetic towards the plight of the traditional 
landowners because the backwardness of agriculture 
laid obstacles in the way of industrialisation. Its 
political representatives wished the peasants to be 
incorporated into the internal market through an 
increase in their living'standardsl so as to promote 
industrial expansion. 
The industrial bourgeoisie therefore, viewed in 
favourable terms the transformation of a backward 
agriculture into a modern and capitalist agriculture 
which would be capable of benefitting the peasants. 
Nevertheless ... many 
industrialists while agreeing 
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with this perspective, were worried about the process 
of expropriation instituted by the law which enabled 
long term compensation to be calculated on the value 
of the property declared for taxation purposes, rather 
than on its full market value. They were worried in 
case this method ever came to be extended to other 
sectors ... 
They accepted a certain kind of agrarian reform in which 
they saw advantages both for themselves and for the 
capitalist development of the country; but their 
acquiescence was only provided on the understanding that 
the reform would not go too far and would not endanger 
the sectors of society in which they had a direct interest. " 
[Chonchol, 1977: 60-11 
In sum therefore, the industrial bourgeoisie was not opposed 
to a land reform which would both abolish private landed 
property by incorporating it into capital and which at the same 
time extended the domestic market. It was too weak to lead 
the process of capital-led development which-it left to the 
leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie as I have noted. At the 
same time however, the industrial bourgeoisie was opposed to 
any measure which went beyond the incorporation of landed 
property into capital, to a challenging of private property 
itself. Not surprisingly, as the militancy of the peasants 
increased towards the and of the PDC term of'office, the 
industrialists withdrew their support from the Christian 
Democrats. The position of the industrial bourgeoisie boded 
ill for the future, for it confirms the analysis pursued in 
this work which suggests that by 1970 there was no longer an 
independent landed property in the Chilean countryside13. 
Any attempt to 'radicalise' the land reform by increasing the 
expropriation of estates of whatever size, would now challenge 
private property - i. e. ", capitalism - itself. 
10.2.3 Concluding Remarks 
0 
By the and of the decade the PDC agrarian reform had exploded 
as a result of its own internal contradictions, yet, at the 
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same time the nature of the class structure in Chilean society 
had been substantially transformed. The land reform had 
finally accomplished the transformation of capitalist landlords 
into capitalist farmers and had thus united the two previously 
antagonistic classes of domestic capital. Further, it had given 
a boost to the peasant road to the capitalist-=development of 
agriculture, thus accelerating the differentiation of the 
peasantry. The middle-peasant inquilinos were--now being 
transformed into rich peasant asentados, while still being 
under threat of proletarianisation on the still unexpropriated 
estates. Their position, despite their new found ability to 
resist through unions, was still precarious, and-given the slow 
nature of the reform process, they were increasingly willing 
to support the marxist parties which were arguing for an 
acceleration of the process. The poor peasants and rural 
wage-labourers had not only 'not benefitted' from the reform 
as most of the literature understates, but were also finding 
themselves increasingly worse off and unable to-find employment. 
Not surprisingly they provided the basis of Popular Unity 
support in the countryside CGeljart, op. cit. ], for the left- 
wing coalition was promising to extend the benefits of the 
reform to the 'peasantry' as a whole. 
In the towns the working-class was suffering under the 
increase of inflation so that it easily gave support to 
Popular Unity which was intent on enacting a programme of 
income distribution and the raising of workers' living standards. 
The industrialists and the new capitalist farmers now united, 
withdrew their support from the PDC and backed their own 
right-wing candidate, Alessandri, at the 1970 elections. Only 
sectors of the urban petty-bourgeoisie on whom the rigours 
of inflation had much less effect, along with a number-of the 
beneficiaries of the land reform, now supported a Christian 
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Democratic party, itself depleted after a breakaway in 1969, 
led by Chonchol and his followers, which led to the Formation 
of MAPU [Movement for United Popular Action). In these 
circumstances Allende, the candidate of the Popular Unity co-,. 
alition13, acquired 36.2% of the votes in the 1970. presidential 
elections, followed by Alessandri with 34.9%. and Tomic, the 
PDC candidate with 27.8%-CRoxborough at al., op. cit.: 69). The 
victory of Allende therefore rested first on an electoral 
alliance between the urban working class, the rural proletariat 
and poor peasants, and the middle peasants, and second on a 
split between the bourgeoisie and the petty--bourgeoisie. Both 
these points merit further brief comment because they had 
important effects on the struggle which followed. First, the 
electoral alliance between the urban working class, the middle 
peasants and the poor peasants was just that - an electoral 
alliance - and not much more. Because of their different class 
positions, these various classes supported the Popular Unity 
parties for different reasons. They were united in-their 
opposition to the bourgeoisie and the new agrarian capitalists, 
yet, as in all class alliances, their concerns were different. 
I have already noted some of the class contradictions which 
pertained both within the peasant organisation and between 
the working class and the peasantry. Given both the dominance 
of the middle-peasantry in the peasant unions and the lack of 
any coherent co-operation between these unions and those of 
the urban working class, the latter were divided from their 
counterparts in agriculture. Second, the electoral split 
between the bourgeoisie was not one between the representatives 
of capital and those of landed property. I have had occasion 
to argue that this division had been an important factor in 
determining the relatively powerful, position of the urban 
806 
working class. In the absence of this division however, as 
was the case in 1970 when industrial and agrarian capitalists 
were not only economically united but also politically united 
behind Alessandri, one of the important causes of working class 
power had disappeared. From now on the-bourgeoisie would be 
united against any measure which it construed as an attack on 
private property. There was and could be no question of Chile 
requiring any revolution of the classical bourgeois-democratic 
type after 1970. The only force which the bourgeoisie might 
have been thought liable to attack in alliance with popular 
forces was imperialism, but even-then this was highly problematic. 
Not only had the 'contradictory' 'liberal' imperialist policies 
of the Alliance for Progress by then totally disappeared and 
the United States reverted even more explicitly to its usual 
straightforward role, but there was no sign of any national 
bourgeois movement of any strength to involve more than 
'radicalised' sections of the petty-bourgeoisie. In such 
circumstances it was crucial for the newly elected parties to 
produce alliances of classes which would include the urban and 
rural proletariat, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the middle 
peasants at least, under the leadership of the former if any 
transformation, whether socialist or purely 'transitional', 
was to succeed. This was the case not only for 'political' 
reasons due to the balance of forces, but also for 'economic' 
reasons, as an increase in the workers' standard of living 
would require increases in food production. Both 'political' 
and 'economic' forces constantly reinforce each other, and no 
popular class or group can or should be expected to support' 
a socialist transformation if it receives no immediate benefit 
from such a transformation. The problem of food production was 
central to Chile's capitalist economy. It could be overcome in 
two major ways: either by increasing agricultural production 
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by deepening and strengthening bourgeois relations in the 
countryside, thus sacrificing the poor peasants and the rural 
wage-labourers-in favour of a 'future ideal' [the characteristic 
feature of the so-called 'progressive' transformation of 
agriculture under bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leadership); 
or else by increasing agricultural production through'the 
promotion of 'incipient' socialist forms of co-operation based 
on the true leadership of the proletariat. In the former case 
the urban working class would find itself isolated from its 
'other half' in the countryside, while its rural petty-bourgeois 
allies would be more and more forced to produce cheaper agri- 
cultural products and as a result would resist the 'alliance'. 
The dangers of this approach should be reasonably clear. In the 
latter case a socialist transformation could be possible, 
although it required numerous difficult and painful struggles. 
Whatever the alternative adhered toi the contradiction between 
town and country which divided the Chilean working class, both 
from itself along urban/rural lines, and from its allies, could 
not be expected just to 'go away'. It necessarily had to be 
confronted and transformed for the proletariat to consolidate 
its power. 
10.3 Agrarian Reform and the Failure of Socialism: '1971-73 
Nearly a decade has passed since the disastrous defeat of the 
Chilean Left in 1973 and the debate over 'what went wrong' 
still continues unabated. The massive volume of literature14 
which has been produced as a result however, has not always 
been particularly informative, often amounting to exchanges of 
rhetorical abuse between adherents of various political factions. 
P1'M 
In so far as more serious reassessments of the Allende 
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government of Popular Unity (UP) have been attempted, they 
have tended either to revolve around the question of the 
nature of the State in capitalist society and whether it'is 
possible to have a 'democratic' road to socialism, or on the 
political tactics, or 'strategy' employed by the various parties 
in the UP coalition15. These various appraisals, whether by 
those who were directly involved in the government or by 
marxist aacJemics, have tended to put the disaster down to 
mistakes of policy, tactical miscalculation, or to the actions 
of 'reformists' or 'ultra-leftists' depending on their point 
of view. Only in very rare cases do these reappraisals go 
beyond such superficial accounts, leaving one analyst to 
conclude in 1980, at the end of his excellent review of the 
'analyses' of the Chilean leaders in exile-, that: 
"The defeat of the Chilean Left in 1973 calls for a 
profound reassessment of their overall strategy. It 
places a major question mark over the terms in which 
the political participation of the Left integrated the 
working class and the peasantry into the system of 
domination. The reassessment by the two main groups 
in the Popular Unity is still not radical enough: it 
does not confront some features of the country's 
underdeveloped structure and. does not relate them to 
their own political practice. The interpretations so 
far offered by the Chilean left-wing leaders concentrate 
rather too much on the penumbra of political 
manoeuvering. Only by moving beyond the shaky terrain 
of political manipulation will the Chilean Left be able 
to absorb the lessons of the 1970-73 period. " 
(Faundez, 1980: 75) 
These retrospective assessments fall into two groups: a 'Right' 
group represented primarily by the Communist Party which argues 
that the defeat of the UP can be attributed to the failure of 
the government to make enough concessions to the so-called 
'middle strata' and the PDC; and a 'Left' represented primarily 
by the Socialist Party which suggests that both the POC and 
the 'middle strata' which the former represented, were 
essentially bourgeoist. and-hence that any concessions'were 
only a futile exercise and diverted the forces of the movement 
60 9 
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from the 'real' struggle. Faundez shows very well how these 
respective 'assessments' by the leaders of the labour movement, 
despite their differences, accept unquestioningly the analysis 
underlying the government programme and are mere 'reiterations 
of the entrenched positions of the two major factions of the 
UP. Their assessments leave one with the feelings he notes' 
that: 
it ... it 
is possible to explain the catastrophic defeat 
of the Chilean Left in terms of a series of errors and 
miscalculations and that the military coup could have 
been prevented had the government. been politically 
more skillful. Furthermore ... because their interpret- 
ations concentrate almost exclusively. on the political 
manoeuvering, they do not provide a satisfactory answer 
to why Allende failed. " 
[ibid.: 69) 
Indeed, he continues: 
" ... after having 
identified the middle strata as the 
main stumbling block, and having decided that the main 
issue centers on how to persuade them or force them to 
accept the hegemony of the proletariat, any further 
discussion about the nature of the opposition to 
Allende or the failings of the Popular Unity seems to 
be superfluous if not foreclosed. " 
Cibid.: 71] 
He rightly suggests that it is not possible to assess 
realistically the Allende period without a consideration of 
the nature of. the Chilean proletariat and that of, the peasantry. 
He concentrates on discussing the former and points out 
correctly that given the structure of the Chilean economy where 
the 'commanding heights' were controlled by a tiny fraction 
of enterprises employing only a small number of workers, the 
decision to concentrate on nationalising this sector effectively 
postponed the immediate aspirations of three-quarters of the 
industrial proletariat Cibid.: 731. In addition Popular Unity 
never seriously confronted the fact that for similar reasons 
"nearly 70 per cent of the industrial workforce were either 
barred from unionisation or., else could only belong to very 
small unions which were, isolated from the main stream of the 
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labour movement. " Cibid.: 743. Finally he adds that: 
... the radicalization of workers beyond the limits 
foreseen by the official strategies of the Left was 
largely due to the fact that some fundamental decisions 
such as those contained in the Popular Unity's programme 
or those taken at top level conclaves, were not generated 
by a truly democratic process. " Cibid.: 731 
Thus, Faundez shows that despite their differences, there is 
a general unity or agreement between the two major 'official' 
interpretations of the Popular Unity period. This is a point 
to which I shall have occasion to return. 
Unfortunately Faundez' work is a rarity among more 
'academic' analyses of the period. These writings, also when 
written from a marxist position, largely tend to apportion 
blame to one fraction or the other of the UPS even when they 
attempt a more sophisticated analysis. Thus for Sandri [1976] 
the major 'explanation' seems to be the 'irresponsible' position 
of the leadership of the Socialist Party (PS)9 the ultra-leftist 
tactics of the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and 
the general lack of 'social discipline's while for Smirnow 
01979] the main 'culprit' seems to be the 'reformism' and 
'electoralism' of the Communist Party (PC). Both fail to 
discuss with any rigour the theory and practice of the parties 
of the Left as a whole. 
In what follows I do not intend to provide a'total analysis 
of the UP period; such ai 
the limits of this work. 
major problem: the total 
worker/peasant alliance. 
one major reason for the 
due, I shall suggest, to 
enterprise would take me far beyond 
Rather I wish to concentrate on one 
failure by the Left to establish a 
This failure, it seems to may was 
defeat of the Chilean Left, and was 
the erroneous analyses and practices 
of the parties of the Left as a whole and not to one party in 
particular. To be more precise, I shall first assess the 
various parties' analyses of agriculture and the various lines 
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which they propounded and will then examine some aspects of 
the social contradictions in agriculture and between agriculture 
and industry. Despite their differences these party lines 
exhibited common problematic aspects which laid insuperable 
obstacles in the path of the formation of a worker/peasant 
alliance. It is not my wish to criticise the political work 
of militants, organisers and the people themselves who often 
managed to create such an alliance in many instances in spite 
of the various party lines. The fact that these instances 
remained isolated and ad hoc responses to particular problems, 
shows the isolation of the political parties from the masses, 
the lack of a coherent appreciation by the political parties 
of the Left of the real social contradictions pertaining in 
the Chilean countryside, and the inventiveness of the militants 
and people themselves in the absence of coherent-party guidance. 
The question of the worker/peasant alliance has hardly 
received any attention in the retrospective analyses of the 
Popular Unity period. The reasons for this are not dissimilar 
from the reasons for which it was not always seriously 
discussed at the time16. Roxborough at al. Cop. cit.: 1351 for 
example, note that they do not discuss agriculture in any 
detail in their book because "the fate of the Chilean revolution 
was determined by the developing class struggle between the 
urban working class and the bourgeoisie, and by the response 
of the armed forces to these developments. ". To assert that 
the fate of the revolution - if indeed there was ever such a 
thing - was determined by the class struggle between the 
working class and the bourgeoisie, is not only to ignore the 
class struggle in the countryside, but it is to assume that 
the urban working class can transform society on its own, 
despite being in a minority of the population. It is based 
on the fallacy that revolutions only involve two classes, and 
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forgets that socialism is about the emancipation and liberation 
of all oppressed classes under the leadership of the proletariat, 
a fact which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao all systematically 
maintained. If it is true that in Chile the 'revolution' 
was restricted to the class struggle between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, that in itself says quite a lot, it seems to me, 
regarding its disastrous failure. - Given that Popular Unity 
had the support of only a minority of the population, however 
one measures this support, it was essential for this support 
to be broadened through a correct identification of classes 
and correct policy of alliances. It may well be important to 
recall Lenin at this point: - 
"In a certain sense of the word, it is only a nation-wide 
revolution that can be victorious. This is true in the 
sense that the unity of the overwhelming majority of the 
population in the struggle for the demands of that 
revolution is essential for victory to be won. This 
overwhelming majority must consist either entirely of 
one class, or of different classes that have certain 
aims in common ... the conscious particpation of the 
overwhelming majority of the population in the struggle 
is essential for victory to be won ... 
The concept of a 'nation-wide revolution' should tell 
the Marxist of the need for a precise analysis of those 
varied interests of different classes that coincide in 
certain definite, limited common aims. Under no 
circumstances must this concept serve to conceal or 
overshadow the study of the class struggle in the course 
of any revolution. Such use of the concept of 
'nation-wide revolution' amounts to a complete rejection 
of Marxism and a return to the vulgar phraseology of the 
petty-bourgeois democrats or petty-bourgeois socialists. 
This truth is frequently forgotten by our Social-Democratic 
Right wing ... All real revolutionary progress means 
drawing broader masses into the movement; consequently - 
a greater consciousness of class interests; consequently - 
more clearly-defined political, party groupings and more 
precise outlines of the class physiognomy of the various 
parties; consequently - greater replacement of general, 
abstract, unclear political and economic demands that 
are vague in their -abstractness, by the varying concrete, 
clearly-defined demands of the different classes. " 
[Lenin, 1907F/1972: 404-51 
In Chile, while the Right of the labour movement fell precisely 
into the error described here by Lenin of restricting itself 
to vague, abstract demands, the Left never seriously understood 
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the necessity to create the unity of the overwhelming majority 
of the population. In both cases their class analyses were 
never precise and the particular stage of the transformation 
process was never clearly identified. 
As far as the more sophisticated writers on the Chilean 
countryside under Popular Unity are concerned-Ce. g., Kay, 1975), 
their discussions are largely formulated in a manner which 
implies that agriculture was solely one area of government 
policy, and they do not examine explicitly the problem of the 
worker/peasant alliance. Yet it seems to me, for the reasons 
I have already elucidated, that despite the fact that less 
than one-third of the Chilean population was employed in 
agriculture during the 1970's, a successful worker/peasant 
alliance was crucial for the success of Chilean socialism. 
10.3.1 The Class Analyses of Agriculture under Popular Unity. 
In his conversations with Regis Debray, Allende makes the 
following remarks: 
"This is a working-class government because the 
predominant ideology is that of the working class ... 
We use the term 'feudal' sectors in a loose way to 
indicate what should more accurately be called backward 
forms-of 'Chilean land capitalism'. The backwardness 
lies in the fact that these capitalist relationships 
still reveal traces of anachronistic personal fealties, 
which are steadily dying out, and a great concentration 
of land ownership, which goes back to a great extent 
to the property structure of the last century ... Land 
Reform, taken in isolation, is well known as one of the 
so-called democratic bourgeois changes, in otherwords 
a change which can act as a stimulant to capitalism 
itself. However, in the modern world, when the 
fundamental conflict has reached the stage of socialist 
transformations, it is accepted that a far-reaching 
Land Reform, corresponding to the interests of the 
agricultural labourers and the various categories of 
medium-size and small peasants can only be carried 
out through an alliance of all the oppressed classes, 
headed by the working class. In our case, Land Reform 
is not accompanied by the maintenance of capitalism, 
but by the destruction of its fundamental nucleus: 
national and foreign monopolistic capitalism. It is 
not, therefore, a case of developing capitalism in the 
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countryside, but a proces of guiding tenurial structures 
towards Socialism by the means which are best suited 
to the character of our historical and social development. 
It is understood that in some cases, the new structure 
will be of the most advanced type - communal ownership; 
elsewhere various forms of cooperative system; and 
finally, the survival of sectors of small private 
ownership will have to be considered. " 
[Allende in Debray, 1971: 82,101-2) 
It seems important to me to put Allende's statements to a 
critical scrutiny, to examine whether the dominant ideology 
of the Popular Unity was working-class and whether the practices 
of the coalition did guide, or indeed could have guided, social 
relations in agriculture towards socialism. -The rest of the 
chapter will be concerned with these problems. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious ambiguities which prevails 
throughout the programmatic statements of the Popular Unity 
government, including the speeches and comments of Allende 
himself, concerns the nature of the transformation process 
which it was meant to initiate. On the one hand, in statements 
such as the one cited above, Allende certainly stresses'that 
what is at stake in agriculture is more than a bourgeois- 
democratic revolution, the construction of socialist relations 
in fact, while in other statements he stresses the bourgeois- 
democratic, pluralist and mainly nationalist nature of the 
process. For example, Allende notes that 11 ... our basic, most 
vital, principle is one of anti-imperialism, as a first step% 
towards the making of structural changes" Cibid.: 85). Here 
the bourgeois nationalist nature of the process is emphasised 
and a notion of stages is implied. 'Pluralism', 'democracy' 
and 'liberty' in a general abstract sense are stressed by 
Allende throughout his speeches and so is the government's 
support for 'small' and 'medium' business enterprises [Allende, 
1973: ch. 20, for example]17. On yet other occasions the 
emphasis is laid on 'popular power' and socialist transformation 
[Popular Unity, 1970a: 31; Allende, op. cit.: ch. 23. , Now, the 
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point I am making here is primarily one concerning the 
ambiguity of the nature of the transformation process and 
not whether it was mistaken or correct to protect bourgeois 
freedoms or not. Usually Popular Unity is criticised for 
holding that a 'parliamentary road' to socialism was possible, 
but it seems to me more pertinent to ask whether this process 
was indeed calculated as a socialist process or not. One PC 
supporter has recently suggested that it was nothing of 
the kind, that its programme ýf ... was not a program for 
building socialism; it corresponded to the anti-imperialist, 
anti-oligarchical, national, social-democratic stage of the 
Chilean revolutionary process" [Sandri, op. cit.: 198-93. Now, 
if this was indeed the case, then the Programme's insistence 
on 'popular power' (Popular Unity, 1970a) and Allende's and 
other leaders' continuous reference to the socialist nature 
of the process, including his remark on agrarian reform cited 
above, are entirely misleading. It will easily be recalled 
that the nature and stage of the transformation process is 
crucial for each implies - different balances of class forces, 
different alliances and different strategies and tactics. 
This inability to provide a coherent and unitary position on 
the nature of the revolution could only have disastrous effects. 
Apart from anything else, to talk of socialism if a bourgeois 
transformation is contemplated, not only misleads the masses 
but is also likely to antagonise the bourgeoisie as a'whole. 
This ambiguity regarding the nature of the process reflects 
in large measure the different positions of the different 
political parties in Popular Unity, as we shall see below. 
It reflects the fact that a common line was never agreed upon 
and that profound differences existed from the very beginning. 
Bearing in mind that an alliance of the PC and the PS had 
existed long before 1970j'Popular Unity seems to have been 
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singularly unprepared to take power18. 
Yet, the programmatic statements of the UP were not 
restricted to such ambiguities which reflected divisions between 
party lines. There is also a characteristic vagueness 
regarding many points on which different parties agreed. For 
example, where the land reform is concerned the official 
documents continuously refer to the distribution of land to 
'the peasants' in general, without specifying who these peasants 
are. On the one occasion when this is done 'the peasantry' 
seems to include all rural classes apart from the landlords. 
Thus: 
"The benefits of Agrarian Reform will be extended to 
the groups of medium and small farmers, smallholders, 
employees, sharecroppers and temporary labourers who 
have so far been excluded from these benefits. " 
(Popular Unity, 1970b: 281) 
It seems pertinent to ask what kind of agrarian reform it is 
which benefits all of these antagonistic classes, from wage- 
labourers through to middle and small capitalist farmers? 
Although it is not said who these middle and small farmers are, 
it turns out, as we shall see, that they were the large modern 
enterprises which could control up to 80 BIH. Now, it is not 
impossible to reconcile such class differences in the short 
term through a kind of bourgeois-democratic revolution under 
the leadership of the proletariat, but such statements by 
Popular Unity never detailed how this could be done; they 
remained at a purely abstract level. Another problem is 
related to the slogan by Popular Unity to 'abolish the latifundio' 
- i. e., to expropriate all enterprises over 60 BIH totally 
irrespective of the economic, or more importantly, the political 
position of their owners. This policy on which all the major 
left-wing parties [with one minor exception) agreed, was 
problematic whichever way one looks at it. Economically it 
was problematic because the large properties were purely 
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capitalist. An attack on them would amount to an attack on 
capitalism as a whole unless they could be differentiated 
from other capitalists in different terms [e. g., in political 
terms). The expropriation of all enterprises over 80 BIH, 
irrespective of whether the landowners were bourgeois 
nationalists or supporters of imperialism, would have the same 
effect. Although, of course, popular with the people, the 
demand for the-abolition of the 'latifundio'-was a populist 
demand and shows a lack of a critique of bourgeois conventional 
categories. The political parties in the countryside operated 
systematically with such concepts and never saw it as part of 
their practice to transform cultural terms. 
These problems led to the fact that there was never any 
detailed, coherent and precise position or policy by Popular 
Unity with regqrd to the question of agriculture"[Roxborough, 
1974: 11. Rather, the position was one where vague goals were 
put forward by the government and where each party pursued 
its own independent line in the countryside, competed for 
followers, and so on. The result was that "diversity, conflict 
and confusion were inherent in the nature of the political 
situation in the Chilean countryside during those three years" 
Cibid.: 271. Yet it would be false to restrict oneself, to 
noting the diversity and conflicting positions within the 
Left at the time, for underlying the divergent positions was a 
common unity which exhibited highly problematic features. 
Both the vagueness of the agrarian 'policy' of Popular Unity 
and some of the problematic features, of all the parties' 
positions can be initially apprehended in the statement of the 
'basic goals' of the agrarian 'policy': 
"The primary goals of the Popular Unity Government's 
agricultural policy are: 11 to increase production and 
productivity, 21 to improve-income. distribution - this 
implies eliminating both the latifundia and rural 
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unemployment and-3] to achieve widespread campesino' 
(peasant - M. N. ) participation in political and 
economic decision making ... One of the most pressing 
problems facing the Popular Unity Government is to 
build 
.a new. agrar.. 
ian structure that will incorporate 
the entire campesino population into the Government's 
programme and the benefits of reform, instead of only 
those residing on the expropriated estates. " 
CBarraclough, 1973b: 121, emphasis added) 
Barraclough had the status of an official expert ! adviser' at 
the time, so that this statement can be said to have official 
sanction despite its evidently liberal stance. 'For ,a 
start 
the statement does not elaborate on the many theoretical and 
political problems it raises, such as how are increases in 
production to be reconciled with the development of socialist 
relations, the elimination of unemployment and widespread 
peasant 'participation'. More importantly, however, the terms 
'peasant', 'participation', and even more so the phrase 
"incorporate the entire campesino population", illustrate 
some of the concepts with which all the parties operated to 
a greater or lesser degree. The notion of 'the peasantry' 
has already been commented on, but the notions of 'participation' 
and 'incorporation' are also highly problematic for they 
imply a transformation 'from above', not made by the people 
themselves. Finally, the 'incorporation of the entire campesino 
population', rather than just the residents of the expropriated 
estates, points perhaps to the greatest problem of all, for 
it implies that Popular Unity saw the solution to the problem 
of agriculture as consisting of merely 'incorporating' the 
excluded 'peasants' into the 'reformed enterprises' already 
dominated by the rich peasants. The effects of this line, 
adhered to by all the parties of Popular Unity, exhibits a 
phenomenal lack of knowledge of social relations in agriculture 
by primarily urban parties. It was to have disastrous effects. 
At this point I want to examine briefly the political 
lines of the various left-wing parties in relation to agriculture. 
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I shall concentrate specifically on the points which unite 
them as well as noting some of their differences. In this 
manner I hope to bring out what seems to me to be the essential 
problematic underlying their practices. Fortunately a 
descriptive presentation of the position of these various 
parties in relation to agriculture has been provided by 
Roxborough (1974). This consists simply of a presentation of 
the parties' positions, with a minimum of comment so that 
despite being a second-hand account, it follows the official 
texts extremely closely. Moreover, in so far as I have been 
able to check this work against original party statements, I 
have not been able to find any major discrepancy. This isý 
particularly the case with regard to the vague and often general 
level at which many of the party positions are couched. As 
far as I have been able to ascertain, this vagueness and 
generality is not the product of Roxborough's text but is a 
fair reflection of the parties' positions themselves. In what 
follows I shall concentrate on the text by Roxborough where 
greater detail can be found, and will supplement it when 
necessary with direct party statements. Roxborough outlines 
the positions of Four political parties, three of which formed 
part of the Popular Unity Coalition (MAPU, PC, PS), and one 
outside the coalition (MIR). These parties are chosen and 
the two small social democratic parties and the small Christian 
Left party, which were also part of Popular Unity, are ignored 
because only the former had a considerable basis of support 
in the countryside. As my intention is to show the essential 
unity underlying the major split within the marxist parties 
in Chile, this exclusion is entirely justifiable. I shall 
discuss these parties in a manner slightly different from that 
followed by Roxborough, concentrating on the PC and the PSS 
and ending with a shorter assessment of the MIR and MAPU. 
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[i] The Agrarian Line of the Communist Party. 
Despite the many problems in both its analysis and its general 
line. the PC held perhaps to the most logical and coherent 
position of all the parties of the Left. It, understood the - 
need to maintain the split within the bourgeoisie, the consequent 
necessity of the proletariat to ally with 'progressive' sectors- 
of this bourgeoisie and the crucial importance of increasing 
agricultural production. The problems with the PC lay largely 
with the manner in which it conceived these issues and the 
erroneous analysis of agrarian relations on which they were 
based . 
For the Communist Party the central character of Chilean 
agriculture was its feudal or semi-feudal character dominated 
by the latifundio and its feudal system of labour relations 
CRoxborough, op. cit.: 11-121. It was this backwardness which, 
for the PC, held back the level of production in agriculture, 
with the result that it viewed the transformation process which 
was to be supported as a national bourgeois-democratic 
revolution in the classical sense - i. e., as, anti-feudal and 
anti-imperialist. To this was added the typical Latin-American 
attack on the 'oligarchy' [the so-called 'oligarchy' being seen 
as the main national support of feudalism and imperialism) 
thus: 
"The fundamental demand of this revolution is, without 
doubt, the total elimination of the agrarian landlord 
system, the national oligarchic monopolies and the 
foreign consortia who are milking dry our principal 
sources of wealth. The revolution iss thereforei 
anti-feudal, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist. " 
[cit. Roxborough, op. cit.: 113 
Interestingly and in total contradiction to the supposedly 
'feudal' nature of agriculture, the-PC'maintains that the 
numerical majority of the-labourers in the countryside are 
proletarians! In order to come to this absurd conclusion, it 
includes under this rubric°not only wage-labourers (voluntarios, 
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of uerinos), but also inquilinos (middle peasants), overseers, 
specialised workers, technicians, white collar workers, and 
semi-proletarians Cibid.: 13). By agricultural proletarian the 
PC understood "any peasant who for lack of ownership of property 
lives mainly from the sale of his labour in exchange for a 
wage paid wholly or partially in money" Ccit. ibid.: 12, emphasis 
added] . 
Several points must be noted here. - First, the inquilino 
middle peasants are included unproblematically-in the 
proletariat; as we shall see this was done by all parties of 
the Left. In addition overseers, empleados, and other such 
problematic categories who are in daily opposition to the 
proletariat are unproblematically included. Women, incidentally, 
are not even mentioned. The only positive observation of the 
analysis in this context, is the recognition of the fact that 
"the fundamental nucleus of the proletariat is composed of 
temporary labourers" Cloc. cit. ]. Other parties were to classify 
temporary labourers in a 'sub proletariat'. Second, this 
agricultural proletariat is only a stratum, a subcategory of 
'peasants' [campesinos). It would be false to see here merely 
a terminological problem, as the 'peasantness' of the rural 
proletariat could always be invoked when the latter did not 
'behave as theory indicated it should'; for" example, when 
they preferred to cultivate their private plots rather than the 
collective land, and so on. For instance, for Corvalan, the 
PC General Secretary, the substitution of a 'latifundist economy' 
by an agricultural sector controlled by the peasants themselves 
encountered many problems under Popular Unity because of "the 
backwardness and illiteracyof the peasantry over generations, 
because of the ideological and organisational influence of the 
Christian Democrats among-the peasantry [parallelismo sindical], 
and because of certain unreal policies of the Popular Unity 
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Government" CCorvalan, t1972: 28-9]is . Third, for the PC. the 
'rural proletarian peasants' are differentiated from a category 
of 'peasant peasants' in terms of the legal ownership or 
non-ownership of 'property'. The consequencesof this view 
can be pursued through an assessment of the PC's second'major 
category in the countryside. 
This category is referred to as "non-wage-earning peasants" 
CRoxborough, op. cit.: 12-13). It is distinguished by'the fact 
that its members legally own the land they cultivate and 
'hence' according to the logic, do not have to sell their labour- 
power. They constitute a category of 'peasant peasants'. 
They are divided according to the PC into three categories: 
"poor peasants", "medium peasants" and "rich peasants/capitalist 
farmers". floxborough Cibid.: 12) comments on this point by 
noting that this procedure follows Lenin's methodology, but it 
should be evident that it is a pure travesty of Lenin, who 
was never so crude as to distinguish the peasantry from the 
proletariat in terms of the legal ownership of land. The 
"poor peasants" For the PC are those-who personally work the 
land and do not employ wage-labour Cloc. cit. ); in other words, 
they refer in actual fact to a section of the middle peasantry. 
The PC's "medium peasants" have more means of production than 
the "poor peasants" and employ wage-labour; in=other words, 
they are rich peasants. Finally, and as a result of downgrading 
the real categories of peasants, -the PC analysis finds itself 
without a rich peasantry and has to equate it with the 
capitalist farmers who "are characterised by their regular 
and permanent use of wage labour" [ibid.: 13) . They are 
distinguished from the landlords in that they personally work 
the land rather than being-absentee landlords Cloc. cit. ). Two 
Further points need to be made regarding the PC categorisation. 
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First, because of its assumption that legal property and 
wage-labour cannot be combined, it has no way of classifying 
peasant proprietors who also work as wage-labourers [i. e., the 
minifundistas]. It imposes a crude a priori graduation onto 
a reality which does not fit. Thus, while-the-PC asserted that 
"in exploiting in a regular manner outside labour, the medium 
peasants have, in reality, interests opposed to those of the 
workers" [cit. ibid.: 13) it failed to recognise'similar 
antagonisms within 'the proletariat' itself which it took as 
an unproblematically unified category. Second, by considering 
capitalist farmers as rich peasants it systematically downgraded 
the existence of capitalism in the countryside, a fact which 
is also evident in the PC's final category: the landlord class. 
For the PC, the landlords [terratenientes) were 
characterised by their "lack of interest for the conservation 
of soil fertility and for the use of backward production methods 
and semi-feudal systems of work" [cit. ibid.: 13). By defining 
the landlords in a manner which brings out their anti-bourgeois 
characteristics, rather than their exploitative anti-proletarian 
ones, the PC shows its adherence to the bourgeois-democratic 
road under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. This is further 
shown in the overall 'strategy' of the PC to which I turn 
below. For the present it is important to note that for the 
PC, as Roxborough Cibid.: 13) points out, the feudal latifundia 
were in effect restricted to a category of farms of 80 BIH 
and over, while below that acreage-size, similar social relations 
came under the 'capitalist farm' bracket. This problem comes 
from equating implicitly or explicitly farms measured in 
acreage, with determinate and specific social relations, an error 
which all left-wing parties fell into to a greater or lesser 
extent, and which is symbolised by the term 'latifundio'. 
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The two main preoccupations of the agrarian policy of the 
PC were the 'elimination of the feudal latifundia' and 'winning 
the battle for production'. Both these slogans were highly 
problematic, but both were related and founded on a position 
which was coherent in its own terms, and both were continuously 
expressed and consistently applied. For the PC, as we have 
seen, there were three 'classes' in the countryside, so that 
its 'strategy' was for the 'proletariat' to maintain an alliance 
with the 'non-wage-earning peasants' while undertaking the two 
objectives noted above. The abolition of the latifundia, 
which was viewed as the "principal obstacle to the expansion 
of agricultural production" CCorvalan, op. cit.: 261, was of 
course predicated on its feudal nature, to which the 'middle 
stratum' of peasants and capitalists could only be opposed. 
In the absence of feudalism of course, there would no longer 
be any logical opposition between the'large' and'medium' farms 
so that the possibility of an alliance between the 'proletariat' 
and the 'middle sectors' could not exist - at least not on the 
basis of an opposition to feudalism. The problem was of 
course that such an antagonism no longer existed within the 
Chilean social formation. If Joxe 01972: 2251 is correct in 
suggesting that the PC was operating under a two stage theory 
of revolution which had not altered in its basics since 1962 - 
i. e., before the final incorporation of landed property into 
capital - then the party is open to even greater criticism. 
The alliance of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie was 
consolidated by reassuring its members against expropriation, 
guaranteeing them the right to a reserve, encouraging them to 
increase production, restricting the demands for expropriation 
and mobilisation of the peasants, and so on. When this position 
came increasingly under attack by the 'Left' of the UP which 
wished to 'radicalise' the reform, such attacks were fiercely 
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resisted by the PC. For example, in December 1971 the 'Left' 
parties of Popular Unity [PS, MAPU) in the province of Linares, 
along with the MIR, signed'a Declaracion demanding among other 
things the lowering öf the 'limit of non-expropriation' from 
80 to 40 BIH, and the suppression of the landowners' right to 
a 'reserve' [CEA No. 1: 17-18). The response of the 'Right' to 
the Declaracidn came from Allende in a speech he made on the 
24th July 1972 and with which the PC agreed [Corvalän, op. cit.: 31). 
Allende stated that estates between 40 and 60 BIH were not to 
be expropriated in the next two years, and he reiterated the 
guarantee of a reserve of 40 BIH to all estates between 40 and 
80 BIH [Allende, 1972: 1). For Allende: 
"Every farmer who manages his property directly and 
obtains from it his only source of income, has an 
assured right to a reserve. In this manner the small 
and medium proprietor will be stimulated to invest in 
that part of his property defined as the future reserve. " 
Cibid.: 1-2] 
In this argument can be seen elements of the 'classical"position 
on the bourgeois-democratic revolution under the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisie. For the PC, increases in production were 
viewed in technicist and individualistic terms: increases in 
the utilisation of machinery, pricing policies and other 
individual incentives, and exhortation to higher individual 
effort. Production was to be increased "by means-of the 
planning of a network of agricultural industries ... that is 
to say, an attempt to transform Chilean agriculture into an 
industrialised sector of the-economy. " [cit. Roxborough, -op. cit.: 15 
For the PC there was no immediate connection between levels 
of material production and social relations, so that any 
transformation of the latter'which was seen as prejudicial to 
the former was labelled as 'premature', 'irresponsible'' and 
so on. Thus although the PC paid continuous lip-service to 
'participation', mobilisation of the masses and so one these 
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processes could only take a secondary position to increases 
in capitalist accumulation and they were limited, as any 
alliance with sections of the bourgeoisie requires. The problem 
of course was that under such circumstances the people could 
not understand the reasons for these limits, as they were not 
in charge of the transformation process in conjunction with 
the party. 
For the PC the transference of the expropriated latifundia 
to 'the peasants' would make possible an increase in agricultural 
production. Thus: 
"Rapidly liquidating the three thousand latifundios will 
make possible a great increase in productivity on these 
properties, incorporating into the new units a greater 
number of rural social strata ... which, finding work 
and joining the process of transformation of Chilean 
agriculture, will open up new channels for a real 
agricultural development. " 
[cit. ibid.: 14, emphasis added) 
I lay stress on the notion of 'incorporation' here because for 
the PC, as indeed for the other parties of the Left, the major 
problem confronting the land reform was the fact that enough 
peasants had not benefitted from the reform. This was not 
seen as being the necessary effect of the bourgeois social 
relations which were being reproduced, but was rather reduced 
to the fact that the majority of 'peasants' had been excluded 
from membership of the new 'reformed sector'. The solution 
to the problem was therefore seen as one of 'incorporating' 
the peasants into these units. As far as these units were 
seen as defective, this was put down to the organisational 
character of these institutions themselves, as we shall see below, 
rather than to the leadership of the transformation process 
by the middle-peasants, as it should have been. What this line 
amounted to was the incorporation of a poor peasantry into 
organisations dominated by rich peasants. In no way could this 
policy establish the leadership of the rural proletariat in 
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the countryside. Indeed, as we have seen, middle-peasants 
and agricultural wage-labourers were both included into one 
all-embracing category. It is also interesting to note that 
the asentados, the beneficiaries of the Frei reform', do not 
feature in the PC's class analysis. Presumably they would 
have to be included in the category of 'rural proletariat', 
as otherwise the policy of 'incorporation' would have been 
obviously erroneous. 
[ii] The Agrarian Line of the Socialist Party. 
The line of the PS was much more vague and less consistent 
than that of the PC. While paying lip-service to notions of 
class alliance and production increases, the effects of its 
practices were to operate against these prescriptions. 
For the PS. there were five basic strata in the countryside: 
the "agricultural proletariat", the "semi-proletariat or 
smallholding peasants", the "small proprietors", the "medium 
proprietors", and the "landlord and large latifundista class". 
The agricultural proletariat consisted of those labourers who 
earned a "daily wage in capitalist agricultural enterprises" 
CRoxborough, op. cit.: 18, emphasis added). Although it is not 
indicated who is included in this category, this becomes 
evident when the next category is defined. The "semi-proletariat 
or smallholding peasant class" refers to the minifundistas 
[loc. cit. ), so that the agricultural proletariat must include 
inquilinos, empleados and so on, as well as full-time 
agricultural labourers. As temporary labourers do not receive 
a 'daily wage', they seem not to feature in the classification 
at all, although the PS rightly notes that the minifundistas 
only work part of the time on their plots and are obliged to 
sell their labour-power [loc. cit. ). The category of "small 
proprietors" includes those proprietors above the minifundio 
"which at least meet the needs of the family group, and at the 
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other extreme do not exceed an area of 20 BIH, and which do 
not use more than two or three permanent paid workers" 
[cit. ibid.: 181. In other words, this constituted a category 
of well-to-do middle peasants. The "medium-proprietors", on 
the other hand were seen as owning between 20 and 40 BIH. All 
the above categories are seen by the PS as 'peasants', and as 
'exploited' by the "landlord and large latifundista class" 
Cloc. cit. ). This latter class: 
" ... is made up of the landlord-class 
[terratenientes] 
and by the agrarian capitalists, individuals who buy 
or rent an area of land greater than 40 BIH from the 
landlord class in order to invest large amounts of 
capital, particularly in products designed for export 
... The difference between the two groups cannot and 
should not be measured in terms of the size of the 
properties, but rather by the capital invested and the 
manner in which the properties are worked..... .A . capitalist 
generally exploits more workers than the terrateniente. " 
[cit. ibid.: 18] 
Two further points need to be noted with regard to this 
classification. First, it is obviously vague and lacks precision. 
It is not clear, for instance, either what the difference 
between landowners and agrarian capitalists is, or what the 
point is of distinguishing them in the First place, as the PS 
advocated the expropriation of them all, Cibid.: 19]. The PS 
actually went even further and suggested that "as a result of 
subdivision, many properties which belong to the agrarian 
bourgeoisie appear to be less than 40 BIH" Cibid.: 181. In 
other words, because the expropriated landlords were allowed 
to keep their capital, the estates of 40 BIH which they, 
controlled were really to be classified in the 'agrarian 
bourgeoisie'. ' The reference to "the manner in which the 
properties are worked" now seems to make more sense, yet 
despite this fact, the debates between the various parties of 
the Left over expropriation were. conducted in terms of simple 
acreage. No reference was ever made to the political positions 
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of individual members of these strata. Politically progressive 
and/or politically reactionary capitalists or landlords were 
to be expropriated or not, according to the acreage they 
controlled. Second, and most importantly; what comes across 
from the classification of the PS is the impossibility of any 
alliance with bourgeois capitalist farmers. The PS rightly 
did not consider that there were any feudal landlords in Chile 
but it did not make any other distinction among the bourgeoisie 
either. Every farm over 40 BIH [and presumably even some below 
that figure) was to be attacked as all were 'bourgeois'. The 
PS maintained the following: 
"Several points proposed by comrade Allende in his 
speech of 24 July 1972 seem to us to be greatly 
mistaken, as does the project for constitutional 
reform concerning guarantees for small and medium 
proprietors. We consider the guarantee-of 
inexpropriability for properties between 40 and 60 
BIH unacceptable ... Besides the pressure for 
expropriation of many of these, it will lead to the 
creation of even greater difficulties than those this 
guarantee tries to avoid, leading to indiscriminate 
occupations which might not have an easy solution, 
creating a climate of tension in the countryside. " 
[cit. Roxborough, op. cit.: 193 
Given this position of course. , no 'alliance', 
however conceived, 
could be possible with any sectors of the bourgeoisie. 
At the same time and consistent with its 'leftism' the 
PS could only pay lip-service to the fundamental problem of 
raising agricultural production and concentrated instead on 
transforming ownership relations and 'peasant' mobilisation 
(CEA No. 5: 25). Thus, - while the PS rightly insisted against 
the PC that the problem of increased production was not due 
just to the obstacle of the latifundio but also to bureaucratic 
practices, it maintained that this could only be achieved 
through the "conscious incorporation of the peasant into the 
production process"'[Socialist Party of Chile, 1972: 40, emphasis 
added]. At the same time as it maintained that the problem 
of production was an aspect of the class struggle in the 
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countryside [Roxborough, op. cit.: 193, it. had such an erroneous 
conception of the nature of the peasantry that the relation 
between class struggle and production was never coherently 
thought out. Rather, the PSS along with the other 'leftists', 
concentrated their efforts on transforming property relations 
20 
For the PS, as for the PC, the question was one of 'incorporating' 
the excluded 'peasantry' into such institutions where all 
would 'equally participate'. 
For the PS the ? vanguard' of the struggle in the country- 
side was to be the 'agricultural proletariat' organised in 
the unions. "These unions, dominated by the agricultural 
proletariat, were to be the organization vehicle whereby 
proletarian leadership was to be given to the class struggle 
in the countryside" [ibid.: 20]. Even inside the Peasant Councils - 
the peasant organisations set up by Popular Unity - "the unions' 
task was to win over the other peasant strata to their position 
and exercise a leadership role" Cloc. cit. ]. In no way does 
the PS acknowledge the fact that the proletariat may not be 
the leading class in the peasant unions, and that a struggle 
within the unions was required to establish this dominance. 
In actual fact it could not possibly do so, given-its inflated 
notion of who the 'agricultural proletariat' was. Under such 
circumstances the Socialists' notion of 'proletarian leadership' 
could only mean the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie. 
[iii] The Agrarian Line of the MIR. 
Although the MIR did not belong to the Popular Unity coalition 
and was not a mass party like the PC and the PSS it is worth 
commenting briefly on its agrarian line for two main reasons: 
first, because it was strong in some areas, particularly-the 
South where it organised the Mapuche Indians; and second, 
because it is worth considering whether, in its analysis of 
agrarian social r elationss the MIR's position was in any way 
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radically different from . either of the two parties already 
examined; so as to enable it to provide a coherent alternative. 
Like the PS, of which it could be said to represent the 
'radical wing', the MIR was not interested in any alliance 
with sectors of the bourgeoisie. It advocated and systematically 
attacked the 'reformism' of the PC, to which the latter 
replied with charges of 'adventurism', 'ultra-leftism' and so 
on21. The MIR criticised what it referred to as "the social- 
democratic myth of the semi-feudal latiFundio" [cit. Roxborough, 
op. cit.: 22) but did not provide an analysis of any other 
division among the bourgeoisie which it attacked as a whole. 
Like the PS it adhered to the 'leftist' position which held 
that socialism can be brought about more or less automatically 
as a result of the increasing 'militancy' or the 'working class', 
a category which it artificially inflated beyond recognition. 
For the MIR there were four 'classes' in the countryside: 
a "big agrarian bourgeoisie", a "small and medium agrarian 
bourgeoisie", a "poor peasantry and semi-proletariat" and an 
"agricultural proletariat" [loc. cit. ]. The MIR divided the 
"big agrarian bourgeoisie" into three sectors: an "entrepreneurial 
agrarian bourgeoisie", a "tenant bourgeoisie" and a "landowning 
bourgeoisie", according to purely economic criteria. No 
political reason is given for these divisions, all of which 
are to be found in the 40 to 80 BIH range and in farms over 
80 BIH. As was the case with the PS, these divisions seem to 
be purely descriptive, as the 'big agrarian bourgeoisie' is to 
be attacked as a whole. As with the PS this class extends 
over the whole 40 to 80 BIH group and no alliance with any 
of its fractions is contemplated. For the MIR#, the "small 
and medium bourgeoisie" is not identified with any precision', 
but it "has secondary contradictions with the big bourgeoisie. 
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These contradictions are based on agricultural price policy', 
control of marketing channels, access to credit, control of 
agro-industry, etc. There also exists in the countryside a 
small and medium commercial bourgeoisie, a petty-bourgeoisie 
sector and various middle strata", [cit. ibid.: 23). The "poor 
peasantry" are "subsistence landowning peasants" - i. e., middle 
peasants - whose main demand is land Cloc. cit. ], while the 
'semi-proletariat' is composed of individuals who: 
... have a double tie to the productive apparatus; on 
the one hand as wage workers who sell their labour power 
for limited periods of time, and on the other hand as 
small subsistence producers ... They constitute the 
social bases of afuerinaje, and are an extremely 
explosive sector ... They are subject to an 
intense and 
accelerated process of proletarianization. Their 
principal demand is not so much access to the land as 
the right to permanent and stable work. " 
[cit. ibid.: 231 
This constitutes an accurate analysis of this class, but it 
is still erroneously considered to be a class above the 
"agricultural proletariat" in the social ladder. The latter, 
predictably, is inflated to include inquilinos, volun tarios 
and afuerinos. As with the PC and the PSS it is not clear 
whether the asentados fit into this categorisation. 
As far as its strategy was concerned, the MIR declared: 
"The central objective of our policy is to gain 
political force, to change the correlation of forces 
by mobilizing the agricultural workers and the poor 
peasants in order to deal a frontal blow to the agrarian 
bourgeoisie, while we try to neutralize the small and 
medium bourgeoisie. " [cit. ibid.: 241 
The MIR does not discuss how the alliance between the 
"agricultural proletariat" and "poor peasants" is to be 
constructed and it seems to consider it as given, as it 
classifies these two 'classes' under the heading of worker/ 
peasant alliance in its estimates of numbers Cibid.: 23). 
Moreover, as Roxborough himsL&f notes", "there was a considerable 
gap between the rhetoric and the reality of MIR's attempt to 
neutralise the middle classes. Perhaps more than any other 
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party the MIR, and to some extent the Socialist Party, by their 
advocacy of militant actions, helped antagonise the Chilean 
petty-bourgeoisie" Cibid.: 241. Rather than isolating a main 
enemy, what this line produced was the ultimate isolation of 
the rural proletariat. The MIR ignored the question of 
production and unlike the other, parties had little to say on 
the organisation of the enterprises in the 'reformed sector'. 
It did not attribute an important role to the unions, preferring 
to operate through its own organisation - the MCR'(Revolutionary 
Peasant Movement). 'Like the unions, however, the MCR was 
organised on a farm to farm basis Cibid.: 25) and as the MIR 
had the same inflated misconception of who the rural proletariat 
was, the organisation could not establish the leadership of 
that class, a concept which in any case the MIR, along with 
the other parties of the Left, did not analyse to any meaningful 
depth. 
[iv] The Agrarian Line of the MAPU. 
The reasons for ascertaining the agrarian line of the MAPU 
are similar to those given for discussing the MIO. After its 
split from the PDC, MAPU transformed itself into a marxist- 
leninist party in 1971 after Chonchol and his followers had 
departed and the former had graduated to the position of 
Minister of Agriculture. At the same time MAPU was able to 
bring with it an-estimated 32,000 members out of a total of 
76,000 from the PDC union Triunfo, which MAP. U organised in the 
Unidad Obrero-Campesino union [Kay, 1972: 5451. 
The MAPU provided the most detailed and complex analysis 
of the class structure in the countryside. For this reason, 
and because I shall return to this data later on, it is worth 
reproducing it here (Table 10.161. Several points are worth 
noting with respect to MAPU's analysis. First, although 
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Table 10,16 
Relative Numerical lmpor_tance of the i. Classes in the 
Chilean Countryside according to MAPU: 1971 
Large Landowning and Agrarian Bourgeoisie 6,000 
(80+ BIH) 
Medium Bourgeoisie: 
Big Medium Bourgeoisie [40-80 BIH) 13,000 




Petty Bourgeoisie [5-20 BIH) 72,000 
[includes medieros) 
Minifundistas 277,000 
Workers in the Reformed Sector 
22 
Asentamientos 42,000 
CERA's and 'Peasant Committees' 9,000 
Production Centres CCEPRO's) 4,000 
Sub-Total 55,000 
Proletariat: 




Administrators' technicians, etc. 15,000 
TOTAL 764,000 
Source: Roxboraugh, op. cit.: 7 
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'classes' in the higher brackets were identified in terms of 
acreage, MAPU recognised other economic and political criteria 
such as "technological development" and "links with rightist 
parties" CRoxborough, op. cit.: 6). This means, among other 
things, that for MAPU both a "big" and a "medium" agrarian 
bourgeoisie existed within the 40 to 80 BIH bracket. Roxborough 
comments on this fact by noting that "the fluidity of the 
definitions and the fact that the groups tend to shade off into 
each other poses a number of problems from political organisation 
in any specific locality, since while the big bourgeoisie is 
to be attacked, the medium bourgeoisie is to be won over or 
neutralised" Cop. cit.: 6). However, -it seems to me that this 
'fluidity' of MAPU's analysis is one of its assets, for it 
means that the decisions as to who these classes are is' 
ultimately left to local circumstances. The political line 
thus allows for local initiatives in relation to local conditions 
rather than imposing a general categorisation on regional 
differences. Moreover, MAPU was the only party to recognise 
the fact that the Popular Unity slogan of 'end to the latifundio' 
was confusing and ambiguous, since it attacked both the 
"traditional landowners" and the "big agrarian bourgeoisie" 
Cibid.: 8). The second point worth noting is that MAPU is 
alone among the parties to address explicitly the question of 
the peasants in the reformed sector. In fact MAPU notes that 
the asentados are a group "in transition" towards a petty- 
bourgeois class situation: 
" ... because owing to the very characteristics of 
the asentamiento as a productive structure, there 
exists the tendency to convert these peasants into 
petty-bourgeois. Even when they work part of the land 
collectively, they hire labour, and there is an 
individual appropriation of the profits, and they own 
and utilise means of production in an individual manner. " 
[cit. ibid.: 6) 
Unfortunately MAPU's ignorance of Lenin's arguments on the 
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differentiation of the peasantry lead it to misunderstand 
the meaning of this process which is one of a transformation 
of middle peasants into rich peasants. There is nothing 
'petty-bourgeois'-in the employment of 'wage-labour'. 
There are also other major problems with MAPU's categoris- 
ation. 'In the last instance' classes are based on the acreage 
of productive units and women are sytematically ignored; the 
minifundistas are seen to be 'peasants' and classified above 
the inquilinos despite the fact that it is explicitly stated 
that both groups are experiencing an increasing proletarianis- 
ation Cibide: 6,7); the proletariat is inflated by the addition 
of inquilinos and reduced to full time employed 'workers', 
so that the afuerinos are classified as 'sub-proletarians'. 
All these problems are in accord with the general theoretical 
problematic underlying the practices of the Chilean marxist 
parties as a whole. The same problems are reflected in MAPU's 
rural strategy, which was: 
... to change the correlation of 
forces between the 
agricultural proletariat and the big agrarian 
bourgeoisie and landowners by enlisting as allies [or 
at least neutralizing) other rural, social groups which 
had primary or secondary contradictions with the big 
agrarian bourgeoisie. In this struggle,. the principal 
force of the alliance was to be the agricultural 
proletariat and the workers in the advanced production 
structures of the reformed sector. It was not the 
sub-proletariat. " [ibid.: 8, emphasis added 
Thus for MAPU, the main force of the agricultural proletariat 
the temporary agricultural labourers, were classified as 
sub-proletarians and explicitly restricted to _a subordinate 
status. Not surprisingly for MAPU, the "union should be 
the organizational form of. the vanguard", a role which it 
should also play in the peasant councils whose aim should be to 
"organize the allies of-%the, agricultural proletariat around a 
common programme" Cibid.: 93. Interestingly, MAPU recognised 
correctly the major failure, of, Popular Unity in the countryside, 
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although it was unable to explain it coherently: 
"In the opinion of MAPU, the alliance between the 
agricultural proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and 
other groups was not achieved. There was a lack of 
-unity in the agrarian programme of the UP as a whole 
and the UP neither led mobilization nor gave a vanguard 
role to the unions. This initial abdication of 
revolutionary leadership led to a growth of. spontaneity 
in the countryside and in large measure accounted for 
the failings of the UP agrarian reform. " 
Cibid.: 11) 
Unfortunately it is far too simplistic an account of the failure 
of Popular Unity, to refer to the 'abdication of revolutionary 
leadership' and the lack of the 'vanguard role' of the unions. 
On the contrary, it seems to me that one of the major problems 
was precisely the character of the unions, along with the 
practices of the various parties which, despite their divisions, 
had common erroneous conceptions regarding the rural structure. 
It is obviously true, as Roxborough Cibid.: 27) concludes, 
that there were major differences between the political parties 
of the Chilean Left regarding the characteristics of agriculture, 
who the main enemy was, with whom the alliance should be, the 
methods of struggle and so on. The fact that these differences 
persisted throughout the Popular Unity period largely explains 
the failure to develop a commonly agreed 'Popular Unity Line'. 
Yet it would be erroneous to account for the failure of the 
Allende agrarian reform and the disastrous and murderous defeat 
of the Left simply in terms of such disagreements, for, even 
at a superficial level, it should be evident from the foregoing 
that there was a large measure of [largely erroneous) agreement 
over some crucial issues between the various parties. Further- 
moral even where fundamental, differences existed, they were 
situated, I would argue, within the same theoretical terrain. 
Let me note some of these common and highly problematic 
conceptions. 
For a strat, there was, despite small differences, general 
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agreement as to who the proletariat in the countryside was, 
and in all cases this 'proletariat' included the middle-peasant 
inquilinos. The reason for this was very simply that the 
proletariat was defined as composed of those persons [generally 
man] who-, because they did not have legal possession of land, 
were employed on agricultural estates. For some 'employment' 
meant 'full-time employment', for others not; but in all cases 
lack of -landownership was confused with proletarian status. 
Thus, despite the fact that legal owners of land may have been 
in a more precarious position than non-legal owners, the former 
were consistently defined as mere 'peasants' and placed in 
terms of status above the latter. The fact that different 
classes of peasants worked on the same estate was enough, it 
seems, to constitute them as a unitary class. Any antagonisms 
within this group could therefore not be understood as class 
antagonisms as these divisions could only be seen as divisions 
between strata which were only components of a large unitary 
whole. The systematic class antagonisms within the 'reformed 
sector'23, or regarding access to the reformed sector, could 
only be accounted for by the Chilean Left as a whole in terms 
of such 'factors' as the 'mentality' and 'backwardness' of the 
peasantry, the legal and organisational character of the 
institution of the asentamiento, the propaganda of the PDC, 
and so on. Thus for Chonchol, the Minister of Agriculture: 
" ... as the mentality of the peasants 
has not changed, 
many of the peasants in the reformed sector, who know 
that after a period of five years they can become land 
owners, have become very egoistic. They do not wish 
to incorporate into the asentamiento more people than 
those originally working on the farm, because they 
argue that when the time comes for the distribution of 
the land they will each get less. So, when extra labour 
is. taken on, it is only as wage-earners and not as full 
asentados. This results in curious family conflicts 
with the sons of the asentados who, when they reach 
working age, are employed by peasants of the reformed 
sector as wage-earners. In many places this new form 
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of conflict between young peasants and asentados, 
has produced typical worker-employer conflicts in 
which lengthy petitions have been lodged within the 
asentami ento ." 
(Chonchol, 1973: 1111 
It seems to me that this remark shows clearly the inability 
of Popular Unity to comprehend the nature of. social relations 
in the countryside, and the erroneous-framework within which 
such processes were thought and debated. The above remarks 
cannot be dismissed as coming from a member of the 'Christian 
Left'; such a framework was adhered to by the parties of the 
Left as a whole. On such a basis of course, there could be 
no coherent attempt to develop a worker/peasant alliance -, 
an alliance of the agricultural proletariat and poor peasants 
with the middle peasants, under, the,. leadership of the former. 
Although there was no agreement between the parties 
regarding which institution should replace the asentamiento, 
there was agreement that the problem could be solved by an 
institution which would 'incorporate' the [wage-earning) 
'peasantry' as a whole into the reformed sector. The 'Left 
wing' of Popular Unity argued that this institution should be 
'egalitarian', while the 'Right' suggested that such 
egalitarianism was rather utopian, as it did not correspond 
to the 'level of consciousness' of 'the peasantry' , but in 
neither case, was the nature of the so-called 'peasantry' ever 
questioned. While the 'Left wing' concentrated on the problem 
of creating 'egalitarian institutions' and mobilising the 
'peasantry', the 'Right wing' argued primarily for increased 
production. The former concentrated on social relations of 
ownership, the latter on technical production; in both cases 
production and social relations were considered de facto as 
distinct [despite rhetorical statements as to their connection 
by the 'Left wing' in particular). Underlying both positions 
was a more or less explicit distinction between 'production' 
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and 'equality'. 
The false notion of an inflated and unitary 'agricultural 
proletariat' was of course paralleled in the primacy given 
by all parties to unions or union-like structures, which, as 
we have seen, were dominated by the middle-peasants. This 
domination was not accidental; it was possible only because 
peasants were organised on the basis of 'employment' in 
enterprises. This erroneous conception was of course also made 
possible by the equating of ownership with legal ownership, and 
by the reduction of social relations to property relations, 
a fact which appears throughout the 'class analyses' of all 
parties, along with a differentiation of classes in terms of 
acreage owned 'in the last instance'. The problems of this 
conception were particularly well illustrated in the constant 
utilisation of the customary ideological concept of 'latifundio', 
which refers primarily to size. As MAPU in particular recognised, 
the concept could cover forms of enterprise with different 
social relations. This question takes us to the problem of 
the split within the bourgeoisie which it was necessary for-, 
Popular Unity to maintain and increase, and through which 
alliances had to be devised. Here the PC took the most coherent 
position, arguing that the 'latifundios' were 'feudal' and 
hence opposed to 'modern democratic industrial' capitalism. 
On this basis, of course, the alliance was to be with the latter 
against the former. The problem of course was not only that 
these estates were not 'feudal', but further, as I have shown, 
that the opposition between landed property and capital no 
longer existed by 1970. The 'Left wing' j while generally 
recognising correctly that feudalism was a myth, falsely took 
this to mean that no division could exist within rural capital, 
as all estates were capitalist. They thus attacked capital as 
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a whole and consistently failed to divide it in any way, 'a 
division which was crucial for Popular Unity's survival. 
Another aspect of the same opposition between the two 
erroneous poles of the 'Right wing' and 'Left wing' of the 
Chilean Left concerns the antagonism between town and country 
as reflected in the crucial problem of increasing agricultural 
production. The 'Right wing' represented by the PC was the 
only party to take this question seriously. The PC took the 
well-known line based on the idea that such an increase in 
production could only come primarily from the capitalist farmers 
and rich peasants who had access to most modern technology, 
'know how', and so on. The party therefore systematically 
advocated price incentives, the capitalisation of such enter- 
prises and so on. At the same time the PC advocated similar 
individual incentives in the 'reformed sector' and a reliance 
on technical advice by experts, education of the 'peasants' 
in rational production methods, and so on. This line is put 
across particularly eloquently by Lehmann [1972a) in a paper 
published in Chiles the abstract of which reads as follows: 
"The paper opens by stressing that the transition to 
socialism in the rural sector should not be viewed 
in isolation if analytical and political errors are 
to be avoided. Therefore the collectivization of 
agriculture in itself is an insufficient condition 
and will not necessarily lead to a socialist agriculture. 
The author emphasizes that the process of transition 
must advance by stages. 
Having defined his starting point the author then goes 
on to examine the relations between the agricultural 
and the industrial sectors. Agricultural policies 
should be analysed in"terms of their cost [especially 
in scarce foreign exchange) via a via other economic 
sectors. 
The paper continues by demonstrating how government 
land reform policy has unintentionally stimulated the 
peasant household economy within the expropriated 
latifundium, resulting in an almost de facto subdivision 
of the reformed farms. ", Peasants clearly prefer to 
develop their private peasant economy, disregarding 
collective cultivation. " 
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The author concludes that the role of the agricultural 
sector in the present period of transition to socialism 
in Chile is to increase production in order to sustain 
the income redistribution policy and to reduce the 
demand on foreign exchange thus freeing part of these 
resources for the industrial social property sector. 
The proposition which follows from this conclusion is 
that, in this initial stage of the transition period, 
a capitalist rationality must be developed within the 
reformed sector if production is to increase substantially. 
This would intensify economic differentiation among the 
peasantry and heighten class struggle in rural society. 
Once the problem of power has been resolved in favour 
of the proletarian parties and the socialized industrial 
sector has become dominant, the second stage of complete 
socialization of agriculture can be introduced. " 
[Lehmann, 1972a: 144) 
I have cited these remarks in full, For they express particularly 
cogently and coherently a position which I have been criticising 
throughout this work and which is adhered to by the Chilean PC. 
'First increase production and then we can collectivize''says 
Lehmann; 'first develop socialism in industry and then in 
backward agricufture', he asserts. In another of his texts 
Lehmann supplements his above argument by asserting the general 
law that: 
" ... the interests of the peasantry 
[high prices and 
relatively high self-consumption) are opposed to those 
of the urban proletariat (low food prices and a 
substantial marketed surplus). " 
[Lehmann, 1977c: 324) 
In yet another text Lehmann is highly complimentary towards 
the speech made by Corvalän, extracts from which were cited 
earlier [Corvalan, 19721 and where price policies, individual 
incentives and the like are systematically stressed as methods 
to increase production [Lehmann, 1974c: 1113. There is no need 
to reiterate the problems with the above conception at any 
length. It will easily be recognised as a statement of the 
so-called 'agrarian question' discussed in Chapter 3. Suffice 
it to note that what it does is advocate the increased 
exploitation of the poor peasants and agricultural labourers 
under expanded capitalist relations of production and thus 
divides the working class between its urban and its rural 
8 43 
components. At the same times this policy cannot allow 
agricultural prices to rise too high in order not to alienate 
the urban working class, hence free capitalist development has 
to be restrained in some way. This, 
, 
of course, is where 
the State comes in - 'once the proletariat has won State power' - 
pegging agricultural prices at a low level. The consequences 
are well known. The rich peasants and capitalist farmers refuse 
to increase production, a black market develops, the State 
represses the rich peasants even more, and the urban proletariat 
does not have access to cheap and plentiful food. 
The 'Left wing' of the Chilean Left recognised many of 
these problems, particularly the fact that a technical view 
of increased production only meant further exploitation of the 
poor peasant classes and was therefore being resisted in the 
countryside. They understood correctly that this line would 
sacrifice the-rural proletariat, and that the policy of alliance 
which accompanied it would reproduce and increase bourgeois 
relations and further differentiation among the peasantry. 
Yet, they could not understand what was mistaken about it. 
The 'Left wing' rejected alliances with the bourgeoisie, 
rejected the importance of increasing production and concentrated 
on advocating collectivisation. They therefore had no solution 
either to the antagonism between town and country. To economism 
they counterposed voluntarism - its mirror image. 
10.3.2 Agrarian Reform and the Failure of the Worker/Peasant 
Alliance. 
The four major stated aims of the UP agrarian reform can be 
said to be the elimination of the 'latifundio', the 
'incorporation' of the previously excluded 'peasants' into a 
transformed 'reformed sector', the 'participation' of'the 
'peasants' themselves in the'process of agrarian transformation, 
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and the increase of agricultural production. I shall examine 
briefly developments in each of, these areas in turn. 
The elimination of the latifundio is perhaps the easiest 
aspect of the land reform to document. There was not much 
disagreement between the parties of the UP as to the need to 
expropriate estates above 60 BIH. Much more controversial, of 
course, was the expressed need to 'neutralize'-the 'medium 
producers', defined as owners. of farms between 20 and 80 BIH9 
who were to be economically supported [Kay, 1975: 422). The 
legal instrument on which the UP relied to undertake this 
measure was the existing PDC land reform law. Chonchol . 
justified the utilisation of this law in the following terms: 
"We are using this law because, as a government, we 
are obliged to act within the legal framework, and 
secondly, because any changes in such a complex law 
as the Agrarian Reform Law would certainly have required 
many months of discussion, which would paralyse the 
agrarian reform process resulting in great frustration 
among the peasantry, who are pressing for the 
acceleration of the process. Also it was felt that, 
given the political willingness to use the existing 
law much more thoroughly, it would be possible to 
accelerate the agrarian reform process. " 
[Chonchol9 1973: 1071 
Now, I do not wish to discuss here whether this decision was 
politically valid or not, but it may be useful to point out 
that Chonchol here is merely speaking of accelerating the 
existing reform process and not of transforming it into a 
qualitatively different social process. This, of course, is 
totally consistent with the PC's view of the transformation 
process as a bourgeois-democratic nationalist process [under 
the leadership of the bourgeoisie). There is certainly no 
question of socialism here. Yet, at the same time Popular 
Unity understood that it could not undertake even a bourgeois 
revolution without the support of the peasantry, and for that 
reason it created 'peasant councils' as advisory bodies or 
channels for government policies in which peasants were to be 
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represented through their existing organisations. These 
councils were seen by the UP as fulfilling the role of main 
agricultural pressure group, thus replacing the landowners' 
organisations within the corporate State [Popular Unity 
1970b: 2811. 
Despite operating within the POC legal framework, the 
UP managed to reduce the size of landowners' reserve From 80 
to 40 BIH and there is also evidence to suggest that the 
proportion of expropriated landowners retaining a reserve Fell 
from 60% under Frei to 10% under Allende [Kay, 1977a: 1271. 
The UP had completed the expropriation of the large estates by 
1972: twice as many in two years as the PDC had achieved in 
six [loc. cit. ]. 
Table 10.17 




farm units C%) 
Area Distribution 
in BIH C%J 
1965 1972 1965 1972 
Less than 5 81.4 79.3 9.7 9.7 
5-20 11.5 11.3 12.7 13.0 
20-40 3.0 3.3 9.5. 11.6 
40-60 1.3 2.5 7.1 14.5 
60-80 0.8 1.6 5.7 12.8 
80 + 2.0 0.1 55.3 2.9 
Reformed Sector 0.0 1.9 0.0 35.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 10010 100.0 
Source: 
_ _Barraclough and Fernandez, op. cit.: 38 
Apart from the practical disappearance of the large estates 
over 80 BIH [the so-called latifundios) by 1972, Table 10.17 
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also shows the constant position, both in numbers and in land 
owned, of the small units below 20 BIH, and an increase on 
both counts of the units owning 20 to 80 BIH. By 1972, there- 
fore, not only had the small minifundios [which provided, it 
must be remembered, part of the basis of the afuerino stratum) 
not benefitted at all from the redistribution of land, but also 
the middle-sized units now controlled over one-third of the 
land. As these had been formed primarily from the reserves 
of expropriated landlords, they also had access to much of the 
best land and were highly capitalised concerns due to the fact 
that in the majority of cases the landowners had managed to. 
retain possession of their means of production. I shall return 
to this issue in due course, for the present it is only 
important to note that as far as land distribution was concerned, 
the UP land reform merely completed the POC project. Over 
77% of the agricultural land was now divided between modern 
individual capitalist farmers and a 'reformed e&tor' better 
described as a 'state capitalist' or 'communal capitalist' 
sector. Although the UP did achieve the disappearance of the 
hacienda from the Chilean countryside, it was much less 
successful in its other stated aims. 
The parties of the UP were agreed in holding that what 
they perceived as the inequalities of the asentamientos - the 
dominance of individual economy over collective economy, and 
the restriction of the benefits of the Frei reform to a small 
section of the 'peasantry' - was largely as a result, of the 
structure of the asentamiento itself., The idea therefore, was 
to introduce a new type of organisation which was bath more 
'equal' and which would 'incorporate' more 'peasants' into 
its structure [Kay, 1975: 429-37, Lehmann, 1974c: 107-13), 
A solution to the problem was therefore seen in the establishment 
of new institutional) forms. Unfortunately there was no agreement 
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between the parties of the Left as to what form this 
institution should take and it was only after long discussionsN 
that the UP announced in 1971 that this new institution would, 
be known as the CERA [Agrarian Reform Center. Of course' the 
structure of the CERA was established by decree 'from above' 
and not surprisingly it encountered strong opposition from 
important peasant classes. As Kay notes, the CERA was an 
institution: 
if ... which would bring together various neighbouring 
farms so as to rationalise the use of infrastructure 
and capital equipment, and so as to incorporate landless 
seasonal labourers who had traditionally worked on 
these farms [afuerinos). In some areas even minifundistas 
were to be integrated in the CERA. The CERA was also 
to be characterised by its greater internal equality 
as all members would have equal rights on the admin- 
istrative council and equal, but restricted, rights 
to production fringe benefits, as the emphasis of the 
CERA was to develop the collective economy. Economic 
differences arising from different productive capacities 
would be reduced by socialising the surplus produced 
by each CERA through the contribution of a percentage 
of profits to a regional development fund. " 
[Kay, 1975: 429) 
Not surprisingly this institution was calculated to antagonise 
the inquilino middle peasants, and Kay continues by noting 
that: 
"The permanent workers of the expropriated latifundia, 
particularly the inquilinos, having become accustomed 
to . the idea of their privileged position on the 
asentamiento were unwilling to accept the outside 
seasonal labourers with equal rights on the farm as 
this would reduce production perquisites and the share 
in profits for each member. " 
Cibid.: 429-301 
Of course, it would have only been possible to establish an 
advanced collective institution if the poorer peasants and 
agricultural labourers had dominated the peasant movement 
24 
but given the erroneous conception of the urban proletariat 
which all the parties had, such a fact was not understood. 
The opposition parties, particularly the PDC, took advantage 
of these errors and mobilised its peasant base against the 
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UP by arguing that the inquilinos would lose their access to 
means of production [land, house, 'production fringe benefits', 
etc. ), would lose their individual profits which would disappear 
into a 'community fund', and would be forced to incorporate 
afuerinos as permanent members CKay, 1977a: 129,139). The 
inquilinos, of course, with good reason, viewed this process 
as one where the State merely replaced the old landowner. The 
PDC- already had the support of the asentados and found no 
difficulty in organising resistance to the CERA's. It was 
also not averse to joining forces with the landowners' organis- 
ations against the UP on such issues (Kay, 1975: 435) and was 
able to organise strikes against the government's agrarian 
policies25. 
As a result of this opposition, a compromise solution was 
reached with the Peasant Committee which became the most 
widespread unit in the reformed sector. The Peasant Committee 
"was similar to the asentamiento but eliminated the differences 
between members who all had equal rights in the running of the 
farm and in the distribution of production fringe benefits. 
It still left out the afuerinos and the minifundistas who could 
be incorporated as full members only if-, the majority of the 
permanent labourers so wished" [Kay, 1975: 4301. Whether the 
expropriated estates were organised into CERA's or Committees 
was dependent on the outcome of specific struggles. The 
Socialist Party and the Left wing of the UP pressed for the 
establishment of CERA's, while the PC seemed-to be content 
with Committees which it saw as conforming best to 'objective 
conditions', the 'lack of consciousness' of the 'peasantry' 
and so on CRoxborough, op. cit. ]. It should also be noted that 
the UP also established another new institution in the 
countryside which it called the CEPRO [Production Center]. 
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The CEPRO's were straightforward State farms which were 
organised on the minority of expropriated enterprises of an 
agro-industrial character; they were run by the technical 
'experts' of the State and employed wage-labour. The CEPRO's 
were often the more 'successful' enterprises in technical terms 
and production levels [Kay, loc. cit. ). 
The CERA's and Peasant Committees were run on a similar 
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basis to the old asentamientos. The State owned the land and 
means of production, provided most of the fertilizers, seeds, 
tractors, spares and so one and paid a regular 'advance' [wage) 
to the members. At the same time the UP wanted to educate 
the 'peasantry' into both a 'socialist ethic' and in technical 
ability, so it also carried out programmes of 'consciousness 
raising' and 'extension' CConcientizaciön, Capacitaciön] 
Cibid.: 431; Barraclough and Fernandez, op. cit.: ch. 51. The - 
evidence however, points unmistakably towards-the systematic 
development of capitalist relations on the new enterprises of 
a similar form to those experienced by the asentamientos. The 
beneficiaries still preferred to concentrate on individual 
rather than collective production in the same manner which 
was previously discussed. Barraclough and Affonso 01973: 83] 
estimate that in 1971/72 a large proportion Cover 50% in certain 
areas) of the cattle on the 'reformed units' were in the hands 
of individual peasants while at least 13% of the cultivated 
land of the same enterprises was also controlled by individual 
peasants. Kay C1972a: 129] notes that the proportion of such 
private land at least doubled between 1965 and 1972. The 
same author also remarks that this expansion of individualised 
production in the 'reformed sector' occurred systematically 
throughout the UP agrarian reform: 
... not only because more land and more pasture rights 





number of workers on the reformed units increased. 
It was Popular Unity policy to work on the principle 
of equality, and therefore workers who previously 
had not, or. restricted, production perquisites [like 
the voluntarios and the new members) now received a 
similar amount as inquilinos, thus reducing the 
collective lands and pastures. " 
[Kay, 1975: 4311 
In this manner the UP imposed a form of bourgeois equality 
on the rich peasantry of the reformed sector while hoping that 
were predictable: the increased membership of the 'reformed 
it would develop a 'socialist consciousness'. The results 
sector' now had guaranteed access to individual plots of land 
and means of production. 
" ... as peasant plots expanded, both 
in numbers and in 
size, more labour time was needed for working on the 
peasant economy particularly during harvest time, and 
the collective economy suffered as peasants worked less 
days per year and less hours per day on the collective. 
Collective land was left uncultivated or neglected 
reducing output per hectare. Reformed peasants were 
reluctant to hire afuerinos, which were readily available, 
to amend this situation as they feared their incorporation 
as full members. Finally, the productive capacity of the 
collective was reduced when, in some cases, resources 
belonging to the collective such as machinery, seeds, 
fertilizers were allocated to and utilised by the 
peasant enterprise, without payment to the collective. " 
Cibid.: 431-21 
Of course, as indicated earlier, this process was helped 
by the fact that, like the PDC, the UP was unable or unwilling 
to force the settled peasants to repay the debts on their 
'advances', and as Lehmann notes in this contexts. 
. by 1972 it was common practice to sell produce from 
the collective land to private merchants without 
declaring these sales, and then to claim that the 
asentamiento was unable to-pay its debts - having 
distributed the income from the sale. " 
[Lehmann, 1974c: 94) 
Undoubtedly this practice took place on other types of 'reformed 
units' as well, as from the middle of 1972 the growth in the 
black market for food meant that the prices offered by the 
State marketing agencies were well below black-market prices 
[Lehmann, 1972a]. The black market of course served only to 
increase capitalist accumulation, the differentiation and the 
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antagonism between classes in the countryside, and between 
the rural bourgeoisie in all its forms and the urban proletariat26. 
At the same time of course, the State [and the parties of the 
Left as a whole] restricted the new rich peasants' ability 
to accumulate by legally restricting the size of private plots, 
offering low prices for agricultural commodities, insisting 
on incorporation and formal equality, capturing part of the 
profits for regional development, and so on. In addition, as 
the State provided most of the capital equipment and replace-. 
ments and did not enforce the repayment of debts incurred, 
there was no need for the rich peasants to take maintenance 
seriously. Machinery broke down frequently and was left idle 
for long periods [Kay, 1975: 433). For all these reasons, 
levels of production on the farms of the 'reformed sector' 
remained low. 
One of the more extraordinary aspects of--the Chilean 
Left's agrarian policy was not simply that it relied largely 
on the middle-peasants, but that it systematically went out 
of its way to transform agricultural wage-labourers into 
middle and rich peasants by incorporating them into a form of 
gnterprise which granted them land on an individual basis, 
gave them access to means of production, made collective work 
unattractive, and so on. The UP never considered transforming 
the middle peasantry into a supporter of collective production 
run by the poor peasants. It could obviously not do soy given 
its conception of the peasantry. It goes without saying that 
the UP could only 'incorporate' a minority of peasants in 
addition to the inquilinos. These further members usually 
came from the permanent voluntarios who were relatives of 
inquilinos. Lehmann notes that the asentados did not object 
strongly to an 'incorporation' of members of their own families 
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especially when it became apparent that only the collective 
would suffer, and when this 'incorporation' "would be 
subsidized by CORA through the monthly advances. But the 
government also hoped that those landless labourers who lived 
in minifundio areas, or who were migrant labourers, would 
be integrated, and reaction among asentados was so strong that 
the government barely sought to implement thistt [Lehmann, 1974c: 
1061. By 1972 only 16% of the urban workforce was employed 
in the 'reformed sector', while 607. was still attached [employed 
and unemployed] to the minifundios and farms of less than 
20 BIH [Table 10.211. It should not be thought however, that 
because bourgeois social relations dominated the reformed 
sector, the beneficiaries were keen to subdivide the estates 
into private parcels as the law allowed. - Rather, the majority 
seemed to have preferred to retain the communal status of the 
property, as its subdivision would have meant that they would 
have had to pay both the debts they had accumulated and for the 
land, that they would no longer receive the 'advance', and 
that they would not receive State subsidised credits, machinery 
and other investments [Kay, 1975: 4331. This fact cannot of 
course be interpreted as any sign of a 'collective consciousness'. 
The small percentage of peasant beneficiaries in the 
'reformed sector', despite their increase from 1970 onwards, 
meant of course an increased struggle in the countryside 
throughout the period, as the vast majority of peasants [mainly 
minifundistas and afuerinos) were being 'left out' of the 
process. The literature stresses systematically the increase 
in 'militancy' of the peasantry over this period, yet at the 
same time what is largely conspicuous by its absence is any 
systematic discussion of the struggle by the poor peasants and 
rural wage-labourers against the development of the rich-peasant 
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economy discussed above Given the theoretical framework 
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within which the majority of the literature is situated, 
such an absence is not surprising. Moreover, of course, there 
were no organisations which could be said to represent these 
classes in the Chilean countryside. Any such struggle in the 
countryside would therefore be systematically obscured. What 
comes across from the literature is that an-increasingly 
militant 'peasant movement' was demanding more, 'faster' and 
more 'radical' expropriations, increases in wages, and so on, 
in other words that the peasant organisations directed their 
attacks primarily against the landowners and capitalist farmers 
rather than against the rich peasantry. The debates between 
the parties of the UP reflect this situation and they concentrate 
on the size of properties to be expropriated, whether or not 
the landowners should be granted a reserve of what size, whether 
they should be able to choose its and so on. As far as the 
character of the 'reformed- sector' is concerned, and as'I have 
already noted, all parties concentrated on debating the nature 
of an 'appropriate' institution irrespective of the fact that- 
whatever the nature of this institution, it could only benefit 
the richer peasants, while restricting at the same time through 
the State their possibilities of accumulation. The 'Left' 
argued for the more 'egalitarian' CERA, while the 'Right' 
seemed to be content with the Peasant Committee. In either 
case, both the rich and the poor peasants were obviously 
dissatisfied, as the continued power of the POC in the rural 
areas confirms. The character of the 'peasant movement' as 
described in the literature conforms in general to a process 
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under the leadership of middle and rich peasants. 
The dramatic increase in strikes and seizures of estates 
after 1970 can be seen from Tables 10.6 and 10.9. The evidence 
also indicates a qualitative alteration in the nature of these 
t ., 
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actions after 1970. Both strikes and seizures of estates 
revealed a higher proportion of actions of solidarity where 
peasants acted to support the grievances of other farms. 
According to figures cited by Kay [1975: 424), one-third of the 
strikes in 1970 and 1971 were 'solidarity strikes'. Seizures 
were also often organised through labourers on various farms 
taking joint action, and such actions were increasingly being 
organised by peasants themselves without help from outside 
organisations [ibid.: 425). It was only in'the final stages 
of the expropriation process [mid-1972) when most estates 
over 80 BIH had been expropriated and "large-scale peasant 
mobilisations were ebbing that parties of the UP,. the PS and 
MAPU in particular, began to direct selective seizures of farms 
between 40 and 80 BIH" [loc. cit., emphasis added). Another 
important feature of the estate seizures is that they involved 
a larger number of classes than did strikes, which of course 
generally involved only full-time employed 'workers'. It is 
estimated that in half of the number of seizures, minifundistas, 
tempo ary labourers and unemployed labourers also participated 
[loc. cit. ). Finally and crucially, it must be noted that 
, apart 
from in the South where the Mapuche Indians were organised 
by the MLH, the occupations of estates were undertaken to put 
pressure on the State to expropriate the farm, or to prevent 
the landlord from removing the means of production29. It does 
not seem to be the case that such seizures were undertaken 
in order for the peasants to run the farms themselves [Lehmann, 
1974c: 104-5). Several points can be gleaned from this 
evidence. 
First, of course the increasing combativity of the 
peasantry is clearly noticeable and the fact that the period 
witnessed an intense class struggle in the countryside is 
beyond dispute. What is worth assessing, however, is the nature 
855 
of that struggle and the dominant peasant classes therein. 
In this case the evidence is highly schematic. Second, strikes 
seem to have been dominated by a minority of-'employed'. 
peasants - i. e., middle peasants and full-time employed 
wage-labourers. Despite the existence of solidarity strikes, 
their aims were primarily concerned with "the solution of labour 
and economic problems" [Kay, 1975: 424). Third, more direct 
forms of action such as seizures, involved members of several 
classes but were restricted to pressurising the State. Both 
these last points reveal the relative weakness of poor peasants 
and wage-labourers. Fourth, according to the literature, 
'peasant action' seems to have been more powerful and successful 
in its attacks against the large estates, while-its actions 
were not directed against the rich peasants on the 'reformed 
sector'. All these points imply the dominance of the richer 
peasants in the movement. This is further confirmed by Kay's 
statement to the fact that the large-scale peasant mobilisations 
were ebbing by mid-1970, when the majority of estates over 
80 BIH had been expropriated. On the 'medium sized farms' 
between 20 and 80 BIH [the reserves, the subdivided estates 
and so on), the available evidence suggests that wage-labour 
was dominant and that the majority of workers (80%) were not 
so much interested in acquiring land, but in running collective 
enterprises [Zammit, ed, 1973: 125). There is also evidence 
to suggest that a large proportion of seizures took place on 
farms below 80 BIH [ibid.: 129]. The fact that such farms were 
never systematically expropriated testifies not only to the 
UP's unwillingness to antagonise the 'middle sectors', but 
also to the isolation and weakness of the poor peasants and 
agricultural labourers. Having supported the middle peasants' 
demands for expropriation, they were of course abandoned 
after the middle peasants had acquired access to the land of 
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the large estates. 
Evidence as to the leadership of the rich peasants can 
also be found in the nature of the unions and the Peasant 
Councils. As far as the rural unions are concerned, the position 
is relatively straightforward. The membership of rural 
unions in 1974 is indicated in Table 10.18. If compared with 
Table 10.5, the increase in union membership since 1970 can be 
appreciated, the major increase being experienced by the 
marxist union, Ranqull. If it is assumed that the figures given 
in Table 10.16 regarding the numerical size of rural strata 
are reasonably accurate - and political parties have greater 
incentives to produce accurate information on these matters 
than have academics - then a category of 'potentially unionisable 
peasants' can be created by adding the numbers in the categories 
of minifundistas, "workers in the reformed sector", "proletariat" 
and "sub proletariat" from that table. This figure comes to 
a total of 639,000 which, if compared to the total number of 
union members in Table 10.18, indicates that only around 40% 
of the 'unionisable peasantry' actually belonged to a union. 
On the assumption that these figures are reasonably accurate - 
a fact which I realise is difficult to confirm - the unionising 
activity of the UP proved to be extremely weak. Whatever the 
nature of this data however, other information is available 
regarding the nature of union membership. It has been estimated 
that nearly the totality of permanent, or permamently 'employed', 
labour Cinquilinos, voluntarios, and other full-time wage- 
labourers) was unionised by that date, while it is agreed that 
the temporary rural labourers, unemployed and poor peasants 
Cafuerinos, minifundistas, etc. ] constituted the majority of 
the non-unionised peasants [Barraclough and Fernandez, op. cit.: 
178-9; Barraclough and Affonso, op. cit.: 113). The class 
membership of unions therefore did not alter substantially under 
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Table 10.18 














m The second figure is more accurate as it 
includes unions which were not registered 
in official data. --- ----"--- 
Source: Barraclough and Fernandez, op. cit.: 179 
the UP. This is hardly surprising given the practice of marxist 
parties and the nature of unions previously discussed. 
The dominance of the rich and middle peasants over the 
poor peasants and wage-labourers can also be seen in a brief 
account of the Peasant Councils30. The UP conception of 
Peasant Councils originally restricted. membership to the 
organised peasantry. The idea was that 'peasants', be represented 
by the various organisations of asentados, minifundistas and 
unions [Kay, 1975: 4271. Around one half of the peasantry 
did not belong to any organisation at all in 1970 and moreover, 
the majority of 'organised' peasants were controlled by PDC 
organisations - the Christian Democratic organisations there- 
fare often dominated the Councils which opposed UP agrarian 
policy Cloc. cit. ). Under pressure from poorer peasant classes 
in different areas - particularly from the Mapuche peasants 
in the province of Cautin - the nature of several Councils was 
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transformed to include non-organised peasants (ibid.: 427-B; 
Lehmann, 1974c: 99-106). The original Councils were referred 
to as 'councils created by decree', while the latter type 
which was modified under pressure to include the non-organised 
peasantry and which the government was forced, to recognise, 
were referred to as 'councils enlarged by the grass roots'. 
In addition, in some localities Councils were formed by 
exclusively 'non-organised' peasants and became known as 
'councils created by the grass-roots'. As Kay notes: 
"In the latter two types of councils some or all the 
representatives were elected directly in various 
local peasant assemblies, specifically called for that matter, 
in which all the peasants had the right to participate. 
These additional or alternative ways of, constituting 
councils were not only more democratic but also more 
favourable to the Popular Unity as many of the yet 
organised peasantry tended to be supporters of the 
government. However, Christian Democrat organisations 
withdrew from those councils in which they had lost 
control through mass mobilisation, arguing that they 
were no longer 'democratic'. Other councils came, to 
represent peasants of one particular party of the 
Popular Unity as other parties adopted sectarian 
attitudes, and councils became party organisations 
instead of representing the various peasant groups. " 
[Kay, 1975: 428) 
The PS, the MAPU and the MIR were the only parties which 
supported most consistently the 'grass roots councils', while 
the PC, never seeming to be particularly interested in the 
movement at all, stood by legally recognised councils and 
preferred to concentrate on expropriating haciendas 'from above' 
(Lehmann, 1974c: 102; Castells, -1974: 355). The 'grass roots 
councils' were the nearest, thing to popular organisations in 
the countryside and Castells [op. cit.: 353] argues that their 
leading force were those peasants who had been bypassed by the 
agrarian reform: the minifundistas,. afuerinos and unemployed 
rural labourers. Unfortunatelyr. they never managed to establish 
any permanent power in the countryside. In April 1972 peasant 
councils had--been formed in 208 out of the 235 districts 
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(comunas] of the country, but a third of these did not function 
at all and many only functioned on an irregular basis 
(Kay, 1975: 4281. Of all the councils, 63% were original 
'decree councils', 25% were 'enlarged councils' and only 12% 
were exclusively 'grass roots councils' (Castells' op. cit.: 3511. 
The latter form of council functioned more regularly and more 
actively. Data on the social composition of the leadership 
of all councils show that in 27% of the councils the majority 
of the leadership was 'proletarian' in nature; in 15% of the 
councils it was made up in majority by peasants from the 
'reformed sector'; in 16% of the councils minifundistas and 
other smallholders dominated; while in the rest (42%] the 
leadership was 'mixed' (ibid.: 354]. Unfortunately the data 
include, under the heading of 'proletarian', inquilinos as well 
as voluntarios and afuerinos, so that in real terms the poor 
peasants and rural proletariat are even more under-represented 
in the leadership than these figures imply. If the social 
composition of the leadership of all councils is compared 
with the class structure throughout the country, this point 
appears more clearly (Table 10.19). Unfortunately the 
unemployed are excluded from these data and the category of 
proletariat includes middle peasants and wage-labourers, but 
it is nevertheless possible to see both the over-representation 
of peasants from the reformed sector among the leadership of 
councils, and the under-representation of 'smallholders'' the 
majority of which were minifundistas or poor peasants. There- 
fore, despite the inadequacy of the data, the indication is 
that the lower classes of peasants were under-represented 
among the leadership of the councils. 
Kay remarks that, by. the and of 1972 the balance in°the 
forms of council had altered so that 60% were now either 




. of . the . social composition of the 
leadership of 
peasant councils with-the numerical composition of the 
class structure [in percentages) 
PEASANTS RURAL EMPLOYED LEADERSHIP POPULATION OF COUNCILS 
'Proletariat' 43 46 
(inquilinos, afuerinos, 
voluntarios) 
'Asentados' 8 27 
Call peasants in 
'reformed sector'] 
'Smallholders' 49 27 
[under 20 BIH) 
TOTAL 100 11 100 
Source: Castells, 1974: 353. 
which confirms the relative gtnwth of poor-peasant power at 
this time. Unfortunately the lower peasant classes were 
becoming more and more isolated as by this date the expropri- 
ations demanded by the middle peasants had been completed. 
In sum, throughout their short life, the Peasant Councils were 
seen as simple vehicles for the UP's policies and were largely 
dominated by the richer peasants. By the time the poorer 
peasants had managed to increase their position in them, any 
policy of alliance under their leadership was no longer possible, 
both because the richer peasants had obtained access to land 
and capital, and because the 'Left-wing' organisations to 
which the poor peasants adhered were not thinking in such 
terms anyway. 
Let me now turn finally to the question of agricultural 
production, the crucial nature of which I have already stressed. 
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The massive redistribution of income which the UP enacted in 
the rural areas resulted in a sharp increase in the consumption 
and demand for food31 thus proving that the decline in imports 
of foodstuffs under Frei had only been achieved at the expense 
of working-class living standards. These increases can be 
seen from Tables 10.13 and 10.14. At the same time during 
the first two years of UP government, agricultural production 
increased (although at a decreasing rate] but not sufficiently 
to meet the rise in demand (Tables 10.10 and 10.13). The 
result was an increase in the rate of inflation which is 
indicated in Table 10.20. The government attempted to establish 
price controls while at the same time adjusting all but the 
higher salaries and wages to the cost of living index 
32. This 
of course reduced profits dramatically and drew the opposition 
Table 10,20 
Consumer_ Price Index and Annual Percentage Increase in 
Santiago Prices 1971-73 
ANNUAL % 
YEAR INDEX INCREASE 
1971 164.8 22.1 
1972 434.1 163.4 
1973 [Sept] 1271.1 192.8 
1973 [Dec] 2640.0 508.1 
Source: Roxborough at el. 9 
. op. cit.: 
147 
of the bourgeoisie. The shortages and massive inflation rates 
after 1972 contributed to the increasing mobilisation of the 
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in the State sector were under-priced so that-"the 'social 
property sector', both in industry and agriculture, ' produced 
massive deficits rather than the planned surpluses [Roxborough, 
at al. s 147]. 
Kay notes that the negative effects resulting from the 
deterioration of collective agricultural production were only 
felt with catastrophic consequences in 1973. ` He" cites two 
different estimates which suggest that in that-year agricultural 
production fell by between 5 and 15 per cent (Kay, 1977b: 2121. 
This fall in production along with a massive increase in demand 
had the effect of greatly increasing food imports from 
US 0 110 million in 1970 to around US % 400 million in 1973 
[Kay, 1975: 434). If we bear in mind that the'price of'copper, 
the main source of foreign exchange, fell from 57.7 US-cents 
per lb. in 1970 to 47.8 US cents per lb. in 1972 CRoxborough, 
at al., op. cit.: 1351 we have some indication of the massive 
foreign exchange crisis with which the country was confronted33 
Inflation and shortages of course always affect the working ' 
class more than other sectors in spite of' wage increases, 
because the working class has less access to the black'market, 
is exploited by profiteers, and so on. Under these circumstances 
the workers and the 'peasants' appeared to have irreconcilable 
'interests'; there could therefore be no systematic alliance 
between the urban proletariat and the peasantry 
349 
Due to the fall in agricultural production occasioned 
primarily by the disastrous performance of'the so-called 
'reformed sector', the country relied for over half the production 
actually marketed on the so-called 'middle farms' - the new 
capital-intensive enterprises. This can be seen in Table 10.21 
which gives the best available description of social relations 
in the countryside in 1972. At this date capitalist social 
tC 
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relations dominated the countryside and the Failure to 
establish a worker/peasant alliance under the leadership of 
the proletariat can be seen in three main areas. First, the 
rural proletariat did not control any sector of agriculture, 
as we have seen. The small farms under 20 BIH still accounted 
for 60% of agricultural labour and included most of the 
unemployed, while the 'reformed sector' was dominated by rich 
peasants. The rest of the enterprises were run on straight- 
forward capitalist lines and employed wage-labourers. Second, 
the urban working class relied for its necessary means of 
subsistence on capitalist farmers and rich peasants, so that 
it was separated from its counterpart in agriculture. Under 
such conditions the only possible 'alliance' could be one 
between the urban proletariat and the capitalist farmers and/or 
rich peasants; but, third, the latter two groups did not 
satisfy the workers' demands and continued to exploit wage-labour 
as a whole. In sum the various fractions of the rural 
bourgeoisie were still very much in control of the transformation 
process. By this date, all the UP had managed to achieve 
was the strengthening of a rich peasant road at the expense 
of modern agrarian capitalism and the total isolation of the 
rural proletariat both from its counterpart in the cities and 
its erstwhile 'allies' amongst the middle peasantry. When the 
demands of the poor-peasants and agricultural workers started 
taking an explicit proletarian character From late 1972 onwards, 
their isolation meant their predictable defeat. 
10.4 Concluding Remarks 
The social transformation of Chilean agriculture between 
I ill 
1962 and 1973 cannot be adequately understood by considering 
865 
this process simply as one of capitalist development, nor 
can it be comprehended by restricting one's observations to 
the agrarian sector itself. This process cannot be understood 
simply with reference to the development of capitalism, both 
because capitalism was already dominant in this sphere and 
also because the period was characterised by the antagonism 
between two competing forms of capitalist agricultural 
transformation. It should be clear first of all that the 
process which Chile witnessed over this period was one of the 
further transformation of an already capitalist agriculture 
under the dominance or leadership of different classes at 
different times and not one of a 'transition from feudalism to 
capitalism'. The process was one of antagonism primarily 
between landed property-led and capital-led capitalist develop- 
ment. Second, a peculiar characteristic of the Chilean case 
was that industrial capital itself did not lead the attack 
on landed property which was left in the hands of the petty- 
bourgeoisie [both urban and rural]. This was added to the 
fact that the primary antagonism in the countryside was one 
between a capitalist 'sector' of transformed landowners and 
large agrarian capitalists and an equally capitalist 'sector' 
dominated by rich and middle peasants. -Over. the decade the 
process took the following forms: first, a totally dominant 
landlord-led process of capitalist development where the 
earlier process of the transformation of landlords into 
capitalist farmers was continued (1962-64]; second, a process 
which concluded the transformation of landlords into capitalist 
farmers, and dramatically initiated a rich peasant road to 
capitalist development which had always been in antagonism 
to landlord development but-which until then had been entirely 
smothered [1964-70]; finally, a process which gave a further 
impetus to the rich peasant road which was completed by 1972 
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at the expense of a minority of large capitalist farmers/ 
landowners C1971-731. In this final process the proletariat 
lent its'--support-to the burgeoning peasant road and after 1972 
the antagonism between rich peasant agriculture and modern 
capitalist farmers' agriculture Ci. e., between the rural 
petty-bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie) no longer prevailed, 
so that the attempts at socialist transformation which then 
took place were confronted by a united capital. 
Of course this account only considers agriculture itself, 
but it should be clear that the question of food production 
was central in this period as it had been since the end of 
the nineteenth century. The dominance of capitalist production 
relations throughout the decade in question meant that the 
antagonism between town and country, and the divisive effects 
which this had in relation to the nature of the proletariat 
itself and to the relation between the proletariat and its 
allies, were never systematically overcome. As a result of 
this failure a socialist transformation'could not be undertaken. 
Accounts of the failure. of the Popular Unity agrarian 
reform usually take two dominant forms. The first asserts 
that the UP or the Left in general imposed a utopian egalitarian 
form of production on a recalcitrant 'peasantry' in the 'reformed 
sector', for example. This imposition, it is suggested, put 
obstacles in the path of 'peasant production' and accumulation 
which only alienated 'the peasantry' and created a fall in 
production with predictable results. Thus it is maintained 
that the UP proceeded 'too fast' under pressure from its 
Left-wing. Rather, the UP should have proceeded by stages and 
should have avoided initially any utopian egalitarianism in 
the countryside until peasant production and class differentiation 
had increased. This position is exemplified by Lehmann 
[1972x, 1974c). He argues that "the attempt to establish 
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CERA's was yet another case of concentration on moral' political 
and legal rules and neglect of "the rewards and sanctions of 
the market which continued to offer the best explanation of' 
asentado behaviour, especially where it ran counter to the 
hopes of politicians and ideologies" (Lehmann; 1974c: 1101. 
He continues by noting that: - 
"The erroneous solution seems to be that advocated by 
certain factions of the Socialist Party, who seek to 
collectivize, along the lines of the CERA, without 
any consideration for the relevance of the technological 
environment. The experience of the past seven years of 
reform demonstrates, surely, that where the industrial 
process does not impinge upon the agricultural, and 
where the agricultural produce can easily be sold at the 
farm gates to any small trader, collective forms of 
work breed subterranean peasant family enterprises, and 
the control of such collective units involves the 
multiplication of bureaucratic effort to little good. 
In Chile, it would seem, the socialization of agriculture 
will have to follow upon that of industry, unless a 
confrontation with the peasants is sought - and of this 
there is little evidence. " Cibid.: 1141 
It should be noted that there is nothing particularly 'Chilean' 
about this argument which is an exposition of the classic 
argument of the backwardness of agriculture in relation to 
industry. Lehmann of course complains about the imposition 
of bureaucratic rules on the middle peasants of whom he shows 
himself to be a spokesman, arguing that individual incentives 
should have been implemented to promote production [ibid.: 111). 
Lehmann is right to argue against the imposition of 
'egalitarian' measures from above, but he erroneously equates 
the peasantry as a whole with the richer peasants and advocates 
the extension of capitalist production and accumulation, and 
hence the further expanded exploitation of the poor peasants 
and agricultural labourers. His argument is linked to a 
notion of eternal antagonistic 'interests' between the [urban] 
proletariat and an innately 'conservative peasantry' 
[Lehmann, 1972c: 324) which is entirely consistent with his 
ideological affinity with the 'Right-wing' of the Chilean Left. 
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The second argument suggests that the UP agrarian reform 
did not move fast enough. It was not radical enough for it 
paid little or, no attention to 'peasant' mobilisation and was 
far too concerned to compromise with the agrarian bourgeoisie 
in an electoralist 'reformist' manner. Rather it is argued 
that the UP should have expropriated not only the large 
latifundios, but also the new rural bourgeoisie, thus creating 
'peasant power' in the countryside. This argument pays little 
or no attention to the question of production and class 
alliances, which often remain at a rhetorical level, the latter 
term being used solely to refer to an alliance between the 
urban proletariat and the 'peasantry'. The work of Kay often 
provides the most sophisticated version of this argument 
[Kay, 1974,1976b). For example, he notes that:. 
"With regard to the peasant mobilisation, the Popular 
Unity parties ... should have organised and conducted 
seizures of estates. In doing so they could have 
incorporated to a much greater extent the large numbers 
of rural unemployed proletarian groups into the 
expropriation process, thus strengthening the forces 
favouring coll+ectives. Such a mobilisation policy could 
have led to a socialised reformed sector as land for 
viable peasant units would not have been sufficient 
and, above all, because the rural proletariat lacked 
the. private means of production for establishing a 
peasant enterprise ... Thus we would conclude that 
particularly through the political mobilisation of the 
afuer_inos, the rural unemployed and the poorest 
minifundistas, i. e,, those peasant groups which had 
largely been excluded from the reformed sector and the 
peasant councils, the Popular Unity could have achieved 
the following situation which would have greatly 
strengthened the revolutionary forces and radicalised 
the process. First, it'could have further weakened 
the rural bourgeoisie by not only expropriating the 
latifundistas but the big medium rural bourgeoisie 
whose expropriation the above mentioned peasant groups 
were demanding. Second, a more collective type of reformed 
sector would have emerged and the potential threat of 
the reformed peasantry moving into the opposition camp 
of the bourgeoisie would have been eliminated. Finally, 
peasant councils might have developed into an effective 
revolutionary organisation of the peasantry in the 
struggle'against the new rural bourgeoisie and for a 
more collective reformed sector, as those councils would 
have become more representative of the mass of the most 
exploited and poorest peasants. " 
CKays 1975: 438-9) __ 
.. 
869 
Here Kay rightly emphasises the class struggle and the 
necessary reliance on the poor peasants. His position is more 
sophisticated than that of the Left-wing of the UP in general 
for he draws attention to a split within the peasantry as a 
whole35. Yet, at the same time he adheres to a 'Left' position 
by advocating an uncompromising attack of all sections of 
the bourgeoisie [and the middle-peasants who benefitted from 
the reform] thus making any alliance [even with the middle- 
peasants] impossible. He also tends to restrict mobilisation 
to the seizure of estates and does not mention mobilisation 
for production which was crucially necessary in order to 
overcome the contradiction between town and country. 
Both the 'Right' and the 'Left' interpretations of the 
UP agrarian reform, it seems to me, are highly. problematic. 
They-both take for granted the fact that the UP could have 
succeeded if only it had enacted the correct policies. Both 
these-arguments are based on similar principles. One argues 
that the UP was too 'Left! in its orientations, the other 
suggests that it was too 'Right'. Both assume that the failure 
of the UP was merely the effect-of mistaken policies and that 
these policies could have been corrected if one or-either of 
its 'wings' had been dominant. Neither examines the root 
causes of the failure of Popular Unity which cannot, it seems 
to me, be reduced to a question of mistaken decisions, policies 
or tactics. Rather, both the line of the 'Right' and that of 
the 'Left? were highly problematic and were far from new - 
events in Chilean politics. Both the 'Right' and the 'Left' 
adhered to similar principles, the erroneous nature of which 
was apparent long before the UP came to power. The practices 
of both the 'Right'-and the 'Left' of the UP operated within 
the samie theoretical terrain, the nature of which can be made 
clear through a brief outline of their theory and practice. 
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More often than not a characterisation of political 
positions in terms of a Right/Left dichotomy reflects a crude 
dualist methodology, for it restricts classification to a 
series of polar opposites within an identical terrain. It 
thus implies a sometimes false unity in the terrain itself. 
In the case of Chile the major split within the labour 
movement as a whole has generally been visualised in such terms, 
and 'Left' and 'Right' positions are compared according to 
whether they held to a theory of stages or not, whether they 
emphasised revolution 'from below' or revolution 'from above', 
whether they were 'reformist' or 'revolutionary', whether they 
sought alliances or not, and so on. Although these dichotomies 
are often crude, they do, it seems to may point to a real 
feature of the Chilean case which is that the dominant separation 
or opposition between 'Right' and 'Left' did indeed take place 
within a common terrain: the problematic of dualism, with'all 
its attendant metaphysical aspects. 
The 'Right', represented by the PCB Allende and a minority 
in the PS, adhered to a conception of 'alliance' with the 
'progressive' sectors of the bourgeoisie which not only simply 
equated 'alliance' with 'support', but the latter with 
'electoral support'. Its notion of stages was one in which 
no connection between stages was theorised and where these were 
seen in electoralist terms. It reduced 'strategy' to ad'hoc, 
tactics of compromise with the PDC in order to maintain electoral 
support. It was this line which was dominant in the UP as 
Faundez shows, while correctly remarking that the solution to 
which the Allende government adhered in its attempted 'alliance' 
with the PDC was "an uneasy mix of political opportunism and 
technocratic short-sightedness, which left the strategic question 
unresolved and aggravated the ideological confusion at the 
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grassroots level. " CFaundez, op. cit.: 63). - Another of the 
more acute observers of Popular Unity's position wrote in, 
1972 in relation to the rural struggle: 
"Though the-desire to eliminate the latifundistas 
remains a unifying factor among the various categories 
of agricultural workers, the Popular-Unity must come 
to grips with the peasant problem. The fact that the 
Christian Democrats continue to mobilize apparently 
to their benefit certain 'anti-feudal' revolutionary 
elements among this new peasantry (still partially 
'in powert in the asentamientos) emphasizes certain 
contradictions within the popular rural classes. In 
analyzing this phenomenon, the various Popular Unity 
groups all too often do little except to take up a 
political stance, since the political views adopted 
by the Christian Democrats [favouring the interests"of 
the small and medium peasant proprietor classes) have 
led the Popular Unity groups to adopt diametrically 
opposed positions. Thus, while seemingly bent on 
maintaining a certain degree of State domination in the 
Agrarian Reform Centers, the Government is compelled, 
by virtue of the pressure exerted by the competing 
forces, to make concessions, either to the Left, or to 
the-capitalist agricultural sector. This general line, 
together with its exceptions, can only be defined as a 
strategy or tactics from the traditional political 
point of view; it cannot be regarded as a clear definition 
of the strategy of the working class in relation to the 
peasant problem. If this political opportunism continues, 
it is obvious that the new peasant class, whose 
differences with regard to the working class need be in 
no way antagonistic, could, as a class, only support the 
latter through the medium of the Christian Democrats, 
as a political tendency. From the general political 
point of view, this implies all manner of further 
compromises and constitutes one of the first points 
which act as a brake on the process. " 
[Joxe, 1973: 227-8) 
One need not-agree in all respects with the manner in which 
the author poses the problem to recognise the pertinence of 
his comments. It was the lack of a coherent strategy towards 
the various peasant classes along with a largely opportunistic 
conception of alliances which was the main characteristic of 
the Right. Founded as it was on a totally mechanical conception 
of stages, this-line and the 'alliances' it pursued could 
only promote the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for it 
equated 'alliance' with support for bourgeois exploitative 
relations. In spite of some superficial points of similarity 
with Lenin's position, this line can in no way be described as 
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'leninist', but it is a clear example of mechanical economistic 
marxism. The economistic conception of stages on which it 
was based - in which the bourgeois nationalist revolution is 
equated with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie - was logically 
paralleled by an asocial conception of production. Equality 
and production were seen as distinct and the latter as more 
or less socially neutral. The metaphysical underpinnings of 
this overall position have already been stressed. 
While the 'Right' recognised the importance of a conception 
of stages, alliances and production, however false, the 'Left' 
rejected these notions as such. As Faundez notes, "the 
Socialists rejected the two-stage approach implicit in the 
Communist position on the grounds that it would block the 
emergence of a truly socialist society" [Faundez, op. cit.: 611. 
At the same time, as I have already noted, the-Left rejected 
alliances in general, underemphasised production and took a 
line which could be called. extremely 'voluntaristic', as it 
seemed to imagine that the proletariat could achieve power alone. 
The 'Left' advocated a line which alienated all the proletariat's 
support and left it isolated. As Debray, often himself 
criticised for 'ultra-leftism', puts it: 
"It is here that we find the fundamental error of 
gauchisme: it sees the two so clearly as to be 
blind to the three. For if there are only two camps: 
there is a struggle between two entities - labour and 
capital, and two classes - bourgeoisie and proletariat, 
but nothing between the two. True, there are only two 
camps, but there are three forces, and if the revolutionary 
camp is to win the day, it must of necessity be 
extended to include the pivotal forces, those upon 
whom victory or defeat hinges - it may be the peasants, 
it may be the petty bourgeoisie, it may be both. 
Gauchisme - dualist and Manichean - is incapable of 
achieving a successful policy of alliances. " 
[Debray, 1975: 125-61 
The 'Left', rather than criticising and attacking the 
mechanical and economistic conception of stages, alliances 
and production put forward by the 'Right', rejected these notions 
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as a whole and replaced economism by voluntarism. The 'Left' 
thus adhered to a position which emphasised an ideal situation; 
in this it was aided by a totally erroneous conception of the 
rural proletariat which made it seem numerically much larger 
than it was and which could not enable a correct posing of 
the question of the worker/peasant alliance. In conformity 
with this, the bourgeoisie is also dramatically increased in 
the class analyses of the 'Left' [primarily the PS and MIR) 
and the size of the petty-bourgeoisie pales into insignificance. 
Interestingly enough, Chonchol, -in his assessment of the 
Popular Unity period, makes a number of accurate observations 
regarding both the PC and the PS which largely confirm the 
points made above. He remarks that: 
it The two dominant parties in Popular Unity, the communist 
party and the socialist party, had views of society 
which, in my opinion, did not conform to the reality 
which we were living. Through an excessive simplification, 
the communist party equated to a large extent the whole 
of the people with the factory workers, who only constitute 
a small proportion of the population of underdeveloped 
countries. The socialist party which had a smaller 
proletarian membership, was influenced by a form of 
revolutionary voluntarism which did not sufficiently 
take objective conditions into account. In particular, 
the intial experience of the Cuban revolution played an 
important part in the analysis which the leaders of the 
socialist party made of the Chilean situation. 
The 
middle classes were not included in either of these ways 
of thinking. Neither the communist party nor the 
socialist party had a clear policy with regard to the 
problem of the middle-classes in our specific revolutionary 
process. Their concerns were directed essentially towards 
the proletariat and its vanguard, -leaving no room for 
the middle classes from within this perspective. Some 
attempted to pacify them unsuccessfully. 
All this was 
a mistake given the political weight which they 
held in 
Chilean society. Under such circumstances it is not 
surprising that we never worked out a common strategy on 
this question. " [Chonchol, 1977: 122-31 
The failure to develop a coherent strategy of class alliances 
was therefore an effect of both the economism of the 'Right' 
and the volunitarism of the 'Left'. 
As Mao puts it: 
"Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and 
adventurism, are all characterised by the 
break between 
the subjective and the objective, by the separation of 
knowledge from practice. '' (Mao, 1937b/1971: 80] 
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Economism and voluntarism are of course two sides of the 
same coin, as Althusser among others has continuously stressed36. 
They are always found together precisely because they are 
variants of the separation of the economic from the social - 
the necessary effect of capitalist production relations. In 
this context it would be mistaken to see the 'Right' as purely 
economistic and the 'Left' as purely voluntaristic. Rather, 
it is more a question of-emphasis - both parties seeing production 
and social relations as largely distinct. Both parties reduced 
classes to simple economic categories according to their 
relations in enterprises; both reduced possession to legal 
ownership; both operated with bourgeois customary concepts - 
all-of which explains why these parties all had erroneous con- 
ceptions-of social relations in the countryside and were unable 
to discover the correct nature of the class structure. True 
enough the 'Left' could point to its greater emphasis on mass 
mobilisation to show its closer contact with'the masses, but 
mobilisation in itself is not enough, especially'if this is 
not undertaken on the basis of marxist categories, a proletarian 
ideology and a correct political line. The people being the 
products of bourgeois relations are bound to express themselves 
in bourgeois concepts which have been imposed upon them. 
Spontaneous demands need transforming into revolutionary demands 
ýýý 
by a party embodying a proletarian ideology [Bettelheim, 1971: 72-51 
The 'Left' in no way embodied such an ideology as its class 
analysis and 'strategy' makes clear. 
Both the 'Right' and the''Left' never seriously confronted 
the problem of the division between town and country and both 
largely adhered to a notion-of distinct realms of agriculture 
and industry. This appears most clearly in the argument off 
the 'Right' regarding increased agricultural production and 
the eternal conception of the antagonism between the proletariat 
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and the peasantry; but it is also apparent in the vague 
conception of worker/peasant alliance adhered to by both sides 
in which this notion is reduced to an 'alliance' between an 
'urban proletariat' and a'rural peasantry'. Moreover 'Left' and 
'Right' exhibited tendencies towards statism and 'dirigisme', 
as is evidenced by the concepts of 'incorporation', 
'participation', and so on, through which--debates were 
37 
conducted 
In sum the opposition between the 'Right' and the 'Left' 
of the Chilean labour movement was an opposition between two 
false opposites. Like those positions assessed in the first 
part of this work, particularly those in Chapter 39 they were 
essentially astrategic. Like those arguments, the positions 
of both 'Right' and 'Left' were founded on a common dualist 
problematic. That this dualist ideology did not develop 
suddenly in 1970 should be evident from Chapter S. Rather, it 
dominated the major marxist parties' attitudes towards the 
peasantry from their early practices in the countryside. 
Popular Unity's failure in the countryside cannot therefore 
be ascribed to errors of policy. Rather, it was largely the 
effect of dualist theories and practices which had been dominant 
for a long time, and which simply reproduced, albeit in a 
different form, the underlying capitalist relations of production. 
The fact that a correct proletarian line never became 
established is one of the tragedies of the Chilean failure. 
If nothing else this tragic disaster should point towards 
taking dualism and its effects seriously. 
In order to end this chapter I can think of nothing 
better than to cite a remark made in 1971 by Charles Bettelheim 
which, it seems to me, captures precisely the question of the 






"The constitution of the proletariat as a class is the 
result of an historical process: the process by which 
the proletariat appropriates its own ideology. This 
historical process requires the intervention of a 
specific ideological apparatus, the proletarian party, 
and is itself the result of a process of social struggle 
for the transformation of society and the world. It is s 
of course, through such a struggle that the proletariat 
transforms itself by achieving a unity inspired by its 
own ideology, by increasingly casting off the alien 
ideology which weighs upon its by gaining increasing 
domination. over material and social forces, and by 
transforming the nature of-the productive forces in 
the light of the truth of this ideology -a truth which 
becomes proletarian power as soon as it takes hold of 
the masses. It is through these transformations that 
the proletariat becomes a dominant class which no longer 
dominates other classes but only itself. " 
CBettelheim, 1971: 701 
CONCLUSION: ONCE AGAIN ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 
... the free development of the class struggle in 
the countryside. This ... is the fundamental and 
focal point in the theory of revolutionary Marxism 
in the sphere of the agrarian question. [In essence 
all the delusions and fallacies of the 'critics' of 
Marxism on the agrarian question boil down to a 
failure to understand this very point, and the boldest 
and most consistent ... of them, Mr. Bulgakov, openly 
declares in his 'survey' that the 'doctrine' of the 
class struggle is quite inapplicable to agricultural 
relationships] . 't 
(Lenin, 1902b/1964: 1241 
I have been concerned in this work with a discussion of 
theoretical problems surrounding capitalist transformation and 
agriculture. I have attempted to argue systematically that 
the dominant conceptualisations of this process are founded 
on a common social problematic which I have referred to as 
dualism. In my attempt to outline what can only be a small 
contribution to a necessary ongoing critique-of dualism, I have 
insisted on the centrality of social relations and the class 
struggle in any attempt to comprehend such transformation. 
A dominant theme which appeared in various guises in all the 
foregoing chapters is what has sometimes been referred to as 
the 'agrarian question'. A pertinent way to conclude this 
work may therefore be a brief reiteration of this problem in 
order to bring out in a final explicit way, both the place 
which agrarian reforms take within this question, and more 
importantly the manner in which dualism systematically obscures 
social relations and the class struggle. 
The 'agrarian question' can be and has been formulated 
in a number of ways which usually take an 'economic' or a 
'political' form. One set of statements revolves around the 
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question of 'agricultural' production and its relation to 
'industry'; the other is concerned with the nature of the 
worker/peasant alliance. Despite the fact that both of these 
groups of statements are often presented separately, they 
cannot be adequately comprehended distinctly from each°other. 
First of all then, there are a"number of formulations which 
present the 'agrarian question' as referring to a number of 
supposedly purely 'economic' and 'scientific' - i. e., natural 
and eternal questions. These formulations revolve''around the 
general notion that a 'surplus' must be extracted from 
'agriculture' by 'industry' in order for 'industrialisation' 
or 'development' to take place. They involve therefore a 
notion of agriculture and industry as distinct, separate and 
unitary realms. Even though the class heterogeneity of such 
realms may be recognised it can only be visualised as secondary 
to their fundamental unity. These formulations may assert 
that 'agriculture' must be 'exploited' by 'industry', for 
'industrialisation' and 'capital accumulation' to take place. 
This is usually explained by arguing that cheap food and ' 
means of production - particularly the former - is necessary 
for 'industrialisation'. From this statement it is not 
difficult to deduce of course, that the 'interests' of the 
'peasantry' and the 'working class' are naturally opposed, 
for it is in the latter's [general) 'interest' to have access 
to cheap food, while it is in the former's [equally general) 
'interest' to produce highly priced food. The inability, of 
'agriculture' to 'produce' (as if agriculture, a mere sector 
of economic activity, can itself produce anything) cheap food 
is then put down to its backwardness by which is meant its 
supposed lack of capitalist development. This can be seen, 
the argument goes, in the backward productive techniques of. 
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of landlords and 'peasants' alike, which are left-ovens from 
a pre-capitalist past. It should not be difficult to see 
that the views both of the exploitation of agriculture by 
industry and the technological backwardness of the former in 
relation to the latter are only made possible by a dualist 
problematic. It is dualism which makes possible both the 
view of the essential separation of the two realms of 
'agriculture' and 'industry' and the separation of technology/ 
industry/production from other 'factors', which enables the 
hierarchical division to be made. Moreover, it necessarily 
follows, as social relations are visualised both as distinct 
from and secondary to the 'economic', that a concept of 
'agrarian classes' is adhered to whereby these classes are 
fundamentally united in their overall distinct sphere of 
economic activity: agriculture. 
If the above formulations and statements are historicised - 
which, to put it simply, is what the present work has been 
concerned to do - it is then possible to explode their, - , 
ideological nature. It becomes clear, to start with, that 
these statements all deduce from a specific historical set of 
relations - capitalist relations - laws which supposedly 
govern 'production', 'accumulation' or 'development' in general. 
As these refer to capitalist relations and capitalist production' 
what they hide are the antagonistic production relations on 
which the capitalist mode of production is founded. - What is 
hidden by these formulations is precisely that 'development', 
'accumulation' and 'production' are anything but neutral 
'economic' concepts, that the process to which these notions 
refer is the increased exploitation and oppression of wage- 
labour - i. e., the reproduction of the capital/wage-labour 
relation. What is hidden in the so-called necessity to cheapen 
? "I rl 
the price of food, is a requirement of capitalist relations. 
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Capital requires cheap food and means of production to'', '' 
increase the exploitation of wage-labour; the antagonism 
between 'industry' and 'agriculture' therefore hides the 
antagonism between capital and capitalist landed propertya- 
the latter being a fundamental structural obstacle to the 
increased exploitation of wage-labour. It is capital which 
requires the abolition of rents in order to develop the 
extraction of relative surplus-value (industrial capitalism]. 
As Marx stressed on several occasions in his assessment of the 
struggle over the Corn Laws, it makes no economic difference 
whatsoever to the proletariat if the surplus-value extracted 
from it takes the form of profit or rent. It does, however, 
make a crucial difference to capital end landed property. The 
antagonism between 'agriculture' and 'industry' may also hide 
the opposition between urban and rural capitalists, although 
this conflict is no different from any other opposition between 
that section of capital which produces necessary means of 
subsistence and that which does not. The above formulations 
also systematically remove from view, by adhering to a notion 
of a unitary peasantry, both the existence of capitalist relations 
in the countryside, and specifically the unity of wage-labour 
in society. They reproduce the division of labour between 
industrial and agricultural wage-labour, for the production of 
cheaper food means the increased exploitation of both urban 
and rural wage-labour. The notion of the backwardness of 
landed property hides the capitalist nature of landed property 
which constitutes the ultimate reason for the slow level of 
development of the productive forces on landlord enterprises. 
The notion of the backwardness of 'peasant' production also 
hides the fact that it is individual private - i. e., capitalist - 
production which ruins the middle peasants [as well as 
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recreates them), for capitalist accumulation means precisely 
the expanded reproduction of the capital/wage-labour relation, 
the continuing separation of wage-labour-from capital. This 
process does not come to an end as long as capitalist production 
relations exist. It should be evident from what has been 
argued therefore, that the 'agrarian question' is a product of 
economism, whether 'marxist' or not. 
Another way of expressing the 'agrarian question' is 
associated with the 'problem' of the 'persistence' of the 
middle-peasantry. It is held that the existence of petty- 
commodity producers constitutes a problem for marxism because 
the latter supposedly maintains that capitalist development, 
means the progressive disappearance-of small enterprises, and 
the numerical dominance of 'pure wage-labourers' among the 
population. This 'peasantry' is said to be a left-over from 
pre-capitalist modes of production and to be reproduced 
accidentally by particular forms of capitalism - i. e., it is 
asserted that the existence of this 'peasantry' is not a 
necessary effect of capitalist relations. Because the so-called 
'peasantry' under capitalism is seen as a unity and as a left- 
over from a period where it was really a unity, this view, 
iis-often accompanied by a notion of the 'exploitation' of the 
'peasantry' as a whole. This 'exploitation' may be ascribed 
to landlords who are equally seen as left-overs from feudalism, 
or if landlords do not exist this 'exploitation' may be said 
to be undertaken by 'capital', 'society', the 'State', or 
whatever. It should be clear that these arguments are equally 
based on dualism, that they see agriculture and industry as 
distinct realms and the former as dominated by pre-capitalist 
forms. They systematically remove from view the class struggle 
and divide the working class according to the lines inscribed 
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by the social division of labour. What these formulations 
do is to deduce illegitimately from the fact that capitalist 
development reproduces and extends the antagonism between 
capital and wage-labour, the false conclusion that this means 
a greater number of proletarians and a gradual polarisation 
of the population between capitalists and wage-labourers. 
This view is also reflected in the more 'political' 
expressions of the agrarian question where the problem is often 
formulated as a simple question of numbers. For example, it; is 
sometimes suggested that it is only because Russia and Chinb 
were backward - because their agricultures were dominated by 
'peasant production' - and that in consequence their proletariat 
was very small, that an alliance of this proletariat with 
the 'peasantry' was necessary in the bourgeois democratic 
and socialist revolutions. In other words, as sometimes 
formulated, the question of the worker/peasant alliance is 
simply seen as a tactical if not opportunist question - as merely 
being a matter-of requiring the numbers necessary to ensure 
the support of a majority of the population. Several points 
must be made in this context. 
First, clearly the alliance of the 'proletariat' with 
the 'peasantry' is not a purely tactical or 'political' 
question for it is necessarily founded on an 'economic' theory 
of the exploitation and oppression of this 'peasantry' in the 
absence of which it would not be possible for it to be in favour 
of any alteration of social relations. It is not just a 
question of numbers. The fact that the 'peasantry' is 
visualised as a potential ally of the proletariat [as compared 
to women, for example) points not only to the numerical 
preponderance of 'peasants', but to a specific theory of the 
'peasantry'. 
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Second, this theory is usually precisely the one 
outlined above. It is maintained that 'agriculture' is 
basically pre-capitalist, that peasants are exploited by land- 
lords, that the struggle of the (bourgeois) peasants against 
the landlords should be supported by the 'proletariat'-in order 
for capitalist relations to develop at a faster rate. Not only 
will this increase the numerical preponderance of this 
proletariat in the social formation but it will increase the 
production of food and means of production, which 'industrial 
development' is said to require. This iss of course, precisely 
where bourgeois land reforms come in and where it becomes 
clear that the 'political' and 'economic' aspects of the 
agrarian question are intimately related. 
Third, what this argument makes apparent is also the fact 
that because 'agriculture' and 'industry' are seen as separate 
entities at different stages of 'development', it becomes possible 
to visualise two separate revolutions taking place at once: 
a socialist transformation in-the towns and 'industry', and a 
bourgeois revolution in the countryside and 'agriculture'. 
As the peasantry is seen as a unity, its only revolutionary 
role is an anti-pre-capitalist one. This argument, by falsely 
imposing a unity on antagonistic peasant classes, advocates 
the support of the proletariat both urban and rural, "for the 
extension of capitalist exploitative relations of production. 
It advocates the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. 
Finally, the term worker/peasant alliance is itself 
highly misleading. It implies a false dichotomy between a 
working class which is restricted to urban areas, and a united 
'peasantry' which is contained in agriculture. It replicates 
the false capitalist/pre-capitalist and urban/rural dichotomies. 
It implies that if someone is a worker he/she cannot be a 
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'peasant' and vice versa. Of course this formulation is 
normally read precisely in this manner and is an effect of the 
dualism I have been discussing. As a result the worker/peasant 
alliance as dominantly formulated amounts to a support of the 
urban proletariat for the rich peasants in agriculture. The 
expanded reproduction of capitalist relations which this 
'alliance' amount to produces the increased exploitation of 
the poor peasants and agricultural labourers and the increased 
exploitation of the urban sector of the proletariat through 
the decrease in the price of labour-power - in other words, 
it reproduces capitalist relations while systematically splitting 
the proletariat. It reproduces capitalist relations without 
at the same time also reproducing socialist forms which may 
enable the overcoming of those relations. Whatever the manner 
of its expression, the so-called 'agrarian question' therefore, 
systematically removes the class struggle from view. 
The worker/peasant alliance must be understood as first 
establishing the unity of the proletariat across the urban-rural 
divide and second, as forming an alliance under the leadership 
of this united proletariat with the petty-bourgeoisie and 
middle peasants. It is impossible to undertake a viable 
alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie if the proletariat is not 
coherently united. This also means a particular form of 
alliance in which the petty-bourgeoisie (both urban and rural] 
is drawn both politically and economically into a support of 
the proletariat, and not an 'alliance' in which the proletariat 
lends its support to the establishment of the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisie. It means recognising the political nature 
of production as well as the economic nature of politics. That 
this process means overcoming dualism in all its forms through 
a systematic critique of phenomena should hopefully be clear. 
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Centrally, it means recognising that the problem of classes 
is not just one of numbers, but primarily one of practices. 
r 
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NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 
1. Three recent texts have unfortunately been published too 
late for me to incorporate them within the body of the text. 
They are: A. Hussein and K. Tribe, Marxism and the Agrarian 
Question, London: Macmillan, 1981 [2 volumes); A. de_Janvey, 
The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America, Baltimore 
and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1981; 0. Goodman 
and M. Redclift, From Peasant to Proletarian, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1981. 
2. See for example G. Djurf eldt [1981]; Massey and Catalano 
C1978). 
3. Such assertions are made for example in Chapter 1 of the 
book by Goodman and Redclift noted above. They also assert 
explicitly that they adhere to a marxist position. 
4. On realism see Bhaskar 01975,1979) and Keat and Urry 
C19751, for example. 
5. See Hindess C1977b, ch. 73; Hindess and Hirst C1977); 
Cutler et al. (1977,19781. 
6. Althusser's epistemology is compared with that of Marx 
in Sayer C1979c]. 
t 
7. It is tempting to note however, that Althusser's 
'reinterpretation' of the phenomenal forms/essential relations 
distinction in terms of a distinction between an object and 
its concept has rather strange effects. Marx shows for example 
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that surplus-value is the essential category which accounts 
for the existence of the phenomena of profit, interest and 
rent. If we follow Althusser, this implies that surplus-value 
is a concept while profit, interest and rent are not concepts 
but 'real objects'. 
8. Incidentally, it is on this basis that Althusser criticises 
the concept of experience, yet there is no need to consider 
the concept in this way. It is crucially important not to 
reject all notions of experience simply because in empiricist 
modes of analysis, the term denotes a human capacity which 
produces a 'straightforward reading of the essence in the 
phenomenon'. It could be argued that experience is not simply- 
given but produced by social relations. 
9. It should be noted that this point is not made by 
Althusser who restricts his discussion of essentialism to the 
relations between a general universal principle and specific 
social formation while ignoring the intermediate step. This 
view is a common one and is closely related to a position 
which equates 'history' with the empirical and opposes it to 
'theory' which is supposedly only general and abstract. The 
similarity of this dichotomy with. the oppositions theory/fact 
and determinate/indeterminate are not fortuitous. It seems 
to me that the historicity of theory and the theoretical nature 
of history must be constantly stressed. 
10. There are some exceptions. As I shall note in Chapter 71 
one such exception is to be found in Marx's treatment of petty- 
commodity producers whom he sometimes sees simply as 'non- 
wage labourers'. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
1. See inter alia Foster-Carter [1974], Gendzier [1977], 
for example. 
2. See Connell-Smith [1976], Nystrom and Haverstock C1966]. 
3. Some of the I classical I expositions of this position are 
to be found in the work of Rostow, in Economics and History; 
in the work of Parsons, Hoselitz, Eisenstadt, in Sociology; 
in the work of-Huntingdon, in Political Science; and in the 
work of McClelland, in Social Psychology. Some of these authors 
will be examined below. It is also worth noting that the 
philosophical roots of the theory of development are to be 
found in the works of Spencer, Comte, Saint Simon and Hobhouse, 
among others. See Bottomore (1962: ch. 16), Turner (1975), as 
well as Ionescu, ed. [1976] and Kumar [1978]. 
4. This notion of the 'prime mover' of history employed 
here by Burns is also central to the discussion From within 
the 'marxist tradition' surrounding the work of Dobb in 
Hilton, ad. C19763. Although I shall not be concerned in 
this chapter with an explicit discussion of the variants of 
the 'industrialisation thesis' within marxism, particular 
cases will be referred to in footnotes. 
5. This argument is used by, among others, Parsons C1960: 
Part 23, as well as by Kerr at al. C19731. 
6. See principally Kerr at al. [1973] and Dahrendorf [1964). 
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The work of Kerr formed part of a large volume of literature 
in social science which attempted to provide alternatives to 
the marxist concepts of capitalism and class, from the early 
1950's onwards. Among some of the better known are Aron (1967), 
Bell (1973), Touraine (1974), Dahrendorf (1959) and Galbraith 
(1972). For a discussion of some of these texts see 
Goldthorpe (1964) and (1971), Kumar (1974) and (1978). 
7. The fact that the level of technological development 
produces a particular- form of [neutral) State is the central 
theme of Galbraith (1972). Similar notions can be found in 
Khruschov's notion of the 'State of the whole people' developed 
in the USSR in the early 1980's. For a critique of this notion 
see CC of the CPC (1964). 
8. Although Goldthorpe shows that there is no evidence for 
the coming of a 'middle class society', he does not make the 
more fundamental point with regard to Kerr at al. that to argue 
as they do that a development of 'economic' equality automatic- 
ally gives rise to an 'ideology of equality' is a simple 
effect of their 'essentialism', which maintains that there 
is a simple correspondence between the 'economic position' 
of a group of individuals and their ideology, consciousness 
or values. Obviously, Goldthorpe cannot reject Kerr's 
theoretical position without at the same time rejecting the 
sociological concept of class to which he strongly adheres. 
See in this context, Cutler. at al. C1977: 186f]. 
S. Haddon states that: 
"The significance of concepts. like 'industrialism', 
'industrialisation' and 'pathways to industrialism' 
as these are used by Kerr at al. is that they 
represent an attempt to provide the basis for a single 
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theoretical framework capable of embracing a range of 
historical experience over time and space. They are 
used as essentially unifying concepts. The substitution 
of the 'industrialization`process' for the 'process of 
capitalist production' is central to this attempt, since 
it seeks to distinguish between an historical configuration 
or epoch Ccapitalism in nineteenth century Europe) and 
an analytical concept [industrialisation). " 
[op. cit.: 8-9) _ 
10. Examples of this classification can be found in any 
introductory textbook to the Economics of Development. See 
for instance, Maddison C19701, Elkan (1973], Maier [19701ß 
Kindleberger and Herrick [1977]. 
11. Such dichotomies include the following: 'traditional-modern', 
'backward-advanced' 'authoritarian-democratic', 'rural-urban', 
'pre-industrial-industrial', 'underdeveloped-developed', and 
so on. For Parsons see his (1951). I do not wish to argue 
that Parsons' 'pattern variables' can simply be used as 
'heuristic devices' in isolation from his general theory. The 
fact remains, nevertheless, that they have been used in this 
manner for instance by Hozelitz C1960: ch. 21 and by Lipset 
[1967), among others. 
12. See Frank (1969: 24-39). 
13. ibid.: 26. 
14. See inter alia, Coates and Silburn C1970), Weddeburn, ad. 
C19741, Atkinson, ed. [1973], Kincaid [1975]. 
15. One of the best accounts is still Marx [1867/1974: ch. 25]. 
16. See, for instance, Meillassoux (1974) where it is argued 
that famine is the effect of a policy of agricultural exploitation., 
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17. This is clearly evident in the work of Rostow, for 
instance, who defines a 'traditional society' as "one whose 
structure is developed within limited production functions, 
based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre- 
Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world" [Rostow, 1962: 4). 
Rostow's concept of 'traditional society' has rightly been 
criticised for combining into a unitary category entirely 
different communities and societies (present day 'underdeveloped' 
countries, Asian empires, pre-Colombian civilisations, tribal 
systems, and so on) whose sole common feature is that they 
are not 'modern' or 'industrialised'. See, for example, 
Bernstein [1971). 
18. There is a voluminous literature on these theories. On 
the 'dual economies' and 'enclaves of gorwth' see W. A. Lewis 
C1954), Levin C1960), Meier C1970: ch. 3), Weeks C1971), Kula 
(1976). On the folk-urban continuum see Redfield (1941) and 
(1947), 0. Lewis (1953). A discussion of both these variants 
is provided in Frank (op. cit.: 61-6). and Stavenhagen (1969). 
It is important to note that neither of the last two authors 
point to the immanentism of these dichotomous appraoches. 
A further consequence of this immanentism is that both Lewis 
and Redfield assume a simple correspondence-between 'economic 
position' and consciousness, in this case with reference to 
a 'class' of peasants or rural dwellers. 
Thus, similar criticisms to those made of the traditional- 
modern dichotomy can be made of Redfield's [and Lewis's) 
categories. In the case of Redfield, Oscar Lewis has put it 
in the following manner: 
"The folk-urban conceptualization of social change 
focusses attention primarily on the city as the 
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source of-change, to the exclusion or neglect of 
other factors of an internal or external nature ... It follows that in many instances culture change may 
not be a matter of a folk-urban progression, but rather 
an increasing or decreasing heterogeneity of culture 
elements ... 
The 'folk society', as used by Redfield, would group 
together food-gathering, hunting, pastoral, and 
agricultural peoples, without distinction ... the point is that in attitudes and value systems, folk societies 
may resenble some urban societies much more than they 
resenble other folk societies ... What has been said 
about the folk and of the folk-urban formula applies 
also to the urban end. " 
CO. Lewis, 1953: 130-11 
0 
A similar division between a unitary realm of the turban' and 
a realm of the 'rural', with 'development' being seen as the 
diffusion of industry from the former to the latter, is prev- 
alent in many texts of a marxist persuasion. The best example 
is probably Kautsky (1900/1970) who as a result-also adheres 
to a conception of a unitary 'peasantryA. I discuss Kautsky 
in Chapter 6, while the rural/urban opposition is discussed 
in various guises throughout this thesis. 
20. The most systematic attempt to develop such a methodology 
is of course associated with Weber's work, where it is 
combined with methodological individualism. Weber, for instance, 
states that: 
"For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis 
it is convenient to treat all irrational, effectually 
determined elements of behaviour as factors of deviation 
from a conceptually pure type of rational action .. 
the construction of a purely rational course of action 
in such cases serves the sociologist as a type ['ideal 
type'] which has the merit of clear understandability 
and lack of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is 
possible to understand the ways in which actual action 
is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts, such 
as affects and errors, in that they account for the 
deviation from the line of conduct which would be 
expected on the hypothesis that the action were purely 
rational. " 
He continues: 
"Only in this respect and for these reasons of methodolog- 
ical convenience, is the method of sociology 
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'rationalistic'. It is naturally not legitimate 
to interpret this procedure as involving a 
'rationalist bias' of sociology, but only as a 
methodological device. It certainly does not involve 
a belief in the actual predomiance of rational elements 
in human life, for on the question of how far this 
predominance does or does not exist, nothing however 
has been said. " [Weber, 1964: 92-31 
Even though 'ideal types' may not actually exist for Weber, 
the fundamental problem still remains. As he himself makes 
clear, social phenomena are merely visualised in terms of their 
deviation from an ideal and not in terms of their own conditions 
of existence. It should be stressed that this problem of 
immanentism is entirely independent of Weber's methodological 
individualism. 
21. See inter alia Frank Cop. cit.: 39-43,66-75); Meier 
Cop. cit.: 92-120); Maddison Cop. cit.: 36-8s 98-9); Rhodes [1968). 
22. It should be noted at this point that this economism 
is not restricted solely to straightforward bourgeois theorists. 
As is well known, it also dominates much of what usually 
passes for marxism. For example, Stalin, while maintaining 
that the 'productive forces' refer primarily to technology, 
notes: 
"First the productive Forces of society change, and 
then, depending on these changes and in conformity 
with them, men's relations of production, their 
economic relations change ... however much the relations 
of production may lag behind the development of the 
productive forces, they must, sooner or later, come 
into correspondence with - and actually do come into 
correspondence with - the level of development of the 
productive Forces, the character of the productive 
forces. " CJ. Stalin, 1936/1947: 586-7] 
Such statements are not restricted to Stalin but are more or 
less prevalent in the writings of all major Bolsheviks - 
Trotsky and Lenin included. They are even more obvious in 
more recent texts from the Soviet Union. See in this context, 
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Corrigan at al. C1978: chs. 36 51. I return to such conceptions 
within marxism at later points in this thesis. At this point 
it is only worth noting that Kerr's view of the 'convergence' 
of the United States and the USSR, was s as far as this ideology 
is concerned, not completely off the mark. Not surprisingly 
this theoretical argument provided part of the basis for the 
international policy of 'detente' between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 
23. McClelland defines this 'need for achievement' as: 
" ... a desire to do well, not so much 
for the sake 
of social recognition or prestige, but to attain an 
inner feeling of personal accomplishment. " 
(McClelland, 1966: 140) 
24. This false criticism has often been levelled at these 
writers by the 'dependency theorists', for example. See 
Dos Santos [op. cit. ]; Frank [op. cit. ], inter alia. 
25. See Bernstein [op. cit. ] and Rhodes [op. cit. ], for example. 
26. For detailed criticisms of this aspect of bourgeois 
economics see Godelier [1972], but see also the criticisms of 
Godelier in Hussain (1973). 
27. It is interesting to note here that although Lipsey has 
a voluntarist notion of the family and the firm, he does not 
subscribe, at least not explicitly, to a voluntarist notion 
of the State: 
"It is not a basic assumption of economics that the 
central authorities always act in a consistent 
fashion as if they were a single individual. Indeed 
conflict between different central bodies is the subject 
of much intermediate analysis of the theory of the 
control of the economy. " Cibid.: 781 
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28. McClelland in fact considers himself to be a disciple 
of Weber and his theory can indeed be considered as a vulgar 
form of Weberianism. Hindess, for example, shows precisely 
that Weber, despite his superiority over McClelland, was never 
quite able to theorise structures coherently, and that: 
" ... in spite of his talk about the 'combination of 
circumstances' responsible for the unique development 
of the West, Weber discovers ... that the decisive 
obstacle to the rationalisation of the East lies in its 
failure to embody the essential rationality of the 
West ... Weber clearly conceives the development of the 
West as a process of realisation of the essence of man. " 
[Hindess, 1977a: 184,168) 
29. The list here is endless, but perhaps one of the best 
known of these theorists is Schumpeter [1934), with his emphasis 
on entrepreneurship. See also Hoselitz [1960] and Lipset 
and Solari [1967]. 
30. For an introductory discussion of the elite theorists 
see Bottomore (1964]. 
31. This feature is perhaps most obvious in the so-called 
functionalist theory of social stratification propounded most 
concisely by Davis and Moore C1969); although the concept of 
'elite' as such is not always used, they maintain that: 
"Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved 
device by which societies ensure that the most 
important position are conscientiously filled by the 
most qualified persons. " 
(Davis and Moore, op. cit.: 4051 
These qualifications are based on acquired skills but, asTumin 
puts it in his criticisms of Davis and Moore, for them: 
it .. * only a. limited number of individuals in any society 
have the talents which can be trained into the skills 
appropriate to these positions. " 
CTumin, 1969: 416, emphasis added) 
Hence, Davis and Moore's position ultimately amounts to 
considering the stratification system as replicating innate 
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talent. As a side point, it must be mentioned that structural 
Functionalism formed the backbone of modernisation theory. 
See the numerous articles by Functionalist sociologists and 
political scientists in Finkle and Gable [1966). For a 
discussion of the most sophisticated structural functionalist's 
- i. e., Parsons' - teleological conceptions, see Hindess [op. cit. ) 
and particularly with reference to the teleology of Parsons' 
analysis of political systems, see Savage C1977a). Political 
science, as is the case with the other social sciences, has 
exhibited a clear ethnocentric and immanentist conception of 
political change, with 'underdeveloped' countries generally 
being seen as having 'authoritarian and unstable' political 
systems, and advanced societies being seen as characterised 
by 'stable' and 'democratic' systems. See, for instance, 
Huntingdon (1968). 
32. See in this context the discussion of the cultural traits 
of hacienda-owners in Wolf and Mintz 01957: 387 in particular). 
They see the cultural feature of 'conspicuous consumption' 
and 'status aspiration', characteristic of the 'traditonal' 
landowners, as a function of the lack of capital on traditional 
haciendas. The idea that the capitalists must sacrifice their 
personal well-being and consumption patterns for capitalism 
to develop, was incidentally, criticised long ago by Marx 
in his critique of the so-called 'abstinence theory' in 
Marx 01867/1974: 554-61). 
33. This is one of the underlying assumptions of the dual 
economy thesis. 
34. Such comments have been very common but do`not elucidate 
897 
the main inadequacies of modernisation theory, for they imply 
that this perspective is somehow valid in its accounts of 
Western development. Thus Cardoso, in the work already cited, 
maintains that: 
"Explanations which are valid in accounting for the 
behaviour of social groups in the highly industrialized 
countries with central economic systems, cannot be merely 
transferred to provide an adequate interpretation of the 
formation of industrial communities in the peripheral 
countries ... the special circumstances in which the industrialization is taking place in Latin America, make 
it difficult, if not impossible, for industrialists 
and businessmen to play the same dynamic role that they 
have sometimes taken up elsewhere in the development 
of capitalism and the formation of an industrial society. " 
(Cardoso, op. cit.: 112-31 
35. Veliz, for example, states the following: 
"There exists in the region [Latin America] a resilient 
traditional structure of institutions, hierarchical 
arrangements, and attitudes which conditions every 
aspect of political behaviour and which has survived 
centuries of colonial government, movements for 
independence, Foreign wars and invasions, domestic 
revolutions, and a confusingly large number of lesser 
palace revolts. More recently it has not only 
successfully resisted the impact of technological 
innovation and industrialization, but appears to have 
been strengthened by it ... if this institutional 
structure is not fundamentally transformed, Latin 
America will not be able to develop at a satisfactory 
rate. " CVeliz, 1965b: 13 
Strictly speaking, Veliz's work belongs to the liberal 
developmentalist variant of development theory to be considered 
in Chapter 2 (he includes "hierarchical arrangements" among 
the obstacles to development, which modernisation theory 
does not do). Nevertheless, he is worth citing at this stage 
because of the explicitness of his position. 
36. When bourgeois social science does provide an explanation 
for inequality, it is always of course in terms of factors 
beyond human control. For vulgar economics it is technology; 
For sociology it is 'functional necessity', 'innate ability', 
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etc. For an excellent discussion of this feature of vulgar 
economics, see Nell (1972). Bourgeois social science either 
takes the class/power structure as given [economics] or analyses 
'power' in terms of interpersonal relationships (ultimately 
therefore, in terms of a philosophical anthropology) and classes 
in terms of statistical or technicist aggregates [sociology, 
social psychology). 
37. In this context see Gonzalez Casanova C19751, for instance. 
38. Some authors criticise the more vulgar economic 
determinists for not distinguishing between 'economic develop- 
ment' and 'economic growth'. They suggest that: 
It .., economic growth means more output, while economic 
development implies both more output and changes in the 
technical and institutional arrangements by which it is 
produced and distributed. " 
[Kindleberger and Herrick, op. cit.: 3) 
Of course, even though such authors may distinguish between 
these two notions, this in no way contradicts their fundamental 
economism. 
39. See for example Metcalf (1969: ch. 4) and Meier, ed. 
Cop. Cit.: ch. %). 
40. It is highly debatable, given the miserable conditions 
in which the working class live during 'the initial stages of 
industrialisation' [e. g., 'shanty towns'), whether their 
consumption of food is any higher than it was when they 
resided in rural areas. Moreover, a relative decrease in the 
rural population does not necessarily imply a fall in 
agricultural production. The major increase in demand for 
food during this period would come primarily from the better- 
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off sections of the population, i. e., the bourgeoisie and 
petty-bourgeoisie, who incidentally can turn to foreign imports 
to satisfy their demand. This of course reduces the amount 
of foreign exchange which can be invested for capital 
accumulation. 
41. Interestingly the same 'peasants's who in capitalist 
'underdeveloped' societies are said to be 'pre-capitalist', 
were said in the USSR to be 'capitalist' or 'pre-socialist'. 
Indeed, it was on the basis of an argument which maintained 
that the peasants in the Russian countryside were ? capitalist' 
that their exploitation was justified in the most sophisticated 
work on this issue. See Preobrazhensky [1926/1965). This 
seems to indicate that for economism, the major problem is not 
the existence of a 'peasantry' as such, but rather the 
backwardness of 'agriculture' in relation to 'industry'. 
42. There have been many critical assessments of Green 
Revolution policies. Two of the best are Wharton (1969] and 
Griffin C19741. See also Dasgupta C19771. 
43. The theoretical rationale behind the Alliance for Progress 
was provided mainly by the work of Rostow, who as well as 
occupying various important governmental positions in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was for a time'the 
United States representative on the Inter-American Committee 
for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), the Alliance's principal 
co-ordinating body. See Schlesinger [1967: 767), Frank [op. cit. ] 
and Petras and LaPorte [1971: 392-3). 
44. This outline of the Punta del Este Charter is taken from 
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Schlesinger [op. cit.: 592-3); the section on land reform is 
from Barraclough C1973a: xv]. 
45. Feder notes that: 
... the Alliance recognises that there exists a link 
between changes in the structure of society - i. e., in 
its socioeconomic and political organisation - and 
economic growth, and through the Charter of Punta del 
Este it makes such changes in the structure a 
prerequisite to economic development. " 
[Feder, 1965: 1131 
46. "Declaration of the Presidents of America" (Punta del 
Este, April 15,1967: 151, cited by Petras and LaPorte [op. cit.: 382] 
47. Horowitz [1964], Delgado [1968), Feder [op. cit. ], as 
well as Petras and LaPorte [op. cit. ], all make this point. 
48. Congress of the United States - Joint Economic Committee, 
Sub-Committee on Inter-American Economic Relationships: 
Economic Policies in South America, Washington, United States 
Government Printing Office, 1962: 24-5,79, cited by Delgado 
Ccp. cit.: 395-61. 
49. For a useful analysis which links the manner of compensation 
[cash, government bonds, etc. ] and the timing of compensation 
[immediate, long term, etc. ) For land expropriation to the 
power of various classes, see Gutelman [1972x) and(1974: Part II9 
chs. 3 and 4]. 
50. Probably the best known example of such a United States 
strategy occurred in Guatemala in 1954 when the bourgeois 
nationalist government of Arbenz was overthrown by a coup d'etat 
engineered by the United States, because of its attck on 
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United States interests and the planned nationalisation of 
400,000 acres of uncultivated land owned by United Fruit. 
See Horowitz [op. cit.: 133) and especially T. and M. Melville 
C1971]. 
51. The terms 'colonisation' and 'parcelation' are defined 
by Delgado 01968: 384-51 as follows: 
colonisation 
tt ... the opening or preparation of new agricultural, 
cattle raising, or forest land owned by the Government 
or of no definite ownership, and the settlement in it 
of a rural population.? ' 
parcelation 
"i] the acquisition by a Government agency of land used 
for crops or cattle by purchase from its private owners 
paid in cash and at once and 
ii] the subdivision of this land for resale as private 
property to landless or poor peasants by payment of an 
amount of money equal or similar to that laid out by 
the Government agency on the installment system with 
a fixed term and low interest rate. " 
52. See Delgado Cop. cit.: 382-394). On the Colombian land 
reform see Feder [1965], Felstehausen [1971] and Adams and 
Montero [1965). For an analysis of the Venezuelan agrarian 
reform see particularly Wing [1970]. 
53. On this point it is worth noting a remark made by Kennedy 
and cited by Schlesinger, which holds in a nutshell the 
strategy of the United States foreign policy vis-a-vis Latin 
America. After the assassination of the quasi-fascist dictator 
of the Dominican Republic, Trujillo, in 1961, Kennedy is 
reported to have remarked: 
"There are three possibilities ... in descending. order 
of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation 
of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought 
to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the 
second until we are sure that we can avoid the third. " 
(Schlesinger', op. cit.: 5981 
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So much for American 'liberal' leaders. In 1965, Johnson 
sent 20,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to prevent a 
'communist takeover'. It is not surprising therefore, that 
much less 'liberal' American officials such as Kissinger or 
Nixon would wish to 'save the Chilean people from themselves' 
in 1973. 
The similarities between the Alliance for Progress and 
the Marshall Plan are unambiguously stated by its supporters, 
Nystrom and Haverstock: 
... the late President-Kennedy articulated the needs of 
Latin America in terms which seemed acceptable and 
meaningful to Latin and North Americans alike. He saw 
Latin America as involved in a life or death struggle 
to overcome the evils of underdevelopment. The lesson 
of the communist takeover in Cuba was that the outcome 
of this struggle was of paramount importance not only 
to Latin America but to the United States as well - 
and indeed, to the Free World. 
President Kennedy committed the United States to a 
decisive role in establishing and strengthening free 
societies in underdeveloped areas of Latin America with 
much the same urgency that the United States under his 
predecessors had helped to rebuild the advanced nations 
of Western Europe through participation in the Marshall 
Plan. " (Nystrom and Haverstock, 1966: 4] 
Nevertheless, although it is correct to see the Alliance 
as a response to the Cuban revolution, one must go beyond 
a simple analysis of international politics, to the theoretical 
utterances of the modernisation theory of development, if 
the characteristics and effects of such a policy are to be 
adequately explained. 
54. In Mao's sense of that section of the bourgeoisie which 
is directly linked to imperialism and foreign capital. See 
Mao Tse-tung C1926b/19711. 
55. Such an agricultural development strategy corresponds 
closely to what Lenin termed the 'Junker road' to capitalist 
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development in his analysis of the development of capitalism 
in Russian society (Lenin, 1907i/1972: 32]. I discuss Lenin's 
position in Chapter S. 
r, 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. See for instance O'Brien 01975) and Frank (1977). 
2. See Furtado C1970 .: chs. 10 & 11]. 
3. Particularly influential and well known were the works 
of Myrdal and Seers. See Myrdal C1968) and [1971]; Seers 
C1972] and [1970]. See also UphoFF and Ilchman [1972]. 
4. For a detailed discussion of Prebisch's position on trade 
relations see Elkan C1973 ,: ch. 3). For a discussion of the 
policy of import substitution see Helleiner C1972: ch. 61. 
5. It is important to note here that the devalopmentalists' 
ideological position in Latin America was at the same time 
anti-imperialist and anti-marxist. See O'Brien [: 1975: 9). 
S. In his previously mentioned introduction, Veliz also 
makes this point extremely clearly: 
it .6 the 'classical' Marxist or 
liberal models of 
development based on the experience of the more advanced 
countries of Europe are not applicable to Latin American 
conditions. The principal task in Latin America at 
present seems to be the construction of a theoretical 
model based on the experience of the last decades which 
can be used effectively to understand, interpret, and 
direct the processes of social and economic change. " 
CVeliz, 1965b: 83 
7. With reference to agriculture, Darner and Kanal make this 
point abundantly clear: 
"Any judgements concerningia particular system (of land 
tenure] must take note of the institutional and 
technological conditions in the society and the stage 
at which that society lies in the transformation from an 
agrarian to an industrial economy. " 
[Dorner and Kanal, 1971: 39) 
Similar remarks to the ones mentioned with regard to modern- 
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isation theory can therefore be made: 
(i] Industrial societies also exhibit unequal income 
distribution patterns. The differentiating line can therefore 
only be drawn in an arbitrary position. 
[ii] Certain 'underdeveloped countries' may have more 
in common with certain 'developed countries' than with others 
in their own category. 
[iii] -What does it mean to be put on the periphery of 
trade relations? Surely one could argue that this situation 
could change according to the products exchanged. OPEC countries, 
for instance, would be in the centre as regards petroleum exports 
and in the periphery as regards the importation of armaments. 
It goes without saying that I am not maintaining-that 
international trade is based on relations of equality. The 
point is that societies cannot be divided into opposing camps 
in relation to, a universal principle, as the ECLA economists 
maintained. 
8. This point assumes that in certain cases, these 'problems'- 
can be solved. Indeed, developmentalists maintain that to a 
certain extent they have been solved in the industrialised 
countries "where economic and political power are widely shared. " 
[Dornerz 1971: 15]. What the developmentalists argue, there- 
fore, is not that the existence of poverty and inequality is 
a necessary result of the capitalist mode of production, but 
that these problems are 'left overs' of a previous stage of 
development. They are not necessarily solved, indeed they 
might even be exacerbated by particular strategies; nevertheless 
capitalism can and must resolve these questions.. 
9. It is clear that Seers identifies capitalist development 
m I; 
with the realisation of a 'human essence', to use Althusser's 
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term. Apart from-the immanentism of this position, it ist.,. 
evident that, as for modernisation theory, capitalist 
development is equated with a notion of 'development' in 
general. ýf 
10. Prebisch makes the same point in a slightly different 
manner. He argues that: 
"Industrialization is not an end in itself, but the 
principal means at the disposal of those countries of 
obtaining a share of the benefits of technical progress., 
and of progressively revising the standard of living of 
the masses. " (Prebisch, 1964: 3401 
11. The argument to which Seers is referring hare is closely 
linked to the functionalist argument noted in Chapter 1 
(Note (31] ]. 
12. Three points must be made here: 
[i] The characteristics which Seers imputes to under- 
developed countries such as class and race barriers to advance- 
ment, low propensity to invest in local industries, etc. g can 
equally be made [and are made] of - 'industrial' societies: 
Britain, for instance. [The question of rationality and 
irrationality has already been dealt with and need not be 
repeated. ) 
C'ii] It is clear that developmentalism implicitly or 
explicitly takes the patterns of income distribution to be 
found in industrial societies as an ideal to be attained. 
Ethnocentrism is thus let in 'through the back door'. It is 
not surprising that the immanentism of modernisation theory 
is not challenged. Instead of technology and levels of income, 
we now have 'income inequality' as the main distinguishing 
feature of the developed/underdeveloped dichotomy. 
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(iii] An observed correlation between income distribution 
and so-called saving propensities is elevated to a causal 
connection. But even if developed nations exhibit higher 
propensities to save or invest, it might be for other reasons, 
such as the availability of returns due to their favourable 
position in a market. 
13. This contradictory position, anti-ruling class but also 
anti-revolutionary and legalistic, is obviously related to the 
anti-imperialist/anti-Marxist position of the developmentalists. 
This position has much in common with populism. Indeed it was 
espoused by most of the post-war populist leaders in Latin 
America. See O'Brien [op. cit.: 8). Indeed developmentalism 
often expressed itself in a clearly populist terminology [there 
are echoes of this in the above passage by Chonchol). The 
people/power bloc dichotomy is present in many forms in 
developmentalist writings, e. g., people/oligarchy; poor/rich, 
etc. This is not to say that the developmentalists were in 
fact populists, but simply to argue that their utterances 
sometimes took on a populist character, as indeed many marxist 
political discourses have done. The point, however, is. that 
behind their populist ideology the liberals are advocating 
strictly capitalist forms of development. For a useful 
theoretical analysis of populism with particular reference to 
Latin America see Laclau (1977: ch. 4). 
14. The prime example of developing countries successfully 
controlling their own resources and the market for their 
primary product must be'the case of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries'COPEC]. 
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15. It might seem as first glance that Dos Santos' account 
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differs somewhat from the picture I have painted of the 
developmentalists' approach, in that he maintains the primacy 
of technological over structural changes. Nevertheless, Dos 
Santos himself states that the more 'leftist position' within 
this framework, the one I have described, put greater emphasis 
on the need for structural changes. See Dos Santos (op. cit.: 66]. 
16. CIDA is the Spansih abbreviation for the Inter-American 
Committee for Agricultural Development, an organisation made 
up of the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the 
Organisation of American States, the Inter-American Institute 
for Agricultural Sciences and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The research undertaken looked at census data, Fiscal 
records and also undertook field research. Barraclough, the 
director of the studies, mentions the fact that one of the 
resolutions adopted by the Punta del Este Conference recommended 
that the OAS, in collaboration with other international 
organisations, undertake a general study of land reform and 
agricultural development, and reach conclusions with respect 
to the best means of increasing agricultural productivity and 
of assuring that the benefits of greater productivity would 
be available to those who work the land. See Barraclough 
C1973a: xv). 
17. Domike makes the point that out of the seven case 
studies the one on Chile was the "most thorough and directly 
influential: the Christian Democratic government of President 
Frei - with Hugo Trivelli, former head of CIDA, as Minister of 
Agriculture - drew on the CIDA study to give shape to its 
agrarian reform programme. " (Domike, 1973: 57]. 
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18. Domike, who was also involved in the CIDA studies, puts 
the objectives of the research in a slightly different manner: 
"The conception and ambitions of the studies was that 
shared by the Webbs in Britain and John A. Commons in 
the U. S., viz. to present an authoratative, sympathetic 
history of the (in this case rural) working class, and 
of the economic and solid structures moulding their 
futures. " (Domike, op. cit.: 55) 
19. Fortunately one does not have to examine each individual 
report in order to make general comments on the CIDA studies. 
Several works by authors directly involved in the studies 
provide comparative data and conclusions for the area as a 
whole. The most useful of these are Barraclough and Domike 
[1966) and Barraclough [op. cit. ). See also Feder (1971). 
I shall concentrate here mainly on the book by Barraclough, 
as it reproduces and extends the previous work by Barraclough 
and Domike and is also vastly superior to Feder's account. 
20. It'is arguable whether [if expressed in such simple terms) 
this assertion is applicable to Latin America, as we have 
seen that there had been, by the time the CIDA research was 
conducted, an appreciable degree of industrialisation (in other 
words, capitalist development) in Latin America. This implies 
that there must have been other 'groups' [e. g. ' capitalists) 
in Latin America with a 'substantial amount of power'. This 
simplistic assessment of Barraclough's is obviously related 
to a variant of the view previously discussed, whereby 
'traditional societies' [whether tribes or sophisticated social 
formations) are seen as 'agrarian societies'. 
21. Barraclough defines 'land tenure' in the Following manner: 
"The term 'land tenure' is used to express the legal 
and traditional relations between persons, groups, and 
classes that regulate the rights to the use of land, 
-ý. ý 
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transfer thereof, and enjoyment of its products, and 
the duties that go with these rights. In brief, land 
tenure can be considered as a reflection of the power 
relations between persons and groups in the use of land. " 
(ibid.: xvii) 
For Barraclough, land tenure refers to more than mere "legal 
technicalities" Cibid.: 13]. 
22. This is a typical zero-sum concept of power propounded 
particularly by writers such as C. Wright Mills. Indeed 
Barraclough refers specifically to Mills, although he mistakenly 
seems to equate Parsons' position on power to that of Mills 
Cibid.: 300, n. 4). It is well known, of course, that Parsons 
correctly criticised such a simple notion of power for assuming 
that power is quantifiable and limited. It also primarily 
concentrates on the distribution of power as opposed to its 
creation. See Savage C 1977a) for an excellent discussion 
of Parsons on this point. It must be noted that, as for 
Barraclough land is the source of power in 'traditional societies', 
he does not consider the 'creation of power'. Nevertheless 
as land is obviously limited, so presumably is power. In other 
words, the greater the amount of land under one's control, the 
greater one's power (with 'control over labour' entering as 
an intervening variable and thereby complicating the picture). 
The trouble is that there may be 'individuals' or 'groups' 
who have a considerable amount of 'power' in Barraclough's 
terms in 'traditonal' societies, without either controlling 
any-land or labour: for instance, witch-doctors or priests. 
23. Barraclough also asserts that agriculture in Latin America 
is organised into various "land tenure systemsIt which are 
"distinctive patterns of land tenure institutions that correspond 
closely with local social systems ... those of most importance 
F -n 
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are the latifundios, including large plantations, haciendas 
and estancias; the minifundios, both individual and in 
communities of small holdings; the latifundios-minifundios 
complex in which the two systems are in a sort of symbiotic 
relationship; small and medium-scale commercial farms; and 
various transitional situations" CBarraclough, op. cit.: 17J. 
All these terms refer to various agricultural enterprises in 
the local terminology. Minifundios refer to very small 
enterprises, latifundios to very large ones. Haciendas and i 
estancias are simply forms of latifundio. 
24. Scott sees these two features of 'efficiency' and 'equity' 
as the "contradictory core" of a populist position which he 
describes as "neo-classical populism"j and which he sees as 
characteristic of the CIDA studies. See Scott C1977). Neverthe- 
less it seems to me that although Scott's assertion may be 
true, and although the CIDA reports do at times express them- 
selves in populist phrases, the two contradictory features 
which Scott refers toi could be said to be as prevalent in 
non-populist, petty bourgeois ideologies of the 'liberal social 
democratic' type. 
25. Throughout his accounts Barraclough specifically avoids 
the term 'peasant', to which he prefers the Spanish term 
campesino, which in his own words is a class designation 
"understood to include both landless agricultural workers and 
the owners or operators of small holdings [minifundios)" 
Cibid.: 297, n. 11. Either concept, however, refers to a'false 
unity of 'agricultural producers'. 
26. These "tenure institutions vary" according to Barraclough 
"from peona je and inquilina je" - which refer to forms of 
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corvee labour - "through various forms of wage and share- 
cropping, to instances of 'commercial' cash and share-tenancy 
contracts" Cibid.: 18). 
27. [i] The tautology of the description is here evident, 
whether one considers the control of labour or land as the 
basis of 'power'. The origins of the power system can be 
accounted for historically, but once entered into it is 
presumably a self-perpetuating system. One cannot imagine 
how such a 'system' can be overthrown, as one would presumably 
require the control of land and labour in order to acquire the 
'power' to do so. This is obviously total nonsense. It is 
nevertheless the logical conclusion of Barraclough's own 
argument. As Barraclough is by no means concerned with anything 
remotely ressembling logical consistency, he can dispense with 
such problems. His explanation for the 'questioning' of the 
'system' is based on three factors: population growth' technology 
and values [p. 9]. "Land reform emerges as a social movement 
where traditional societies are in the process of modernisation" 
[ibid.: xxiii]. 
[ii] It must be made clear that Barraclough does not 
argue that Latin American landowners must control land and 
labour-power in order to produce and thereby make a profit. 
[Incidentally, in Latin America the majority of large landowners' 
whether capitalist or otherwise' are not rentiers. See 
Table 2.5 below]. For Barraclough the landowners need to control 
these two 'factors' in order to maintain their position of 
power and prestige. He does, not therefore visualise this class 
as fulfilling primarily an economic function, but rather a 
political function of domination. Landowners are seen as mere 
parasites or leeches who do not contribute to production. 
This is why he can argue that the power of this class cane 
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indeed must, be suppressed for economic development to take 
place. Not surprisingly therefore, Barraclough backs up 
this argument with the statement already examined about the 
landowners' high 'propensity to consume'. "A considerable 
portion" of their incomes$ he says "are spent on foreign travel 
and consumption of imported articles. Investments when they 
are made, are usually safe investments such as land, foreign 
stocks and bonds or in the construction of apartments and 
luxury hotels" (ibid.: 31). See also Feder [1971: 96-103). 
28. Despite the superficial disagreement with modernisation 
theory, it is evident that the developmentalist discourse 
remains, as I have argued, within the theoretical terrain of 
its adversary. This is shown for example by the voluntarism 
of this approach. For a voluntarist position it is a very 
easy matter to equate the 'rationality' of farmers with the 
'rationality' of the farm. A direct result of this position 
is that when it comes to analysing the results of agrarian 
reform programmes, developmentalism, spends much of its time on 
totally useless discussions regarding the relative efficiency 
of various forms of agricultural enterprise (such as private 
farms, co-operatives, collectives, or whatever) . considered 
abstractly and independently from the social relations which 
underpin them. 
29. [Ibid.: xviii-xix] and Barraclough and Domike Cop. cit.: 3951. 
30. This comment works to the advantage of Barraclough's 
argument., as the result of inflation would be a greater increase 
in the 'inequality gap'. It seems surprising that he does 
not make more of it. 
vý 'r, 
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31. It is interesting to note that Barraclough explains the 
introduction of labour saving machinery in terms of an attempt 
to reduce 'labour problems', while the more usual explanation 
is that machinery is introduced in order to increase profits. 
His moral populism is clearly evident here. His explanation 
is obviously due to his definition of power. See Note [27) 
above. 
32. The simple control of expanses of land is of course in 
itself meaningless. A landowner could control vast areas of 
unproductive desert land which would not make him powerful. 
Surely productive capacity is a much more accurate measure of 
a producer's 'importance'? 
The advantages of legal ownership over tenantship are 
not spelt out by Sarraclough. Presumably he wishes to infer 
that tenantship is a less 'secure' relationship to the land 
than ownership, and that it implies less 'power'. Such a 
simple assertion is debateable, to say the least. The fact 
that the producers on these farms are tenants does not tell us 
anything about their position, as they could be capitalist 
or 'peasant' tenants. IF the former is the case, then their 
power and security of tenure is likely to be much higher than 
if the latter is the case. However, we have no way of telling. 
Neither are we told what proportion of these farms is in fact 
of sub-Family size. 
33. In fact, despite the special categories devised by CIDA, 
Barraclough talks mostly in terms of latifundios and minifundios. 
These terms$ it must not be forgotten, are the ones used in 
common parlance in Latin America. They are phenomenal 'common 
sense' categories and are not linked coherently and systematically 
I. R '1 
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within a theory. 
34. Barraclough explicitly dissociates himself From such a 
position. He says: 
"It is often argued that the concentration of land 
ownership on large-sized holdings is as prevalent in 
developed countries as in Latin America. This is 
false. An examination of United. -States Census data, 
for example, reveals that using CIDA criteria of farms 
big enough to employ permanently more than twelve labourers, 
only about one percent of the country's cultivated lands 
are in large multi-family-sized holdings as contrasted 
with 65 percent in Chile or 20 percent in Argentina 
[the lowest percentage encountered in the CIDA studies). " 
Cibid.: 301, n. 7) 
35. Unfortunately productivity on this medium sized category 
cannot be calculated because Barraclough merely provides the 
percentages and not the gross figures. It must be stressed 
that the value of agricultural production is a much better 
indicator of power than mere acreage. This is because' the 
area of farms does not say anything about the scale of production. 
36. Chonchol notes that: 
"Between 1950 and 1960, for example, in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay this increase in the 
cost of food has been anything from 12 to 75 per cent 
greater than that in the general cost-of-living index. " 
CChonchol, 1965: 90) 
Detailed figures of inflation in Chile are provided in 
Chapter S. 
37. For this categorisation see Table 2.5 below. It will 
easily be recognised that these three categories are vulgaris- 
ations of the three categories of Classical Political Economy: 
the labourer (or owner of labour-power]; the capitalist (the 
owner of capital]; and the landlord (the owner of land). See 
Ricardo (1817/1951: 5) for example. The only major similarity 
916 
between the sophisticated position of Ricardo and the vulgar 
position of Barraclough is, however, their opposition to 
landlords. Outside of this feature no strict comparison is 
possible. In this context see Hindess C1973a: ch. 31 for a 
discussion of the categories of the Indian agricultural census, 
where similar points are made. 
38. It is worth noting in this context that Marx criticised 
Rodbertus for attempting precisely to apply Ricardo's 
categories to the case of Pomerania where the capitalist mode 
of production did not exist. 
"A very large number of objectives which. Rodbertus 
raises against Ricardo arise from the naive manner 
in which he identifies the 'Pomeranian' conditions 
of production with the 'English'. Ricardo presupposes 
capitalist production to which, where it is in fact 
carried out, as in England, corresponds the separation 
of the farming capitalist from the landlord. Rodbertus 
introduces circumstances which are in themselves alien 
to the capitalist mode of production, which has merely 
been built upon them. " 
[Marx, 1863b/1969: 1571 
See also Lenin's discussion of this point in his C1907k/1972: 272-51 
It is indeed interesting to note that the categories 
used by CIDA for its description of the agrarian class structure 
in Latin America are a mere vulgarisation of the categories 
of Classical Political Economy. This is indicative of-the 
contradictory position of developmentalism which, it must not 
be forgotten, purports to be a purely Latin American, or 
rather 'Third Worldist' theory. It is as guilty when it comes 
to applying 'European theories' to the 'Third World' as 
modernisation theory, which it criticises for ethnocentrism. 
39. Kay (1977a]ß following Baraons (1965), distinguishes 
between an 'internal' and an 'external' peasant enterprise in 
his analysis of the Chilean hacienda system. The distinction 
is made simply on the geographical grounds that some of the 
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labourers employed by the hacienda live within its territorial 
boundaries, while others live outside. 
40. These are Latin American terms referring to forms of 
corvee labour in Chile and Ecuador respectively, and share- 
croppers in the Peruvian coastal region. 
41. We should not be surprised by this, as 'modern estates' 
are partly defined as employing solely wage-labourers. 
Barraclough does not define 'modern estates' explicitly; but 
see Wolf and Mintz [1957]. 
42. It could be objected that Barraclough did no more than 
inherit these difficulties from the agricultural censuses used 
by CIDA. Although there is some truth in this, the CIDA 
studies reinterpreted the census data through their own 
theoretical categories, as shown throughout this section. 
Furthermore, Barraclough asserts, while commmenting on the 
data presented in Table 2.1, that "except For the Colombia 
Census, small tenants and sharecroppers were seldom enumerated 
as farm operators but were counted as labourers" CBarraclough, 
op. cit.: 17). This suggests that CIDA reinterpreted the data 
to draw up Table 2.5. 
43. Another criterion would probably be the different local 
terms given to the various 'operators' or 'workers'. 
44. As already noted, the mere ownership of his plot of land 
does not in itself give the peasant any power whatsoever. 
Indeed, in cases where he would have to repay a heavy loan, 




is paid. Further it is not the mere legal ownership of his 
small plot that will 'free' the peasant. As Barraclough 
himself shows, even the minifundistas who are owners have to 
work on the large estates or elsewhere in order to supplement 
their income, or else face the prospect of partial unemployment. 
Finally, the legal rights of ownership of small peasants have 
never in themselves been successful in protecting them from 
the encroachment of the large landowners in Latin America or 
elsewhere. The landlords cannot be restricted by a mere legal 
title but only by the political organisation of the peasantry, 
as the literature on peasant movements shows only too well. 
This is not to argue that Barraclough is necessarily unaware 
of these points - indeed he himself shows that the many existing 
laws which, for example, proscribe tenancy abuses have not 
been effective in Latin America in the absence of peasant 
organisation Cibid.: 43-6] - but merely to suggest that his 
concepts infer as much. 
It is totally consistent with Barraclough's-position that 
he should advocate that an agrarian reform should give the 
small peasant a title to his land. He says: 
"It should be noted ... that while redistribution of 
property in land usually means dividing existing large 
landholdings, it does not always imply the actual 
subdivision of existing farm-operating units. Where 
large properties are being cultivated by tenant farmers, 
each with his own small plot, reform may consist in 
-merely giving. each small cultivator title to his land 
... it Cibid.: 33) 
The important point here is surely the one made by Kautsky 
and echoed by Lenin: namely, that it is the peasant's bond 
to the land which is the source of his poverty. See Lenin 
[1899c/1972: 98-9]. There is a vast literature on Latin 
American peasant movementsy but see for instance Juliao [1972]; 
Landsberger ed., [1969]; Stavenhagen ed., [1970); Womack Jr. 
(1972); Huizer [1973). 
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45. It is interesting to note that in a somewhat 
abbreviated version of this table, category G'is headed 
"Landless farm workers" [Barraclough, op. cit.: 19]. 
46. No reason is given by Barraclough for the fact that in 
Table 2.5 the category of "Resident farm workers" should 
embrace labour tenants, share tenants and cash tenants, as well 
as wage-labourers, while sharecroppers come under a special 
category. 
47. "Kind- or money-paying tenants are known by a wide 
variety of terms throughout Latin America. They are 
referred to as _medieros and aparceros 
in Chile; 
camayosconcerntados, and yanaconas [coastal region) 
in partidarios in Ecuador; aparceros in Colombia; 
habilitados in Argentina; and arrendatarios in most of 
Latin America. `- . 
Labour-rent tenants are called inquilinos 
in Chile;.. huasipungueros, cuadreros, arr_imados, colonos, 
and yanaperos-in Ecuador; allegados, colonos, and 
yanaconas (Sierra region] or arrendires (Cuzco and Salve 
region) in Peru; peones acasillados in Mexico; 
terrazgueros,. colonosI and concertados in Colombia. " 
(Kay, op. cit.: 133, n. 5) 
All these terms refer in fact to various types of tenants 
who are situated within relations of production of a specific 
kind, akin to feudal production relations. Labour rent, rent 
in kind and money rent are examples of such relations'and do 
not refer to 'institutions' of-social control simpliciter. 
It is symptomatic of Barraclough's position that he 
should, as we have noted, consider the peasantry as a whole 
as a class (see Note [25] ]. Such a view is totally 
consistent with his simple descriptive notion of class. On 
the other hand it somehow contradicts his distinction between 
'operators' and 'workers'. -Although a critique of the notion 
of the peasantry as a unitary category in social science is 
beyond the scope of this work, a few remarks may be of use. 
In the currently dominant conceptions of social science 
920 
the peasantry tends to be considered either as a cultural 
unity or as an economic unity, or as a combination of the two. 
In other words, it is considered as a class. Associated with 
the first position is the work of Hadfield, with the second 
the work of Chayanov, and an example of the third is to be 
found in the work of Wolf. For bourgeois social science the 
notion of the peasantry is theorised in similar terms to that 
of the 'pre-industrial society' we have examined -in other 
words, as a type defined in opposition to another type or types. 
For other authors influenced by marxism, the notion of a 
'peasant mode of production' is maintained. In either cases 
however, the notion of the peasantry as a unitary, analytical 
category is untenable, for it simply refers, as the Spanish 
term campesino makes abundantly clear, to a description of lab- 
ourers of-all sorts, whose only common characteristic is their 
sphere of activity - namely, agriculture. In addition, the 
notion of a determinate peasant culture presupposes a form of 
simple correspondence between 'economic' position - in this 
case, the simple fact of working in the sphere of agriculture - 
and ideology. This feature is common to most sociological 
notions of class as has already been noted. Amongst the 
extensive literature on the peasantry, the works most 
representative of these various positions are: Redfield (1956]; 
Chayanov (1966); Wolf (1955) and [1966). The most useful 
discussions of these conception are to be found in Ennew, Hirst 
and Tribe [1977], Littlejohn (1977] and Small [nd]. 
48. Barraclough seems to want to explain the difference between 
these various institutions in terms of the technical forms of 
organisation of agricultural production, although as usual 
pI 
he does not expand this idea: 
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"Tenure systems and relationships vary according 
to the type of farming, type of marketing, location, 
and other factors related to the operating units. 
That iss tenure relations may be different in areas 
of intensive agriculture for domestic markets from those 
in areas in which plantations devoted to growing products 
for foreign markets are prevalent. " 
[Barraclough' op. cit.: xix, emphasis added] 
It follows therefore, as power is derived from these 'land 
tenure relationships', that power is for Barraclough 
ultimately dependent on these technical factors. How Barraclough 
can reconcile this position with his explicit advocation of 
changes in the power structure is anybody's guess. 
49. Thus Domike's assertion that, despite the relative success 
of the CIDA studies "the right questions were asked" CDomike, 
op. cit.: 55), must be categorically rejected. Not only were 
the fundamental questions concerning the capitalist development 
of agriculture never broached, but the framework utilised can 
at best only be described as a combination of the crudest 
form of conceptual development with a dubious moral rhetoric. 
50. See University of Wisconsin - Land Tenure Center [1975]. 
51. It could be argued that this variant of empiricism is 
also a feature of modernisation theory, and to a certain 
extent this is correct. Nevertheless, no developmentalist 
has to my knowledge been able to attain the level of 
theoretical coherence and consistency of modernisation theory. 
As a consequence developmentalism loses much of its credibility 
as a valid alternative to the latter. 
52. Conventionalism as the criterion for scientific validity 
is of course associated with Kuhn C19701. For a critique of 
Kuhn see Tribe [1973). 
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53. Warriner's empiricism is perhaps made even clearer in 
the following statement: 
"Since monographic treatment provides no basis for 
comparison, while abstract analysis leads to false 
generalization, it is necessary to combine both 
methods of treatment, using the experience of individual 
countries to illustrate generalization, and generalizing 
from the special cases. " Ccp. cit.: xviii] 
54. For similar definitions and definitional approaches see 
Barraclough Cop. cit.: 33); Lipton [1974: 269-74). See also 
Feder [1965]; Delgado [1968]; Lehmann [1974b]; Kay [1977b]. 
55. This position is obviously in total accord with Lipton's 
notion of the equalising 'motive' or 'intention' behind land 
reform policies Cop. cit.: 270). 
56. Lipton's definition is as Follows: 
"Land Reform [agrarian reform, reforms a raria] comprises 
Cl) compulsory take over of land, usually a by the 
State, [b] from the biggest landowners, and Cc] with 
partial compensation; and [2] the farming of that land 
in such a way as to spread the benefits of the man-land 
relationship more widely than before the takeover. The 
State may give, sell or rent such land for private 
cultivation in smaller units than hitherto [distributionist 
land reform); or the land may be jointly farmed and its 
usufruct shared, through co-operative, collective or 
State farming [collectivist reform]. " 
[op. cit.: 270) 
57. J. Martinez-Alier characterises Warriner's work as 
populist. See Martinez-Alier (1971: 277f]. For a good example 
of the crudest form ofthis kind of populism one need look no 
further than England and some of the statements which have 
come out of the more bizarre variants of the Ecology movement. 
See in this context Girardet ed., [1976) and the following 
indicative statement by one'of the contributors to the volume: 
"The lesson for frustrated town dwellers or self- 
sufficiency freaks in the west is not to find and 
cultivate a guru. It is rather to develop the more 
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natural, less exploitative vision of nature which 
comes often with a spiritual discipline. We are lucky 
in that we can call upon the science of ecology which 
has given us an almost mystical appreciation of the 
interdependences of nature, backed by rational enquiry. 
It is in these terms we must get in touch with the 
earth spirit once more. For it is in this way that 
we may be able to influence the development of the world's 
economy. It is no use a state bureaucracy steamrolling 
through measures of land reform. The new approach to 
land must come from man himself. ' 
[Lycett, 1976: 81) 
58. Apart from anything else it is evident that this drive 
to define land reforms in terms of the concepts of development- 
alist theory and to reject other policies as 'land reforms' 
in name only, totally contradicts any conventionalist position. 
59. In this light, it is perhaps amazing to note Lipton's 
assertion quoted above to the effect that the 'definitional 
errors' he attacks could "be due to a wish to 'define' as land 
reform only those agrarian changes that seem to the definer to 
be desirable" [ibid.: 270]. 
60. Delgado [op. cit. ] rejects parcelation and colonisation 
programmes on similar grounds. See also Feder C19653; 
Barraclough Cop. cit.: ch. 41; Barraclough and Domike (op. cit. ); 
and, of course, Warriner [op. cit. ]. 
61. Warriner, For example, mentions three main notions 
behind the enactment of land reform policies: (i) the abolition 
of Feudalism, which she calls a "class motivation"; [ii] 
nationalism' a "national motivation"; and [iii) social and 
economic equality which is presumably an individual motivatiion 
[ibid.: 3-15). For a similar conception of politics see also 
Lipton [op. cit. ); Chonchol [op. cit. ]; and Barraclough [op. cit. ). 
Traces of this conception can also be found in one of the more 
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serious writers in this area; see Lehmann 019711 and (1974b]., 
62. Chonchol is here in agreement with the classical 
functionalist concern with political stability propounded as 
we have seen by modernisation theory. See, for instance, 
Huntingdon [1968] and also Lehmann's critique, Lehmann C19711. 
Both Chonchol and Huntingdon agree that economic growth is 
necessary in order to avoid revolutionary political upheaval. 
The difference in their positions lies largely in the manner 
in which this is to be achieved: income redistribution for 
Chonchol; modernisation for Huntingdon. This difference reflects 
the essential distinctions between modernisation theory and 
developmentalism. 
63. As a result of the low levels of income and employment 
in Latin American rural areas, there is a continuous flow of 
migrants to the cities. At the time when Chonchol was 
writing, the situation in Chile, for example, was the following: 
between 1950 and 1960,685,000 people in net terms left the 
rural areas for the towns. This represented 11.9% of the total 
population and 29% of the rural population (Sarraclough and 
Domike, op. cit.: 608). On arrival in the towns these migrants 
dwell in the shanty town areas or 'marginal' settlements of the 
great Latin American cities and are not absorbed by industry. 
This industrial reserve army, if employed at all, finds work 
in the service industries, büt most members of this group 
are either partially or totally unemployed. See for instance 
Hobsbawm 01967) and Ray C1969). 
64. Chonchol's argument here is basically that as the lend- 
owner is in a monopoly position with a large quantity of land 
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and a compliant labour force [and therefore cheap labour-power] 
at his disposal, he can make important profits without having 
to undertake large capital investments. There is therefore 
no incentive for him to modernise. Consequently a land reform 
must break the monopoly position of the landlords. However, 
this is not in itself a valid explanation for the lack of 
investment or large enterprises, as there were in this period 
in Latin America large capitalist enterprises where modern 
techniques and large capital investments were undertaken, as 
admitted by Barraclough. Chonchol does not provide an 
explanation for the fact that some large landowners find it 
advantageous to modernise?. Even though Chonchol places less 
emphasis on the 'traditionalism' of the attitudes of the large 
landowners than modernisation theory, the 'explanation' provided 
is still very much in terms of 'traditionalism',, the 
'traditionalism' of the monopolistic structure of agriculture. 
The theoretical terrain of both these positions is one and the 
same. 
65. Chonchol shows that between the two periods 1934-38 
and 1958-60 the per capita real value of exports in agricultural 
and stock rearing products increased by only 6%9 while the 
volume of physical imports of these products doubled between 
the two periods [ibid.: 89-90). 
66. The list of, works one could mention in this context is 
extensive. As examples see, Barraclough (op. cit. ]; Delgado 
(1968]; Adams and Montero [1965]. 
67. A review of the literature concluded in 1971 that: 
!ý 
it ... we have empirical-studies that look at agrarian 
reform alone with only generalized reference to its 
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connections with other societal-political forces and 
programmes. ... Additional research will examine [sic) 
the role of agrarian reform as an effect as well as a 
cause of societal, political, and economic development. " 
[LaPorte, Petras and Rinehart, 1971: 485) 
It is indeed indicative of the state of agrarian reform theory 
that this should be the case in spite of the fact that "most 
countries contend that the effects of agrarian reform, their 
extent and intensity, stem from the forces that create the 
reform in the first place more than from the reform itself. " 
[loc. cit. ]. Indeed the writers reviewed were not concerned 
with analysing these forces to which they seemed to attribute 
so much importance except in a circumstantial way. An' 
explanation for this apparent anomaly is not provided by 
LaPorte, Petras and Rinehart, nor by Petras and LaPorte [1971] - 
the extension of the previous work - nor, for that matter, 
by Lehmann [1974b: 15n] who also notes this feature. 
68. As we have seen in the case of Barraclough, descriptions 
of the agrarian structure are generally preceded by the 
obligatory 'historical introduction' and the agrarian structure 
of Latin America is seen as unchanging from the colonial 
period up to the 1960's. Even though this may be the case - 
a fact which is highly debateable; see for instance Chevalier 
[1966] - this persistence needs: to be accounted for. The 
persistence of the so-called 'traditionalism' of Latin 
American agrarian structures is rarely if ever explained by 
developmental ism. Of course, this is not a theoretical 
accident, as for this position 'traditional societies', including 
their agrarian structures, are accounted for as we have seen, 
in terms of the absence of the 'essential features' of the 
west, as deviations from an ideal. Of course it is in the 
character of this argument that traditionalism, the source of 
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all subsequent explanations is itself never accounted for. 
This is the case despite the recognition of the specificity 
of the historical experience of societies. This is because, 
as I have already argued, the non-essential variables are 
given partial effectivity. 
69. For example, the State, 'policy makers', a class, etc. 9 
are all subjects with a will: 
"While the traveller can check on the reality of a 
reform by observations, the motives behind each 
policy require interpretation. ... There are two 
questions to be asked, the first 'what did they 
think they were doing? ' and the second, 'what did 
they really do? ' The answers to the two are not 
identical. " 
CWarriner, op. cit.: 3) 
70. As was the case with modernisation theory, policies are 
seen either as removing the obstacles toi or creating the 
preconditions for, development. This is put succinctly by 
Haup: 
"Much discussion surrounding the issue of land reform 
and economic development is presented with a negative 
cast. Defects in land tenure appear as an obstacle to 
development; the issue is resolved when the obstacle is 
removed ... [but - M. N. 
] land reforms may contribute to 
economic development' not by removing obstacles but by 
promoting a new climate of expectations. The stress 
here is on the creative art of devising a new basis 
for the identification of reward with effort of 
balancing costs against returns. " 
[gaup, op. cit.: 2933 
Raup's contribution is primarily to argue that land reform 
should create the incentives for investment, in other words, 
given the correct environment the nature of 'human rationality' 
will be realised. 
71. See also Warriner [op. cit.: xx) and Chonchol [op. cit. ). 
The amazing thing regarding -Barraclough is that immediately 
below the section just quoted-he states: 
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"Opponents of . 
land reform equally stress the non-' 
measurable dangers that are presumed to lurk behind 
a redistribution of power over land and labour. 
Chief among these are loss of freedom, violation of 
sacred individual rights, and societal disintegration - 
the same values which the advocates of reform believe 
it will nourish instead of destroy. " 
Cloc. cit., emphasis added) 
Barraclough's argument seems to be geared towards 'proving' 
the validity of his rhetoric and the falseness of that of his 
opponents. 
72. It must be noted at this point that in the developmentalist 
theory of land reform, the relationship between social classes 
and the State is rarely mentioned, let alone systematically 
theorised even though such a relationship must be assumed, as 
for this position an agrarian reform is a State policy which 
is designed to alter the class structure. Presumably, the 
form and composition of the State as well as the character of 
social classes must both be simple expressions of the same 
underlying 'essence'[s] of change if this position is to 
maintain some semblance of coherence. In this context see 
Byres 01979] which is a critique of Lipton (1977). Byres 
correctly stresses that Lipton's theory of the State and 
classes is merely implicit and that this implicit 'theory' 
is of an extrmemly crude nature and internally contradictory. 
This contradiction is-evidenced by the fact that the homogeneity 
of urban and rural classes is assumed; and the State is seen 
as far from neutral [biased towards 'urban intereste') while 
capable at the same time of being convinced by reasoned 
argument into adopting a neutral position. See Byres 
(1979: 233-7]. 
73. See, Polanyi C1944). Fora critique of Polanyi and the 
more general 'substantivist'. position see Jenkins [1977). 
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74. Although sophisticated, Polanyi's position is a form of 
immanentism as it reduces the development of capitalism to 
the predominance of a 'market principle'. See for instance 
Hindess and Hirst [op. cit.: 262] and, of course, Jenkins 
[op. cit. ]. 
75. This point is made clear in the following passage, where 
the form and outcome of the class struggle is seen as an 
immanent process: 
"The course of modernizing agriculture often proceeds in 
a series of stages, from a situation (a) where the 
State is weak (or non-existent) in relation to the rural 
upper class, to a stage [b] where the rural elite needs 
and uses the State, to a further stage Cc) where the 
rural elite's leadership and power over the peasants is 
challenged by other contenders, to a modern stage Cd) 
where farm people and other interest groups build up 
organizations [pressure or lobbying groups) responsive 
to their needs and effective in influencing government 
policy. The second stage corresponds to landlord 
dominance of local politics, the third to political 
pressure on the landlord class and demands for land 
reform, and the last to a tenure system stripped of 
political and social significance, similar to that in 
the U. S. ... " 
[Kanel, op. cit.: 331 
What Kanel is describing here is not any general notion of 
'development' in the abstract but the particular case of the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism. In this he is 
undertaking the same project as his fellow developmentalists. 
He is, however, far more explicit than the rest of his 
colleagues in his analysis of land reform as part of a process 
of capitalist development even though the term itself is not 
used. A particular form of development - capitalist development - 
is transformed into 'development in general'. In addition, 
Kanel's conception of the State is very indicative of bourgeois 
social science. Under feudalism the State is an organ of the 
landowning class, whilst in modern capitalism the State has 
developed into a neutral body. It is obvious, although Kanal 
does not really attempt this, that it is impossible simply 
930 
to derive the nature of the State or of the class struggle 
from "technology, the organisation of production and attitudes". 
The addition of two extra'factors'does not solve the problems 
encountered in Kerr's case for example. Of course the works 
of writers such as Galbraith and Dahrendorf are other examples 
of this argument of the teleological development 'of a neutral, 
pluralist State. Another example iss of course, Parsons where 
'Capitalism' (seen along with Kerr and others as a description 
of early - i. e., nineteenth century - industrialism'] is 
still characterised by an instrumentalist State while modern 
industrialism is not. S ees for instance, Parsons [1960: ch. 3] 
in whose work the underlying process of change is one of 
'structural differentiation'. See also Savage [1977a] and 
[1977b]. 
76. These conflicts may occur between producers of the same 
agricultural commodity, producers of substitutes or producers 
of completely different commodities. 
77. Perhaps the most commonly known example of such a case 
where tariffs were used in order to keep agricultural prices 
high was the 1815 English Corn Laws, which restricted the 
importing of grain from abroad. These laws were{ abolished 
in 1846 by the industrial bourgeoisie which wished to cheapen 
agricultural production and thus supported Free Trade. The 
power of the English landowners was thus curtailed. The 
major point to keep in mind here, however, is that landowners 
do not 'monopolise' land in any manner substantially different 
from that in which capitalists 'monopolise' capital. The 
notion of 'monopoly' Used with reference to landlords is more 
of a descriptive term than ascientific concept. It refers 
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to an idea of class monopoly and not to the more rigorous 
conception of 'monopoly' as utilised. by Lipsey. OF course 
one of the common features of landlord dominated economies - 
especially the ones in which industrialism has_not. yet achieved 
its dominance over agriculture - is that the price of 
agricultural products does tend to be high. Nevertheless 
this cannot be ascribed to monopoly in the strict sense, as 
it would then be impossible to explain why certain of these 
landlords do find it in their interests to 'modernise' their 
productive methods and thereby cheapen their products. Rather, 
this class monopoly must be explained in terms of a variety 
of 'factors', the most important of which are market forces 
and the class struggle. 
78. The anti-landlord ideology propounded by Lipton and his 
fellow developmentalists is of course not simply. directed 
against landownership as such, but towards, the fact that 
peasants - or rather certain peasants - are to a large extent 
excluded from the benefits of landownership. 
79. On this point see the remarks by Byres Cop. cit.: 233-411 
regarding Lipton C1977). One of the features of the 
capitalist development of agriculture is precisely the 
differentiation of the peasantry, as Byres makes clear. This 
is also, he rightly argues, a feature of agriculture in the 
'Third World' today. Of course Lipton's inability, to understand 
this process is due to his remaining well within the 
problematic of the enterprise, the theoretical terrain of the 
sociology of industrial and pre-industrial societies. It is 
due to his inability to conceptualise capitalism. 
It must be made clear that I am not talking about the 
differentiation of the peasantry in the same manner that I 
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have referred to sectoral conflicts within the landlord class 
above. In the case of the peasantry, I am referring to 
peasant classes, while the various possible conflicts between 
landowners do not consitute conflict between classes. 
Notwithstanding this point, in any social formation there could 
be different landlord classes - e. g., a class of feudal 
landlords and a class of capitalist landlords - if feudal 
production relations, for instance, are present alongside 
capitalist production relations. 
80. This point of criticism is also forcibly made by Byres 
Cop. cit.: 236-7). 
81. I discuss Marx's concept of ideology in Chapter 5. For 
the present it suffices to keep in mind that the concept as I 
shall use it refers to two distinct but related notions: 
[i] a system of ideas characterised by its overall falsity 
and, [ii] a system of ideas which fills, in a phenomenal realm 
of the 'social' Car the 'ideological' or the-'cultural'], a 
similar relational position to that Filled by a 'class' in the 
equally phenomenal realm of the 'economic'. It is the second 
notion which is of particular interest to me in this chapter, 
for the question I wish to elucidate is which class or group 
of classes, in the context of the Latin America of the 1960's, 
can the ideology of developmentalism be said to be related to. 
The important point is to differentiate the ideological nature 
of developmentalism from that of modernisation theory. 
82. This 'problematic of the enterprise' is of course the 
I 
terrain of theories of industrial society and modernisation. 
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E33. This simplistic separation of types of reforms in terms 
of the organisation of productive technique [individualistic/ 
collectivistic) is of course another consequence of the 
problematic of the enterprise. Collective forms of production 
can exist under different modes of production and are not in 
themselves defining features of socialism. -This * conception 
conflates forms of legal ownership and modern technical 
organisation with societal forms. Through its construction of 
'ideals' this argument shows itself to be merely a variant of 
immanentism and it is therefore open to the usual criticisms. 
84. See also King (1973: 10): "the chief conflict, and it is 
an important theme in land . reform studies, is between social 
equality and economic efficiency. ". This opposition between 
'equity'. and 'growth' is merely an effect of the division of 
'society' into a realm of the 'economic' and one of the 
'social'. I shall argue in Chapter 5 that this division is an 
effect of historically specific capitalist relations of 
production. It follows, if my point is correct, that outside 
capitalist production relations there need not be an 
opposition between 'equity' and 'growth'. Not only are 
'equity' and 'growth' not general abstract categories 
applicable across social relations, but the supposed opposition 
between them is also not natural and ahistorical. 
85. Lipton develops his notion of "urban bias" more explicitly 
in his (1977). This idea is based on a rural/urban distinction 
of the traditional sociological type, but rather than being 
simply extremes on a continuum= C Lewis, Redfield, Pahl, 
etc. ) there is a relation of exploitation between the two. 
Lipton suggests that-in underdeveloped countries development 
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resources are deliberately and systematically allocated, by 
State policy so that the share allocated to 'rural people' 
is far less, and that going to 'city dwellers' is Far greater 
than considerations of 'equity' or 'efficiency' suggest 
as 'desirable'. The criteria used to discuss such 'bias' are 
price policy, evolution of the terms of trade between agriculture 
and industry, fiscal policy, foreign trade policy, credit and 
investment policy, etc. There is no need to examine'this 
argument in any detail at this stage. What can be said, 
however, is that Lipton's notion of 'urban bias' is an 
intra-societal version of the developmentalist position on 
trade relations, much as Redfield's folk-urban continuum is an 
intra-societal version of the modernisation theory. As such 
it is based on the same immanentist notions as the'earlier 
conception. Such positions conflate either economic activity 
[industrial/non-industrial] with spatial location [urban/rural], 
or the above two with ideology [urban culture/rural culture]. 
As Castells puts it with reference to the notion of 'urban 
culture': 
" ... the culturalist tendency in the analysis of 
urbanization presupposes the correspondence between 
technical type of production [essentially defined by"' 
industrial society], a system of values ['modernism') 
and a specific form of spatial organization, the city'- 
whose distinctive features are a certain size and a 
certain density. " [Castells, 1977: 9) 
Similar remarks of course can be made regarding the 'rural 
end' of the spectrum. One of the results of this crude 
conception is that class distinctions and the class struggle 
are obscured, as Byres Cop. cit.: 213,233-71 makes clear in the 
case of Lipton. Another important point worth noting is that 
Lipton and others rarely justify theoretically the division 
of society or the economy into an 'urban' and a 'rural' entity. 
This division is merely taken as given. I shall return to this 
point in later parts of this thesis. 
V4 
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G6. - See for instance Ricardo [op. cit.: ch. 2). 
87. 'Lipton recognises six such constraints. The First he 
observes, is that there may not be enough land to go round, 
as "'viability' sets a lower limit to Farm size ... there 
are many parts of the world ... where completely equal 
distribution of land would leave no livelihood holdings at all, 
and it is hard to see their contributing to the creation of 
an innovative or happy peasantry Csic! ]. " Cop. cit.: 2831. 
Secondly, he suggests that although the efficiency of land 
and capital use increases as land size falls, below three 
quarters of an acre they fall thereafter. Hence the effects 
of increasing the size of mini-Farms from one quarter to half 
an acre will for him be "very disappointing". The third 
constraint is that below half an acre the relationship between 
land size and the buying of food accelerates sharply with the 
result that the 'marketed surplus' decreases. In such cases 
to whom should the "above-ceiling land" be distributed, asks 
Lipton? Interestingly in view of his 'ethical' stance, he 
answers that mini-Farms should be made up to 'viable' holdings 
rather than the surplus land distributed to landless farmers. 
Fourthly, Lipton admits that there is a 'political' problem 
set by the power of the landowners in that "decisive action 
against the top 5 per cent of -, landowners is much easier than 
against the top 10 per cent and may not yield very much less 
land above the ceiling. "-Cibid.: 2841. This is very thoughful, 
but what happens to those peasants who are excluded?. Lipton 
in this case refrains from answering. Presumably such a 
reform would be classified as a , 'failure' due to 'political' 
considerations. Presumably landowners can in such cases be 
blamed for this so-called . 'failure' even if, had-they been 
expropriated, there might not: have been enough land to create 
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'viable holdings'. Fifthly Lipton suggests equality might 
be limited by differential inherent managerial skills. 
"In theory, if all farmers had equal natural gifts, there 
would indeed be-a single optimum size of farm; but differences 
in managerial skills, innovativeness and spatial position do 
justify some actual difference in the operated holding size, 
as measured not in even acres per family but in 'efficiency 
acres' or productivity equivalents of land per consumption 
unit. " Cibid.: 2851. By this stage than, Lipton has abandoned 
all pretence of maintaining an 'egalitarian ethic' and is 
explicitly advocating preferential treatment of 'efficient' 
farmers. It comes as no surprise, therefore, when the final 
'constraint' is outlined to discover that it concerns landless 
labourers in situations of relative equality in the size of 
holdings. "To distribute non-viable holdings to the landless 
is a sentimental but ineffective method of improving the 
situation (sic). There are many other ways to help them [sic), 
notably by rural works, such as supplying the irrigation 
maintenance needs of the new class of viable small farmers. " 
Cibid.: 286, emphasis added). 
This section of Lipton's work is fascinating for what 
it reveals of the bourgeois ideology of 'equity'. I shall 
refrain from a full-blown discussion, however, as most of the 
relevant points have been or are to be made in other parts of 
this chapter. I shall make three brief comments here: 
[i] It is quite clear that Lipton must have some criterion 
for deciding what constitutes_an 'optimum' size of enterprise. 
This is despite his claims that this is not the case and that 
'all that is claimed is that distributivist land reform, by 
creating viable family holdings, improves the efficiency of 
farming as compared with. thepre-reform situation" Cibid.: 303). 
We know, of course, that Lipton is opposed to large holdings 
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as they are inefficient and we are told that small farms are 
enviable. Apart from these general remarks we do not know 
what 'viable' units are supposed to be. Neither do we know 
who is to make the decision as to what is a viable unit. 
Of course, such a decision as Lipton admits is made on 
'political' grounds and the attempt to build a theory on 
apparently 'rational' 'economic' criteria of viability collapses. 
It is worthwhile commenting that Lipton abandons the criterion 
of acreage when it suits him, as when he suggests that a 
measure of "efficiency acres" or productivity should be utilised. 
Presumably the higher the productivity, the more it should be 
encouraged. Lipton's populist rhetoric has here disappeared 
altogether and he is seen for what he iss an advocate of large- 
scale, efficient capitalist farming. 
[ii) This point is made even clearer when'Lipton suggests 
that rather than give landýto the landless, they should be 
put to work as agricultural labourers to benefit the efficient 
capitalist producers. It is therefore clear that Lipton is 
advocating the creation of a class of capitalist farmers and 
the creation of an agricultural proletariat; in other words, 
the development of capitalism in agriculture. 
[iii) Most interestingly, however, in view of our 
present concerns with the ideological aspect of Lipton's 
'theory', is the fact that the author advocates, under the 
guise of pious populist rhetoric, the differentiation of the 
peasantry as the effect, not of social relations, but of factors 
beyond the peasants' or his control. What are invoked as 
reasons for this differentiation are factors such as the 
'power of landowners', the,. 'lack. of land', the 'viability of 
holdings' and the 'innate psychological characteristics of 
individuals'. Lipton hasýa convenient set of 'explanations' 
III 
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to produce to any disgruntled non-beneficiary of a land 
redistribution programme. Accounting for processes of social 
change with reference to natural 'things' beyond social 
relations is of course clearly ideological. 
88. Lipton's 'evidence' is in fact non-existent. He admits 
himself that this question cannot be answered until socialist 
societies open their borders to western social scientists or 
"objective scholarly inquiry" [sic) as he puts it [ibid.: 287). 
He suggests that little is known regarding economic equality 
on collective or State farms but that we do know that substantial 
political inequality exists. He seems not to have heard of 
the experience of the People's Republic of China and merely 
notes the exploitation of agriculture by industry in the USSR 
of the 1920's. The question of the relation between agriculture 
and industry in the process of development is treated in a 
later chapter, but on the USSR see Harrison [1978), for example, 
where it is suggested that despite a policy of plundering 
agricultural resources, the latter in actual fact did not 
finance the increase in industrial accumulation in the 1930's, 
and that collectivisation did not'enable the extraction of an 
increased surplus from agriculture. In addition the following 
quotation from Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program may be 
pertinent here: 
"Vulgar socialism ... has 
taken over from the bourgeois 
economists the consideration and treatment of distribution 
as independent of the mode of production and hence 
the presentation of socialism as turning principally 
on distribution. " [Marx', 1875b/1973: 321] 
Socialism for Marx is not about distributive justice, neither 
is it an 'egalitarian system', as it involves positive 
discrimination in favour of'the proletariat. Only communism 
is such a system. This is'not to say that the USSR is or is 
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not a socialist society, merely that the criterion of, bourgeois 
'equity' which Lipton uses to judge 'collectivist' socialist 
reforms is irrelevant. 
89. Lipton refers toi among others, Darner C1972: 1201; this 
work is merely a precis of Dorner and Kanal [op. cit. ]. 
90. This point is stressed by Kautsky [1900/1970: 160-76). 
Kautsky argues that if the family of the small peasant were 
to be fed as well as the labourers by the large farmer, the 
peasant would suffer a large deficit. "His surplus came, not 
from his full corn bins, but from his empty stomach. t' [ibid.: 
167, and quoted by Lenin, 1899d/1972: 130]. See also Lenin 
[ibid.: 129-31] and (1899e/1972: 168-70; 273-51. 
91. Interestingly enough, on the same page Darner suggests 
that a comparison of the figures of 'man/land ratios' on 
agricultural enterprises in India, Chile and the USA suggests 
"a wider range of production techniques in the agriculture of 
the less developed countries". This, of course, refers to the 
presence in such societies of capitalist as well as non-capitalist 
forms of production. Needless to say Darner does not follow 
up the consequence of his own statement. 
92. What Byres seems to be forgetting here is that 
industrialisation is a. consequence of the development of 
capitalism in the economy generallyl. including both industry 
and agriculture. As Lenin, following Marx, argues the 
development of capitalism is the development of an internal 
market. See Lenin C 1899a/1972: ch. 1 ]. This error of Byres 
is the result of his mistaken view view that early,. capitalist 
development is based on the exploitation of agriculture by 
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industry. This problem of the 'agrarian question' will be 
returned to in Chapter 3. 
93. On Stalin's policies of industrialisation and the 
collectivisation of Soviet agriculture sees for example, 
Lewin--[1968); Bettelheim 01976) and C1978); and Harrison [op. cit. ]. 
94. In fairness to Byres it must be stated that he does not 
make the utopian mistake of considering that the formation of 
post-land reform enterprises is merely a question of convinving 
the State of the need to make a rational choice. He is 
obviously aware that this is the result of a, power struggle 
Cibid.: 221-4). He is also aware of the fact that land reform- 
increases the differentiation of the peasantry [ibid.: 249). 
Nevertheless, the point of criticism made above is essentially 
correct. 
95. In opposition to this, Lipton argues that total marketed 
surplus need not fall after a 'distributivist' reform. This 
is because "farmers who move into viability" become able to 
produce net marketed surpluses for the cities; because that 
part of the rich farmer's surplus eaten up by the poor peasants 
can now be transferred to the city and finally, because output 
per acre is bigger on smaller farms [op. cit.: 292). It is 
noteworthy that although Lipton-is-advocating the creation, 
in terms of acreage, of small family farms he is in fact also 
advocating their 'economic viability' and the maximisation of 
surplus production with its necessary concomitant of increased 
capital expenditure. He is therefore advocating large farms 
measured in terms of the value of the means of production 
employed on the enterprise. See Lenin [1915/1964: 64-72). 
pp 
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Lipton is'advocating the capitalist development of agriculture. - 
He makes this explicit on page 309. 
96. See Lipton [op. cit.: 310]. 
97. Another problem with the notion of marketed surplus is 
that it is often forgotten that what the peasant markets is 
not necessarily 'surplus' to his or his enterprise's 
requirements, as he is required to purchase socially necessary 
means of consumption or necessary means of production on the 
market. In other words, peasant proprietors, at least in the 
period of capitalist development, are not in a position to 
reproduce themselves independently of the market. This becomes 
even more the case with expanded reproduction, but in this 
case the cultivators would of course better be described as 
(small) capitalists, which iss after all, what Lipton wishes 
to encourage. As Littlejohn (1977] has convincingly argued, 
parcel-owning peasants are at least partly dependent on the 
market for their own and their enterprise's reproduction. 
Lipton seems at least to be aware of this problem, even if he 
does not pursue it [op. cit.: 292). 
98. There can be no tenable notion of tthe family' in general, 
as any notion of the family presupposes forms of kinship, 
inheritance, etc., determined beyond the family enterprise. 
What exist are historically specific forms of the family based 
on specific production relations. - See Ennew, Hirst and Tribe 
[op. cit. ]. See also Hirst [1975], which is a review of 
Sahlins [1974] and also Harris (1976] and Young [1976). 
99. This point is made Forcibly. by Kautsky [op. cit.: 162FF). 
ill' 
ý_ ... ý. 
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100. Of course Lipton is not so insensitive as not to provide 
for this explicitly. He also advocates cheap credit and other 
forms of State help for farmers. Of course Lipton's failure 
to understand the class structure in rural areas means that 
he 'fails to see', not simply the differential access to credit 
which exists in the countryside, but also and more importantly 
that it is not always rational for small farmers to invest in, 
say, new seed varieties because the risk is too great. If the 
harvest were to fail the peasant would be ruined and of course 
Cavan more? ) in debt. Furthermore, modern hybrid varieties 
can often be used only once - the seed produced by the crop 
cannot always be used - with the result that a greater capital 
outlay is needed the following year. For the more prosperous 
peasant, of course, modern techniques are not such a risk. 
Failure will not entail starvation. We should not be surprised 
by Lipton's advocation of credit for small farmers. After all 
he is also in favour of the creation of a rural proletariat 
[see Note C87) J. The formation of capital and of a free 
labour force is of course what the development of capitalism 
is all about. 
101. The similarity between Lipton and agrarian reform theory 
and the Russian Populists or Narodniks is striking. The 
latter also idealised peasant production and the 'traditional' 
values of Russian lif es arguing that the development of 
capitalism should be resisted in Russia. Their crude 
voluntarism and their ideology of the rich peasant was constantly 
criticised by Lenin. The Narodniks were# however, much more 
theoretically sophisticated than our modern populists, and 
were well versed in Classical Political Economy. For a lucid 
discussion of Narodnism, see Bleany C1976: ch. 71. 
943 
102. See=Lenin C1899b/1972: 238-47). I discuss Lenin's 
'peasant road' in Chapter S. 
103. This is precisely one of the criticisms made of the 
Frei agrarian reform in Chile, as we shall see in Part Three. 
104. See for instance Dumont [1966) and Feder [op. cit. ], among 
others. 
105. We have seen that this point is in a sense recognised 
by Lipton, although it takes the form of psychological 
differences between individual 'talents'. In a similar view 
Dorner also remarks: 
"tIf a reasonably egalitarian system of land distribution 
in family-sized farms is established, such a system may 
well tend towards greater inequality over time. This 
will occur as a result of a variety of influences - 
differential income and price elasticities of demand for 
different products during the process of development, 
locational factors in the movement and concentration 
of industries in the transformation of an agrarian 
economy into an industrial economy, differences in 
entrepreneurial abilities, and as a consequence of the 
latter [sich, differential access to credit and other 
services, etc. 
All farm operators do not have equal entrepreneurial 
talents. Some would do better working under the direction 
and supervision of others. Public services such as 
research, extension and often formal education are more 
likely to be geared to favour the more aggressive and 
those in a position to utilize and take advantage of these 
services. " Cop. cit.: 63, emphasis added) 
Notice that here also inequalities are due to factors beyond 
human control. Presumably it is the agricultural labourers, 
who obviously lack entrepreneurial talent, who "would do 
better working under the direction and supervision of others". 
106. The theoretical context of Narodnism can itself be traced 
back to the Swiss economist Sismondi. See Lenin's 
C1897/19721. 
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107. Byres makes precisely this point with reference to 
Lipton's work. See Byres (1979: 235). 
_. ýýý 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. Among the better known works I include under the general 
rubric of neo-mercantilism are the works of Baran and Sweezy, 
A. G. Frank, and the Latin American 'dependency' theorists 
such as Stavenhagen, Dos Santos, Cardoso and Faletto, Furtado, 
and so on, and the workd of Emmanuel, Samir Amin, Szentes, 
Wallerstein and Rodney. Among the better presentations and 
assessments of these positions are Frank C1969) and C1971), 
Wallerstein (1974], Amin C1974a), Cardoso and Faletto C1979), 
Emmanuel C1972), Laclau (1971] and C1977), Bettelheim (1972], 
Brenner C1977). See also Frank C1977) for a reply by Frank 
to many of his critics and for an extensive bibliography of 
works on dependency theory. 
2. See inter alia Gonzalez Casanova C1975) and Stavenhagen 
[1969) for the utilisation of this notion with reference 
to Latin America and Wolpe 019751 for a critique of this concept. 
3. For greater detail see O'Brien [1975] and Booth [1975] 
for example. 
4. These failures are enunciated from a dependency 
perspective by Dos Santos [1973: 67-71] among others. 
5. For discussions of the Cuban experience, the theory of 
the loco and their effects, see Guevara (1969], Hodges (1977], 
Debray [1968] and his autocritique, Debray [1977], Chaliand 
[op. cit. ), Martinez-Alier [1970). 
S. See Baran [1973], Baran and Sweezy [1973], as well as 
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the contributions by Sweezy in Hilton, ad. (1976]. For a 
'critique' of Baran and Sweezy, see Culley [1977]. 
7. One should be careful not to overcriticise dependency 
theorists in this respect, as opposed to other marxist 
theorists. In many ways the theorists of dependency are more 
sophisticated than many marxists who do not question the., 
a priori separation of societies into dual entities associated 
with W. A. Lewis, but merely his analysis of the connections 
between such entities. A prime example here would be W. Kula 
(1976) for whom a slightly transformed version of Lewis' 
model represents the necessary "point of departure for the 
economic analysis of all pre-industrial societies" (p. 24) 
including feudalism with which he is explicitly concerned. 
The utilisation of a similar version of this model is also to 
be found in Shanin [1972], for example, with disastrous 
results. See Littlejohn (1973a] and [1973b]. 
8. A similar perspective has also been utilised to analyse 
regional or spatial differences within 'advanced' countries 
themselves. See the article by I. Carter on Scotland in 
de Kadt and Williams, eds. [1974] For example. 
S. See Cardoso and Faletto (1979] for example and Frank C1972b] 
and C1978]. 
10. See Wallerstein [1974), Emmanuel [1972) and Amin [1974a) 
and [1974b) for slightly different versions of this argument. 
The latter two authors utilise concepts linked to the labour 
theory of value. For critical assessments of these arguments 
see: on Wallerstein, Brenner [1977); on Emmanuel, Bettelheim 
[1972); and on Amin, S. Smith [1980). 
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11. As all major critiques of this position have stressed; 
including Laclau (op. cit. ), Bettelheim Cop. oit. ), Brenner 
[op. cit. ] and Culley [op. cit. ]. 
12. See Frank [1972a: 23] for example. Frank attributes this 
lack of capacity to the failure of the actions of the Latin 
American bourgeoisie to create a form of social organisation 
capable of generating "self-sustained growth" because of its 
links with imperialism. The use of terms borrowed from 
Rostow is here very informative. Frank explicitly betrays, 
by the usage of such terms, what is always implicit in his 
analysis, namely his belief that the Rostowian and other 
theories of modernisation are adequate for an understanding of 
the development of capitalism in the West. See also his 
01969,21-94). 
13. It is the possession or lack of this capacity which 
distinguishes 'center' from periphery in the works of Amin 
and Wallerstein for example. Wallerstein [op. cit. ] also 
distinguishes intermediary positions between these two 
extremes. 
14. Frank never pauses to consider that there is no such 
thing as 'natural wealth' in the absolute and that what counts 
as wealth is structured by social realtions. The notion 
of 'wealthy countries' in the sense used by Frank [wealth= 
capital) presupposes capitalist relations - i. e., that capitalist 
social division of labour existed prior to capitalism. 
15.1 pursue a similar argument in Chapter 9 in relation to 
Frank's assessment of-Mexican colonial development. 
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16. The view that underdeveloped countries as a specific 
'type' are characterised by a specific 'type' of State is 
put forward from a marxist position by Alavi [1979] among 
others, in Goulbourne, ad. [1979]. 
17. S. Amin C1974a] provides a detailed theory on such a 
basis. 'Peripheral capitalism' is theorised on this basis as 
a unitary type which deviates from a Western 'pure type' of 
capitalism. For an assessment of Amin's work see S. Smith 
[op. cit. ]. 
18. See his C1972b: ch. 4J for example. 
19. This point is stressed by Laclau [op. cit. ] and Brenner 
[op. cit. ] for example. 
20. This conflation appears throughout Frank's work. It 
r-I 
cannot be circumvented by a statement to the effect that he 
is merely concerned with capitalist development, for he 
adheres to a position which accounts for capitalist development 
in terms of eternal categories. See notes 0121 and [14] above, 
for example. Not surprisingly, Frank never provides a 
systematic definition of what he means by the term 'underdevel- 
opment'. 
21. And because, according to the theorists of dependency, 
the national bourgeoisie is involved in the process of 
production of luxury items and is linked by family ties to the 
landowning and banking 'oligarchy'. See Stavenhagen Cop. cit.: 110) 
and Cardoso C1967), 'for_example. OF courses family ties do 
not in any way show in-themselves the lack of antagonism 
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between a national and a comprador-bourgeoisie. These 
authors also confuse [like the communist parties which they 
criticise) a class of industrialists of Latin American 
nationality with a national bourgeoisie. Industrialists in 
the 'Third World' [or anywhere else, for that matter] are not 
necessarily nationalists. For a serious analysis of the 
concept of national bourgeoisie see Gibbon [1980]. 
22. Frank does not even seem to be aware of the fact that the 
Cuban revolution went through several land reforms, the first 
of which was hardly 'revolutionary' in an absolute sense. 
See Gutelman 019671 for an account of the Cuban agrarian 
reforms. 
23. For a critique of the concept of internal colonialism 
see H. Wolpe [1975]. 
24. For 'Marx . the transformation of 
the means of production 
into capital- and the transformation of labour into wage-labour 
are two facets of the same process, thus: 
"In themselves money and commodities are no more 
capital than are-the means of production and of 
subsistence. They want transforming into capital. 
But this transformation itself can only take place 
under certain circumstances ... The capitalist system 
pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers 
from all property in the means by which they can 
realise their labour. As soon as capitalist production 
is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this 
separation, but reproduces it on a continually 
extending-scale.. The process,. therefore, that clears 
the way for the capitalist system, can be none other 
than the process which takes away from the labourer 
the possession of his means of production; a process 
that transforms, on the'one hand, the social means of 
subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, 
the immediate producers-into wage-labourers. The 
so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the 
producer from the means of production. It appears as 
primitive, because: it: forms the pre-historic stage of 
capital and of the mode of production corresponding 
with it. " (Marx, 1867/1974: 6681 
9 
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25.1 discuss Marx's position systematically in Chapter S. 
t 
26. For example in the work of M. Dobb C19671. See also 
Dunman (1975) for a cruder position with reference to Western 
and socialist agriculture. 
27. Lipton's crude theory of 'urban bias' is systematically 
developed in his [1977]. 
114 
28. It should be stressed that the purely economic manner in 
which Byres uses the term 'agrarian question' is not identical 
to the manner in which it was used either by Kautsky or 
later by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. For the latter this 
'question' was also a 'political' question of what attitude 
to adopt to a more or less 'backward' 'peasantry'. Ultimately, 
as we shall see in Chapter 61 these 'classical' marxists did 
I'I 
adhere to a greater or lesser extent to an economic reductionism 
which explains why both 'agriculture' and the 'peasantry' 
were considered to be a 'problem', or an 'obstacle' to socialist 
development. Pace Byres, there was no 'agrarian problem' 
or 'peasant problem' in Mao's China, as we shall see briefly 
also in Chapter S. For a superb analysis of Mao's development 
economics, see Gray [1973) and also [1969). 
29. The argument which asserts that 'rural society' exhibits 
its 'own' specific classes with rural characteristics, while 
'urban society' also produces its 'own' class structure, is 
a pervasive one within sociology and has disastrous effects. 
For a particular example of this position with reference to 
'Third World' societies, see Stavenhagen C1975). The point 
is not of course that classes in capitalist societies may be 
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influenced by'their material setting but that classes are not 
essentially rural or essentially urban, i. e., 'ideal typical' 
categories cannot be constructed on such material bases. 
30. Here Byres replicates practically word for word the 
statements of the classical bourgeois conceptions of the 
exploitation of agriculture by industry assessed in Chapter 1. 
For example: 
"If food supplies fail to expand in pace with the growth 
of demand the result is likely to be a substantial 
rise in food prices leading to political discontent and 
pressure on wage rates with consequent adverse effects 
on industrial profits, investment, and economic growth. " 
[Johnston and Mellor, 1961: 5731 
"Now if the capitalist sector produces no food, its 
expansion increases the demand for food raises the 
price of food in terms of capitalist products, and 
so reduces profits. This is one of the senses in 
which industrialization is dependent upon agricultural 
improvement; it is not profitable to produce a growing 
volume of manufactures unless agricultural production 
is growing simultaneously. " 
[Lewis, 1954: 173) 
Following this line of reasoning, it is sometimes asserted 
that a 'natural' antagonism exists between the proletariat 
and the peasantry whereby "the interests of the peasantry 
[high prices and relatively high self-consumption] are opposed 
to those of the urban proeltariat [low food prices and a 
substantial marketed surplus]" [Lehmann, 1972c: 324). What 
this assertion 'forgets' is First that a decrease in Food 
prices is not the only way to increase the welfare of the 
working class; an increase in wages while the price of food 
remains the same, or increases is also in the 'interests' of 
the working class, but it depletes the profits of the capitalist. 
In other words the abstract notion of 'interest' asserted by 
Lehmann, Byres and others, takes the profits of capital (and 
capitalist production relations in general] as given; it is 
similar in effect to those bourgeois assertions which maintain 
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that an increase in wages causes an increase in prices. 
Second the 'peasantry' in Lehmann's remark is conflated with 
a 'peasant producer' or enterprise; in other words, the 
'peasantry' is considered as a unity and equated with a 
dominant peasant class. This also takes capitalist production 
relations as given in the countryside. In a sense it is 
always in the 'interests' of a seller [whether 'rural' or 
'urban') to obtain the highest possible price for his commodity, 
and in the 'interests' of a buyer [whether 'rural' or 'urban') 
to purchase these commodities at the lowest possible price. 
The problem iss however, that buyers are also sellers, and 
sellers are also buyers. Let us assume a set of production 
relations under which a rural co-operative run by agricultural 
workers sells food and raw materials to an industrial collective 
run by urban workers, and that the rural co-operative then 
purchases machinery and manufactured products from the industrial 
collective. In such a case there is no clash of ? interests', 
t. I 
for an increase in 'rural' prices will only produce an increase 
in 'urban' prices. This example, however, assumes the 
non-existence of capitalist relations; it assumes that 
capitalists do not exist. The problem with the argument of 
the so-called 'natural antagonism' between peasants and 
workers is that it abstracts from capitalist production relations 
and implicitly or explicitly assumes these to be natural. 
In particular under such relations, rural producers do not 
purchase their commodities from the workers but from urban 
capitalists and in addition, an increase in the price of food 
does not benefit agricultural workers. The antagonism 
between agriculture and industry is therefore in effect an 
antagonism between agricultural producers and industrial 
producers, for an increase in. the price of food, if followed 
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by a rise in wages, will reduce the profits of the urban 
capitalist. The urban capitalist will struggle to keep wages 
down, while his rural counterpart will attempt to increase the 
price of food. Wage-labour is squeezed in the middle. I 
hasten to add, however, that this antagonism is not to be 
reduced to an antagonism between agricultural and industrial 
capitalists. Rather, it is an antagonism between those 
capitalists which produce the necessary means of consumption 
and capital as a whole. The production of housing, transport, 
social services, welfare, water, and so on, all affect the 
price of labour-power. The main point at issue is that the 
antagonism I have discussed presupposes capitalist relations 
of production. 
31. See Lipton Cop. cit.: 108-15). 
32. Kay comes to this conclusion because he rightly identifies 
n 
capitalism with the existence of specific social relations. 
If this is rigorously done, as we shall see in Part Two, it 
is impossible to visualise the devision between agriculture 
and industry in any way other than as an effect of capitalist 
relations of production. 
33. Kula 01976] analyses feudalism precisely on the basis 
of such a division. 
34. Some of these criticisms are answered by Frank in his [1977). 
See also Aguilar [1968) which contains a number of useful texts on 
the various marxist parties' lines in Latin America from the 
beginning of the century to 1968, including the various debates 
between the 'traditional' communist parties and 'Guevarism', etc. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. The list here is endless but see in particular the works 
by Althusser, Hindess, Hirst, Poulantzas, Bettleheim, Sayer 
and Mepham referred to in the bibliography. 
2. Marx argues that they are apparent under feudalism and 
also -in communism. See for example [1878/1974: 84]; 
[1865a/1974: 790). But see Althusser's Essay 'Marxism and 
Humanism' in his C1977) and also Sayer C1979: 10]. Incidentally, 
to say that the conditions of social existence are sometimes 
obscured does not in any way entail that only professional 
scientists can disentangle them. Appearances are contradictory, 
as we shall see, and their contradictory nature can be 
disentangled'by anyone, as long as a critique is undertaken. 
3. The Newtonian theory of gravity provides a simple illustrationk, 
of this form of reasoning. What we experience are objects 
falling to the ground. In order to explain this phenomenon, 
Newtonian theory provides an account of a relationship of 
attraction between bodies and a particular concept of 
gravitational force. The force of gravity is not open to 
experience but it is real nonetheless. We never experience 
gravity itself, but only its effects. The gravitational force - 
or more precisely, the relation of attraction - is the 'essential 
relation' which explains the phenomenon of the fall of objects. 
It should be stressed that both essential relations and 
phenomenal forms [whether relations or 'things'] are real for, 
Marx. The distinction is not one between 'appearances' and 
'reality' as is sometimes maintained. 
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4. See his [1867/1974: chs. 10 & 11). 
5. "In studying a problem one must begin with the appearances 
that people can see and feel, in order to research the 
essences that lie behind them, and then go from there 
to reveal the substance and contradiction of objective 
things and events. " [Mao Tse-tung, 1960/1977: 1121 
6. It should be noted that to suggest that the relations of 
production dominate the forces of production in. a mode of 
production, as do Althusser and others, is to presuppose such 
a separation and to assume that the forces of production are 
ultimately purely material. 
7. See particularly Sayer (1975], C1979a] and C1979c]. 
8. See inter alia Sayer [1975] and [1979a) and the various 
texts in Mepham and D. H. Ruben, eds. [1979] as well as Godelier 
C1972a]. 
S. See Althusser [1977J, Althusser and Balibar [1970], 
Hindess and Hirst (1975) and Sayer C1979c]. 
10. In this context see for example Poulantzas' discussion of 
the distinction between mode of production and social formation 
in his [1973: 10-13). 
"In the theoretical examination of a 'pure' mode of 
production, of the 'pure' CMP for example as it is 
presented in Capital, we see that its effect on the 
supports is reflected in a distinction between two 
classes, that of the capitalists and that of the 
wage-earning labourers. However, a social formation 
consists of an overlapping of several modes of production, 
one of which holds the dominant role, and it therefore 
presents more classes than the 'pure' mode of production, " 
CPoulantzas, 1973: 71] 
Poulantzas merely stresses the irreducibility of social formation , 
to mode of production but fails to account for this irreducibility. ' 
r 
956 
His talk of a 'pure' mode of production, even in inverted 
commas, shows only that in the absence of any theorisation of 
the production of social formations, the latter are conceived 
as accidental deviations from an ideal. Incidentally, this 
failure by the 'articulation of modes of production' theorists 
also accounts to a large extent for their ultimate espousal of 
dualism 'in the last instance'. I shall return to this point 
in Chapter 7. Hindess and Hirst (1977] criticise the concept 
of mode of production on these grounds precisely. While their 
criticism of the althusserian concept is correct on this point, 
they falsely ascribe to the althusserian conception of mode of 
production, the status of the only possible conception of a 
mode of production, with the result that Marxism is rejected in 
toto. See Cutler et al [1977] and (1978). 
11. For an excellent critique of the base/superstructure 
model see Sayer [1975). 
12. Although in recent years, of course, the observed absence 
of a class of capitalists directly involved in the enterprise 
in Western social formations, has given rise to a flurry of 
intellectual activity surrounding the notions of 'ownership' 
or 'control' of the means of production. See inter alia 
Blackburn [1972], Poulantzas [1975). The fact is, of course, 
that Marx theorises a social category of capital which may or 
may not be represented by a collectivity of individual 
capitalists in a particular social formation. 
13. If this argument is correct, then there is nothing to 
restrict the social relations of production to the relations 
between capital, wage-labour and landed property. Other 
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components of these essential relations remain to be discovered. 
In particular, it seems to me to be crucial to theorise 
capitalist gender relations at, this level. It is'also important 
to develop a theory of supranational relations of production 
at the level of the world economy. This latter point is 
developed in Chapter 7, section 2. 
14. See Sayer (1979: 83-7). 
15. This point has recently been correctly stressed by Sayer 
[1975] and [1979a]. 
16. The most notorious example of this procedure is provided 
by Balibar in Althusser and Balibar [1970]. 
17. See note (2) above. 
18. For a brilliant discussion see Sayer [1979a: ch. 2). For a 
critique see Cutler et al [1977]. 
19, See Marx [1867/1974: ch. 5]. 
20. "The exchange of equivalents occurs [but is merely] the 
surface layer of a production which rest on the 
appropriation of other people's labour without exchange, 
but under the guise of exchange. " 
C1858a/1969: 114] 
21. See his C1967/1974: ch. 19) and his [1865a/1974: Part 1). 
22. See also Cibid.: 1083 where Marx refers to "the categories 
which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society and on 
which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage-labour, 
landed property. '' 
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23. Marx provides a critique of the vulgar economists' [and 
by inference, the sociologists'] account of classes in his 
C1865a/1974: ch. 473 and in his C1863c/1972: addenda). See also 
Sayer C1979: ch. 3] where an excellent discussion cF Marx'e 
critique of 'factors of production' is provided. 
24. These formulations have been the object of much commentary 
recently, especially in the context of the work of Althusser 
and his associates. An example of this kind of formulation in 
Marx can be found in his [1865a/1974: 680]. 
25. See Hall 01977: 54-51. 
26. Marx outlines this argument in his [1867/1974: Part 6]. 
27. See Marx, CfBGSa/1974: Part 1, ch. 11. 
28. By the term 'profit' I am referring here to 'gross profit' 
and I am ignoring its subdivision into interest and profit of 
enterprise in order to simplify the issue. Marx suggests that 
gross profit is "the specific characteristic form of surplus- 
value belonging to the capitalist mode of'production" 
(1865a/1974: 814). It is for Marx the clearest realised form 
of surplus-value under capitalism and constitutes the specific 
revenue of a class of capitalists. See Sayer [1979a: 54]. 
29. The 'basis' of revenue must not be confused with the 
'source' of revenue which, for Marx, is, of course, labour. 
30. Surplus-value can be extracted in two main formst absolute 
and/or relative surplus-value. I disucss these concepts at a 
later stage in this chapter. 
959 
31. - Immediately below this passage Marx goes on to discuss 
the effects of such a monopoly price on the wages of the labourer. 
32. Marx defines these simply as: "the various titles to that 
portion of the social product which goes into individual 
consumption" [ibid.: 879). 
33. "The production of capitalists and wage labourers, is thus 
a chief product of capital's realization process. " 
[1865a/1974: 512J 
34. See Marx [1867/1974: 223]. 
35. Marx [1867/1974: Part 1, ch. 12). 
36. The similarities between the extraction of absolute 
surplus-value and feudalism are outlined by Marx in his 
[1867/1974: ch. l0, section 21. 
37. The classical bourgeois conceptions of feudalism are, of 
course, defined in such terms. See Bloch [1965]. These 
conceptions have been adopted by writers such as Frank and 
Wallerstein with problematic results. See for-example Frank 
[1979] and my review Neocosmos [1979], as well as Wallerstein 
[1974]. Some of these issues will be touched upon in Chapter 9 
of this thesis. 
38. See Marx [1867/1974: Part 4). 
39. See Marx [1866/1976: 1037]. 
40. See Marx (1867/1974: Part 5tch. 16); (1866/1976: 1019-38]. 
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41. It should be borne in mind that Marx is using the term 
'mode of production' here to refer to the labour-process. 
42. See Marx (1667/1974: ch. 15). 
43. See Marx [1867/1974: 442-51]. 
44. See Marx [1867/1974: chs. 13 & 14). 
45. Marx suggests that in England the process of primitive 
accumulation started at the end of the fifteenth century 
[1867/1974: 672], while the period of, manufacture roughly 
"extends from the middle of the 16th to the lest third of the 
18th century" Cibid.: 3183. The period-of machinery and modern 
industry [i. e., industrial capitalism proper] only develops 
systematically after the last third of the 18th century. 
46. Marx refers to competition as an added incentive to invest; 
e. g.,, [1867/1974: 301]. Of course competition does force 
capitalists to invest in machinery. The point, however, is 
that the rate of exploitation throughout society, only increases 
after the necessities of life have been cheapened., 
"The general rate of surplus-value is, therefore, 
ultimately affected by the whole process, only y when 
the increase in the productiveness of labour, has 
seized upon those branches of production that are 
connected with, and has cheapened those commodities 
that form part of, the necessary means of subsistence, 
and are therefore elements of the value of labour-power. " 
Cibid.: 302-3, emphasis added] 
The argument is not therefore that technology will not be 
employed anywhere prior to its utilisation in those industries 
which produce necessities. Rather, the argument is that the 
I 
general increase of the extraction of surplus-value throughout 
society can only take place once labour-power has been cheapened. 
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The reason, for this is that the introduction of machinery into 
the production of non-necessities only cheapens the product 
temporarily, for the individual capitalist who has introduced 
the new technique. As soon as the other capitalists have 
introduced the same technique, his extra profit vanishes. The 
introduction of machinery into the production of necessities, 
however, reduces the price of labour-power throughout society, - 
and thus cheapens systematically the commodities of all capitalists 
even the ones of those who do not produce necessities or who 
do not modernise. See Cibid.: ch. 123. It follows that in order 
to force capitalists to cheapen wage-labour systematically 
through the introduction of machinery in the production of 
necessities, a struggle by labour-power is required to resist 
(or to decrease] the extension of absolute surplus-value 
extraction. In the absence of such a struggle there is nothing 
to force capitalists to concentrate on investing systematically 
in the production of necessities rather than anywhere else. 
47. For the purposes of this analysis I am ignoring the realm 
of the 'political', as it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to consider the separation of this realm From the other two. 
Nevertheless, many of the arguments put forward here apply 
mutatis mutandis to this separation also. 
48. For referenoas see note (23] above. 
49. See for example Marx (1863c/1972: 272). 
50. This concise definition is provided by Laclau [1977: 159]. 
51. See Poulantzas C1973: 73; 2313. 
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52. See inter alia Massey and Catalano [1978]. 
53. Marx's statements to this effect will be'outlined below. 
For Lenin see his C1901b/19731 and his C1907k/1972: ch. 3) for 
example. 
54. Tribe (1977] makes much of this point in his critique of 
Marx's theory of rent. 
I 
55. Lenin's analyses of the 'peasant' road and the 'Junker' 
road will be discussed in detail in Chapter S. 
56. See Frank's "Destroy Capitalism, not Feudalism", in his 
(1969]. 
57. The so-called 'dependency theorists' exemplify the first 
form of reasoning. For an example of the second see Taylor 
[1979] and the review by Mouzelis [1980]. 
58. Marx [1867/1974: ch. 27]. 
59. Marx rightly stresses the violent nature of this struggle 
which is systematically ignored by bourgeois social scientists 
and is not implicit in the term 'accumulation'. See his 
(1867/1974: Part 8,703 and passim). 
60. The most notorious example is provided, as I have noted, 
by Preobrazhensky [1926/1965: especially ch. 21. 
61. Particularly Adam Smith. See Marx [1867/1974: 667]. 
62. Preobrazhensky was, of course, a prime exponent of the 
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doctrine of the 'logic of the productive forces'. Much of the 
debate surrounding Soviet 'industrialisation' in the 1920's 
was conducted within this terrain. See Corrigan at el [1978]; 
Lewin [1975]. This point is equally applicable to those 
writers discussed in Chapter 3, as we have seen. Marx's position 
is clearly expressed in the following: 
"The original formation of capital does not happen as is 
sometimes imagined, with capital heaping up necessaries 
of life and-instruments of labour and raw materials, in 
short, the objective conditions of labour which have 
already been unbound from the soil and animated by 
human labour. " [1858a/1973: 506] 
For Marx, the transformation of labour into wage-labour is 
at the same time, the transformation of the means of production 
into capital. It is not a question here of two processes 
Cone of 'proletarianisation' and one of 'accumulation'] operating 
in parallel as is sometimes maintained, but of one and the 
same process of the development of a relation, viewed from 
two different angles. 
63. Apart from the writers already mentioned in note [60], this 
separation is assumed to exist prior to capitalist development 
by Kautsky, as we shall see in Chapter 6. 
64. See also Marx C1865a/1974: 812). 
65. Tribe [op. cit. ) asserts that this is exactly what Marx 
does. Rey 019731 on the other hand, bases his argument concerning 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism on a supra-historical 
conception of landed property and the 'political'. I comment 
on both these authors in the Appendix to this chapter. 
66. See Cibid.: 715): "The capitalist mode of appropriation, 
the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces 
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capitalist private property". 
67. See for example his [1866/1976: 949 ff]. 
68. See Marx's remark in his [1865a/1974: 615). 
69. This argument is outlined in Marx [1865a/1974: 618]. 
70. See also Marx [1865a/1974: 616]. 
71. See Marx [1865a/1974: 634-93. 
72. It is interesting to note in this context that although 
the French language cannot distinguish, like English, between 
'work' and 'labour', it has two words which correspond to our 
one 'rent': la rente, which means 'rent' or 'interest', and 
le loyer, which means 'lease-money'. 
73.1 comment in detail on such readings in the Appendix to 
this chapter. 
74. Marx [1865a/1974: 625]. 
75. See Marx [1865a/1974: 624-39]. 
"When we refer to a monopoly price, we mean in general 
a price determined only by the purchaser's eagerness 
to buy and ability to pay, independent of the price 
determined by the general price of production, as well 
as by the value of the products. " [ibid.: 775] 
The concept of monopoly, therefore, refers firstly to a 
relationship between producers and consumers and only secondly 
to a relationship between owners and non-owners. A monopoly 
of agricultural commodities could only exist if one producer, 
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or a cartel of landlords, dominated agricultural production. 
76. See for instance Marx [1867/1974: 54-68; 501-73. 
77. This argument is elaborated in Marx [1865a/1974: Part 2]. 
78. This process gives rise-to a series of contradictions in 
capitalism surrounding what Marx sees as the tendency of the 
general rate of profit to decline. See Marx [1865a/1974: Part 33. 
But see also Sayer (1979a: 167n] for some of the problems in 
Marx's analysis. 
79. Marx is indeed correct in making such a theoretical 
assumption. In practice, however, the obstacle posed by landed 
property, as we shall see, not only impedes capital accumulation 
in agriculture, but capital accumulation throughout the 
economy, with the result that as long as landed property exists, 
capitalism cannot 'fully mature'. 
80. Marx gives a series of reasons for this which are mainly 
concerned with the level of science and technology employed in 
agriculture. See his [1962/1975: 123). He also argues that in 
agriculture, production time is longer than working time, a 
fact which lengthens the turnover period of agricultural capital 
and means that a smaller amount of surplus-value is created in 
agriculture. See his (1863b/1969: 16-21] and (1874/1974: chs. 12 6 
13). Ultimately, of course, the slower rate of development 
of the productive forces in agriculture is explained by the 
existence of the capital/landed property relation. 
81. See Marx (1865a/1974: 758]. Monopoly rents based on 
monopoly price are distinguished from both differential and 
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absolute rent in Cibid.: 765; 832-3). Marx also states that 
the landlord's so-called 'monopoly' of land is no different, 
from the capitalist's 'monopoly' of the means of production. 
See Cibid.: 815 and 816) and his (1963b/1969: 94). 
82. Although 'For Marx rent is a social law, it appears as a 
law of nature. Just as capital seems to create interest, 
technology, profit and labour wages, so rent seems to arise 
from the land itself. See his C1865a/1974: ch. 46J and his 
C1863c/1972: addenda). 
"The form nf_ revenue and the source of, revenue are the 
most fetishistic expression of the relations of production. 
It is their form of existence as it appears on the 
surface, divorced from the hidden connections and the 
intermediate connecting links. Thus the land becomes 
the source of rent, capital the source of profit, and 
labour the source of wage .' The distorted form in which 
the real inversion is expressed is naturally reproduced 
in the.. views. of _the agents of this mode of production ... 
The land or nature as the source of rent, i. e., landed 
property, is fetishistic enough. But as a result of a 
convenient confusion of use-value with exchange-value, 
the common imagination is still able to have recourse 
to the productive power of nature itself, which, by 
some kind of hocus-pocus, is personified in the landlord. " 
[1863c/1972: 453,454] 
Thus the sources of the revenue of three'main classes appear 
tobe completely different and independent, as well as natural. 
The distribution of these sources of revenue among different 
groups Iof the population, seems also to be natural and to be 
the only reason'For the existence of classes. It follows that 
the class struggle, the antagonistic social production relations 
on which the distribution of the product and the existence of 
these classes is premised, disappears entirely from view, so 
that class relations appear as harmonious as well as"natural. 
In so far' as' disharmony 'does appear between classes, it takes 
the Form of an accidental competitive conflict rather than 
a structural and necessary struggle. 
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"This, moreover, ' renders a substantial' service to 
apologetics. For (in the formula: ) land-rent, capital- 
interest, 'labour-wages, for example, the different Forms 
of surplus-value and configurations of capitalist 
production do not confront one another as alienated 
forms, but as-heterogeneous and independent forms, 
merely different from one another but not antagonistic. 
The different revenues are derived from quite different 
: sources, one from land, the second from capital and the 
third from labour. Thus they do not stand in any hostile 
connection to one another because they have no inner 
connection whatsoever. If they nevertheless work together 
in production, then it is a harmonious action, an 
expression of harmony, as, for example, the peasant, 
the ox, the plough and the land in agriculture, in the 
real labour process, work together harmoniously despite 
their dissimilarities. Insofar as there is any 
contradiction between them, it arises merely from 
competition as to which of the agents shall get more of 
the value they have jointly created. Even if this 
occasionally brings them to blows, nevertheless the 
outcome of this competition between land, capital and 
labour finally shows that, although they quarrel with one 
another over the division, their rivalry tends to 
increase the value of the product to such an extent 
that each receives a larger piece, so that their competition, 
which spurs them on, is merely the expression of'their 
harmony. " (1863c/1972: 503) 
83. One could also add the landed property/wage-labour relation, 
which is, of course, indirect as it is mediated by capital, 
but which is important nevertheless as landed property only 
exists because of the extraction of surplus-value from wage- 
labour. This triple relation is discussed in Marx [1858a/1973: 
275-91. An example of the importance of the relation between 
landed property and wage-labour will be considered below when 
the role of landed property in the transition to relative 
surplus-value extraction will be discussed. 
84. The other conditions for the existence of a collectivity 
of individuals [as opposed to any other form of appearance 
which class bases may take] are numerous and cannot be 
theoretically specified. They can only be ascertained in 
specific historical instances through concrete historical 
investigation. Not only does landed property not always appear 
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in the form of a collectivity, but when such a collectivity 
does exist, the legally sanctioned phenomenal relations of 
ownership which identify it as such, also exhibit a high degree 
of diversity both between and within social formations. Let 
me clarify this point. When a collectivity or class is present 
in a social formation, its access to the supposed source of 
its revenue is sanctioned by law, custom, traditions, and so on. 
Patterns of 'land ownership' [land tenure], 'capital ownership' 
and 'labour ownership'. differ to a great extent within societies 
so that if one were to restrict one's observations to such 
patterns of ownership, one would simply be examining different 
legal expressions of the relations of distribution. It follows 
that no unitary class, let alone its class basis, can ever be 
established on such criteria. For example, Massey and Catalano 
[1978] distinguish three basic forms of land tenure in Britain. 
On this basis they conclude that a unitary class of landowners 
does not exist in Britain; but on such a basis there can never 
be any class in Britain, as 'labour' is 'owned', in the form 
of many different skills and 'capital' is 'owned' in as many 
different forms. To attempt to establish the existence or 
lack of a class of landowners on the basis of land tenure 
arrangements is an identical procedure to that of attempting 
to ascertain the existence of a class of wage-labourers on the 
basis of different skills, occupations and trades. It is, of 
course, impossible to show the unity which the concept of class 
requires on such criteria. This should not be taken to mean 
that patterns of 'ownership' are not important dimensions of a 
class analysis in a social formation, but only to mean that the 
existence and identification of classes cannot proceed along 
such lines. The same point is equally valid for the identification 
of peasant classes as Mao was obviously aware. See Mao 
[1903b/1971: 44). 
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85. For an important discussion of fractions of capital in 
relation to Marx, see Clarke C1979). 
86. See Marx [1865a/1974: chs. 20 & 363; [1867/1974: 161-2]. 
87. For details see Marx [1865a/1974: 274-6]. 
88. These advantages are outlined for instance in Marx 
C1865a/1974: ch. 27,435-41). 
89. Differential Rent I always exists under capitalism, as it 
is bound up with natural fertility and location independently 
of capital investment. 
90. Marx argues that this is often the rule in agriculture. 
See his Cf865a/T974: 627-333, from which the following remark 
is taken: 
"A much more important fact, however, is 
of the actual farm-labourer's wage below 
average, so that part of it is deducted 
part of the lease money and thus, in the 
ground rent, it flows into the pocket of 






91. See Marx-[1663b/1969: 44-5,152-33; [1663c/1972: 472]; 
[1865a/1974: 75]. ß 
92. See Marx and Engels [1848/1973: 52] and Marx (1881c/1975: 332]. 
93. Marx makes this clear for example in the comment quoted 
above, p. 320. See also Lenin's remarks in his [1907k/1972: 296-7]. 
94. See Marx's remark in his (1665a/1974: 006). Incidentally, 
I have treated the concept of rent in the manner Marx does, by 
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reference to agriculture. Marx, however, makes it clear that 
other land also bears rent, e. g., building land, fisheries, 
mining land, and so on. See Marx [1865a/1974: ch. 46]. 
95. The ideological form which this struggle takes can be 
seen, Marx says, in the fact that capital and its ideological 
representatives, the political economists, see: Cfalsely] 
capitalist landownership as basically feudal'. See, For example, 
his C1865a/1974: 618) and his comments on Ricardo's anti-landlord 
position particularly as opposed to those of Malthus and 
Anderson in his C1863b/1969: 114-27; 152-3-and 236-503. 
"We understand such economists as Mill, Cherbuliez, 
Hilditch and others demanding that rent should be 
handed over to the state to serve in place of taxes. 
That is a frank expression of the hatred the industrial 
capitalist bears towards the landed proprietor, who 
seems to him a useless thing, an excrescence upon the 
general body of bourgeois production. " 
C1847a/1976: 2033 
96. See Marx Cf856a/1973: 277). 
97. It is important to stress the involvement of society as 
a whole in the process of capitalist development. It should 
be stressed that Marx does not analyse this process in terms of 
an 'unequal exchange' between supposedly independent realms 
of 'agriculture' and 'industry', whereby a surplus is extracted 
from the former by the latter. On the contrary, as we shall 
see below, Marx argues that this separation is a necessary 
phenomenal form of appearance of capitalist relations of 
production. The only process of exchange which Marx (and 
Lenin) analyse in their assessment of capital accumulation is 
that between the department of the economy which produces means 
of production [Department I) and that which produces articles 
of consumption [Department II). It is this equal exchange which 
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produces and expands the home market. 'This process is referred 
to as the process of realisation of the social capital. Both 
the departments exist in agriculture as well as in industry. 
No opposition or unequal exchange between a supposed 'rural' 
and a supposed 'urban' sector of the-economy is utilised to 
explain the development of capitalism, although'the dominance 
of the town over the country is recognised as a, feature of the 
capitalist social division of labour. See Marx [1874/1974: Part 3]; 
(1865a/1974: 632-3]; Lenin C1899a/1972: ch. 13; Mao [1956/1975]. 
98. This position is primarily associated with Lenin in his 
analyses of the development of capitalism in Russia, where the 
process of differentiation was producing a rich; a middle, and 
a poor peasantry. See his [1899a/1972: ch. 2]. But see also 
Marx [1863a/1969: 409]. 
99. See Lenin [19071/1972: 32-3) and [1907k/1972: 238-242). 
Lenin's analysis of the two roads to the capitalist development 
of agriculture is assessed in Chapter S. 
100. See Lenin [1899a/1972: chs. 3-7). 
101. Brenner's tendency to identify relative surplus-value with 
capitalism and absolute surplus-labour [value] with feudalism 
is thus somewhat of an-oversimplification. Apart from 
anything else, it merely reproduces the common error of 
identifying-capitalism with industrialism. See Brenner (1977]. 
102. Marx [1867/1974: 299]. 
103. It may be, of course, that industrial capital can bypass 
domestic agriculture by importing cheaper food from abroad, in 
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which case the transformation of agriculture will be retarded. 
But no country can rely totally on food imports so that the 
transformation of domestic agriculture must eventually take 
place even in such circumstances. IF the landlords are powerful 
they can put off their takeover by capital and buy time for 
their own transformation into capitalists by forcing the 
importation of food from abroad. This is precisely what 
happened in Chile from the 1930's to the mid 1960'2, as we shall 
see in Chapter S. 
Incidentally, it should be noted that I do not mean to 
suggest that the initial introduction of machinery into 
production necessarily requires the prior suppression of landed 
property (although it requires wage-labour]. What I am 
suggesting is that the dominance of machine industry throughout 
the economy requires such an abolition. 
104. Or more generally the relative increase in the price of 
labour-power. 
105. See Marx C1867/1974: ch. 10, sections 56 6]. 
106. For the backlash which followed, see Marx [1867/1974: 270 ff] 
and [1865c/1974: 108). 
107. See Marx (1865a/T974: 626) for example. 
108. See also Marx (1665a/1974: 680]. 
109. Marx quotes this extract From the Reports of Inspectors,, 
of Factories, October 1848: 98: "Great manufacturers, thoughtful, 
calculating men of business, have said that ten hours' labour 
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would be quite sufficient, if the Corn Laws were repealed. " 
[Marx, 1865a/1974: 1083. 
110. This constitutes an example of the operation of the 
wage-labourlanded property relation. 
111. See Kay (1981: 487]. 
112. Ibid.: 495. 
113. This illusion is the source of all the Robinsonades of 
Political Economy, i. e., the utilisation of an isolated 
individual producer-[Robinson Crusoe], to illustrate the 
workings of-a social and historical system of production. 
See Marx [1867/1974: 81 ff] for example. I 
114. In the social division of labour, Marx includes the division 
between mental and manual labour and by extension, the. 
categorisation of people by skills, gender, class, age, and so 
on. Also an international dimension of the social division of 
labour is produced by capitalism. 'See for example Marx and Engels 
(1846/1976: 32 ff; 46 ff; 64-74 and passim); Marx [1857/1973: 99, 
108) and (1858a/1973: 156-165,238-50). 
115. This is in fact the reason why Lenin discusses the social 
division of labour in such detail. He is concerned to show 
vis-a-vis the Narodniks, that the development of a home market 
is one aspect ofýthe development of asocial division of labour 
based on `capitalist production relations. Sea in particular 
his C1899a/1972]. 
The argument which I develop here, namely that the 
separation of agriculture and induotry is the process of 
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capitalist development, has also been put, in a similar-'though 
less theoretical fashion, by Merrington [1975] in relation to 
the debate surrounding the transition from feudalism to- 
capitalism. Despite the problems associated with a conception 
of 'transition' which considers feudalism and capitalism as 
polar opposites-(and hence as unitary realms], I concur 
entirely with Merrington's conclusion, that "the dualistic 
tendency to separate urban progress and rural backwardness, seen 
as a relic of the past, must be set against the fact that 
'urbanisation' and 'ruralisation' are opposite sides of the 
same process of the capitalist division of labour. " (op. cit.: 195]. 
116. Lenin was clearly aware of the fact that the separation 
between agriculture and industry arose First with the develop- 
ment of capitalist relations and productive activity based on 
absolute surplus-value extraction (manufacture), and then was 
further increased with the introduction of machinery in the 
period of 'modern industry', See his [1899a/1972: ch. 6, section 4 
and ch. 7, section 113. 
117. See for example Sayer (1979: 55). 
r., I i- 
118. As is-wellýknown, Marx's comments on the peasantry are not 
always satisfactory. For an assessment of Marx's contradictory 
statements on peasants see Duggett (19753. 
119. I have restricted the concept of relations of, production 
to essential relations themselves, the object of empirical 
investigation being both the discovery of these relations and 
the explanation of the forms which they take. I, differ in this 
respect from Sayer who considers relations of production to be: 
"all those'social relations necessary toi-or implied in, a 
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particular mode of production. " [Sayer, 1975: 782). It seems" 
to me that this conception is problematic on several grounds. 
[1] This formulation comes extremely close to suggesting that 
relations exist because, of their necessity to production. 
Depending on whether a mode of production is taken to refer to 
a manner of producing a form of social organisation, or to a 
manner of producing material products, the statement either 
implies a tautology or a form of functionalism. 
[2] Perhaps more importantly, Sayer's conception of production 
N 
relations covers both essential relations and phenomenal relations. 
In so far as they are phenomenal relations, the definition 
implies that they appear as such. Phenomenal forms only-exist 
at the level of appearances; if they are to be called production 
relations, they must appear as such. But if they appeared as 
such, they would have been altered a long time previously, since 
the whole purpose of the theory of ideology is to argue that 
an oppressive reality is obscured by 'things'. It seems to me 
that if one wishes to remain consistent to an appearance/essence - 
distinction, as Sayer rightly does, one can only do so by 
maintaining rigidly the existence of two analytically distinct 
sets of categories whose interrelation is recognised as a 
problem. Phenomenal 'production relations' cannot appear to 
be something else [things], as for such a form of reasoning, 
a third set of categories would be required. Phenomenal forms 
are already the representation of essential relations, they 
cannot represent themselves as something different without 
introducing a third level of categories. Sayer does not 
introduce such a level, and thus fails to account for the 
existence of 'things'. 
[3] In fact, of' course, there is no need for a third set of 
categories as long as a distinction between essential relations 
and phenomenal forms is rigidly maintained. IF such a 
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distinction is to be maintained, then both categories cannot 
be included in the all-embracing term of 'relations of 
production'. In-a sense Sayer's definition vitiates his 
entirely correct analysis of the distinction between phenomena 
and appearances by the conflation of both categories into one. 
Further, essential relations often appear as relations [although 
not as relations of production] as well as appearing as things. 
The forms of co-operation in the labour-process, For example, 
are visible as relations. Indeed, bourgeois social scientists 
have always seen the [technical] division of labour in the 
enterprise as a relation between individuals. Their problem, 
however, is, that they have accounted for its existence and 
development either in terms of its own immanent development or 
as a result of population growth, or again as a requirement of 
technology, i. e., they have accounted for its existence in an 
ahistorical eternal manner. But this does not alter its social 
nature. To say that a phenomenon is social, and to say it is 
historical is not synonymous. Social categories can be seen 
as ahistorical and as eternal as 'things'. Sayer's conception 
fails, therefore, to distinguish between the phenomenal level 
of the 'social' [which is composed of relations, but not relations 
of production, although these include relations in material 
production) which exists seemingly in and of itself, independently 
of production [social as well as material), and Marx's 
conception of the socio-material, which forms a unity which is 
not apparent in phenomena. What is so important about Marx's 
concept of social relations of production is not simply that 
they are social, but also that their existence only makes sense 
in'relation to a material environment with which they interact. 
Social relations are only antagonistic [i. e., they are only 
relations of production] in relation to such a material setting. 
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As Marx makes clear, divorced from their relationship with 
nature, social relations appear as 'free floating': "Interest- 
bearing capital is capital as property as distinct from capital 
as a function. But so long as capital does not perform its 
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function, it does not exploit labourers and does not come into 
opposition to labour. " [1865a/1974: 379, emphasis added]. 
Lest it be thought because landed property takes no direct part 
in the labour-process, that its existence is independent of 
the appropriation of nature, and hence that it may not be a 
production relation, the following remark by Marx should be 
noted: 
"Landed property has nothing to do with the actual process 
of production. Its role is confined to transferring a 
portion of the produced surplus-value from the pockets 
of capital to its own. However, the landlord plays a role 
in the capitalist process of production not merely 
through the pressure he exerts upon capital, nor merely 
because large landed property is a prerequisite and 
condition of capitalist production since it is a 
prerequisite and condition of the expropriation of the 
labourer from the means of production, but particularly 
because he appears as the personification of one of the 
most essential conditions of production. " 
Cibid.: 82? ] 
See also [ibid.: 883] and quoted on page 1398 of this thesis. 
The relatbns between capital, wage-labour and landed property 
are the relations of the production of a historically specific 
form of social organisation: capitalist society. 
[4] As Sayer's definition conflates essential relations and 
phenomenal forms into one category, it becomes' impossible from 
his perspective to ascertain why essential relations may appear 
both as things and as social relations, and thus to account 
for the phenomenal division between the material and the social. 
Every component of social formations is for Sayer a social 
relation of production. For his position, it is not that 
essential relations appear as real material things, but, rather, 
that material things are themselves social relations [op. cit.: 791]. 
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It also thus becomes difficult, if not impossible, to explain 
how different essential relations may take the same form of 
appearance, as not only does he provide no criteria for 
distinguishing between different components of his 'production 
relations', but the distinction between phenomena and their 
conditions of existence is blurred. 
120. "The social structure and the state are continually 
evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, 
however, of these individuals, not as they may appear 
in_their own or other people's imagination, but as they 
actually are, i. e., as they act, produce materially, and 
hence as they work under definite material limits, 
presuppositions and conditions independent of their will. " 
[Marx and Engels, 1846/1976: 35-63 
It should also be stressed in the context of the phenomenal 
division of the economic and the social, that one aspect of 
their division is precisely the pseudo-antagonism between 
economism and voluntarism (or determinism and idealism) which 
Althusser in particular was right to stress. The suprahistorical 
view of 'Man' is, of course, the mere mirror image of economism. 
The falseness of the apparent opposition between these two 
philosophical positions is revealed precisely by a critique and 
a discovery of the-real capitalist relations of production of 
which they are a product. In this context see ©haskar [1979]. 
121. Historical materialism shows precisely that human activity 
operates within historically prescribed social limits. The 
law of rent, for example, is not an immutable 'law of nature' 
but a social law. The text of Capital is replete with such 
social laws, as is well known. This does not mean that they 
cannot be controlled, only that this control requires a 
knowledge of their conditions of operation (of the principles 
which govern them]. The laws of society, like those of nature, 
are in a sense never immutable, as they operate only under 
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certain rigidly defined conditions. The laws of the combination 
of hydrogen and oxygen show that water is produced only if 
certain conditions are present. The law of rent shows that 
rent [and landed property] only exists under certain conditions. 
The existence of both water and landed property can be controlled 
through a control of their respective conditions of existence. 
The distinction between laws of nature and social laws, is that 
the former can only be altered through a control of nature, while 
the latter can only be altered through an alteration of social 
relations. Social relations are not subject to laws of nature, 
their alteration is not restricted to 'scientists', but is 
the product of collective practice. 
122. Perhaps I should stress again that it is not just the 
fact that the basis of capitalism is both social and the 
product of history which of necessity precludes a teleology, 
but also that it is a specific form of the social. It is the 
antagonistic [or contradictory] nature of the social, a 
characteristic which is only possible within a material environ- 
ment, which precludes a teleology. There is as yet no science 
of the history of communism. 
Incidentally, it is perhaps worth noting here that although 
class relations are necessarily antagonistic, they need not be 
exploitative. Only the relation between capital and wage-labour 
[and the relation between landed property and wage-labour, in 
which landed property appears to the labourer as only a fraction 
of capital) is exploitative. The relation between capital and 
landed property, although antagonistic, is not a relation of 
exploitation for it does not occur within the labour process. 
It is therefore, to some extent, independent of the relation 
of appropriation of nature, although it initially makes the. 
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latter possible. This also explains why it is 'superFluöus' 
to capitalism, why this relation need not exist. The relation 
between capital and wage-labour, on the other hand, is essential 
to capitalism, as without it there would be no capitalist 
relation to nature, and capitalism could not produce its 
material, let alone its social, conditions of existence. 
123. See Marx and Engels [1848/1973); Marx [1867/1974: ch. 32) 
and Godelier C1972a). 
124. See particularly some of Marx's formulations in his 
(1867/1974. ch. 32]. 
125. It is not my intention to discuss the details off Marx's 
epistemology. This is undertaken in brilliant fashion by 
Sayer C1979a]. 
126. See Marx [1880/1976: 24] and the discussion in Sayer 
C1979a: 110-13]. See also Mao 01960/1977: 73-41. 
127. This procedure has traditionally been the case. The 
ideological and political position of the working-class'has 
traditionally become a 'problem' for investigation when it 
manifestly did not conform to the ideal inscribed in its 
economic position. Several 'solutions' to this 'problem' have 
been proposed through the years by sociologists [e. g., Weber, 
Michels] as well as by marxists [e. g., Lucaks, Althusser, 
Poulantzas]. All of these authors start from the false conception 
of the separation of the economic from the social. For a 
useful discussion of most of these positions, see Cutler et al 
[1977: Part 33 and Hirst [1977]. Both of these texts, however, 
[falsely] assume that the separation [and primacy] of the 
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'economic' from [and over) the 'social' ['ideological' and 
'political'), forms the basis of historical materialism. As 
a result, after they (correctly) show that the'problem of 
'correspondence' is insoluble, they (falsely) reject-the marxist 
concept of class altogether. 
128. For example see Marx [1850/1978]; [1852/1973]; Lenin 
C1907k/1972); Mao C1926a/19693; C1926b/19713; [1930/1971]. 
129. Poulantzas (19733 and [1975]. See also in this context 
Hindess [1978); Carchedi (1977); Johnson (1977]. 
130. Mao For one was eminently aware of this point. For instance, 
he notes that "essences always lie behind appearances and 
cannot be disclosed except through appearances. " 
[Mao, 1960/1977: 733. 
131. It goes without saying that all phenomenal capitalist 
relations [gender relations, age relations, relations in 
production, and so one should also be transformed for the 
transformation of capitalist production relations to take place. 
This means, for example, that it is not enough to create 
socialist 'institutions' and enterprises (collectives, 
co-operatives, and so on) without altering the forms of 
co-operation - i. e., the social relations - in'these 'institutions' 
What is important to understand about the forms of co-operation 
in the [capitalist] labour-process, is that they do not just' 
appear as social relations, 'but as social relations of a 
particular kind. They are forms of co-operation which imply 
a form of supervision which is not restricted to the regulation 
of production, but also enforces exploitation as Marx 
[1065c/1974: 383-4] makes clear. This particularly oppressive 
, _. _ai 
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social relation of the enforcement of exploitation appears 
as natural, as required either by the mere numbers involved 
or by'the technology itself. A specifically oppressive 
phenomenal relation appears as natural. Even Lenin was confused 
by the seeming neutrality of this form. See Corrigan at al 
C1978: ch. 33. 
132. In case it is thought that this question is only of 
concern to so'-called `, underdeveloped' countries, it may be 
noted that as late as 1910, Seebohm Rowntree was advocating 
the transference of the 'unearned income' of British landowners 
to the State, so as to allow greater numbers of workers to live 
in rural areas and thus to alleviate poverty in urban areas. 
See Rowntree C1911: 534-473. This unfortunately little-known 
text is a sophisticated advocation of the capital-led 
transformation of agriculture and the necessity of this process 
for 'industrialisation'. It should constitute necessary 
reading for all those who wish to understand the importance of 
rural transformation for capital accumulation and development. 
133. For Lenin's discussion of capitalist ground-rent see his 
C1901b/19731 and his C1907k/1972]; for Kautsky, see his 
(1900/f970: ch. 5). 
134. Particularly noteworthy are: Cutler and Taylor [1972]; 
Emmanuel [1972]; Rey [1973); Vergopoulos [1974); Gutelman [1974); 
Bartra [1974); Howard and King [1975); Cutler [1975); Hindess 
and Hirst [1975); Edel [1976); Tribe (1977); Nora [1977]; 
Murray [1977) and [1978]; Ball [1977] and [1980]; Massey and 
Catalano [1978]; Fine [1979] and [1980]. 
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135. Quoted by Rey Cop. cit.: 43). 
136. Quoted by Hey Cop. cit.: 43-43 and by Cutler and Taylor 
(op. cit.: 23). 
137. See in this context Edel [1976]. 
138. See Gutelman (1974: ch. 7: 98 and passim] where it is 
suggested that it is only if, the organic composition of, capital 
in agriculture is below that in idustry, that the landlord on 
the worst land will receive a revenue when his products sell 
at their value. - This position should be compared with Marx 
[1865a/1974: 755-6]. 
139. Incidentally, this process was noted by Marx., See his 
C1865a/1974: 657] for example. 
140. "Nothing would be altered if capitals in certain spheres 
of production would not, for some reason, be subject to 
the process of equalisation. The average profit would 
then be computed on that portion of the social capital 
which enters the equalisation process. " 
[Marx, 1865a/1974: 1741. 
141. I am ignoring here the problems involved in expressing 
constant and variable capital as values rather than as prices 
of production [the transformation problem) as well as the 
problems of turnover [Marx argues that the cost price Cc + v] 
is calculated on the capital consumed in the production process 
and not the total capital advanced: 1865a/1974: ch. 11. Fine's 
errors are independent of these problems. 
142. The rate of exploitation [e] is not summated because Marx 
analyses the differences between agriculture and industry on 
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the assumption that the rate of exploitation is the same in 
both spheres. 
143. A similar confusion is made by Murray [1977] and ['1978]. 
He argues that under capitalism "there is a tendency for goods 
to exchange at their values" (1977: 111). It then follows, 
of course, that for Murray, 'there is a tendency' For the 
revenue of the landowner to equal absolute rent. However, there 
is no 'tendency' For prices to equal values under. capitalism. 
Rather, Marx argues that the sum of all prices of production 
tends to equal the sum of all values; in other words, there is 
a 'tendency', he suggests, For average price to . equal. value. 
See his (1865a/1974: chs. 9 & 10). 
144. This is not strictly true. Fine provides one remark by 
Marx as tactual support which turns out to be a total misquote. 
See Fine [op. cit.: 260, second quote] and compare with Marx 
[1865a/1974: 764]. Fine leaves out the word "not" from the 
third line of Marx's text which thus, in actual fact, says 
the opposite of what Fine wants it to say! 
145. Marx notes this conception of the mythical, socially 
isolated landowner in Proudhon's 'colonus'. Sea his 
[1847a/1976: 197-206). Sea also note [113] above. 
146. See also Emmanuel (1972: 216-7); Cutler [1975: 75); Tribe 
(1977: 77); Howard and King (1975: 140); Vergopoulos, (1974: 91). 
147. See also Cutler Cop. cit.: 76] and Murray [1977: 111]. 
148. In this context it should be noted that the notion of 
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'monopoly-in land' is often justified with reference to its 
so-called natural 'scarcity'. As land is supposedly naturally 
scarce, and cannot be reproduced, it is easy to argue that it 
can be monopolised. This argument is developed particularly 
by Vergopoulos: 
"Land in the capitalist social system appears as a 
perverse element in direct contrast to all other goods 
and -factors cf_ production. 
Despite the fact that 
productive land is increasingly the product of labour, 
its participation in the social process of production 
is subject to two exceptional constraints: 
a] the social availability of cultivable land is 
relatively limited compared to the a-priori unlimited 
availability of other goods and economic factors. 
From the social point of view, only land is neither 
freely extensible nor reproducible at will. 
b] only investment in the primary sector meets with 
a constraint specific to land, that of decreasing returns. 
In other words, whereas in all other branches of production 
additional investments succeed in bringing down total 
cost per unit, it is only in primary production that 
capital.. investment comes up against the barrier of 
constant or increasing costs in relation to the 
invested capital. " (Vergopoulos, 1974: 263) 
Vergopoulos argues that because-of these two characteristics, 
land acts as: an extra-economic constraint on capitalist develop- 
ment (ibid.: 264]. The scarcity value of land can lead to the 
establishment of monopolies and"the imposition of"rent by those 
who monopolise it. Land rents in general [both feudal and 
capitalist] are the direct result of such monopolistic control, 
rent itself "arises from the scarcity of land" Cibid.: 95). For 
Vergopoulos landed property, whether in its feudal or its 
capitalist form, by taking advantage of the so-called 'rigidity 
of land supply', constitutes an obstacle to the'growth of 
capitalism. Despite his talk of "social availability" of land, 
Vergopoulos considers both the scarcity of land and 'diminishing 
returns' to be a product of nature itself. It is because of 
this that Vergopoulos can talk of both feudal and capitalist 
rent as if they were the same thing. 
It should be noted that Marx addresses both the question 
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of diminishing returns and that of the so-called' scarcity of 
land himself. Marx disposes of the question of diminishing 
returns with his famous remark regarding the Edinburgh Review's 
contention that the whole of England could not be fed through the 
cultivation of Soho Square: 
"IF this be considered a special disadvantage of 
agriculture, precisely the opposite is true ... [In large-scale industry - M. N. ) .. a the fixed 
capital invested in machinery etc., does not improve 
through use, but on the contrary wears out ... The 
soil, however, if properly treated, improves all the 
time. The advantage of the soil, permitting successive 
investments of capital to bring gains without loss 
of previous-investments, implies the possibility of 
differences in yield from these successive investments 
of capital. " C1865a/1974: 7813 
A similar argument can be made vis-a-vis the nation of 
'scarcity'. The investment of capital on-land-actually produces 
land. This is after all what Marx's theory of DR II implies, 
as this rent arises from different capital investments on 
equal lands, which amount to the same thing as equal capital 
investments on different lands. 
"Differential rent II is merely differently expressed 
Differential rent I ... It is still the soil which, 
now as before, shows different fertility with the 
same investment in capital, save that here the same 
soil performs for capital successively invested in 
different portions what various kinds of soil do 
in the case , of differential rent I for different 
equal portions of social capital invested in them. " 
[ibid.: 678] 
Land, therefore, can in a sense be reproduced and extended. 
It only appears as scarce under capitalist relations of private 
property because the proceeds of extra investments go to the 
landlord. In the absence of such relations, the benefits of 
increased productivity accrue to all of society and not to 
landed property. For Marx, unlike Vergopoulos, it is note. 
nature and 'scarcity' which produce the social relations of 
landed property and rent,. but social relations which produce 
scarcity. 
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Bourgeois economics is always trying to convince us that 
'capital', as well as all 'resources', are naturally scarce. 
This view is also evident in the concept of man/land ratio for 
example, where a piece of land is said to be able to support, 
a given number of individuals. This notion, however, presupposes 
not only a particular level of technological development, but 
also particular forms of social organisation and co-operation. ' 
Scarcity is not given by nature; it is historically and socially 
produced. These arguments have been generally ignored by the 
debate surrounding Vergopoulos' work. See Mouzelis [1976] and 
[1979] and Vergopoulos [1978]. 
149. Although Emmanuel refers to a passage in Marx (1863b/1969: 
332-33, the point made by Marx is in essence the same as the 
one he makes above. 
150. Hindess and Hirst (1975: 109] also assert that "absolute 
rent can exist under pre-capitalist conditions". Even though 
this point may not always be made explicitly, it is a necessary 
corollary of the view of landed property as an ahistorical 
juridical relation. I' 
151.1 have commented briefly on such a position in note (119) 
above. 
152. See note C51] above. 
153. As landlords create their own conditions of existence, they 
could reproduce themselves for ever. In order to account For 
the disappearance of landed property, the dominant conception 
of rent has recourse to an extra discursive as yet untheorised' 
political 'level'. As absolute rent is thought to be an effect 
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of private ownership, an abolition of this legal relation 
through the mere nationalisation of the land by the State, is 
thought to be sufficient to abolish not only e`class of 
landlords, but also landed property (rent relations]. See 
Hindess and Hirst (op. cit.: 294]. These authors confuse'the 
structural category of landed property with the phenomenal 
category of landownership. I have already noted that the mere 
fact of land nationalisation does not necessarily abolish landed 
property. See also Massey and Catalano (op. cit.: 47-8]. 
154. As Marx stresses: "differential rent presupposes the. 
existence of a monopoly in landownership ,.. " [18658/1974: 751]. 
155. Ricardo only recognised the existence of differential rent 
because he failed to distinguish between value and price of 
production, although for him differential rent is a'product of 
the soil, and not an effect of historically specific capitalist 
production relations, as he considers these relations to be 
natural and eternal. Also for Ricardo, DR II is a mere variant 
of DR I, which for Marx constitutes [in Capital at least)'a 
specific category. Marx discusses Ricardo's theory of rent 
primarily in his C1863b/19691 and in his [1863c/1972). In 
these texts Marx considers DR II as a mere variant of DR I 
(the term 'DR II' does not appear in them], while in his 
(1865a/1974) the former constitutes a separate category. 
156. See Fine (1980: 328] for example. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. See for instance Marx [1858a/1969]; [1867/1974: Part 81; 
C1865a/1974: ch. 47); [1852/1973); [1881b/1969]. A similar 
point is valid with regard to Engels: see for instance Engels 
[1850/1977); [1870/1977]; [1874/1977]; [1894b/1973]., 
2. See Duggett [1975]. 
3. See Lenin Cf899d/19721. 
4. See for example the Economy and Society editorial 
introduction to Kautsky (1900/1976) and Colletti_(1972: 100]. 
5. See for example Lenin's laudatory review of Kautsky's: 
Bernstein and the Social Democratic Programme: an anti-critique, 
Lenin Cf899e/19721. 
6. Colletti [op. cit. ] For example, shows quite clearly that 
the debate between Bernstein and Kautsky was conducted on an 
economistic terrain. 
7. In particular his [1899a/1972]. 
8. At this point I should stress the debt of gratitude I owe 
to the work of P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, and especially to the 
arguments of Corrigan at al. [1978] and [1979] which have 
exercised a strong indirect influence on this chapter despite 
any reservations I may have concerning some of their theoretical 
positions and their concept of production relations in particular. 
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9. By the same token, Lenin's theoretical position in this 
respect could be said to allow for the reproduction of 
bourgeois practices and hence a bourgeoisie within a socialist 
social formation. 
10. Apart from the works of Corrigan et al. cited above, see 
Bettelheim [1976] and [1978]; Rossanda [1971]. 
11. Colletti Cop. cit.: passim] provides an excellent detailed 
critique of the economism of the Second International, its 
philosophical underpinnings, as well as an account of. the 
debates between Bernstein and Kautsky in this period. In 
particular he argues that the Second International created a 
'marxism' which constituted a Weltanschauung which attempted 
to develop universally valid 'laws' of both nature and society, 
and in which Engels' notion of 'dialectical materialism' formed 
the main theoretical pivot. 
12. See Sayer (1975: 792-5]. Engels' famous caveats are to be 
found in Engels C1890a, b & c/1975). 
13. This separation lies at the basis of both idealism and 
vulgar materialism; each is but a mirror image of the other. 
It also constitutes, as we have seen in Part 1, one of the basic 
elements of the problematic of dualism. Sayer (1975] and (1979) 
argues correctly that Marx's innovation consists precisely in 
arguing against this separation. 
14, The debate between Kautsky and Bernstein was very much 
concerned with whether large enterprises were technically more 
'advanced' than smaller ones. See Colletti (op. cit. ]. 
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15. Remaining consistent with its economic determinism, this 
position asserts the 'inferiority' of [both agricultural and 
industrial] small-scale production [and the 'superiority' of 
large-scale production] on technical grounds alone. The 
productivity of these enterprises is thus understood as 
determined solely by technique, irrespective of the social 
relations within which these are situated. In addition small- 
scale enterprises are seen as pre-capitalist leftovers which 
are destined to disappear. The justification for their so-called 
pre-capitalist nature is supposedly the fact that they are 
based on family labour [the absence of wage-labour] and own the 
means of production. One of the few writers during the time 
of the Second International to understand that small-scale 
production [and a petty bourgeoisie] is actually produced and 
reproduced by capitalism, was Rosa Luxembourg: 
}f .. to see the progressive 
disappearance of the 
middle-size enterprise as a necessary result of the 
development of large industry is to misunderstand 
sadly the nature of this process. 
According to Marxist theory, small capitalists 
play in the general course of capitalist development 
the role of pioneers of technical change, they possess 
that role in a double sense. They initiate new methods 
of production in well established branches of industry; 
they are instrumental in the creation of new branches of 
production not yet exploited by the big capitalist. 
It is false to imagine that the history of the middle- 
size capitalist establishments proceeds rectilinearly 
in the direction of their progressive disappearance. 
The course of this development is on the contrary 
purely dialectical and moves constantly among 
contradictions ... The struggle of the average size 
enterprise against big capital cannot be considered a 
regularly proceeding battle in which the troops of the 
weaker party continue to melt away directly and 
quantitatively ... IF one admits that small capitalists 
are pioneers of technical progress, and if it is true 
that the latter is the vital pulse of the capitalist 
economy, then it is manifest that small capitalists are 
an integral part of capitalist development, and they 
will disappear only with capitalist development. " 
[Luxembourg, 1900/n. d.: 24-61 
Recent research has emphasised the erroneous nature of the 
view of the progressive disappearance of small-scale production, 
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in agriculture also. See for example: Amin and Vergopoulos 
C19743; Gledhill C19813. I return to a discussion of this 
question in Chapter 7, section 1. 
16. In a concept of 'stratification' classes are not seen as 
existing only in their interrelations in struggle. It follows 
that a differentiation of the peasantry into strata is 
compatible with a notion of a unified 'peasantry'. This, 
strictly speaking, cannot be the case if the peasantry is 
understood as being differentiated into classes which only 
exist in struggle. 
17. See Colletti [op. cit. ]. 
r 
18. See Colletti [op. cit. ] and Corrigan at al. [1978: 28). 
19. See for example Lenin [1914d/1977: 74]; [1916b/1976]. 
20. It should be noted that this does not prove or disprove 
the point that the theoretical underpinnings of Second 
International economism find their origins in Engels' mature 
works. It could be the case that Engels' statements on 
agriculture and the peasantry are inconsistent with his 
theoretical position. 
21. See Marx C1865a/1974: ch. 47, Section 51. This category is 
referred to as 'middle peasant' in the literature by Lenin and 
Mao. 
22. Marx is sometimes more sophisticated. For example, he 
states explicitly that small-scale rural proprietorship existed 
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under several pre-capitalist modes of production, and that 
"it is found among modern nations as one of the forms arising 
from the dissolution of feudal landownership", [186Sa/1974: 806]. 
This implies that small independent rural ownership is the 
product of capitalist development. See Chapter 7, section 1 
of this text for a fuller discussion of Marx's arguments on 
petty-commodity production. 
23. The manner in which this takes place is, he suggests, 
through the savings of labour-power which result from co-operation, 
thus freeing labour-power for other tasks. See [op. cit.: 635]. 
24. Op. cit.: 635. 
25. Although the basis of Engels' classification of the peasantry 
is not made clear, it is noteworthy that he uses the terms 
'small', 'middle' and 'large', rather than 'poor', 'middle' 
and 'rich'. It can be inferred without much doubt, both from 
his terminological preference as well as from his overall 
approach, that Engels is stratifying the peasantry according 
to the size of their enterprises. This would also explain why 
he equates the 'small-'- peasants with ; parcel owners and not 
with potential agricultural wage-labourers, despite his 
insistence on their ruin. It is interesting that twenty-five 
years earlier, Engels had classified the German peasantry in 
a slightly different manner, referring to the parcel owners as 
an intermediary category and distinguishing them from a category 
of small peasants. See Engels [1870/1977: 14-15]. 
26. Marx himself sometimes puts forward a similar argument. 
In 1675, for instance, he asserts that the position of the 
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proletariat should be to stop the peasants from, wrecking a 
proletarian revolution by facilitating their transition to 
collective ownership. He sometimes, therefore, tends to see 
peasants as potential enemies which have to be neutralised. 
See Marx (1875a/1976). On the other hand, in other texts 
Marx argues that it is possible for traditional forms of peasant 
co-operation, like the obschina in Russia, to form the basis 
of socialist advance. See Marx (1681b/1969). For greater 
detail on Marx's contradictory statements on the peasantry, 
see Duggett [op. cit. ]. 
27. To my knowledge there is as yet no full English translation 
of The Agrarian Question, which was originally composed of 
two volumes. What is available is a translation of selected 
parts of the French edition of the first volume of the book - 
the mainly theoretical volume. - which appeared in Economy and 
Society, vol. 5, no. 1, February 1976. I shall quote as much 
as possible From this text which I refer to as Kautsky 
[1900/1976). I shall also quote from the original French 
translation, especially where passages do not appear in the 
English version. This text is referred to as Kautsky (1900/1970). 
The translations are my own. 
28. Kautsky refers to Sombart's criticisms of this form of 
'marxism', which are elaborated precisely in such terms. 
See [1900/1976: 2]. 
29. It should be stressed that what Kautsky terms 'tendencies' 
are for him necessary lines of evolution. It is only the 
manner of their realisation in social formations which differs. 
30. Kautsky makes similar remarks throughout his work which 
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directly contradict Marx's arguments in Capital Volume one, 
Part 8, "The so-called Primitive Accumulation". He goes so 
far as to suggest that the proletarianisation of the peasantry 
and the transformation of rural property in the period of the 
transition to capitalism, was the direct result of the 'economic 
evolution of the town'. See inter alia [1900/1976: 5,7-8,9]. 
31. Kautsky, (1900/1970: iii-iv]. 
32. The congruence between this argument of Kautsky's and the 
developmentalist and neo-mercantilist variants of dualism 
discussed in Part 1, is not fortuitous. All these positions 
adhere to immanentist conceptions of agriculture and industry, 
considering them to form self-reproducing unities or totalities. 
This congruence has even been noted by at least one develop- 
mentalist [Lipton, 1974: 309) who rightly stresses the 
similarities between his own position and that of Kautsky. 
33. See for example [1900/1970: 163]; (1900/1976: 3,35]. 
34. This is the case despite the fact that under the influence 
of industry, peasants have become pure agriculturalists 
(1900/1976: 4). In spite of asserting this feature, Kautsky 
insists in considering peasants as pre-capitalist leftovers 
because of the 'backwardness' of their productive techniques. 
35. See [1900/1976: 35-38]; [1900/1970: ch. 8]. 
36. See [1900/1970: 347-B]'where Kautsky qualifies as 'medium' 
peasants those owning 5 to 20 hectares. It should be noted 
that he says that even middle peasants generally rely solely on 
family labour. 
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37. See (1900/1976: 21-8); (1900/1970: 138-60). 
38. See 01900/1976: 33-43; 01900/1970: 227-36,395-63. 
39. According to Ennew, Hirst and Tribe (1977: 302], Keutsky 
develops precisely this point in the second volume of 
The Agrarian Question. I should perhaps make it clear at this 
point that the object of my argument is not to suggest-that 
Kautsky is wrong to oppose the conditions of peasant production 
defended by the utopians and populists. Rather, I"am'suggesting 
that he is mistaken to'consider that there is such a , thing as 
'peasant production''in general, -at all. His adherence to a 
notion of a unitary 'peasantry' leads Kautsky to promote a 
programme which opposes all peasants, and which thereby operates 
to the advantage-of the rich peasants [the peasant bourgeoisie). 
40. Kautsky refers to lease money by the French term-'le fermage' 
which in the English version is translated as 'rent charge'. 
See for instance [1900/1970: 111] and. [1900/1976: 20] from which 
the following remarks are taken: 
"Where the agricultural capitalist and the landowner- 
are two distinct persons, the surplus profit accrues 
to the latter. But normally the landowner will not 
receive more than this [assuming that the tenant 
cultivates according to capitalist norms], for unless 
the tenant expects to retrieve an average profit, he 
will not continue business and the landowner will have no 
tenant left. On the other hand, where the landlord's 
rent-charge is less than ground rent, a part of the 
surplus profit will stay with the tenant and he will 
thus have'realised a profit higher than the average. 
Competition attracted by this profit, will therefore 
tend to increase the rent charge. " 
(The last sentence is not included in the English 
translation and is translated from 1900/1970: 111] 
As I have already argued in Chapter 5, the limits to real 
economic rent (whether differential or absolute] have nothing 
to do with 'competition' simpliciter, but are the result of 
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the social production relations under which agricultural 
production takes place. Kautsky's argument can thus only have 
some validity for lease-money. Hence it is clear that Kautsky 
is conflating rent and lease-money. 
41. This error is generally accompnaied by an equating of 
absolute rent and monopoly rent, as I have explained in 
Chapter 5. Kautsky illustrates this false equation perfectly: 
see 01900/1976: 20-13; and especially [1900/1970: 111-20]. 
I 
42. On the other hand, Kautsky sees differential rent as a 
purely capitalist form of, rent which is supposedly the result 
of competition. See for example [1900/1970: 118 ff]. 
43. See Ennew, Hirst and Tribe Cop. cit.: 2971. 
44. See particularly his arguments concerning the persistence 
of a middle-peasantry in [1900/1970: chs. 7,8 & 91. 
45. Although I have not insisted on Kautsky's view of marxism 
as a Weltanschauung, the following quote may provide some 
indication of"the philosophical underpinnings of Kautsky's 
position: 
"Human society is an organism, different from those 
of the animal or plant, but an organism none the less. 
It is absurdýto think that in any society one part can 
develop in one direction, and another in some other 
direction. Society can follow only one line of 
development. But it does not follow that each part of 
this organism should contain within itself the life 
force of its own growth; it is enough that one portion 
of the organism produces the forces necessary to sustain 
the whole of it. If large-scale industry is progressing 
towards socialism and if large-scale industry is the 
dominant power in modern society, this line of evolution 
will win for socialism other domains not capable, on 
their own, of creating the conditions for this revolution. 
It must do so, in its own interests, in the interests of 
the unity and harmony of society. " C1900/1976: 483 
rr 
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46. I will be primarily concerned with Lenin's writings on 
agriculture, rather than with those of other Bolsheviks, because 
his were by far the most sophisticated. Nevertheless most 
Bolshevik writing operated within what Corrigan at al. 01978: 271 
refer to as a "social problematic"; a framework of ideas and 
practices, where debates took place within a set of strictly 
defined, if implicit, limits. I consider Lenin's arguments 
to be representative of this framework. It is not so much that. 
his writings can be considered as in any way 'typical', but 
rather that Lenin remains, beyond question, the best advocate 
of the more general Bolshevik problematic in its orientation 
to rural questions. Other Bolshevik writings on agriculture, 
such as those by Preobrazhensky, Stalin, Bukharin and Trotsky, 
are extremely vulgar in comparison. 
47. See Corrigan at al. (1978: 31]. 
48. In 1914 there were in Russia only 3-4 million wage- 
labourers and over 100 million peasants. Corrigan at al. 
[op. cit.: 33). 
49. See Bleaner C1976: ch. 7], for a modern discussion of 
Russian Populism. 
50. For further examples in Lenin's early writings of 
analyses of developing capitalism in terms of emerging social 
relations, see inter alia (1894/1977: 467-9,471,474,479,480,481); 
(1899a/1972: ch. 2 and passim), where the interpenetration of 
agriculture and industry in the process of capitalist 
development is emphasised, and where the differentiation of 
the peasantry into opposing classes is analysed. 
{. 2p 
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51. Lenin argues in this, manner in 1899. On the other hand, 
by: 1907 his, thinking has changed and he mentions only the 
progressive side of the Narodnik programme, while ignoring 
its reactionary side which he feels cannot possibly succeed. 
See for example (1907k/1972: 347) and note [71] below. 
52. See especially [1894/1972: 474,480]. 
53. I am grateful to P. Gibbon for drawing my attention to this 
passage. 
In addition it should be stressed that Lenin categorically, 
asserts on several occasions that the peasants cannot be 
brought into the Social Democratic Party which they would 
'pollute' with their petty-bourgeois ideas. The following 
remark is illustrative of his position on this score: 
" 'Our Movement' is the Social-Democratic Labour. Movement. 
The peasant masses cannot just be 'brought' into it: 
that is not problematic but impossible, and there was 
never any question of it. " 
(1902b/1964: 120, emphasis in original) 
See also [1906c/1972: 237). 
54. Lenin himself notes in 1914 that: 
"The Narodniks _ . _... -defend 
[in practice] the interests 
of the exploiters of hired labour when they talk about 
the 'peasantry' and 'peasant economy', for the more 
the peasant ressembles a 'proprietor', the more he 
exploits hired labour. 
It is in-the interests of the, bourgeoisie. [in. whose 
footsteps the Narodniks blindly follow] to confuse 
the peasant proletariat with the peasant bourgeoisie. 
It is in the interests of the proletariat to combat 
this confusion and to draw a clear line between classes 
everywhere, including the peasantry. It is useless 
deceiving oneself and others by talking about the 
'peasantry'. We should-ourselves learn and teach the 
peasants that even among the peasantry the gulf between 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is widening day 
by day. " 
C1914a/1972: 113] 
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There is perhaps no clearer indication of the contradictions 
within Lenin's writings than that which is implied by this 
statement. Unfortunately Lenin fails to pursue in a consistent 
manner the correct position which he outlines in the above 
remark. The class struggle between a proletarian line and a 
bourgeois line is taking place systematically within Lenin's 
practice. 
55. This is indeed what happened in Russia before and after 
the revolution. See Bettelheim 01976: 100-1,210-24). 
56. See also [1899a/1972: 161) where the middle peasants are 
visualised as disappearing along with capitalist development. 
As far as I am aware, nowhere do we find in Lenin an explicit 
examination of the production and reproduction of small-scale 
[non wage-labour] production under capitalism. Petty-commodity 
production, whether rural or industrial, tends to be 
unproblematically attributed to the past. 
57. Cf. the following remark in relation to the small peasants 
which is rather enlightening: 
fý ... the small peasant, who 
is being oppressed and 
ruined by all modern capitalism, should desert his 
own class standpoint and place himself at the 
standpoint of the proletariat. " 
Cibid.: 125, emphasis in original! ) 
Hence, for Lenin even the partly proletarianised peasant is a 
petty-bourgeois and a member of the 'peasantry' First and 
foremost, i. e., a member of a separate class from the 
proletariat. Even the agricultural wage-labourers are not 
-exactly members of the proletariat for Lenin: 
ýý ... our rural 
labourers are still too closely 
connected with the peasantry, they are still too 
heavily burdened with the misfortunes of the 
peasantry as a whole to enable the movement of the 
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rural workers to assume national significance, either 
now or in the immediate future. " 
[1901a/1972: 424) 
The 'backwardness' of agriculture seems, for Lenin, to permeate 
all its-social classes. 
58. See [1903/1964: 392-33. During this period, Lenin's 
opposition to co-operatives is in large measure identical to 
Kautsky's. He remains in favour of co-operatives only during 
the socialist stage once the bourgeoisie has been defeated and 
on large estates only [1903/1964: 413]. 
59, Ibid.: 423. Lenin argues that these political demands will: 
... strengthen the alliance of-the rural proletarians and 
semiproletarians with the urban proletarians ... And when 
that alliance is established and strengthened, we shall 
easily expose all the deceit the bourgeoisie resorts to 
in order to attract the middle peasant; we shall easily 
and quickly take the second, the third and the last 
step against the entire bourgeoisie, against all the 
government forces, and we shall unswervingly march to 
victory and rapidly achieve the complete emancipation 
of all working people. " 
01903/1964: 423) 
Lenin seems to be maintaining in this passage that bourgeois 
political demands are sufficient to consolidate a worker/peasant 
alliance. He seems not to appreciate the fact that the policies 
which he advocates, if unaccompanied by mass mobilisation, 
will lead primarily to the strengthening of the [rural] 
bourgeoisie, thus making any attempt at a future socialist 
revolution mubh more difficult. This position implies an 
extremely rigid conception of stages. 
60. Although I shall return to this point below, I should 
perhaps stress at this point that I am not directing my 
criticisms at the concept of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, 
nor at the notion of stages which it implies. The main problem 
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it seems to me, is not the notion of stages as such but the 
manner in which it is conceptualised. 'Hence I am merely 
concerned-here with a discussion of Lenin's conception of the 
bourgeois revolution, in the same manner as I will be concerned 
below with examining Mao's understanding of the same notion. 
It seems to. me that some. conception of revolutionary stages, 
is necessary for any revolutionary party. This does not:. of 
itself-imply any teleology. What it does mean-, is that-the 
Party must continuously reappraise the balance of class 'forces 
and alliances which occur in any conjuncture and that it can 
only plan its strategy on the basis of these (changing] relations. 
Further, in a revolutionary situation, different revolutionary 
classes. may advocate similar demands which are bourgeois in 
nature: greater democracy, national freedom, and so on. They 
do so, not because of any lack of 'true' consciousness, but 
because they are the products of a bourgeois society and must 
initially operate within it. It is only later, as the struggle 
sharpens, that the difference between these classes are thrown 
to the fore. See [1907f/1972: 405]. 
61. See Mao [1926b/1971]. 
62. As I have had occasion to remark in Chapter 5, the roots 
of this distinction are to be found in Marx, but the first 
explicit mention by Lenin of the 'two roads' to the capitalist 
development of agriculture in Russia is to be found in his 
C1905/19743. The notion is developed thereafter in his 
[1906c/19723 and his C1907a, b, c, e, f, g, i & k/19723 in particular. 
63. For Lenin's comments on Stolypin's land reform see inter 
alia his C1907b/1972: 234-53; C1907e/1972: 256-7a and his [1911/1974 
1003 
64. Lenin's discussions of Marx's theory of capitalist ground- 
rent are to be found primarily in his [1901b/1973) and his , 
C1907k/1972: 294-325). 
I 
65. I am aware that Lenin says 'non'-capitalist rather than 
'pre'-capitalist, but the landlords' supposed 'monopoly' must 
be founded on social relations of one kind or another. As 
Lenin has excluded capitalist relations, and these cannot be., 
relations of a socialist nature either, it follows that the 
basis of this 'monopoly' must be some form of pre-capitalist 
relations. The following remark by. Lenin clarifies, this point 
entirely: 
".... differential rent is inevitably an inherent 
feature of every form of capitalist agriculture. 
Absolute rent is-not; itarises only under the 
historically created backwardness of agriculture, 
a backwardness that becomes fixed by monopoly. " 
C1907k/1972: 298 - emphasis added) 
66. This point is made explicit in C1907k/1972: 2993 where 
Lenin quotes a long passage on rent from Kautsky's The Agrarian 
Question in defence of his own arguments. 
67. See inter alia (1906b/1972: 438); [1913a/1977: 206]. 
68. CF. also C1907a/1972: 181]. 
69. See [1910/1974: 4393; [1913b/1977: 376-7]. 
70. See [1907k/1972: 267-87,366-429). 
71. It is surprising in fact how far Lenin is prepared to go 
in his support of the Narodnik programme, as, during this period, 
the reactionary side of their programme no longer seems to be 
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considered a , problem. One possible reason for this may be 
that he considers that the revolutionary effect of their 
programme will destroy the basis of their utopian 'peasant- 
socialism': 
"The fuller and"the more decisive the victory of"the 
peasant revolution, the sooner will the peasantry 
be converted into free, bourgeois farmers, who will 
'give the sack' to Narodnik 'socialism'. " 
[1907k/1972: 347] 
Lenin's underestimation of the power of the rich peasantry and 
of utopian socialism, was not one of his better judgements. 
In this respect Lenin's position after 1905--is inferior to his 
earlier position, which emphasised to a greater extent the 
contradictory nature of Narodnism. His later position seems, 
therefore, to be much more linear in its conception of 
development:, the bourgeois revolution is seen as progressive 
rather than contradictory. 
72. It should be noted, though, that Lenin's practice is 
supporting a different fraction of the bourgeoisie from that 
supported by the Mensheviks. While the latter supported what 
I have called a 'landlord-led' form of agrarian capitalist 
development, Lenin puts his support behind a 'capital-led' 
process guided by the rich peasants. 
73. - Apart from his (1915/1964] see also, for example, his 
[1910/1974]. 
74.. Although there are indications that he changed his position 
with regard to co-operation towards the end of his life, Lenin 
was not able to restructure his theory so as to explain the 
need for, such practices. See (1923a/1973); (1923b/1973). It 
should also be noted that during the period I discuss in the 
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text, Lenin restricts his demands in the bourgeois revolution 
primarily to economic and legal measures, while ignoring 
possible alterations in other spheres [e. g., culture, ideology, 
the position of women] which, if combined with the former, could 
alter feudal production relations to a much greater extent. 
This line, as we shall see, was the one pursued by Mao. Lenin 
is therefore still very much influenced by Second International 
conceptions in his understanding of social transformation. 
75. Bettelheim Cop. cit.: 220-4] notes that an attempt, was made 
by the Bolsheviks in 1918 to ally primarily with the poor 
peasants, rather than with the peasantry as a whole. This 
change of strategy failed, Bettelheim argues, because of the 
absence of party organisation in the rural areas: 
"Above all, because of the lack of an adequate 
presence of the Bolshevik Party in the rural areas, 
it had led to a relative revitalization of the mir, 
owing to the role the latter played in the sharing-out 
of the land, for which it was the instrument, and this 
meant the consolidation of a certain 'unity' of the 
village in relation to the town, a 'unity' which 
benefitted the well-to-do and middle elements among the 
peasantry. " (Bettelheim, op. cit.: 223-4] 
See also Lenin (1918/1974) where only the middle peasantry, as 
opposed to the peasantry as a whole, is now considered as 
petty bourgeois. It should be clear after my discussion, that 
the causes of the events and failures noted by Bettelheim, are 
rooted to a large extent in the kind of theory and practice 
advocated by Lenin himself; although see his [1919/1974: 139-40]. 
76. See Preobrazhensky [1926/1965: ch. 2] where, it is asserted 
that capitalism develops through an 'accumulation of capital' 
[means of production, raw materials, money] on the basis of the 
plundering of peasant production, and the exploitation of a 
backward agriculture by industry; and that socialism should 
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proceed on a similar basis. The dualism of this conception, 
has already-been ascertained and there should be no need to 
distinguish it from Marx's arguments, although the following, 
quotation may be useful: 
"Nothing 
. can_... _. _.. _ be . more 
foolish than to think that 
the original formation of capital proceeded in such 
away that-capital accumulated, and created the 
objective conditions of production - means of 
subsistence, 
raw materials, instruments - and then offered them to the 
workers who were denuded of them. 
... in the term capital much is subsumed that does not 
apparently belong to the concept. E. g., capital is 
loaned. It is accumulated, etc. In all these expressions 
it appears to be a mere object ... 
(rather - M. N. ] it is 
evidently. a relation and can only be a relation of 
12roduction. 11 
Marx, 1858a/1979: 127-8,1343 
A notion of 'primitive accumulation' seems to have prevailed 
among the writings of the major Bolsheviks during the 1920's. 
Apart from Preobrazhensky 01926/19651 see Bukharin [1920/1971: 111) 
for example, along with Lenin's marginal utterances on the 
question. See also Mavrakis 01976: 51-33 for a critical 
statement of Trotsky's use of the concept. See also K. Smith 
C19793. For the consideration of other aspects of capitalist 
development and the position of agriculture, treated within 
the same problematic, see Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 
C1919/1970: chs. 2 & 131. See also the discussion in Corrigan 
at al. C1978: ch. 3). 
77. It is interesting to note how as late as'1914 Lenin 
outlines the 'basics' of marxism, in a manner which remains 
faithful to Second International precepts. See C1914d/1977: 
71-2,75). 
78. In comparison, the proletariat only numbered '2 million 
(1926b/1971: 17]. 
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79. See also his-C1926a/1969: passim3. See his [1933a/1977) 
and (1933b/1969) where'the manner in which Mao differentiates 
between rural classes is outlined. Acreage is not one of the 
criteria he uses; rather', these include ownerhsip of land 
and means of production, utilisation of labour-power, and so 
on. 
80. In his C1926b/1971: 153 Mao refers to these two categories ' 
as forming the "rural masses". 
81. This brilliant text' systematically elaborates and defends 
Mao's strategic position during this period. It should be 
basic reading for all those who wish to discover what a 
political strategy consists of. See also his [1940a/1975] 
and his C1940b/19751. 
82. See C1940c/1975: 446]; C1943a/1975); C1943b/1975); 
C1945a/1975); C1945b/1975). Incidentally, 'a discussion of 
capitalist ground-rent is entirely absent from Mao's work as 
he rightly considered the Chinese landlords to be essentially 
feudal. A study of pre-capitalist forms of rent in pre- 
revolutionary China is provideq by Chen Po-ta [1966), who 
states'explicitly [pp. 34-41) that the categories of capitalist 
ground-rent' were-inapplicable to China in this period. 
83. For an excellent discussion of Mao's conception of the 
national bourgeoisie as a class, see Gibbon [1980]. 
84. This trait, it should be noted,, is also entirely applicable 
to the Chilean bourgeoisie; see Charriere [1975]. 
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85. - By 'the people' or 'the nation', Mao is referring to all 
those revolutionary classes in alliance behind the leadership 
of-the proletariat. Who 'the people' are changes in each 
conjünctural situation or stage of the'social transformation 
process. It is important to note that, during the period of 
Resistance against Japan, the comprador bourgeoisie and the 
landlords are not simply considered to be outside 'the people', 
but also outside 'the nation'; they are traitors and anti-Chinese. 
Mao shows here that bourgeois concepts can'be transformed into 
socialist'concepts'and utilised in a non-bourgeois manner. 
This is a crucial point which is never understood by the 
dependency theorists°and other 'Third World. nationalists'. 
See Mao's'[1940a/1975: 351] and his [1957/1977: 385]. See also 
in this context, Gibbon 019791 and the important work by 
Laclau on populism [Laclau, 1977: ch. 41. 
86., For accounts of the experience of class struggle during 
the'land reform period, see inter alia Chang Su (1952/1979] 
and-Hinton [1966). 
87. At this point in the text Mao inserts a reference to 
Lenin [1923a/1973). Thereýis therefore no contradiction 
between Mao's statement and the argument on Lenin which I have 
elaborated above. See note (74]. 
88. The lessons learnt from the experience of the Border Region 
years were in later years to be extensively applied throughout 
the Chinese social formation. See Watson [1980]; Corrigan 
et'al. 01979: 45-61); Selden C19743. 
89. For an account of what Mao and the CPC meant by a 
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'proletarian style' in the behaviour of party cadres, and of 
the rectification campaigns during this period, see Hinton 
C1966: Parts 4& 53 and [1970]. See also inter she Mao 
[1942a/1975]. For the role of the Party and political practice 
which this implies see Corrigan et, al. [1979: passim]. 
90. Corrigan at al. [1979: 3 and passim]. 
91. See for instance [1927/1977]; [1928/1977]; [1930b/1971]; 
[1941/1975]; [1942b/1980]. 
92. The outline of Mao's historical materialism presented here 
will necessarily be a. brief one, as it is limited by the 
present discussion of Mao's, conception of the bourgeois 
democratic revolution. After 1953 Mao further developed his 
theory in greater detail. For a systematic evaluation of 
Mao's marxism see Corrigan at al. [1979] and for a discussion 
of Mao in relation to the Bolsheviks see Corrigan at al. 
[1978: ch. 4]. See also Rossanda, (1971). 
93. As I have noted, Mao, understands that the opposition 
between town and country or between agriculture and industry, 
can only be overcome by a class alliance between the proletariat 
and the poor peasants. The consequences of this view for 
increasing production, means an equal reliance on agriculture 
and industry, and not an emphasis on [heavy] industry to the 
exclusion of agriculture. Mao realises perfectly well that 
increased production cannot succeed without realisation, without 
a rise in the standard of living of the masses. These points 
are developed in particular in [1956/1975] and [1960/1977]. 
See also Corrigan at al. [1979: 34-41]; Gray [1973]. 
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94. The changing of social relations in order'to reise 
production is perhaps best illustrated in the collection 
Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside which was edited by 
Mao. See-Mao [1955c]. See also Gray C19703 and Corrigan et al. 
[1979: 61-75)'for commentaries on the theory and practice 
surrounding the text. In addition, Mao's understanding of 
classes as practices has one major consequence for socialist 
construction' which needs stressing. This is that bourgeois 
practices will reproduce bourgeois production relations and the 
bourgeoisie itself during the period of socialist construction. 
It follows that continuous class struggle is-necessary under 
socialism itself in order to destroy, not simply the vestiges 
and leftovers of the bourgeoisie, ' but the production and 
reproduction of bourgeois relations under socialism: 
"Under socialism there may be no war but there is still 
struggle, struggle among sections of the people; 
there may be no revolution of one class overthrowing 
another, but there is still revolution. The transition 
from socialism to communism is revolutionary. The 
transition from one stage of communism to another is 
also ... in a socialist society ... there still remain 
differences between mental and manual labour, city and 
countryside, worker and peasant. Although these are not 
antagonistic contradictions they cannot be resolved 
without struggle ... In the course of socialist 
development each and every period is bound to have a 
group that is more than willing to preserve backward 
production relations and social institutions. On 
many, many questions the prosperous middle peasants' 
have their own point of view. They cannot adapt to 
new developments, and some of them resist such 
developments ... " [1960/1977: 71-2) 
Compare this with Lenin's account of the gradual depletion in 
numbers of the bourgeois class under socialism and its 
consequent disappearance, in his discussion of the 'withering 
away' of the State in his (1917/1977]. 
95. The measure of agreement between the position developed 
by Mao and Marx's theory is not solely restricted to the 
relation between social production relations and social 
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productive forces. It should also be clear after this 
argument, that for Mao the production relations themselves can 
only be altered via a transformation of the social formation 
as a whole, ' and not simply through an altering of the economy 
and ownerhsip relations. This is because Mao understands 
perfectly well the relation 'and distinction between phenomenal 
Forms and essential relations stressed by Marx'. See inter alia 
[1930a/1977: 119]; ß[1937b/1971: 68]; [1960/1977: 73-4', 112]: `" 
Mao's conception of class, class struggle and practice'which 
I have briefly sketched in this section, along with the 
centrality of empirical investigation-which they-imply, is 
congruent with Marx's position. See for example [1937b/1971: 
passim]: For a detailed discussion of these issues see 
Corrigan at al. [1979]. 
96. See Marx [1867/1974: 474-5] For a concise statement. 
97. This argument is particularly associated with Trotsky 
and trotskyites. See Mavrakis Cop. cit. ]'for a useful ' 
discussion of Trotskyism. 
98. Cf. for example Mao C1960/1977: 93). It is important to 
stress at the and of this chapter that it is not my intention 
to give the impression that Mao'provides a 'perfect theory to be 
idealised. There are many problems with 'Maoism' not least 
of which is the extreme voluntarism and subjectivism into which 
it sometimes degenerates. What I wish to suggest-is that Mao's 
marxism and specifically his position on agrarian relations is 
often superior to what often counts as 'classical marxism'. 
His theory of social transformation and agrarian relations 
provides a way to transcend, among other things, the sterility of 
the economism versus populism debate on the peasantry. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1. Most of the debates surrounding the 'persistence' of the 
peasantry in the countries of the present day 'Third World' 
are predicated on the arguments surrounding the question of 
whether the so-called 'classical' conceptualisations of the 
'transition' from feudalism to capitalism can be unproblemat- 
ically applied to situations where capitalism did not develop 
endogenously but was 'imported' From the West. The 1950's 
debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism is 
relevant here [Dobb, 1963; Hilton, -, ed., 
1976) and so is its 
revival by Brenner [1976), [1977) and [1978), as well as the 
debates surrounding the work of Frank, Laclau and Wallerstein 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis. See also the recent 
debate, on modes of production in Indian agriculture which has 
been summarised in Alavi [1975). 
See, for example, Mouzelis [1976] and [19793; Bernstein 
[1979]; Winter [1981. 
3. For Further details surrounding Vergopoulos' position see 
his debate with Mouzelis in the pages of The Journal of Peasant 
Studies: Vergopoulos 019783 and Mouzelis 019763 and [1979). 
4. Examples include Harrison, (1977], Boesen (1979] and 
Gutelman [1974]. 
5. See Chayanov [1966], Kerblay (1971) and Sahlins [1974]. 
6. See in particular Littlejohn (1977], Ennew at al. (1977), 
Hirst [1975]. 
1013 
7. In, for example, Amin (1974c] and`Gutelman"[1974). 
8. See Ojurfeldt [1981] and'Winter [op. cit. ]. 
9. It should be noted first that it cannot be maintained, as 
Berstein seems to do, that 'ii struggle -overcontrol of the 
labour-process is solely characteristic of7the relation between 
capital and the 'peasantry'. This I struggle'is always present- 
in capitalist social formations. To argue otherwise would be' 
tantamount to suggesting that working-cläss-struggles'are only 
concerned with the level of wages, while control of the 
labour-process by capital is assumed to be given. Second, 
the struggle over control'of the labour-process is not a 
struggle in production [as Bernstein seems to maintain], but 
a struggle over the distribution of the product of labour. The 
fact that this particular struggle which Bernstein notes`-should 
exist, presupposes the existence of capitalist relations-of 
production. Let me amplify this point. The struggle which 
Bernstein sees as crucial is centred around the struggle 
over control of the labour-process by a class of labourers and 
a`class of non-labourers. The important question to ask is 
why should this particular struggle be'the'most important? In 
other periods of'history what could be described as the 
'fundamental contradiction' was centred around the struggle 
over the 'control' ['effective possession'] of land between a 
class of labourers who also controlled the labour-process and 
a class of non-labourers who had no direct 'control' over the 
labour-process. In'other historical ' periods and forms of 
social organisation the 'fundamental struggle' could be"over 
access to labour-power. 'Dernstain1s's-Erbdgld by-labourers-and 
non-labourers over 'control' of the labour-process presupposes 
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a particular social relation which remains untheorised: the 
relation between capital and wage-labour. We shall see in our 
discussion below on the 'articulation of modes of production', 
that the notion of 'control'-or 'effective possession' itself 
tends to dehistoricise what are specifically capitalist 
production relations, and to assume that they-are'equally 
applicable across history. The fact that one class-is 
restricted to the 'control' of 'capital', another'to the 'control' 
of land, and yet another to the 'control' of labour-power [with 
the attendant struggles which this implies], is"a historically 
specific effect of the capitalist mode of production. 
10. Again, if it is thought that. this is a distinguishing 
feature of the relation between capital and the peasantry, 
precisely the opposite is the case. The struggle between 
wage-labour and capital also takes the form-of appearance of 
a more or less equal exchange of 'labour' For money, as we 
saw in Chapter S. 
if. See S. George [1976] for a very useful study'on how 
agribusiness 'controls' 'Third World' 'farmers' [whether 
employers of wage-labour or not] through its control of the 
market. See also Burbach and Flynn [1980]. V 
12. Bernstein [1979: 440, n. 153 himself makes a remark to 
this effect. 4 
13. There is a large volume of literature which shows quite 
clearly how petty-commodity production developed as a result, 
of the penetration of capitalism in the colonies. The work 
of Frank and Wallerstein is surely important here. For the 
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case of Africa see, for example, Wallerstein (1976] and for 
Tanzania see, for example, M. Mbilinyi [1981]. 
14. See Emmanuel [1972] and the well known and excellent 
critique by Bettelheim [1972]. Moreover, it will be recalled 
from Chapter 3 that Frank and the theorists of 'dependency' 
never maintained that exploitation between countries or regions 
was purely 'external'. They argued precisely that the dominant 
entity structured the dominated entity 'internally'. The 
similarities between the argument of these authors and that 
advanced by Bernstein should be reasonably apparent. 
15. For reviews and discussions of this debate see Kuhn and 
Wolpe (1978], Molyneux [1979] and Barrett (19803. 
16. This position is taken by Balibar [1970]; For a 'critique' 
of his conception see Hindess and, Hirst [1975: ch. 6]. 
17. It should be noted here that contrary to the position 
taken by Vergopoulos [1974], Marx is not suggesting that 
peasants do not constitute an obstacle to the penetration of 
capital because of any immanent characteristics which they may 
possess, but because in this case the landowner and, the 
capitalist are the same person; that is, independent landed 
property has ceased to exist. 
It is also interesting to note that Max Weber, like Marx, 
also understands that petty-commodity production is an effect 
of the development of capitalism. After noting the character 
of a feudal peasantry by remarking that "until the time of the 
French Revolution, the European peasant was only considered 
as a means for supporting certain ruling classes", Weber, in 
his assessment of rural Germany observes the occurrence that: 
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"The former peasant is thus transformed into a 
labourer who owns his means of production, as we 
may observe in France and South western, Germany. He 
maintains his independence because of the intensity 
and the high quality of his work, which-is increased 
by his private interest in it and his adaptability of 
it to the demands of the local market. These factors 
give him an economic superiority, which continues, even 
where agriculture on a large scale could technically 
predominate. " [Weber, 1970: 365,367, emphasis added] 
18. The equal availability of capital to all capitalists is 
a necessary condition of the process of equalisation. Marx 
notes that: 
... in the differential rent 
in form II9 the 
differences in distribution of'capital [and ability 
to obtain credit] among tenants are added to the 
differences in fertility. " [1865a/1974: 677]- - 
19. See Marx's particularly unsatisfactory formulations in-.:, 
Capital, Volume One, Chapter 32: Historical Tendency of 
Capitalist Accumulation. This chapter consists of only three 
pages, a fact which may contribute. to an explanation as-, to 
why it is (with the Communist Manifesto] the most quoted of 
his texts on the supposedly necessary disappearance of petty- 




20. Another example is'the production of commodities from the, 
waste products of large-scale production in'the`'Third World'. 
For example, commodities manufactured From'tyres, r, bottles, - 
beer cans, paper, etc. "., 
21. See, for example, Mao (1948a/1975: 184-5], [1960/1977: 45). 
22. Perhaps the most extreme example of-this position is to 
be found in the work of Gutelman. For this author, agricultural 
producers who do not employ wage-labour are unproblematically 
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pre-capitalist in whatever society they may find themselves 
(1974: 157]. He even goes so far as to suggest that co-operatives 
are pre-capitalist as they do not employ wage-labour Cibid.: 156]. 
His formalism reaches incredible extremes in his (1971: 35f. ] 
where forms of enterprises are represented by an array of 
symbols, a collection of which is ultimately meant to 
represent the "agrarian structure" [sic] of a social formation. 
23. Indeed Bukharin (op. cit.: 20-21] quotes Marx's comments 
to the effect that the division between town and country sums 
up the whole economic history of society [see this work, 
Chapter 5, p. 342 ], and which is situated within Marx's 
discussion of manufacture, as support for the, fact that 
modern industry creates the same division at the international 
level. 
24. This includes Lenin, despite the fact that in his early 
work he insists that manufacture and industry constitute two 
distinct periods. See, for example, his [1897/1972: 190] and 
his [1899a/1972: chs. 66 7]. 
25. See the arguments surrounding Sweezy's position in 
Hilton, ed., (1976). This problematic position is also sometimes 
taken by Marx, for example in his C1865a/1974: 3253. If 
industrial capitalism and the capitalist mode of production 
are not conflated, this traditional view appears as problematic. 
The systematic association of commercial activity with 
capitalist manufacture and its attendant division of labour 
receives its clearest exposition in the work of Adam Smith, who 
was for Marx "the political economist par excellence of the 
period of Manufacture" C1867/1974: 329n). For Smith, the 
division of labour: 
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f' .., 
is the necessary, though very slow and gradual 
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature 
.., to truck, 
barter and exchange one thing for 
another. " (Smith, 1776/1981: 117] 
26. For an excellent critique of Warren, see Lipietz [1982]. 
27. The character of the world division of labour receives no 
systematic treatment in Lenin [1916a/1964] for example. 
28. In this context the following remark by 3ukharin is rather 
illuminating: 
"World economy is one of the species of social economy 
in general. By social economy the science of political 
economy understands, first of all, a system of individual 
economies interlinked by exchange. " ' Cop. cit. ': 273a - 
This reduces Marx's concept of the social to one of simple 
exchange, that is, to the phenomenal realm of the 'social'. 
29. As is well known, Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage 
was central to his advocation of 'free trade' and the abolition 
of the Corn Laws. For an excellent, 'although phenomenal, " ' 
critique see Emmanuel [1972). Marx comments cn'the"'theory' 
of comparative advantage in the Following manner: 
ýf ... we are told that 
Free Trade would create an 
international division of labour, and thereby give to 
each country those branches of production most in 
harmony with its natural advantages. You believe 
perhaps, gentlemen, that the production of coffee and 
sugar is the natural destiny of the West Indies. 
Two centuries ago, nature, which does not trouble 
itself about commerce, had planted neither sugar-cane 
nor coffee trees there. And it may be that in less than 
half a century you will find there neither coffee nor 
sugar, for the East Indies, by means of cheaper production, 
have already successfully-broken down this so-called 
natural destiny of the West Indies. " 
01848/1976: 4641 
30. In the capitalist relations of production between capital 
and wage-labour, production is exploitation; the two are the 
1019 
same thing. This point should be clear, yet it needs to be 
emphasised. Capital and wage-labour are not independent 
categories which exist and then enter into a relation. Such 
a view would only reproduce the errors of the phenomenal 
exchange relation. It is the relation as such which is primary 
here and not the two categories thus related. As we have seen, 
it is this relation which explains the existence of'classes 
and the revenues which' constitute them as such. This idea 
is precisely the one which Althusser [1976: 50] alludes'to when 
he says that the class struggle is not a football match to which 
classes arrive, and then engage in struggle. -It seems to me, 
however, that Althusser's`formulation lacks precision, for the 
class struggle is not immediately-apparent at the phenomenal 
level. What is immediately apparent is accidental conflict. 
31. As Brenner (1977) rightly argues, both arguments'are 
mirror images of each other. 
32. This argument is as prevalent in his later works ['world 
accumulation') asýin his earlier work. See Frank (1978: chs. 
2&3 and passim]. 
33. See in this context Cardoso and Faletto: (1979: xvi]. - 
34. The most useful discussion of these issues is to be found 
in the introduction to Cardoso and Faletto [op. cit. )., "" 
35. This is one of the more nefarious arguments of Warren 
[1980) on which see Lipietz [1982].. 
36. Taylor [1979) for instance, is a good example"of'the 
failures of this perspective. He accounts for the structure 
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of social formations dominated-in imperialism in terms of 
the 'reproductive needs' of Western capital. See in. this 
context, the useful review by Mouzelis [1980]. 
37. Lenin failed to break entirely with a notion of the 
exploitation of country by country. He tends to. view 
imperialism as a simple emanation from Western countries rather 
than as a supranational phenomenon. Numerous formulations in 
his [1916a/1964] and his [1920b/1974), for example, testify 
to this. See also Stalin, [1924/1970). In view of this 
feature of Lenin's position, it is not difficult to understand 
how two different views of his argument can be held. For 
Warren [op. cit.: ch. 3) Lenin is seen. as advocating that 
imperialism has purely regressive effects; Brewer [1980: ch. 5] 
seems to think that for Lenin, imperialism is simply progressive. 
Both these interpretations, irrespective of whether they 
constitute accurate assessments of Lenin, presuppose that the 
world economy is a mere addition of countries. 
38. This is the case because of the impossibility of national 
bourgeois development to break its links entirely with foreign 
capital in the period of imperialism. One of the problems 
with the theory of imperialism developed by Lenin and the, 
Bolsheviks was a conflation of imperialism and colonialism. 
It is implicitly assumed in this theory that imperialist 
domination presupposes the domination of a foreign state. See 
the references in note [37). Of course, this could. have been 
thought as being largely the case. in the early twentieth century 
when these theories were developed. However, this is no longer 
the case and it has become evident since World War II that 
colonialism is only one form of imperialism. The conflation of 
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imperialism with colonialism is an effect of the failure to 
see world capital as supranational. The two stage theory of 
national-revolution follows from this conflation, as the 
division between the two [bourgeois nationalist and socialist] 
is provided by the fact of political independence. In the 
absence of such a conflation, the division between the two 
stages is no longer'that'apparent, and the dominance of 
imperialism and hence the seeming necessity of a 'bourgeois 
revolution', "may exist long after political independence has 
taken place, that}is, after colonial status has been'overcome. 
39. For an assessment` of this period in Greek history and the 
failure of socialism, see Eudes`[1972J. 
40. Lenin of course laid'emphacis on concrete analysis before 
entering into alliances; thus-, 'in his C1920a/1974: 1451 he lays 
stress on the fact that policy should not be developed 
"on abstract and formal principles but, first on precise 
appraisal off the specific historical situation ... ". Never- 
theless, if this appraisal is to be undertaken through the 
medium of a dogmatically applied theory, it will itself be 
largely erroneous. Lenin's"conception of stages is so mechanical 
that if strictly applied, the only purpose of the appraisal 
can be to determine whether the proletariat should lend its 
support or not to the bourgeois democratic 
revolution. These 
alternatives are particularly well expressed in Stalin 
Cop. cit.: 73-63. It is not possible, given its conceptions , of 
'alliance' and 'leadership', for this position to advocate the 
real leadership of the proletariat (in the sense developed by 
Mao] in the bourgeois national revolution. 
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41. This text repays close study as does the work of Cabral 
as a whole. His stress on the necessity of the proletariat 
to lead the struggle for national independence in the period 
of what he terms 'neo-colonialism' is 'close to that of Mao. 
Cabral 019803 is a useful selection of his work. 
42. Although I have been discussing the effects of world 
capitalism on imperialised social formations,, it should be 
noted that imperialism also has effects on what are usually 
referred to as 'imperialist countries'. But the effects of 
imperialism on the working-class of metropolitan countries, 
for example, cannot be reduced to the creation of a 'labour 
aristicracy'. The working-class in such countries cannot be 
seen as 'living off'-, the exploitation of, workers°and peasants 
in the imperialised social formations. Rather, all exploited 
and oppressed classes and groups, throughout the world, must 
be seen as exploited and oppressed, albeit in different forms, 
by supranational capital. These different forms which divide 
the oppressed classes along national lines need systematic 
investigation. New forms of struggle need to be developed in 
order for 'proletarian internationalism' not to remain a mere 
slogan. In this context see the debate between Emmanuel [19703 
and Bettelheim [1970] in the pages of Monthly Review. Although 
socialism is possible in one country, communism definitely is 
not, as the existence of nation-states is an effect of 
capitalist production relations. The production of nation-states 
by capitalist relations of production has unfortunately not 
received much attention by marxist theorists. One notable 
exception is Poulantzas [1978: Part One, ch. 41 who provides 
an initial discussion of some of the issues. 
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43. For the most well known studies of the process of transfer 
pricing see the work of Vaitsos 019701 and (1971). 
44. As Marx suggests: see his [1867/1974: Part 5). In order 
to avoid misunderstanding, perhaps I should state explicitly 
that I do not wish to maintain in this work that "manufacture' 
is 'typified' or 'characterised' by the extraction of absolute 
surplus-value, while modern industry is 'typified' or 
'characterised' by the extraction of surplus-value-in its 
relative form. Marx does not argue this. On the contrary, he 
suggests that manufacture is based on a division of labour 
which reduces necessary labour-time without cheapening the 
necessary means of subsistence [1867/1974: 304), and he makes 
the same point with reference to simple co-operation. In 
addition he stresses that the introduction of machinery aleo 
tends to increase the extraction of absolute surplus-value. 
Rather, the position is more complex. Manufacture refers to 
a labour-process where the extraction of absolute surplus-value 
dominates and where the extraction of-relative surplus-value 
is restricted to. the transformation of Forms of co-operation. 
These forms of co-operation [division of labour in manufacture) 
are necessary prerequisites for the introduction of machinery 
on a large-scale and the systematic cheapening of the necessities 
of life. Modern industry on the other hand relies both on 
absolute and on relative surplus-value extraction through the 
introduction of machinery. The main difference lies in the 
fact that "Absolute surplus value always precedes relative. " 
(1866/1976: 1025). 
ý- .--, 
45. Emmanuel 01972] was the first to note this point regarding 
the difference between labour-power and other commodities. 
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It should be noted, however, that I am not suggesting like 
Emmanuel, that all capital is totally mobile throughout the 
world except labour-power. This point of Emmanuel's is 
highly problematic and for a relevant discussion-see Brewer 
Cop. cit.: ch. 93. I am merely suggesting that's world price 
does exist for most commodities for the simple reason that 
they are exchanged on the world market. This world price may 
be higher or lower than any national price and there is-no 
necessary reason for national prices to become equalised. 
46. See Cardoso and Faletto Cop. cit.: xxiij. 
47. As is well known Marx distinguishes between departments . 
of the economy which produces means of production [Dept. RI) and 
means of consumption [Dept. II]. The latter-is further , 
subdivided into the production of social necessities (Dept. IIa) 
and luxuries [Dept. IIb]. See his [1874/1974: ch. 20]. What I 
am suggesting is that Department lie can be very small in any 
one economy; there is no need for it to expand as long as a 
large petty-bourgeois or, bourgeois sector exists-and/or other 
countries exist where the price of labour-power is high. 
48. The production by capitalism of what are usually referred 
to erroneously as 'pre-capitalist' relations is the main thrust 
of the argument of Corrigan C1977]. The argument I have 
developed here provides a basis in political economy for 
Corrigan's excellent arguments. Several consequences of my 
argument should perhaps be made explicit. First, labour cannot 
reproduce itself entirely or else it would not be selling , 
its labour-power to the capitalist. -Hence the capitalist who 
takes this particular option is inýa risky position for he has 
,, ý 
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to make sure that the labourer acquires means of production 
but not enough to reproduce him/herself totally. 'Extra-economic' 
forms of control are a good way of assuring [with greater ease) 
that this does not happen. It should be recalled, moreover, 
that petty-commodity producers cannot produce all their 
conditions of existence themselves [Littlejohn, 19771. This 
fact helps the capitalist maintain his control, as a self- 
reproducing direct producer needs to have access to money and 
the market in order to acquire those necessary commodities 
which he cannot produce himself. Isolation from the market 
or from money economy is an additional useful way to ensure 
dependence. Second, certain individuals may succeed in 
reproducing themselves entirely, in which case they may withdraw 
their labour-power from the market. Thus this solution to the 
realisation problem faced by capital, provides an additional 
condition [additional to those mentioned in the previous section] 
for the creation of household production under capitalism. 
Third, viewed from this persepctive, the existence of female 
and child labour in the household contributes to reproduce 
a low price of [male) labour-power. It follows that a struggle 
to abolish unpaid female labour in the household [contrary to 
what is sometimes maintained) is far from antagonistic to 
'working-class interests'. 
49. The situation is basically similar to the abolition of 
independent landed property discussed in Chapter S. 
50. It should be stressed that what I have termed 'national' 
or 'domestic capital' should not be confused with the category 
of 'national bourgeoisie'. The latter is a class concept, that 
is, a phenomenal category. The category of capital, whatever 
its form, is a structural essential category. The national 
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bourgeoisie may include any bourgeois nationalist elements 
and not just industrialists, of course. In this context see 
Gibbon [1980]. 
51. It should be noted that I have only dealt here with that 
form of transnational capital which produces in one country for 
sale in another. Transnational capital can also establish 
itself in a country in order to sell in that country. In this 
case, as far as the realisation of surplus-value is concerned 
it is in a similar position to domestic capitals. 
52. Nevertheless, the question of realisation is a central 
point of departure for any theory of the world division of 
labour because the main appearance of capitalism [whether at 
a world or a national level] is the form of exchange. This is 
the reason why Marx starts Capital by looking at commodities 
and their exchange. The phenomenal forms of exchange are 
precisely the point of departure of any critique of such forms. 
53. The traditional theories of imperialism tended to assume 
that only a 'foreign state' could intervene on behalf of 
imperialism (e. g., Lenin]. This assumption is obviously linked 
to the notion of colonial countries (as a whole) being 
dominated by imperialist countries. As the people of, Chile 
learnt to their cost in 1973, the domestic State is equally 
capable of intervening on behalf of imperialism (without being 
a simple 'puppet' of imperialism], with as much ferocity and 
butchery as the colonial state. 
54. Marx himself sometimes expresses notions of exploitation 
of country by country; see his [1848/1976: 464-5], For example. 
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55. Marx in fact merdions a concept of "international 
production relations" in his [1857/1973: 108). 
56. Despite the many problems of Althusser's analyses, his 
insistence that "it is the masses which make history; the class 
struggle is the motor of history" [1976: 59] is a statement 
of the fundamentals of marxism and precisely what the present 
dissertation attempts to develop. Rather than dismissing 
Althusser out of hand or elevating his work 'to the Gods' [as 
Mao would put it) we should recognise the correctness of his 
struggle against idealism and vulgar materialism within 
marxism and take his achievements and errors seriously. 
57. The literature here is extensive. Apart from the works 
of Althusser himself, referred to in the bibliography, see 
also the numerous works by Hindess, Hirst and Cutler at al. also 
referred to in the bibliogarphy. See also Taylor [1979], 
Foster-Carter [1978] and Anderson (1980), for some of the 
debates surrounding Althusser's arguments with reference to 
the 'Third World' and contemproary British politics. 
58. Different conceptions of a 'mode of production' may even 
be utilised within one text as for instance Hinders and Hirst 
C19753. See also their 'autocritique': Hindess and Hirst [1977]. 
59. This formulation is derived from Engels [1890c/1975]. 
60. These points have been developed in detail by Hindesa and 
Hirst among others. See their (1977) and Cutler at el. (1977: 
172 and passim). 
61. See also Sayer (1975]. 
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62. This formulation is sometimes utilised by Poulantzas 
C19733-and [1975]. 
63. See Althusser and Balibar [1970], for example. In this 
context it is interesting to note Althusser's definition of 
'economic' practice and 'political' practice in the notes 
provided by the translator and approved by Althusser: 
"Economic practice is the transformation of nature 
by human labour into social products, political 
practice the transformation of social relations by 
revolution ... " 
Cibid.: 3163 
64. Apart from Rey [op. cit. ] on whom see Foster-Carter [op. cit. ], 
a notion of 'transitional mode production' is also employed 
by Balibar [1970]. For a critique of Balibar's notion see 
Hindess and Hirst [1975: ch. 6]. 
65. For examples of particularly extreme forms of this 
empiricism and the proliferation of modes of production, see 
Long C1977: ch. 41 and Gutelman C1974: 27 and passim). The 
conflation of a mode of production with an enterprise and the 
particular view of classes which this entails is, of course, 
a common misunderstanding of marxism. It is expressed 
particularly clearly in the following remark by Stinchcombe: 
"Marx's fundamental innovation in stratification 
theory was to base a theory of the formation of 
classes and political development on a theory of 
the bourgeois enterprise. " 
[Stinchcombe, 1961: 1653 
See also Wolf and Mintz 019573 for a classical application of 
this conception to Latin American enterprises. 
66. In fact this can be done on condition that one assumes 
a further [supra] structure which determines when, eay, the 
'economic' is primary and when other realms are primary; but 
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this procedure obviously destroys the whole notion of the 
primacy of the 'economic'. 
67. Various notions of 'articulation' are discussed by 
Foster-Carter [op. cit. ]. He-fails, however, 'to elucidate the 
fundamental reasons for the problematic nature of this' 
conception. "" 
Althusser as usual is far more sophisticated than most 
of his critics. He notes: 
'Society is not composed of individuals', `says Marx. 
He is right: -society is not a 'combination', an 
'addition' of individuals. What constitutes society 
is the system of its social relations in which its 
individuals live, 'work and struggle. He is right: 
society is not made up of individuals in general in 
the abstract, just so many copies of 'man'. Because 
each society has its own individuals, historically 
and socially determined. " [Althusser, 1976: 53] 
Although Althusser does not always seem to realise it, the 
same comments are equally applicable to the division of society 
into an addition of modes of production [considered as 
totalities]; 'levels' or whatever. 
68. The position discussed here has proved incapable of 
explaining the creation of what it terms 'pre-capitalist modes' 
by capitalism in the 'Third World', For example. It merely 
accounts for the reproduction '6r persistence of already exirting 
'pre=capitalist forms'*as effects of capitalism. This is 
particularly evident in the case of petty-commodity production 
discussed in the first section if this chapter. 
69. This position is precluded from theorising this difference 
because of its problematic notion-of 'essentialism' which I 
discussed briefly in the Introduction to this thesis. It 
should be noted that this distinction must be theorised and 
not merely stated, for in the latter case phenomena can only 
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be seen as accidental deviations. 
70. In this text I have used a concept of 'transformation' 
rather than one of 'transition' in order both to attempt to 
overcome the notion of linearity and to insist on the centrality 
of collective practice in the process of social change. For 
similar usages of the concept of 'transformation', see 
Corrigan et al., (1978] and (1979] and Ramazanoglu et al. (1981]. 
71. Examples of this form of reasoning, are numerous but see 
Taylor [1979) For a recent statement to this effect and the 
useful discussion in Ramazanoglu at al. [op. cit. ]. 
72. Incidentally, it is impossible for the 'articulation 
model' to provide a coherent analysis of the position of women 
in society, because it cannot situate them within production 
relations which are restricted to the 'mode of extraction of 
surplus-labour'. It can only comprehend the position of women 
in capitalist society as a 'conjunctural' or 'superstructural' 
phenomenon. Thus domestic labour is viewed as 'necessary' but 
'external' to the capitalist mode of production, and so on. 
73. Laclau (1975], in his contribution to-the Poulantzas- 
Miliband debate, points out the lack of justification for 
limiting the number of 'levels' to three. 
74. See Cutler at al. (1977] and [1978]. 
75. For such a discussion see Sayer (1977], Harris (1978) 
and Colier [1979], for example. 
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76. Ultimately, this failure to comprehend the fact that the 
purpose of Marx's theorisation is to explain the existence 
of social phenomena in terms of essential relations, is 
traceable to their rigid adherence to Althusser's notion of 
'essentialism' and what can be termed the 'anti=epistemological 
epistemology' which they derive From it. This epistemology 
is developed in Hindess [1977b]. ' See also the work"referred 
to in note C75) above. 
77. I use the term 'critique' in inverted commas because 
for Hindess and Hirst this notion is reduced to one of providing 
epistemological or logical criticisms of 'discourses'. It 
does not involve a process of discovery`of social relations 
as it does for Marx. 
,,. 
78. Hinders and Hirst provide no theory for the analysis of 
social formations. Indeed, it is very'difficult to see how 
they can possibly do so given their 'anti-epistemological 
epistemology' and their apparent rejection of all ontological 
statements. 
79. Incidentally, Marx's formulations regarding feudalism are 
often contradictory. In his (1865a/1974: 790-1] the most 
frequently quoted passage, landlords might seem to be 
considered as 'parasites'. In another passage of'the same 
work he infers that under feudalism the landlord constitutes 
"the manager and master of the process of production and of 
the entire process of social life ... ''t (ibid.: 883]. It is 
not legitimate arbitrarily to pick out one remark and ignore 
the other. 
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80. The formulation of a notion of 'economic possession' 
in order to provide an alternative to the notion of 'legal 
ownership' is developed by Poulantzas C19751, among others. 
81. This is not to suggest, of course, that enterprises or 
'institutions' are not worthy of analysis, neither is it to 
suggest that an analysis of enterprises may not be pertinent 
to an understanding of the phenomenal forms of the wage-labour/ 
capital relation. It is merely to suggest that a class 
analysis is not to be based on enterprises but on an analysis 
of people and their location into different categories, their 
practices, their antagonisms within enterprises and so on. 
The antagonisms between capital and wage-labour takes the form 
of oppressive and exploitative relations between people, as 
well as between people and 'things' within enterprises. The 
fact that capital and wage-labour are not reducible to people 
does not mean that they are reducible to 'things' such as 
institutions. One must struggle to overcome the fetishism of 
things and not to extend it. 
82. It is important to stress that different phenomenal forms 
are not to be considered as deviations from a non-existent 
ideal form of capitalism. Manufacture is not a deviation from 
industry, absolute surplus-value is not a deviation from 
relative surplus-value, petty-commodity production is not a 
deviation from commodity production, enterprises which employ 
family labour only are not deviations from enterprises which 
employ wage-labour, peasants are not deviations from proletarians, 
and so on. The concept of essential relations does not 
establish an ideal. It says nothing regarding the specific 
forms of phenomena whose specific conditions of existence have 
to be established in each and every case. 
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83. ' Although this should be evident from my discussion, it 
should perhaps be made explicit that for Marx, the concept 
of private property or ownership, is not utilised in the 
sense of the opposite to-'public property', but as the opposite 
of collective'property. It does not refer to`-'6 mere legal 
relation, to the nature of a juridical owner, -but to the 
characteristics ofd ownership which are produced by capitalist 
production relations irrespective of the nature of the juridical 
owner. State ownership under capitalist social production 




NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 '' 
1: Land reforms are sometimes defined as 'revolutionary' if 
they transform the dominant production relations and 'reformist' 
if they do not. See Frank (1963], Gutelman 01974] and 
Kay C1977b) for different examples of such positions. 
2. Here I am following the concept of socialism associated ; 
with Mao Tse-tung as opposed to that associated with Stalin. 
Socialism in the sense I am using the term is a phenomenal 
category and refers to-a social formation in which both 
capitalist and communist. relations of production are combined. 
A 
. 
combination of capitalist and socialist [or communist] forms 
or relations is not necessarily socialism as the latter can 
exist in a social formation where only capitalist production 
relations prevail. This is so because the latter forms can 
exist as effects of the existence of wage-labour. For a 
distinction between socialism and communism see Mao 
[1960/1977: 68-72); see also Althusser (1977b: 15-16]. 
3. See Sayer C1979a: 30-311 For example. 
Iý 
4. For Gutelman, for instance, all land reforms are 
unproblematically 'bourgeois'. See his [1971) and [1974) for 
example. This assertion follows from a position which sees 
all land reforms as 'anti-landlord' and hence as merely 
'juridical relations' [land reform is restricted to the 
redistribution of land], and which conflates essential 
categories with phenomenal categories. This conflation is 
associated with the commonly held viewpoint which falsely 
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maintains that because a reform may be bourgeois-democratic, 
this necessarily means that it must be led by the bourgeoisie. 
5. The following remark by Marx is worth noting in this 
context: 
"All these 'Socialists' since Colins have this much in 
common, that they leave wage-labour and hence capitalist 
production in existence and try to bamboozle them- 
selves or the world into believing that by transforming 
rent of land into a tax payable to the state all the 
evils of capitalist production would vanish of them- 
selves. The whole thing is thus simply a socialistically 
decked-out attempt to save capitalist rule and actually 
re-establish it on an even wider basis than its present 
one. " (Marx, 188ic/1975: 323 
S. The sole period of socialist construction in China to 
which I shall refer through Mao's work is that between 1953 
and 1957. It is sometimes referred to as the 'High Tide' period 
or as the period of 'Socialist Upsurge', in the Chinese 
countryside. Among the texts of this period Mao (1955c] is 
central. It consists of a'collection of reports, edited by 
Mao, on both successful and unsuccessful attempts to establish 
co-operatives throughout China during this period. As such it 
is replete with information regarding what a proletarian 
agrarian reform actually means in practice. This text 
constitutes basic reading for anyone who wishes to understand 
the meaning of socialist construction in agriculture. Valuable 
commentaries have been provided by Gray 01970] and Corrigan 
at al. (1979: 61-75]. See also Hinton 
[1966] for the land 
reform period. Another point worth noting - and this is 
striking in the literature on rural transformation 'inChina - 
is the general utilisation of marxist categories to describe 
different peasants (poor,, peasant, middle peasant; rich peasant, 
etc. ]. Nowhere, in my admittedly limited knowledge, have I 
found references to the customary appellations of different 
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peasant categories. This is not simply the case in lofficial' 
party literature, but permeates novels and other forms of 
'unofficial' literature to such an extent that one can only 
deduce that a new culture was created whereby everyone, 
including the peasants themselves, referred to different peasant 
groups in marxist terms. This procedure could not be more 
different in the literature on Latin America, for example, 
where peasants are referred to by their customary names by all, 
including marxists and marxist parties. It seems to me that 
this cultural transformation experienced by the People's 
Republic of China is fundamental in any socialist transformation 
of agrarian relations. It implies a fundamental critique of 
phenomenal categories. 
7. Mao's exemplary materialism is made clear, as I have 
already stressed, in his understanding of the fact that the 
superiority of socialist relations over capitalist relations 
is precisely that they enable an explosion of the productive 
powers or forces of labour. The following remark is very 
instructive: 
"Socialist revolution aims at liberating the productive 
forces. The change-over from individual to socialist, 
collective ownership in agriculture and handicrafts 
and from capitalist and socialist ownership in private 
industry and commerce is bound to bring about a 
tremendous liberation of the productive forces. Thus 
the social conditions are being created for a 
tremendous expansion of industrial and agricultural 
production. " [Mao, 1966: 261 
The figures documenting the increase in agricultural production 
in China during the decade 1949 to 1959 can be found in 
Chao (1960: ch. 4). He comments for example that: 
tt .. @ the yield in pound per acre for rice has 
increased from 2,400 pounds in 1957 to some 3,050 
in 1958; that of wheat, from 740 to nearly 1,000; 
and that of cotton from 250 to about 350. This 
considerably changes the picture concerning limitations 
resulting from unfavourable land-labour ratio in China 
... The ability to raise rapidly the productivity of 
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major crops also dispels a traditional myth [often 
couched in the so-called law of diminishing returns] 
that farmland in China has been utilized to its 
maximum potential and that there could be little room 
to substantially enhance the yield per unit of land. " 
Cop. cit.: 251) 
To assert like some authors do that a fall in production or 
productivity is a necessary short-term effect of a land reform, 
is thus disproved by the experience of the People's Republic 
of China. 
8. In this context seer for example, his division of 
'industry' into 'light industry' and 'heavy industry', 'coastal 
industry' and 'industry of the interior', which are all 
considered on a par with 'agriculture' in the same text. See 
also his C1957b/1977). 
9. There are indications that Lenin himself was moving 
towards a similar position to that enunciated here towards 
the end of his life. See his (1923a/1973) and [1923b/1973). 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
M"' 
1. See Marx 01867/1974: chs. 27 6 281. 
2. See inter alia Wallerstein C1974: ch. 21. 
3. The encomienda had no juridical connection with land 
whatsoever but was a tribute collecting institution. What were 
allocated to the encomendero were Indians and not land. This 
now well known simple point needs to be stressed since some 
writers still seem to hold the erroneous view that the 
encomienda was concerned with land use. See for example 
Taylor [1979: 168]. This error has particularly important 
consequences in Taylor's case for he uses the example of the 
encomienda to assert that the effects of the penetration of 
merchant's capital in Latin America was to create feudal forms 
of landed property. His error leads him to suggest a false 
and simple continuity between the encomienda and the hacienda. 
Although the encomienda was a feudal institution it had no 
connection with land, so that it cannot be used as an illustration 
of the establishment of feudal land tenure arrangements. 
4. The best short discussions of the encomienda are provided 
by Lockhart 01969) and Keith C1971). But see also inter alia 
Angora C1975), Frank C1972]' C1978), Harris [1974) and 
Wallerstein [1974). 
5. Harris Cop. cit.: 18). The extent of tribute payable 
under such encomiendas can be gleaned from the following account 
provided by Hemming C1970: 354). It refers to an encomienda 
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awarded by Pedro de la Gasca, the viceroy of Peru, after the 
civil wars in the mid sixteenth century: 
"The annual levy from the Conchucos, a remote region 
between the Cordillera Blanca and the Upper Maranon, 
included 2,500 pesos of gold and silver; 400 Ctanegas 
(640 bushels) of wheat; 800 hanegas of barley, 200 of 
maize and 100 of potatoes; 30 llamas; 3 arrobas (76 lb] 
of tallow fat for candles; 30 pigs aged over 18 months; 
300 birds of which half must be hens; 45 brace of 
partridges; 1,040 eggs - 'twenty to be delivered every 
Friday Fish day'; 25 loads of salt; 20 willow or alder 
logs of at least 20 to 25 feat long and 100 agave poles; 
25 small tubs, 25 plates, 25 wooden bowls, 6 saddles 
and 20 chopping blocks; 120 pairs of sandals with their 
ankle laces; 20 seja palms for lassos; 10 sacks and 
4 aprons, and 30 ropes each 30 Feet long and all of 
sisal. Almost all of this awesome array had to be 
delivered to the encomenderv's town house in Huanuco 
many days distant. In addition to the produce, the 
repartimiento had to provide a total of eighty people 
to serve as herdsmen, farm labourers and personal 
servants. " 
G. Three points should be noted in this context. 
[i) Keith mentions that the adoption of the encomienda 
system was not at first recognised as inevitable. Apparently, 
Columbus seems originally to have thought it possible to 
support Spanish. immigrants to Espanola as the Portuguese did 
in Africa but this seemed impracticable [op. cit.: 435]. 
[ii] The fact that the encomienda arose out of local 
conditions exemplifies the fact that it is nonsense to suggest, 
as some authors dog that feudal institutions and traditions 
could somehow be-exported unaltered from Spain into a new 
socio-economic environment. This is further illustrated by 
the struggles surrounding the institution which are dealt 
with below. An example of this erroneous form of reasoning 
can be found in Veliz C1980]. 
[iii] The fact that Indian communities had legal status 
as landowners recognised by the Crown is an indication of 
the complex conFlictual relations which pertained between the 
Spanish Absolutist State and the encomenderos which I discuss 
below. 
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7. The title of encomendero was generally assigned for life 
(sometimes two lives] and then reverted to the Crown. 
8. For a detailed discussion of the character of Spanish 
absolutism see Anderson C1974: ch. 3). 
9. It is interesting to note that neo-mercantilists are not 
the only ones to take this deterministic position. John Taylor 
in a similar 'vein, asserts that the character of the agrarian 
structure in colonial Latin America was a simple result of the 
penetration of merchant's capital. But the reasons why 
merchant's capital supposedly- created "forms of landed property 
and relations of production-similar to those dominant during 
the European feudal period" are not accounted for. See Taylor 
(op. cit.: 187ff). The system of land tenure in Latin America 
was not 'created' by any single force. It was the result of 
long and bitter struggles. What merchant's' capital did was 
to 'impose limits on these' struggles. The effect of merchant's 
capital, as Marx notes; is to give products more and more the 
character of exchange value, and' so much is clear from the 
literature on precolonial South-America. The development of 
production for sale at'local and world markets is correctly 
stressed by Frank, Wallerstaint et al. But the effects of the 
penetration of'merchant's capital in 'colonial societies are 
neither' standard nor automatically guaranteed. They are 
ultimately the product of a whole series of struggles within 
the indigenous modes-of production, as well as between these 
and the 'penetrating' capitalist mode. The alliance between 
the State and merchant's capital also seems to be taken as 
given in Taylor's'bookj*' which has recently been shown to be 
as deterministic and' teleologicalin its conceptions as the 
neo-mercantilists which he criticises. See Mouzelis C1980]. 
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The reproduction of pre-capitalist forms is also seen as the 
immediate and necessary effect of merchant's capital in the 
work of G. Kay [1975) on which see the excellent review by 
Bernstein (1976b). 
10. The argument which follows is an extended elaboration 
of my review of Frank 01978) and [1979): Neocosmos. (1979). 
11. See also Frank C1972: 191. 
12. Frank's criteria seem to be [i) production for a [world) 
market, and [ii) the fact that the encomendero was moved by 
the desire for profit. See for example Frank C1979: 12-13). - 
It is surprising in view of Frank's discussions-of Weber that 
he never noted Weber's point that the 'desire' for profit is 
not specific to capitalism. 
13. The similarities of this form of reasoning with the 
arguments of functionalism which Frank has spent so much time 
attacking are indeed impressive. 
14. These laws also attempted to abolish the encomienda but 
did not succeed in doing so. This was only achieved after a 
series of legal enactments and measures towards the end of 
the sixteenth century, although it survived in Chile and 
other less accessible regions for longer. See for example 
Gdngora Cop. cit.: 2GFF) and Keith (op. cit.: 440]. 
15. The large size of the Indian population relative to the 
Spanish at the time, and their control of most of the lend in 
rural areas partly accounts for the resistance of the Indians. 
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It was only after countless massacres and various epidemics 
that the Indians were decimated. Even sog in the more 
inaccessible areas of the empire, the Indians managed to put 
up a stiff resistance to Spanish incursions, such as the 
Araucanians who destroyed all the settled towns of southern 
Chile in 1598. See Gdngora Cop. cit.: 130) and Note [23) below. 
The Araucanians were only 'pacified' in the 1860's. 
16. See Gdngora Cop. cit.: 1391 who confirms this point. 
17. -Keith stresses that the Crown was probably mistaken 
in 
this view, and that the major cause of the disaster was 
"almost certainly the conflict resulting from the development 
of an extreme form of a gold-induced market economy". 
Cop. cit.: 440). 
18. See Keith [op. cit.: 440); GGngora [op. cit.: 149]; Harris 
Cop. cit.: 18]. 
19. There iss in this context, a gem from Keith which 
is worth quoting9 as it unintentionally portrays the position 
of the Indians: 
11 ... servicio personal 
had to be ended and replaced 
with a system in which Indians had somewhat more 
choice as to whom they were forced to work for [sic! ). " 
[op. cit.: 440) 
20. Gdngora mentions the fact that in New Granada in 1657, 
the mite operated by distributing one quarter of the able-bodied 
Indians to the landowners nearest to them in preference to 
those living farther away. Both the encomendero and the 
cacique might be beneficiaries under this scheme if they were 
landowners and Angora adds that "the landowners who were not 
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beneficiaries under this scheme had to hire free wage-labourers, 
and this was more expensive" [op. cit.: 145, emphasis added). 
With regard to the Potosi mines, Gongora states: 
"From the early seventeenth century onwards, the official 
repcets are concerned with the decrease of the labour 
force, the increase in the period of compulsory labour 
and the desertion of the mite Indians, who stayed an 
in Potosi as free wage-labourers. " Cibid.: 1471 
J. Hemming notes with reference to the same silver mines that 
the Indians initially [in 1545-6] "received good wages" but 
that the'situation soon deteriorated and that persuasion soon 
gave way to coercion as the mine operators had to recruit 
further and further afield. Out of touch with the situation, 
the Crown decreed in 1551 that Indians could be assigned to 
mines provided they went voluntarily, attracted by good pay. ' 
See Hemming [op. cit.: 369-70] 
See also the comments by Harris [op. cit.: 21). The 
opposite tendency to the introduction of cash economy is also 
noted by Gdngora who suggests that in the 1550's the question 
of whether the Indians should pay their entire tribute in 
cash rather than kind involved a risk of shortages in the 
urban areas Cop. cit.: 137). This shows that Spanish productive 
activity was not developed enough and that they were dependent 
on the Indian economy for their own reproduction. The tensions 
and contradictions between a feudal and a developing capitalist 
mode of production are clearly illustrated by these examples. 
These examples also indicate the fact that the dominance of 
the feudal mode of production was not as straightforward as 
is argued by people such as Taylor [op. cit. ), and that the 
objective conditions for the development of certain forms of 
capitalism based on the extraction of absolute surplus-value 
did exist. Elements of a formal subsumption of labour to 
capital did develop during this period although they tended 
to be stifled by the power of the encomenderos and the greater 
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advantages for them of feudal relations. 
21. See Harris [op. cit.: 20]. 
22. Angora notes that the occupation of the most fertile 
lands by the Indians made Spanish agrarian colonisation 
impossible Cop. cit.: 27]. 
23. Bauer cites the following set of estimates of the 
population of Chile from 1540 to 1620. 
YEARS SPANISH EUROPEAN WHITE NEGROES 6 'PEACEFUL' UNCON-. 
6 CREOLE SETTLERS MESTIZOS COLOURED INDIANS QUERED 
MESTIZOS C ENCOMI ENDA INDIANS 
_. 
6 OTHERS] 
1540 154 - 10 - 110001000 
1570 7000 10000 7000 450000 150,000 
1590 9000 17000 16000 420000 120,000 
1600 10000 20000 19000 230000 270,000 
1620 15000 40000 22000 230000 250,000 
Source: Bauer, 1975: 7 
Added to the usual reasons for demogaaphio decline among 
Indians was, in the case of Chile, the violent 1598 insurrection 
of the Araucanians, which cost the Spaniards their control 
of* all territory south of the Blo-Bi+o river. See Note CIS) 
above. An additional cause of the destruction of the Indian 
communities to the slaughters and epidemics already mentioned, 
was the presence of large numbers of European livestock in 
the vicinity of the towns which altered the ecological balance, 
straying into the Indians' arable land and destroying their 
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crops. This was particularly the case in Mexico. Sea 
Göngora [op. cit.: 141] and Frank 01979: 33). 
24. For a discussion of the social composition of this group, 
along with an analysis of other intermediate classes see 
Gdngora Cop. cit.: 109-1151. 
25. For a description of the events surrounding the Peruvian 
civil wars see the famous classic, Prescott [1908: books 4& 5]. 
26. See for instance Gongora Cop. cit.: 153-5) For evidence 
of the utilisation of debt-bondage in the mines during the 
colonial period, and Angell [1972: 13) who shows that the mass 
protests of the nitrate miners in Chile at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries included 
as demands freedom to buy from non-company storesl payment 
in legal tender, and so on. This shows quite clearly that 
mine owners employing wage-labour were perfectly capable of 
utilising similar systems of social control to those utilised 
on haciendas. 
The work of Frank is, of course, the clearest example 
of the view which equates debt-bondage with capitalist 
production relations. See for instance Farnk [1979: ch. 9). 
For arguments which equate debt-bondage with production 
relations of a Feudal [or at least a precapitalist) kind, see 
inter alia the various articles in Duncan and Rutledge eds., 
[1977), Rutledge [1977), Martinez-Alier [1972) and [1977) 
Bauer [1979a). 
In his 'critique' of Bauer C1979a)l Loveman shows that 
debt-bondage was sometimes inscribed in Latin American law 
both before and after independence. Loveman C1979: 4821. 
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This additional evidence suggests that debt-bondage, whether 
inscribed in law or not, cannot be equated with production 
relations unless one reduces these to a purely empirical 
and directly observable phenomenon. 
27. For examples of such an 'industry' see Duncan and Rutledge 
[op. cit. ], Florescano, ed., [1975] and Mörner [1973), which 
is a review of recent research. 
28. See Kay C1976a), which is a review of Florescano [op. cit. ]. 
29. For the case of Bolivia see Pearse [1972aß; For Peru see 
Chevalier (1966], who argues that in highland Peru, although 
the hacienda was born during the colonial period, its 
development to a dominant position as found in that area in 
the 1960's, was a fairly recent phenomenon which occurred at 
the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries. In eight provinces of the region of Puno in the 
high Andes, the number of haciendas increased from 703 in 
1876 to 3,219 in 1915. A certain number of the original 
haciendas were divided up but Chevalier insists that many 
more were created. This phenomenon, he suggests, was linked 
to the development of railways, banks, export agriculture 
and expanding markets, and by the fact that in the nineteenth 
century at least, the law only recognised private ownership, 
thus discouraging communal landholdings (Chevalier, op. cit.: 
823-29). 
30. The role of the State in 'defending' the peasantry must, 
however, not be overemphasised, as it had much less success 
against the hacienda than it did against the encomienda, 
for reasons which should become apparent below. 
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31. See in particular Lockhart [op. cit. ], Keith [op. cit. ] 
and cöngora [op. cit. ]. 
32. See Note [3] above. 
33. See also Frank C1969: 236). 
34. See Wallerstein Ccp. cit.: 189-90]9 who also traces the 
development of the hacienda to these demogarphic forces. 
He also provides evidence for the fluctuations of the price 
of grain in Europe at the time by combining two summaries of 
these fluctuations on page 69p viz.: 
1160-1260 rapid rise 
1260-1310 (1330,1380) consistently high 
1310 (1330,1380) - 1480 gradual fall 
1480-1620 (1650) high 
1620 (1650)-1734 (1755) recession 
1734 (1755)-1817 rise 
35. The paragraph which follows is taken from my review of 
Frank 019601 - Neocosmos Cop. cit.: 526-7). 
36. With the decline in population the burdens in tribute of 
many communities had increased in consequence. See Farnk 
(1979: 75]. 
37. See Keith Cop. cit.: 444-5). He mentions the fact that the 
establishment of these new towns represented a threat to the 
encomenderes, some of whom attempted to resist the process. 
Nevertheless, their weak political position made their 
resistance futile, asp if they failed to apply for land grentsi 
they risked the loss of the land they were already exploiting 
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without legal title; while, if they did apply for grants, 
they-admitted the right of the viceroys to make such grants 
within the area covered by their encomiendas. 
38. "Chile exported to Peru hides, tallow and wheat, in 
exchange for manufactured products from Spain and Peru 
and also sugar; Venezuela exported cacao to Mexico in 
exchange for precious metals, and so on. " 
CGöngora, op. cit.: 149) 
39. For Frank and the neo-mercantilists this does not 
constitute a problem, as Spanish America was capitalist from 
its inception. 
40. See Note C53 above, for example. In this context the 
following remark by Viceroy Velasco is informative: 
"All things in this realm have been so arranged from 
the beginning that, from the greatest thing to the 
smallest, they depend on the labour and service of 
the Indians. " [cit., Gongora, op. cit.: 147] 
41. See Note 0201 above. 
42. See inter alia Frank [op. cit. ), Gutelman [1971), 
Chevalier [op. cit. ), Harris [op. cit. ). 
43. See Göngora Cop. cit.: 152], Frank [op. cit.: 72]. By and 
large it was only worthwhile for the landlord to pay wages 
in those cases where they could be below subsistence level, 
a fact which presupposed the ability of the workers to 
reproduce themselves independently. But where local communities 
or other alternatives did not exist, this was impossible. 
44. Gongora mentions the fact that in Mexico in the seventeenth 
century, if an 
Indian escaped to his village, the hacendado 
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could go there and demand that the Indian governor hand over 
the debtor [op. cit.: 152]. 
45. For a description of debt-bondage and other forms of 
labour control, see Glade C19693. 
46. It is sometimes argued that feudalism did not exist in 
Latin America, as peasants were legally free. This argument 
iss of courses put forward by those who hold to an institutional 
legal and political conception of feudalism influenced by 
Bloch (1965). But debt-bondage had similar effects to classical 
European serfdom and peasants were hounded by landowners' their 
bailiffs, foremen and police forces when they attempted to 
escape. Göngora notes that: 
"The new relationship between Spaniards and Indians 
was theoretically freer than had been the case under 
previous systems but the peon's compulsory attachment 
to the land he worked was a glaringly apparent feature 
of the new social order ... Yet it appears quite 
evident that eighteenth century society cannot be 
described as 'bourgeois' in any sense of the word, if 
one bears in mind, for example, that in addition to 
this more or less compulsory attachment to the land 
Negro slavery still persisted as an institution ... 
Furthermore, there is a vast difference between the 
bourgeois mentality and the aristocratic mentality 
prevalent in eighteenth century Spanish America. " 
(op. cit.: 156) 
47. With regard to the position of the State, Göngora remarks 
that: 
... not even the Bourbon zeal 
for orderly revenue 
collection went so far as to abolish all liberty of 
movement and provoke in the Americas a situation 
similar to the 'second serfdom' described by writers 
on the history of eighteenth-century Russia. The 
Spanish authorities hesitated to take this step, 
owing to the influence of the legal texts inspired 
by Natural Law and gathered together in the compilation 
of 1680; these were to some extent reinforced by a 
certain sensibility on this matter typical of the 
Enlightenment, so that officials did not allow them- 
selves to be swayed exclusively by the economic interests 
involved, but partially attenuated the harshness of 
these factors. " [op. cit.: 157] 
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One does not need to agree with Göngora's idealist position 
in order to admit that the State found itself in a contradictory 
position, being forced to comply with, and indeed encourage, 
the development of a form of agricultural production which 
went hand in hand with a strict control of the movement and 
freedom of the peasants, while maintaining that they should 
be legally free. This contradictory position illustrates 
the weakness of the Crown. It found a convenient compromise 
in the debt-bondage system which could be described as more 
of an 'economic' than a 'legal' restrictions if one did wish 
to maintain such a simplistic and futile distinction. 
48. It must be stressed that debt-bondage did not develop to 
the same extent in all areas of Spanish America and was not, 
and could not, always be used. It did not develop so much in 
Chile, for instance. See Bauer (1971], (1975], C1979a) and 
Loveman (1976] and (1979). 
49. There are few detailed accounts of Chilean agriculture 
between 1850 and 1930. Bauer 019751 is a seminal work on the 
subject and it will constitute my primary source of factual 
information. Another useful, although much shorter texte is 
Kay C1977a). 
50. For greater detail on the nitrate industry and for two 
opposing views regarding its effects on Chilean politics 
see Blakemore [1974] and Frank [1971: 92-123). 
51. Bauer Cop. cit.: 65) gives the following table which shows 
the export of wheat from both the Central Valley and the 
southern colonised region. 
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Aver-age 
. earl -exports of wheat 
b region in Chile: 
1871-1900 (in thousands of metric quintals 





1871-75 1131 1131 
1876-80 946 946 
1881-85 1082 700 382 
1886-90 836 750 86 
1891-95 1409 1200 209 
1896-1900_ 684 600 84 
52. On the other hand, Wright, in another of his works, 
contradicts his noted misconception by declaring that between 
1865 and 1907 "the cities were crowded with marginals who 
subsisted on casual employment, charity, and petty crime. " 
[Wright, 1973: 243). 
53. Kay bases his speculation on the figures regarding 
rural-urban migration, but such figures do not necessarily 
imply any proletarianisation as a large section of agricultural 
labour already consisted of landless itinerant labourers. 
54. See, for example, Kay [1971), C1974a), (1977a); Klein 
[1973); Lehmann [1976). This implicit and uncritical 
absorption of elements of developmentalism, for which the 
hacienda is often seen as the source of all ills pertaining 
to Chilean agriculture, is unfortunately prevalent amongst 
writers on the left such as those cited above. Writers of a 
more conservative persuasion [e. g., Mamalakis, Bauer, Crosson] 
are sometimes more informative, as they are less bound by 
the assumption of land redistribution as being a necessary 
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prerequisite for agricultural 'development'. For other 
examples of what might be termed the fetishism of the hacienda 
throughout Latin America, see Note [47] above. 
55. See Bauer (1971] and C1979a] for an example of such an 
argument. See also Loveman (1979). 
56. The importance of female and child labour in the process 
of household reproduction is systematically underemphasised 
in the literature and ignored in the official statistics. 
See Bauer [1975: 534,1623 For a brief account of the role of 
female labour in the inguilino household in the nineteenth 
century, 
57. For a detailed description of the relationship between 
the hacendado and his workers see Loveman [1976: ch. 2]. 
58. It is worth noting incidentally that although debt-bondage 
seems to have been rarely needed in Chile, the landowners did 
possess the means to apply it if and when they wished. The 
existence of hacienda stores Cpulperias] and the payment of 
wages in the form of tokens to be exchanged only at such 
stores are evidence of this. See Bauer (1971: 1079]. 
59. Kay [1977a: 112) does think that peon wages increased but 
he does not provide any evidence to that effect. 
60. Some landlords were aware of the latent power of the 
peasants. They thought that emigration provided a safety 
valve without which the rural population might occur sooner 
or later "conspire against the established order" [Bauer, 1971: 
1082]. 
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61. These comments are particularly important for they are 
made by an author who, at other times goes out of his way to 
prove the lack of oppression on the haciendas, e. g., Bauer 
[1975166-170]. 
62. See also Bauer [1971: 1078]. 
63. Empleados received a garden plot as a perquisite, a fact 
which has led to much confusion in analysis. The land available 
to labour-service tenants is also referred to as a 'perquisite' 
in the literature and empleados are classified in the same 
category as inquilinos in the official statistics. No one to 
my knowledge, however, is so crude as to refer to empleados 
as labour-tenants. The confusion is made possible by the fact 
that different social relations of production may have, as in 
this case, similar forms of appearance. I discuss some of 
these conceptual problems at the end of the chapter. 
64. Unfortunately the available data are not sophisticated 
enough to allow us to ascertain what proportion of the labour 
employed by haciendas over a year was of a seasonal or service 
nature. 
65. Brenner [1977] refers to this process as absolute 
surplus-labour extraction although it is not clear that this 
category can be transplanted into feudal social relations 
unproblematically. In this context see Fine [1978]. 
66. It is worth observing the fact that there was never in 
Chile any struggle between the State and landowners over a 
peasant 'surplus', as was the case ins say, absolutist France, 
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or eighteenth century Russia. In Chile the largest part of 
State revenue emanated from the export sector. See Bauer 
[1975: 01]. 
67. See Frank (1971: 107-10). 
68. Ramirez summarises ealmaceda's policies as follows: 
I'll To break the monopoly which the English exercise 
in Tarapaca in order to prevent this region's becoming 
.a simple 
foreign factory. 
2] To stimulate the formation of national nitrate 
companies whose stocks would not be transferable to 
foreign citizens or companies. This way, while at the 
--same time neutralizing 
British preponderance, it would 
be possible to keep at least a part of the large 
benefits of the nitrate industry in Chile. 
31 To prevent the growth of foreign firms, though 
without interfering with the activities they already 
had. 
4] To develop the production of nitrates through 
recourse to--better technology, the opening of new 
markets, and the cheapening of maritime and overland 
transportation charges. " 
(Ramirez, 1958: 98y cited in Frank, 1971: 1051 
69. See Angell [op. cit.: 13). 
70. Blakemore Cop. cit.: 30-31). 
71. Details can be found in Wright [1973] and [1975). 
72. In England the national average was 130 lb per head or 
40% of the amount consumed by people in the Chilean capital 
Cibid.: 77). 
73. Wright notes that in 1916 the duties on foodstuffs 'of 
first necessity' were raised by over 50%; other foodstuffs 
were raised by an average of 86%, while duties on some 
agricultural products were increased by over 100%. Some 
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manufactured goods derived from agricultural products were 
raised even more [Wright, 1975: 561. 
74. There is of course no connection as such between 
protectionism and 'national development'. An adherence to a 
protectionist policy does not of itself imply any wish to 
'modernise', neither does the absence of such a policy necessarily 
imply the dominance of foreign interests. The protectionist 
policies of a landed class, such as the Corn Laws and the 
Chilean taxes, were not progressive from the point of view of 
capitalist development. On the contrary, they were obstacles 
to the penetration of capital in agriculture and to accumulation 
throughout the economy. The nature of protectionism, therefore, 
depends ultimately, leaving aside any considerations regarding 
the details of the policy itself, on the class which advocates 
it and on the social relations within which it is situated. 
75.1 use the term 'formally' here in a strict sense to refer 
to the concept of formal subordination of labour to capital 
based on the extraction of absolute surplus value. 
76. This historical period has generally been described 
in Latin America as one which witnessed a change from a process 
of 'development towards the outside' to one of 'development 
towards the inside'. For details of this process seer for 
example, Furtado [1970: chs. 11 & 12)l the various development- 
alist texts in Meier Ced)C1970] and Dos Santos C19731. 
77. The availability and status of loans granted for agricultural 
improvement are a valuable indicator of the position of landed 
property within the State apparatus. Crosson (1970: 12) notes 
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that although agriculture's share of loans relative to other 
sectors of the economy did not diminish in the 1950'sß the 
real value of these loans fell by a half between 1951 and 
1959. He also remarks that during the same decade, 50% of all 
institutional loans to agriculture were for a period of less 
than one year and systematically favoured the latifundia 
[ibid.: 14]. Although we should not be surprised about the 
second point, the extreme short term nature of the loans is 
surprising and does indicate a loss of power by landed property. 
On the other hand the Agricultural Department of the State 
Bank which accounted for 20% of all institutional credits 
extended to agriculture in the 1950'sß charged interest rates 
of 10-15%, well below the prevailing commercial bank rates, 
and also below the annual rate of inflation (ibid.: 14-15). 
These particular credits were divided up in the period 1956-60 
as follows: 36.5% for fertilizers and pesticides; 25.4% for 
annual crops [15.6% for wheat); 17.5% for permanent on-farm 
improvements; 10.4% for purchases of machinery; 7.7% for 
livestock and 1% For plantations and vineyards (ibid. -. 14). 
The picture of agricultural credit in the 1950's is therefore 
a complex one. The obstacle to the modernisation of the large 
estates was not so much the lack of funds for agriculture, 
but rather, principally, the relative lack of long-term loans 
which are particularly necessary in the agricultural sphere 
given the length of the period of turnover. The length of 
the period of turnover is in general much shorter in manufacturing 
industry. Thus the landlords did find themselves in a 
situation where adequate loans (from the point of view of 
turnover, but not of course from the point of view of the 
rate of interest) were lacking during the period of transition 
to a reliance on relative surplus-value extraction. Before 
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the 1930's, of course, landowners had not required these 
forms of credit, since, as we have seen, they expanded 
productivity in other ways than through increases in constant 
capital. 
78. See, for example, Frank [1971], [1969]; Dos Santos [op. cit. ]. 
The power of the national bourgeoisie was constantly 
underestimated by these authors, which is particularly 
surprising as they spent so much of their time and effort 
arguing against it in the shape of ECLA. 
79. Furtado Cop. cit.: ch. 12) argues that the import substitution 
industrialisation process exacerbated, if not created, 
structural inflation. See also Prebisch [1970]. Friedman and 
Lackington suggest that: 
"The planned industrialization program after 1939, which 
emphasizing consumer over production goods and aiming 
chiefly at substitution for overseas imports, resulted 
in steep price increases due to protectionist policies, 
production inefficiencies, and the monopoly position 
of many of the new firms. " [op. cit.: 19] 
80. Mamalakis 01976: 1321 unwittingly expresses the basis of 
the debate between national industrial capital and landed 
property very concisely when he saysq referring to the food 
crisis: 
"One group of specialist scholars blames chiefly the 
status-seeking rather than output raising behaviour 
of the landowners for the crisis, whereas another finds 
profits too low and risk and uncertainty too high. " 
Coming down on the side of the latter, Mamalakis shows himself 
to be a spokesman for landed property. 
81. For a detailed study of the Chilean labour movement 
including both trade unionism and the Communist and Socialist 
Parties, see Angell [1972]. 
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82. This struggle was clearly expressed in parliamentary 
politics. Referring to the period from 1932 to 1964, Loveman 
remarks: 
"Throughout this period the issue of inflation, reflected 
in the price of flour, bread, cooking oil, sugar, and 
other staples, was a dominant theme in every election 
except the presidential election of 1964, which focussed 
on the 'danger of communism'. After the onset of the 
Depression (1929-1930], the Chilean government began to 
fix minimum prices for agricultural commodities to 
defend producers. When the Depression ended, the 
government began to fix maximum prices for a variety of 
wholesale and retail commodities. This development 
created a conflict between urban politicians and landowners. 
The growing militancy of the urban and industrial labour 
movement made it inevitable that increases in agricultural 
prices would reverberate to some extent in pressure for 
higher wages. " (Loveman, 1976: 202) 
83. It has sometimes been argued that the success of the 
struggle for wage readjustment was won at the expense of the 
peasantry, as the lower profits for the latifundistas which 
this policy implied, led, it is argued, to a fall in peasant 
earnings. The Communist Party is especially criticised in 
this context. See Friedman and Lackington [op. cit.: 19-21]; 
Loveman (1976: 203]; Bauer (1975: 231]. Without denying the 
frequent errors of the Communist Party during this period, 
this particular criticism is unwarranted as the Party was 
actively engaged in organising rural workers. It thus attempted 
to squeeze the landlords in the sphere of production as well 
as on the market. These authors also unproblematically 
assume, because the working class was the most visible and 
most ardent advocate of a reduction in'Food prices, that this 
demand or policy was also working-class in nature. It was 
nothing of the sort. The main class to benefit from such a 
demand could only be the bourgeoisie. 
84. See Crosson Cop. cit.: 201. 
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85. See particularly Loveman C1976]; Affonso at al. [1970]; 
Klein [1973] and Carriäre [1977b]. 
86. For evidence of this militancy see AlaluF at al. C1972: 
493,519). Thiesenhusen [1971: 110) notes that between 1960 
and 1964 there were only 97 strikes of 'agricultural workers'; 
in 1965 there were 141 and in 1966 there were 586. After the 
unionisation law of 1967 was passed, there were 693 strikes 
and in-1968 there were 618. 
B7. -The precise figures , are as 
follows: 
Land Leased-to inquilinos and inquilino-madieros: 1965 
Tenants- Hectares % 
Inquilinos [includes 94,606.6 69.30 
empleados) 
Inquilino-medieros 41,903.7 30.70 
Total 136,510.3 100.00 
Source: Chile, 1969: 38-9 
88. There are indications that Kay rightly does not wish to 
make such a problematic equation. See Kay C1977a: 117) where 
he mentions that the empleados were employed on a yearly 
contract and monthly wages, often received a share of the 
profits and received a tenancy as an 'incentive'. The land 
they received should be viewed as a perquisite equivalent in 
status to a company car, and not, of course, as a means of 
forcing labour services. See Note (63) above. 
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89. A remark by Crosson adds weight to this conclusion. 
He notes that there was in 1965 a very large market for 
'non-institutional' credit amounting to 50% of all 'farmers'. 
He remarks that the borrowers were "small farmers, most of 
whom would not qualify for institutional credits, and the 
lenders were mostly local merchants, professional money lenders, 
large landowners for whom the borrowers worked, friends and 
relatives. " [op. cit.: 16). 
The differentiation of the inquilinos is also implicitly 
alluded to by Lehmann, although like most writers on Chile he 
ignores its relevance and emphasises their proletarianisation. 
He notes that t'... the inquilino's plot and cattle rarely 
afforded him the opportunity to accumulate resources and expand 
his enterprise, with the exception of some who engaged in 
petty trade within the larger farms, buying and selling, 
sometimes even transporting. " [Lehmann, 1974c: 91]. 
90. It is important to note that this figure 
ation, as CIDA estimates it on the assumption 
produced the same values per hectare as the ii 
[CIDA, op. cit.: 206). In fact, of course, the 
sharecroppers' land could have been higher as 
capital than the inquilinos. 
91. Klein [op. cit.: 74). 




they owned more 
92. See also inter alia Lehmann (1972: 299]; Angell (1972: 24]. 
93. The absurdity of customary terminology is well indicated 
by the use of the term voluntario [volunteer] to designate 
those wage-labourers who reside on hacienda property but who 
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are not bound and forced to labour by service obligations. 
They are--'volunteers' only from the point of view of the 
landlord who calls on them when he needs them. OF course 
they do not labour by choice as they have to labour in order 
to live. Another example is the term aFuerino [outsider] 
which conflates two entirely different classes [smallholders 
and itinerant wage-labourers) into one category. OF course 
from the perspctive of the hacienda and the landlord, members 
of these groups are ? outsiders' only. 
94. On labour rent see Marx [1865a/1974: Part 6' ch. 47]. On 
the confusion surrounding wages as a supposed payment for all 
labour under capitalism see Marx [1865a/1974: 30Ff);, (1866b/1973: 
210ff); [1867/1974: Part 6). 
Incidentally, the fact that labour-tenants are seen as 
'workers' who are paid in kind with 'perquisites', explains 
why inquilinos and empleados (who include managers) are both 
situated in the same category by the official statistics. 
See Notes f88) and [63) above. In this context see also 
Marx's comments on the confusion between the labour of 
exploiting and the labour, of producing which both appear as 
'labour' under capitalism. For example, Marx C1863c/1972: 495) 
and [1865a/1974: 382-4). 
95. Nevertheless the adherence to such an-erroneous position 
accounts in large measure for Kay's concentration on the 
description of the proletarianisation of the inquilinos after 
1930 rather than their differentiation. As the inquilino is 
considered theoretically a. priori as a 'worker' paid in. kind, 
it is only a matter. of time until he is paid in cash. Theory 
does not provide for a transition from 'worker' to capitalist. 
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96. I am aware that the availability of allotments in 
industrial societies [they are particularly common in Japan] 
may pose problems for analysis, but it must be kept in mind 
that as the socially necessary means of'existence are so much 
greater in the West, allotment production can only produce a 
small part of the conditions of life. In the poor countries, 
access to land enables the peasantry to obtain the majority 
of such necessities. 
97. As Kay [1977a: 112] shows, this was indeed the case. 
Incidentally, it should be borne in mind that an analysis of 
the class situation of peasants such as inquilinos and 
minifundistas is complicated by the fact that different family 
members may labour at different activities of a more or less 
wage nature. Thus in sociological terms different members of 
a family could have different class statuses. Nevertheless, 
for a general classification in terms of a poor, middle or 
rich peasantry, this feature should be less of a problem, as 
it'is the structural position of the family as a whole, rather 
than that of its individual members, which is of importance. 
It goes without saying that the social position of women and 
of the family cannot be deduced from that of husbands. For 
a sophisticated attempt to situate peasants in such groups while 
being aware of such considerations, see the experience of the 
Communist Party of China in, e. g., CC of the CPC. [1933/1969). 
98. Referring to family smallholders, Klein remarks "these 
peasants obviously had no role to play in unions which were 
the basic form of peasant organisation in Chile" [Klein, op. cit.: 
82, emphasis added). 
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99. On this point see inter alia Frank 01969] and [1971]; 
Laclau C19711. 
100. One exception seems to have been Emilio Zapata's 
Liga Nacional de DeFensa de los Campesinos Pobres [National 
League for the Defence of the Poor Peasants] which organised 
smallholders and labour tenants between 1935 and 1940 on the 
basis of leagues independently of the large estates. The 
organisation was eventually undermined by the communists. 
See Loveman (1976: 151-63]. 
101. Most authors seem to think that these are the only two 
alternatives. See Angell [op. cit.: 247); Lehmann Cop. cit.: 299). 
102. Kay [1971: 127] estimates that the inquilinos constituted 
6% of the active rural labour force. 
103. Lehmann Cop. cit.: 300], writing about the 1960's, remarks 
that: 
"Nomadic and temporary labourers are in the weakest 
bargaining position, and are very much outsiders in the 
farms; they have neither joined unions in any significant 
numbers, nor have they been actively sought out by the 
union leadership. " 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 
1. The list here is endless, but among the better evaluations 
of the various reforms see Kaufman C1972); Kay C1975,1977aß 
1977b); Lehmann 01971,1974c); Barraclough and Fernandez C1974). 
Kaufman [1972) is particularly good on the Frei reform, for, 
despite his adherence to an american 'political science' position, 
he is one of the few authors to treat seriously both the 
question of the antagonism between town and country and the 
relative power of the inquilinos in relation to other peasant 
classes. 
2. See Delgado [1968); Frank [1963]; Thiesenhusen C1966b, 
19711, for example. These authors all dismiss the Alessandri 
reform on the grounds that it was merely 'conservative' and 
wanted to 'maintain the status quo', which tells us nothing 
whatsoever regarding the nature of the reform itself. 
3. It is the subject of debate whether this sector could in 
fact be considered as a homogeneous class. Smirnow [1979: ch. 2] 
argues for instance that this was not so and that the failure 
of the Popular Unity government to understand this fact 
created major problems for its policies. It is not my intention 
to discuss the social-composition of this group for this would 
take me far beyond the problem at issue. 
4. The peasants were enfranchised in the 19501s. See 
Loveman [op. cit.: 219). 
5. The leading proponent of the programme and the major 
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advocate of 'communitarian socialism' as an 'alternative' to 
both capitalism and marxism was Chonchol, whose work has been 
assessed briefly in Chapter 2. See Winn and Kay C1974: 1361. 
6. The 'basic irrigated hectare' CBIH] was a means of 
converting land of differential quality into a standard size 
conforming to irrigated land of the best quality. 
7. The size of 80 BIH was exceedingly generous. In certain 
areas of poorer land it could be equivalent to 600 he. See 
Lehmann [1974c: 103) for example. 
8. For a detailed analysis of a particular case study of this 
phenomenon, see Petras and Zemelman [1972]. r" 
9. Kaufman [op. cit.: 125-6) shows that in some cases the 
unions themselves attempted to prevent the hiring of new 
workers on the estates and notes that "although 
in some 
situations the unions may have acted as aggregators, in others 
the beneficiaries of their activity, like the beneficiaries 
of the land reform - itself l were the inquilinos". 
10. Some distribution 'co-operatives' were established and 
also some organisations which channelled State-funds to 
smallholders, but these acted primarily as means of enforcing 
State patronage and control. See Loveman Cop. cit.: 275-6). 
If. This legal prescription had important effects on levels 
of union membership in industry also, for the structure of 
Chilean industry was such that enterprises which employed 
fewer than twenty-workers represented 70% of approximately 
30,000 manufacturing establishments, while enterprises 
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employing more than 100 workers comprised only 6% of the total 
production units CFaundez, op. cit.: 73]. Angell Cop. cit.: 50) 
notes that about 70% of the industrial workforce was either 
not unionised or else belonged to small, 'unions which were 
isolated from the mainstream labour movement because of the 
structure of Chilean industry and the provisions of the Labour 
Code. 
12. In 1966 Chilean national capital was dominant in most 
manufacturing industries and 'control' was highly concentrated. 
The three largest corporations owned solely by Chilean private 
capital controlled over half the total net capital assets in 
44% of the manufacturing industries, and over a quarter of the 
assets in another 39% of the same industries. The largest 
industrial corporations, along with their counterparts in 
commerce, dominated Chilean national industrial capital. ' The 
largest 100 corporations owned by private Chilean capital 
controlled 59% of the aggregate net capital assets of all 
Chilean privately owned corporations. The top ten controlled 
25% of the assets and the top 50 controlled 48% [Zeitlin and 
Ratcliff, 1976: 315-22]. These large concerns - the so-called 
'commanding heights' of the economy - only employed a minority 
of the proletariat. When the Popular Unity concentrated its 
nationalisation programme on this sector, 'the process only 
affected 20% of the industrial proletariat or only 5%'of the 
total workforce [Faundez, op. cit.: 73). 
13. Lehmann 019711 rightly argues that by 1970 the industrial 
capitalists were as much opposed-to the agrarian reform as 
were the landowners because, of the threat to private property 
that the reform represented, but he fails to explain this fact 
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in more than accidental terms. Such an explanation requires 
a knowledge of theory. It is only if the nature of essential 
relations is uncovered that it becomes clear that the 
structural antagonism between capital and landed property no 
longer existed by 1970 in Chile. 
13. Popular Unity was a coalition dominated by the Communist 
and Socialist Parties. It also comprised MAPU, the Radical 
Party, two small social democratic parties and, later, the 
Christian Left party. 
14. For reviews of some of the more recent literature see 
Kay C1976c]; Steenland C19791; Collier [1980]. 
15. There have also been assessments, of course, on the role 
of imperialism in the fall of Popular Unity. In this context 
see Petras and Morley [1974); Gittings, ad [1975). 
16. This does not mean that the question of the worker/ peasant 
alliance was not discussed at all, but rather that when it 
was, this was done in a theoretical and simplistic manner. 
It is interesting to note that in the volume edited by Zammit 
[1973], which is an account of the proceedings of an international 
seminar of Chilean leaders and 'radical' European social 
scientists on the 'Chilean road to socialism', less than a 
page 01381 is devoted to the question of the worker/peasant 
alliance out of a total of around 450 pages. Even though 
this is not an explicitly political text, it is useful for it 
gives a good indication of the terrain in which most of the 
debates operated at the time. 
17. This point is also-stressed by Garces, Allendale closest 
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adviser: 
"Anyone who faces the Chile of today with realism 
must have the courage to recognize that there is no 
social or class antagonism between the government of 
Allende and the coercive forces of the state. This 
affirmation may appear rash in this dawn of the revolut- 
ionary process. There is no antagonism for a fundamental 
reason: President Allende's government is committed to 
the fulfillment of the programme of the Unidad Popular. 
And this Programme, in an explicit and coherent way, 
proposes to end the economic power of the high 
bourgeoisie and of the latifundistas - of the economically 
dominant class. But it respects the middle sectors. 
It desires neither conflicts nor confrontations with 
them. Every economic and legislative policy of the 
government has sought to give them security, and to 
prevent them being drawn into violent opposition in 
the service of the dominant class. " 
CGarces, 1972: 311 
Garces' own account of the reasons for the failure of the 
UP are to be found in Garcas C19763. Interestingly, because 
the UP tended to see the 'alliance' with the 'middle sectors' 
primarily in electoralist terms$ it saw this alliance simply 
as establishing agreement with the PDC or enacting appropriate 
legal measures. It never seriously considered mobilising the 
'middle sectors'. Eventually they were mobilised by the PDC 
against the Left. 
18. Faundez cites Carlos Altimirano, the General Secretary 
of the Socialist Party, as acknowledging today that in 1970 
"the Chilean Left knew what had to be done, but did not know 
how to do it" Cop. cit.: 1611. 
19. Interestingly, in the literature by both the parties 
and the more academic marxists, one systematically encounters 
more or less disguised complaints regarding the petty-bourgeois 
ideology imparted by the PDC amongst the peasants throughout 
this period. This is often taken to be an explanation for 
the actions of those peasants who were jealously protecting 
their private production against further encroachment by the 
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State and poorer peasants. Much less often does the literature 
bother to enquire seriously into why the POC propaganda 
had such success. The class nature of the differences among 
peasants is systematically ignored by the literature which at 
best only refers, to sectoral, status, or income differences 
within an overall 'peasantry'. 
20. Winn and Kay C1974: 154) rightly note that "the Socialists 
in particular stressed that the agrarian problem was one of 
power, not of production". This remark is well formulated, for 
it shows that although the socialists emphasised 'powert and 
the communists emphasised 'production?, both considered 'power' 
and 'production' as distinct and separate problems. 
21. See in this context the various texts in2Najman, ed, C19741. 
This is a useful work, for it reproduces a number of. important 
political texts of the period. It suffers however from 
restricting these texts to those of the Left of the Chilean 
labour movement, and provides no texts by the PC as its 
intention is to criticise that Party's supposed 'reformism'. 
22. The CERA's, Peasant Committees and Production Centers, 
were forms of agricultural enterprises estab. ished by 
Popular Unity. They are discussed below. 
23. For a case study of such antagonisms see Petras and 
Zemelman C1972). 
i 
24. In some isolated cases where the poor peasants and 
agricultural labourers were better organised and more powerful 
the CERA's did develop into genuinely democratic institutions. 
See Henfrey and Sorj 01977: 107-119]9 for example, which 
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reproduces an account by a MAPU cadre. In general, however, 
the CERA's remained dominated by the rich peasants. 
25. 'Lehmann C1974c: 106] remarks that in one such strike in, 
1971 an, estimated 30,000 people participated and he notes 
that this should be compared to the membership of some 95,000 
people in opposition-controlled organisations. 
26. OF course, differentiation was slowly occurring on the 
reformed units themselves and was only limited by legal State 
-measures, 
ra fact which was bound to antagonise rich peasants 
while not helping poor ones. An example provided by Lehmann 
. provides a useful 
illustration of this process of differentiation 
and accumulation: 
"On one asentamiento in Cautin in 1972 there were 
twenty-five asentados owning a total of seventy-nine 
cows. This did not appear strange, since they were' 
by common agreement, allowed rights to pasture for four 
animals each; however, it emerged that. the president 
of the asentamiento, almost the only member previously 
employed as an inquilino, had twenty animals of which 
most were 'shared' with other members. Under this 
sharing agreement, they hired him their pasture rights 
and in return received half of the increase in the 
value of the animals at sale. " 
(Lehmann, 1974c: 95-69 emphasis added) 
27. Differences between various peasant groups are noted 
and remarked upon, but are not systematically analysed. Such 
differences tend to be visualised as simple antagonisms 
between 'beneficiaries' and'non-beneficiaries', or as 
antagonisms between strata, in the same manner as differences 
between capitalist farmers or landowners are seen. See 
Barraclough [1973: 116] for example. 
28. Of course there were isolated exceptions as some case studies 
show. See Kay (1975: 428-9) for example. 
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29. See Henfrey and Sorj Cop. cit.: 112)6-for example. 
Expropriation, Following the PDC law, only really referred to 
the land, which meant that often expropriated farms were 
handed over completely decapitalised. However, there was a 
procedure whereby the State could 'intervene' a farm, a term 
which referred to a temporary measure prior to legal expropriation. 
In practice, however, estates could remain 'intervened' for 
ever, as the litigation procedures could be extremely lengthy. 
The advantage of this procedure was that the owner was not 
allowed to remove his means of production pending the outcome 
of the settlement. A State official replaced the owner as 
manager, and the peasants were encouraged to form committees 
of management while the official only put in an appearance 
from time to time. This procedure could only be adopted in 
cases of 'lock outs' or strikes and was designed to force the 
labourers back to work CLoveman, 1976: 271). As used by the 
UP this measure backfired on the bourgeoisie whom it was 
meant to protect. 
30. For a useful assessment of the Peasant Councils see 
Castells [1974: 348-56). ' Unfortunately the author, along with 
most writers on Chile, suffers . 
from the error of considering 
the peasantry as a unity and its constuent groups as more 
'fractions' Cop. cit.: 353,354,355). 
31. Chonchol; C1977: 78] inf ers. that the UP was taken by 
surprise by the enormous increase in the. demand for food which 
their income redistribution-policies created. This seems to 
indicate that the . UP was 'quite as 
ignorant of urban life as 




32. This was not always undertaken automatically. In 1973, 
for example, there was a very damaging strike by the 
El Teniente copper miners over wage readjustments. Incidentally 
it should also be noted that the UP's income redistribution 
programme was undertaken in an individualistic and not a 
collective form. 
33. For a detailed discussion of the economic crisis under 
UPS see Roxborough at al. Cop. cit.: ch. 6). Incidentally, it 
is also interesting to note that during 1971-72 imports of 
food were kept low while imports of agricultural means of 
production nearly doubled [Tables 10.129 10.13). By 1973, 
however, the pressure of demand could no longer be contained 
and massive food imports had to be made. 
34. This is not to say that there were no expressions of 
such an alliance in isolated cases as these were often the 
product of local struggles. For examples when the lorry owners 
strikes impaired the distribution of food and machinery in 
1973, peasants and workers co-operated in attempting to over- 
come the problem. The MAPU cadre interviewed by Henfrey and 
Sorj Cop. cit.: 119-120) stresses the Following with reference 
to the areas of Aconcagua and Valparaiso: 
... the provincial council 
improved marketing and 
distribution ... It also organized. their sale from 
local councils to the urban poblacianes [popular 
neighbourhoods]. This more than outweighed the 
asentamientos' previous returns from selling their 
products on the black market. Successes like this 
convinced us still further of the UP's need to rely on 
its base as a source of strength ... With INDAP's trucks 
at their disposal and these marketing links already 
established, the provincial councils maintained food 
supplies to the cities. The trucks hardly stopped 
throughout the strike. Campesino escorts gave them 
protection. At this stage they had the upper hand. 
Though the trucks were sometimes sabotaged or attacked 
on the road, they usually got through. These experiences 
also led the councils to take an increasingly vanguard 
position. They demanded that the UP commandeer the 
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strikers' lorries and establish a state transport 
system. 
The growth of campesino consciousness in this period 
was impressive. They grew sharply aware of the 
question of power. Following the first bosses' strike, 
they regularized their contacts with the urban workers 
and industrial cordons. Many distribution arrangements 
developed in the strike were maintained. The two 
sectors held regular consultations, political as well 
as practical. Campesino participation in the March 1973 
elections was higher than it had ever been, especially 
in Aconcagua. Several left candidates were elected in 
previously Christian Democrat areas. At the same time 
the councils were making increasingly political demands. 
Their. leaders held meetings everywhere, linking 
campesinos' concerns to the more basic political issues, 
especially the question of popular power. " 
35. It is interesting to note that here Kay does not mention 
the inquilinos as belonging to the 'proletarian section' 
of the peasantry, while elsewhere [e. g., his 1977a; 1975: 427] 
he stresses the proletarian nature of the inquilinos. 
36. See Althusser and Balibar 01970: 138-9] for example. 
37. Although I have purposely avoided any discussion of the 
views of the various parties on the nature of the bourgeois 
State, it should be stressed that despite their seemingly 
opposite positions, such 'commandist' notions appeared in the 
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